Distrust, Discourse, and Diplomacy: Pimachiowin Aki and Challenges for the Canadian Delegation in the World Heritage Committee

By: Andrew Vandenbussche

Canada has been consistently overlooked on the global stage and assumed to have nothing but good intentions in its domestic and foreign policy. Simultaneously, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (WHC) has garnered an international reputation as a vital organization dedicated to the important cause of conserving and preserving monuments of global significance. However, the nomination and inscription of Pimachiowin Aki, Canada’s first mixed cultural and natural World Heritage Site, reveals a more complicated reality. This paper evaluates the historical and modern challenges to indigenous and non-indigenous relations in the world heritage sphere, which are built on cultures of distrust and disillusionment. Specifically, it discusses the Canadian government and the WHC’s efforts to collaborate with First Nations groups in the conservation of traditional indigenous lands and how bureaucratic machinery supports narratives of continued colonialism and subservience. The text concludes with a discussion of how structural issues with the nomination process hinder conservation efforts and suggests future avenues for scholarship.

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Introduction

The World Heritage Committee (WHC) gathered for a session in the afternoon of July 1, 2018 in Manama, Bahrain.[1] After nearly two decades of fraught discussions between Indigenous groups, provincial and federal governments, and the international community, the committee was reevaluating the nomination of Pimachiowin Aki, a site deep in the boreal forests of the Canadian prairie province of Manitoba far removed from the country’s urban centers. An animated session showed enthusiasm for the proposal as state parties stoutly voiced their support for the site.[2] Spain thanked the state party of Canada for assembling a thorough and worthy nomination document. Hungary applauded the site for its synergistic vision of people and the land. Tunisia congratulated the Canadian government for its dedication to upholding ethical consultation of local communities. The committee then adopted 42 COM 8B.11, adding Pimachiowin Aki as Canada’s first mixed Cultural and Natural Site to UNESCO’s List of World Heritage Sites.[3] The Canadian delegation was then given the floor. Its diplomats first expressed gratitude for the committee’s support after a tumultuous nomination process. Afterwards, Ed Hudson, a member of the Poplar first nation and a director of the Pimachiowin Aki Corporation, while expressing sincere appreciation for the committee’s approval, also noted the difficult path towards World Heritage designation.[4] With good reason, the inscription of Pimachiowin Aki represented a series of calculated logistical maneuvers to coordinate local communities, political agencies, and diplomatic channels. Distrust between Indigenous peoples and higher government agents further compounded the challenges of the state’s nomination.[5] Still, Hudson encouraged other Indigenous groups to make use of the World Heritage Convention despite difficulties in the nomination process. Following the speeches, the tone was understandably celebratory. Diplomats and representatives from the various composite First Nations shook hands as they acknowledged the end of a long journey. They were quickly interrupted by the session’s chair, however, who asked the participants to have the congratulations outside the salle.

The anticlimactic end to this dubious nomination process is representative of a wider challenge for the Canadian delegation. Government officials struggle to adequately represent Indigenous ownership over heritage within a diplomatic channel like UNESCO, which is built from the “top-down” with political higher ups exercising control over local communities. In this paper, I argue that the Canadian government at the WHC, while showing consideration for First Nations cultural heritage in its modern history, struggles to successfully broker trusting relationships between local and international organizations given historic distrust and structural issues with the nomination process. Moreover, given the bureaucratic machinery of the WHC, Canada struggles to adequately secure free, prior, and informed consent. These shortcomings amount to a failure to address the historic oppression of Canada’s First Nations peoples, maintaining a historic division between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations. This paper also faults the WHC and the site inscription process for forcing Indigenous peoples to justify their claims to their land, further exacerbating colonial narratives of oppression and subservience.

With this paper’s focus on Canada, this scholarship is distinct from previous work on the diplomacy of world heritage conservation. Instead of focusing on the strategies of the United States, European states, and emerging BRICS nations, which tend to exercise much larger influence in committee sessions, this paper focuses on the diplomatic policies of the otherwise under-discussed international actor Canada in one of the most salient avenues for modern conservation diplomacy—UNESCO. With immense praise being directed towards the Canadian state party for its considerable efforts to consult with Indigenous peoples, it is worth considering the extent to which the party is succeeding at ethically interacting with local communities. This paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, I establish a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of Canada’s current diplomatic scheme. Specifically, I rely on the WHC’s operational guidelines and contrast them with the calls to action identified by Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), revealing a lack of accountability mechanisms for the Canadian Commission for UNESCO. In the second section, I provide an overview of Canadian diplomatic strategies, both broadly and in the WHC. Within this, I consider the history of Pimachiowin Aki and contextualize its nomination for World Heritage status as part of wider Canadian foreign policy. Third, I discuss the failures of the nomination process to fairly represent the desires of First Nations groups and how these shortcomings have built upon existing cultures of distrust. I argue that the Canadian political agenda and the structure of the WHC worsen relationships between local communities and government representatives. Finally, I conclude with a discourse on other possible areas for research. Note that I will be referring to the local communities of Pimachiowin Aki as Indigenous or First Nations people, as per most national and international organizations’ naming conventions.[6]

Organizational Guidelines for Indigenous Consultation

Historically, the United Nations and its various branches largely neglected Indigenous rights.[7] However, recent efforts have been made to further include First Nations voices in committee sessions. In 2007, the general assembly passed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, serving as “the most comprehensive international instrument on the rights of Indigenous peoples”.[8] Still, the document contains shockingly little guidance for the management of Indigenous heritage, except for Article 31 which states:

“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.”[9]

 UNESCO proudly declares their support of Indigenous peoples. Following the adoption of UNDRIP, the WHC modified their operational guidelines to facilitate the inclusion of Indigenous peoples. Notably, the guidelines advise that “States Parties are encouraged to ensure that Preliminary Assessment requests involve appropriate stakeholders and rights-holders engagement” and that state parties should seek and demonstrate “the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples”.[10] Free, prior, and informed consent refers to the ethical practices associated with conducting anthropological fieldwork which are necessary to mitigate issues of trust and ensure confidentiality.[11] Consent is particularly important in Indigenous communities, where histories of colonial oppression have left lasting scars of local practices.[12] In the case of Pimachiowin Aki’s inscription, the lines between consent and dissent were more blurred, as will be discussed in the next section.

Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), established in 2008, was formed by the Canadian government as part of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.[13] Designed to lay the foundation for lasting reconciliation across Canada, the TRC hosted several national reconciliation events, collected archival materials related to residential schools from the Church and government bodies and gathered statements from survivors. The commission’s activities culminated in the publishing of a series of calls to action, which prominently called for a review of the federal government’s implementation of UNDRIP.[14] Interestingly, there were few recommendations outlined with explicit reference to the management of Indigenous heritage. Articles 70 and 79 suggested that the Association of Canadian Archivists, the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, and other similar Canadian organizations should aim to fully implement UNDRIP with respect to the preservation of heritage and archives, but there is no clear language instructing Canada’s Commission for UNESCO to adopt more reconciliatory approach to heritage management.[15] While the Canadian government has shown obvious interest in the issue of First Nations representation, this goal sometimes falls secondary to other issues, mostly pertaining to Canada’s economic interests as discussed in the following section.[16]

Canadian Diplomatic Strategy and the Nomination of Pimachiowin Aki

Pimachiowin Aki is Canada’s only mixed cultural and natural UNESCO World Heritage Site.[17] Inscribed to the list in 2018, the site represents the largest protected area in the North American Boreal Forest System, covering an area of approximately 2,904,000 hectares. The site includes the boundaries of Manitoba’s Atikaki Provincial Park, Ontario’s Woodland Caribou Provincial Park, and the Eagle-Snowshoe Conservation Reserve. Travel to the site is difficult given its remote location. Visitors can either drive to the Bloodvein River at the Eastern portion of the site, fly to access more rural communities, or voyage through icy roads in winter.[18] Four Anishinabeg First Nations are located within Pimachiowin Aki, all on the Manitoba side of the provincial boundary: Bloodvein River, Little Grand Rapids, Pauingassi, and Poplar River. These groups have historically managed the land, and this history shows in the 285 archeological sites that scatter the area, including pictographs and evidence of traditional land-use which go back almost nine thousand years.[19]

In 2002, four First Nations groups—the Little Grand Rapids, Pauingassi, Poplar River, and Pikangikum—signed an accord among themselves.[20] Their goal was to protect their ancestral lands through a UNESCO World Heritage designation, thus beginning what became a 16-year campaign for the prestigious status. The Bloodvein River First Nation joined them shortly thereafter, also in opposition to possible commercial development. What began as an aspirant goal quickly transformed into an intense effort to nominate the site.

For many nations, global patrimony and the WHC engine serve as pawns of international power dynamics.[21]UNESCO seeks nominations to incorporate nations within its multilateral system and cement its legitimacy as an organization. Meanwhile, many countries recognize the World Heritage brand as a possible source of tourism revenue.[22] The United States, France, and the United Kingdom use committee sessions to assert power through a morphed version of their colonial imperial power status.[23] The consequential BRICS Coalition (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have also used the WHC as a platform for its efforts to increase its influence within the global community. Efforts amongst large players within the organization to project hegemonic power have curtailed many local and Indigenous communities’ influence.[24]

Contrastingly, Canada has stood out as a unique actor, displaying a willingness to seek out Indigenous voices. This display reflects a diplomatic strategy of “multicultural” cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy, as defined by former ambassador Cynthia P. Schneider, is “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding”.[25] A 2019 Canadian Senate Report indicated that Canada’s efforts within the realm of cultural diplomacy, which include its involvement in UNESCO, are designed to maintain Canada’s brand on the international stage, supporting a vision of Canada as being diverse and inclusive.[26] That being said, Canada’s brand image is one facet of the nation’s foreign policy. The government is also deeply invested in its economic interests, with the country historically and presently supporting the construction of oil pipelines through Indigenous lands, particularly for export to other nations.[27]

The nomination of Pimachiowin Aki undeniably fit within Canada’s international brand and allowed the country to present itself to the international community as a nation of model world citizens.[28] With the Canadian government supporting an Indigenous-led grassroots effort to nominate the site, the government could cultivate its image as an ethical, considerate nation to the global community. Moreover, Pimachiowin Aki offered little economic viability; the area has few resources that make it suited for forestry, mining, or fossil fuel extraction.[29] The government therefore could nominate the site without worrying about forgoing any possible business opportunities. In 2004, the Canadian Government added Pimachiowin to the tentative list of World Heritage Sites, being just one of ten potential candidates from a selection of 125.[30] The federal government’s choice was not without controversy. The Manitoba government under the New Democratic Party showed frustration that another nomination for an urban landscape proposal was not accepted.[31] Likewise, Hydro Manitoba, the province’s publicly owned hydroelectric power company, had development plans for parts of the nominated territory to build Bipole III, a transmission line.[32] The NDP government eventually grew warmer to the proposal, recognizing the potential public relations benefits of supporting Indigenous communities. Partnerships with the governments of Manitoba and Ontario led to the creation of the Pimachiowin Aki Corporation in 2006.[33] The institution was established to protect and present Pimachiowin Aki’s “Outstanding Universal Value” if it were designated World Heritage status. However, the group’s formation and the NDP’s support fueled political opposition from the Progressive Conservative (PC) party of Manitoba. The PCs opposed the nomination efforts as part of their 2007 general election platform.[34] First Nations groups expressed sadness with the opposition to the communities’ efforts to claim ownership of their land through the World Heritage Convention.

Over the subsequent five years (2007–2012), management plans were submitted by communities and parks organizations for a nomination document. In 2007 and 2008, Woodland Caribou Provincial Park and Atikaki Provincial Park Management Plan each submitted their management plan proposals respectively.[35] In 2011, each of the five participating First Nations groups completed land management plans for their ancestral lands. Indigenous peoples reported difficulty completing the necessary paperwork given the technical language of UNESCO. For instance, elders in the Poplar River First Nation had difficulty understanding the concept of “Outstanding Universal Value” which did not translate well to their native language.[36] Similarly, Indigenous groups expressed doubt over park management organizations’ proposals. Historically, Canada’s provincial and federal park management organizations like Ontario Parks have lacked clear and concise definitions over collaborative management strategies which have led First Nations groups to be suspicious of their operations.[37] This helped fuel a culture of distrust throughout the nomination process which hindered both Indigenous and government efforts to advance the site.

Following the completion of the management plans, the Government of Canada submitted the World Heritage site nomination bid to UNESCO in 2012. In 2013, a team of International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) evaluators completed a three-day visit of the site.[38]According to Sophia Rabliauskas, a member of the Poplar River First Nation, the evaluators treated the community with respect, kindness, and honesty. Still, tensions emerged between the evaluators and the local community. As Rabliauskas explained, “… one of the evaluators expressed surprise and asked us, where is the evidence of your existence on this land. All he could see was pristine wilderness and no developments. He didn’t understand how the concept that thousands of people have lived and travelled on this land for thousands of years only leaving minimal traces was a positive thing. We couldn’t comprehend his question.”[39] Following the evaluation, ICOMOS released an insulting report, suggesting the nomination be deferred. It elaborated that First Nations groups “did not wish to see their property as ‘exceptional’” since they did not compare their relationship with their land to those of other Indigenous groups.[40] The report also stated that the community needed greater protections to avoid development efforts, which perplexed locals who understood the World Heritage designation as a way to circumvent development efforts from organizations like Hydro Manitoba.[41]

During the 2013 WHC session, UNESCO acknowledged flaws in their nomination process and promised to rethink its method of evaluating proposals for Indigenous mixed nominations.[42] However, they also asked for more information from the State Party, much to the chagrin of all stakeholders. The federal and provincial governments expressed disappointment.[43] Meanwhile, the leader of the Manitoba PCs pessimistically believed that the province would never see a return on the millions of dollars being spent on the bid. This rhetoric furthered distrust between local communities and the government.[44] First Nations groups viewed the rejection as a major loss; they understood the deferral as a refusal, and many wanted to give up on the nomination.[45]

Government officials encouraged the local communities to submit an updated nomination document. In 2014, a new report was submitted which placed greater emphasis on the people’s relationship with the land.[46] It placed the Anishinaabe cultural tradition of ji-ganawendamang Kitakiiminan (“Keeping the Land”) as central to the nomination.[47]ICOMOS and IUCN reevaluated the site in 2016. The visit went much more smoothly, with community members feeling much more at ease with the evaluators, according to representatives from the Poplar community. However, several months after the visit, the Pikangikum First Nation, the only Ontario-based community, abandoned the nomination over concerns with errors in the UNESCO evaluation report.[48] This dealt another blow to the nomination, with the NDP premier of Manitoba being non-committal on continuing to support the nomination, further exacerbating tensions. He even went as far as to entertain the development of the Bipole III transmission line, reversing his previous stance of protecting the site.[49]

For the following two years, remaining groups anxiously continued work on the nomination dossier, with the federal government encouraging all parties to remain on board. With the Pikangikum First Nation exiting, the nomination document was revised once more, decreasing the size of the proposed site.[50] Finally, in 2018, the site was inscribed on the list of World Heritage Sites, following changes to UNESCO’s nomination process. After millions of dollars spent, disagreements over management approaches, and inconsiderate bureaucrats discouraging local community participation, Indigenous peoples finally had realized the goal of their 2002 accord: World Heritage status.

Discussion

The nomination and inscription of Pimachiowin Aki highlight the scores of logistical challenges associated with ethical consultation of local communities in preparation of World Heritage bids. The nomination process required local, regional, national, and international stakeholders to work hand in hand in spite of sour relations. First Nations peoples are rightfully skeptical when working with government agents. Canada’s history of cultural genocide has contributed to significant modern inequities with access to quality health care and education lagging in Indigenous communities.[51]The legacy of Canada’s residential school system remains present, with the discovery of children’s remains on school premises making media headlines internationally in 2021.[52] Despite efforts on the part of the Canadian state party, local groups in Pimachiowin Aki were understandably wary of the government’s involvement in the nomination. Moreover, the politicization of Indigenous heritage management by non-Indigenous actors like the Progressive Conservative party in Manitoba contributed to increased frustration amongst Indigenous groups.[53] A history and modern culture of distrust can partially explain the Pikangikum First Nation group’s decision to pull out. Free, prior, and informed consent is arduous given the sheer degree of dubiety that governments must overcome in order to achieve some degree of confidence from Indigenous peoples.

The structure of the inscription process for World Heritage Sites also inherently violates the premise of free, informed, and prior consent. While Article 31 of UNDRIP states that Indigenous people have the right to manage their cultural heritage, the WHC lacks any real mechanism for Indigenous people to nominate a site without the support of their government, given that local communities must explain to evaluators and state parties the significance of their heritage. This is exacerbated by the organization’s formulaic approach to evaluating heritage sites that leaves local communities like those of Pimachiowin Aki in the unpleasant situation of having to justify their ties to their own land.[54] The WHC’s failure to provide avenues for “bottom-up” participation in sessions (beyond observer status where Indigenous people can occasionally speak on issues pertaining to their land) also worsens colonial narratives by making Indigenous communities justify their culture’s “Outstanding Universal Value” to foreign nations. Thus, free, prior, and informed consent is aspirational at best in an organization which ultimately gives voting power only to nations. Chrissy Grant, chair of the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on World Heritage, has expressed concern over the lack of adherence to the principle of free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples and local communities.[55] As she states, “[the lack of free, prior and informed consent] sends a clear message that their concerns are not required or important.” 

The Canadian government, compared to other state parties in the WHC such as the United States, has acted with far greater concern for First Nations rights. Simultaneously, efforts to consider First Nations culture are often guided by a diplomatic strategy of presenting the nation as diverse and not necessarily out of a genuine interest in reconciliation. While Hydro Manitoba considered constructing a transmission line across the property, Pimachiowin Aki otherwise had little economic viability and therefore served as a relatively non-controversial candidate for nomination.[56] The government has also overlooked calls to nominate sites of First Nations oppression like residential schools, instead favouring sites which present a cheerier image of Canadian cosmopolitanism.[57] While development efforts are an undeniable national priority, attempts to prioritize economic prospects over Indigenous claims to their land reveals a complicated present of continued colonialism. Interestingly, the Canadian Commission for UNESCO does not include any mention of UNDRIP in any of its annual reports, indicating a possible lack of prioritization given to Indigenous representation.[58]

Though efforts to nominate Pimachiowin Aki to the UNESCO World Heritage list led to successful inscription, these efforts occurred in a context of Indigenous distrust of national and international government agents. The outcome was undeniably positive, as Pimachiowin Aki’s First Nations people were able to successfully inscribe their site as they had sought in their 2002 agreement. However, the nomination revealed significant shortcomings of UNDRIP and the failures of the Canadian government to follow through on the calls to action laid out by the TRC. The site’s inscription should therefore not be viewed as a success story of the Canadian government and international community rallying behind the common goal of reconciliation. Rather, it should be viewed as what it was: a tenuous endeavor to coordinate unfriendly stakeholders around the common goal of inscription, despite their differences. This case study does not serve as an example of successful free, prior, and informed consent. Instead, it illustrates how colonial narratives can persist through the continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples to the demands of the national and international communities. While diplomatic agents and channels might view themselves as vessels for reconciliation and peace, their behavior can often contradict these same values.

Conclusion and Further Research

As Vera Mitchell, the former Chief of the Poplar River First Nations group said, “Today we see ourselves as rightful caretakers of our traditional land in Poplar River. We want to run our own lives, our own affairs, and to continue our traditional heritage of living off the land. We have come to a new era where we see ourselves as a people continuing to be stewards of the land, to have a say as to what goes on in that land, our territory.”[59] However, the nomination of Pimachiowin Aki suggests an alternate understanding of ownership over Indigenous heritage: one in which more stakeholders have the ability to determine how traditional ancestral lands are administered, through systems like the WHC which conscribe local communities to lengthy bureaucratic processes when they are already wary of collaborating with government agents. Further research is needed in order for the Canadian government to improve upon its efforts to consult with Indigenous peoples. I outline two suggestions below.

First, scholarship should further scrutinize Canada’s selection of sites for its tentative list. Canada deliberately chose Pimachiowin Aki because it was uncontroversial and could help the government further cultivate its image as a culturally considerate country. Still, the site has very little name recognition across Canada, with the Facebook and Instagram pages maintaining a puny following.[60] The site, given its lack of national recognition, is in many respects a poor reflection of national culture. In light of the discovery of mass graves in residential schools this past year, some scholars have suggested that greater emphasis be placed on nominating sites of oppression.[61] Therefore, the list of tentative sites can be more carefully examined in order to further understand the Canadian government’s strategy of nominating which can represent the nation well on the global stage. From this, we can better understand the lens through which Canadian cultural heritage is examined internationally.

Second, it is unclear whether any of the nomination efforts were worthwhile. Little scholarship has studied the effectiveness of utilizing Pimachiowin Aki’s World Heritage status to protect the land. Given the First Nations groups insistence on leveraging the WHC to protect the local communities’ interests, the broader community impacts of the site’s inscription should be further considered. For instance, few scholars have documented how First Nations members took on new roles as managers of a World Heritage site (i.e. providing tourism services, inspiring newfound relationships with their ancestral lands, etc.). Therefore, scholars should continue to monitor the site to establish whether it is in other First Nations groups’ interest to similarly seek out World Heritage status.

Canada is still a long way from reconciliation as identified by the TRC. While efforts on part of the Canadian government in the WHC to fully implement UNDRIP through consultation with Indigenous communities are steps in the right direction, these efforts simultaneously reveal shortcomings of the World Heritage management system and its consistent inability to sufficiently meet First Nations groups’ needs. The nomination of Pimachiowin Aki is emblematic of this failure, demonstrating an organizational structure that is unable to remedy past grievances because of inability to guarantee free, prior, and informed consent. The nomination process itself also brings unwanted pressure to communities who are frustrated by the bureaucracy of UNESCO and the politicization of their heritage by provincial and federal governments. While the communities of Pimachiowin Aki are grateful for their site’s inscription, much work is still needed in order to achieve further adequate representation in international forums. 

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Andrew Vandenbussche is a sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in political science and economics. He is from Montreal, Canada and currently studies in Philadelphia. His research interests include international development, human rights, and international organizations. He can be reached at avandenb@sas.upenn.edu.

Endnotes

[1] UNESCO World Heritage Centre. 2018. “42nd Session of the World Heritage Committee, July 1, 2018.”

[2] Cody Groat. 2019. “Pimachiowin Aki | The Canadian Encyclopedia.”

[3] UNESCO, “42nd Session of the World Heritage Committee”

[4] UNESCO, “42nd Session of the World Heritage Committee”

[5] Lemelin, Raynald Harvey, and Nathan Bennett. 2010. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project: Management and Protection of Indigenous World Heritage Sites in a Canadian Context.”

[6] Lemelin, Raynald Harvey, and Nathan Bennett. 2010. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project: Management and Protection of Indigenous World Heritage Sites in a Canadian Context.”

[7] Jeff Corntassel. 2008. “Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse.”

[8] United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs. 2021. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples | United Nations For Indigenous Peoples.”

[9] United Nations. 2008. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.

[10] UNESCO World Heritage Centre. 2021. “The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention.”

[11] Jennifer Shannon. 2007. “Informed Consent: Documenting the Intersection of Bureaucratic Regulation and Ethnographic Practice.” 

[12] American Anthropological Association. 2012. “Obtain Informed Consent and Necessary Permissions.” 

[13] Ry Moran. 2020. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission | The Canadian Encyclopedia.”

[14] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. 2015. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Action.”

[15] TRC. “Calls to Action.”

[16] Walker, Ryan, Jojola, Ted, and Natcher, David. 2013. Reclaiming Indigenous Planning : Reclaiming Indigenous Planning. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

[17] Cody Groat. “Pimachiowin Aki.”

[18] Agnieszka Pawlowska-Mainville and Peter Kulchyski. 2015. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers: Hunters, Land Use, and the Poplar River First Nation Proposal for a World Heritage Site.”

[19] Cody Groat. “Pimachiowin Aki.”

[20] Pimachiowin Aki Corporation. 2021. “Timeline - Pimachiowin Aki.” 2021. 

[21] Meskell, L., C. Liuzza, E. Bertacchini, and D. Saccone. 2015. “Multilateralism and UNESCO World Heritage: Decision-Making, States Parties and Political Processes.”

[22] Cassel, Susanna Heldt, and Albina Pashkevich. 2014. “World Heritage and Tourism Innovation: Institutional Frameworks and Local Adaptation.”

[23] Bertacchini, Enrico, Claudia Liuzza, and Lynn Meskell. 2017. “Shifting the Balance of Power in the UNESCO World Heritage Committee: An Empirical Assessment.”

[24] Logan, William. 2013. “Australia, Indigenous Peoples and World Heritage from Kakadu to Cape York: State Party Behaviour under the World Heritage Convention.”

[25] Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 2019. “Cultural Diplomacy at the Front Stage of Canada’s Foreign Policy.”

[26] Senate. “Cultural Diplomacy at the Front Stage of Canada’s Foreign Policy.”

[27] Cecco, Leyland. 2019. “Pipeline Battle Puts Focus on Canada’s Disputed Right to Use Indigenous Land.” 

[28] Senate. “Cultural Diplomacy at the Front Stage of Canada’s Foreign Policy.”

[29] Lemelin and Bennett. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project”

[30] Cody Groat. “Pimachiowin Aki.”

[31] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[32] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[33] Pimachiowin Aki Corporation. “Timeline.”

[34] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[35] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[36] Sophia Rabliauskas. 2020. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki World Mixed Cultural and Natural Heritage, Canada.”.

[37] Lemelin and Bennett. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project”

[38] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[39] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[40] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[41] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[42] Pimachiowin Aki Corporation. “Timeline.”

[43] "Government of Canada Reacts to UNESCO Decision on Pimachiowin Aki." CNW Group, June 22, 2013. 

[44] Winnipeg Free Press. 2013. “Province Not Deterred by UNESCO Bid Rejection.” The Brandon Sun.

[45] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[46] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[47] State Party of Canada. 2018. “Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Project: The Land That Gives Life.”

[48] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[49] C.B.C. News. 2016. “UNESCO Bid for Manitoba-Ontario Boreal Forest Suffers Major Blow | CBC News.”

[50] Pimachiowin Aki Corporation. “Timeline.”

[51] Ray Markham, Megan Hunt, Robert Woollard, Nelly Oelke, David Snadden, Roger Strasser, Georgia Betkus, and Scott Graham. 2021. “Addressing Rural and Indigenous Health Inequities in Canada through Socially Accountable Health Partnerships.”

[52] Anne-Marie Reynaud. 2017. Emotions, Remembering and Feeling Better : Dealing with the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement in Canada.

[53] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[54] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[55] IUCN. 2021. “The Outlook for World Heritage at 50 – Crisis or Crossroads?” IUCN. September 10, 2021.

[56] Lemelin and Bennett. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project”

[57]  Groat, Cody. 2018. "Commemoration and Reconciliation: The Mohawk Institute as a World Heritage Site."

[58] Canadian Commission for UNESCO. 2021. “Canadian Commission for UNESCO.” Canadian Commission for UNESCO. Accessed December 9, 2021. https://en.ccunesco.ca/.

[59] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[60] Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site, Facebook. 2021. “@PimAkiWHS.” 2021. https://www.facebook.com/PimAkiWHS/.

[61]  Groat, Cody. 2018. "Commemoration and Reconciliation: The Mohawk Institute as a World Heritage Site."

References

Agnieszka Pawlowska-Mainville and Peter Kulchyski. 2015. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers: Hunters, Land Use, and the Poplar River First Nation Proposal for a World Heritage Site.” International Journal of Canadian Studies 52: 133–49.

American Anthropological Association. 2012. “Obtain Informed Consent and Necessary Permissions.” November 1, 2012. https://ethics.americananthro.org/ethics-statement-3-obtain-informed-consent-and-necessary-permissions/.

Anne-Marie Reynaud. 2017. Emotions, Remembering and Feeling Better : Dealing with the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement in Canada.

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The Relationship Between Islam and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Challenging Generalizations and Islamophobia by Analyzing Trends of Terrorism

By: Cadet William Frangia

Abstract: Current counterterrorism policy focuses on religion as a key indicator of terrorist activity. This article evaluates this precedent by investigating whether Muslim countries in Southeast Asia are more likely to experience successful terrorist attacks compared to non-Muslim countries in the same region. Analyzing data from the Global Terrorism Database, the Quality of Government Dataset, and the ARDA National Profile 2011 Dataset this article compares the number of successful terrorist attacks to the Muslim population percentage in a State. Muslim countries, which this article defines as those where over one-third of the population is Muslim, have experienced significantly fewer terrorist attacks compared to non-Muslim countries in Southeast Asia. These findings contrast with global trends that Muslim countries have significantly higher amounts of successful terrorist attacks. The difference in trends, however, is most likely due to other permissive factors such as internal conflict, rather than religion, as data from the Middle East skew the global trends. Conflict in the Middle East has caused policymakers to incorrectly correlate religion with the likelihood of terrorism. Policy needs to address the permissive factors of terrorism rather than religion, to increase national security and prevent discrimination. 

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Introduction

For the past three decades, conflicts in the Middle East and refugees fleeing the region have influenced policy about Muslims and Muslim countries, particularly in the context of counterterrorism and security. Since the announced defeat of ISIS in 2018, the counterterrorism effort has focused on the return of foreign fighters leaving Syria and Iraq.[1]Recently, there is greater interest in Southeast Asia because of the number of foreign fighters returning to Muslim countries in the region or joining groups such as Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. As nations make domestic and foreign policy decisions concerning Muslim countries, which this article defines as those where over one-third of the population is Muslim, decisions must rest on data, not stereotypes. To support that objective, this paper assesses whether Muslim countries in Southeast Asia are more likely to experience successful terrorist attacks compared to non-Muslim countries in the same region. It draws from three datasets to conduct a basic trend analysis of terrorist activities between 2000 and 2018. In doing so, this paper also strives to highlight how and why Southeast Asia may differ from global trends, specifically those in the Middle East. The author hypothesizes that Muslim countries in Southeast Asia are not more likely to experience successful terrorist attacks compared to non-Muslim countries in the same region.  In the analysis, this paper suggests that religion alone is not a decisive factor in why terrorism occurs, and many countries with terrorism are involved in larger conflicts which lead to more terrorist activity. The following section will lay out the methodology to test this hypothesis and offer analysis and context to situate the findings. Then, this paper will consider the factors that might be influencing those results, and finally, it will conclude with a discussion about how these observations might help government officials create and implement context-relevant, non-biased policies.

Methodology

The data presented in this paper is based on a database compiled using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Quality of Government Dataset (QOG), and the ARDA National Profile 2011 Dataset. The database analyzes successful attacks conducted from 2000 to 2018 compared to the Muslim population within each State as calculated in 2011. 

All the variables in the dataset were coded at the State level. The Muslim population percentage variable (Perc_Muslim) was calculated by the author using total population and Muslim population data for each State from the ARDA dataset. The Number of Successful Terrorist Attacks (total_success) was taken from the GTD, defined as the “total number of successful attacks in a given country-year observation.”[2] Each State was compared using the country variable (cname) from the QOG. Specific relationships included the year (year) between 2000 and 2018 from the QOG, and the region (region) the State was located as taken from the GTD. The author conducted a further analysis by grouping countries as Muslim or non-Muslim using the variable Muslim Country based on the Perc_Muslim. States with a Perc_Muslim greater than 33.33% were categorized as a Muslim country while those under 33.33% were categorized as a non-Muslim country. 

The independent variable for this analysis is the Perc_Muslim and the dependent variable is the total_success. By comparing a State’s Perc_Muslim and total_success this research attempts to answer the question are Muslim countries in Southeast Asia more likely to experience successful terrorist attacks compared to non-Muslim countries. 

Analysis

This section provides an overview of Perc_Muslim and the total_success in the respective State. First, this analysis section specifically examines trends in Southeast Asia. Then the analysis compares these findings with global trends, examining the effect of Perc_Muslim in a State on the total_success during a specific time.

SEA Trends

This paragraph provides an analysis of trends in the Southeast Asia region between 2000 and 2018. Table 1 presents a summary of the data in terms of total_success in each of the countries. 

Table 1: Total Number of Successful Attacks in SEA, 2000 - 2018

As shown in the table above, the Southeast Asia region experienced a total of 9,048 successful attacks between 2000 and 2018. Thailand and the Philippines, both non-Muslim countries, account for 8,153 of the attacks in the region. Myanmar is another non-Muslim country in Southeast Asia experiencing successful terrorist attacks. The table shows that in recent years the total_success in Myanmar is increasing. Indonesia is the only Muslim country in the region to have successful terrorist attacks, with a total of 501. 

Figure 1.1: Total Number of Successful Attacks in SEA, 2000 – 2018

Figure 1.2: Total Number of Successful Attacks in SEA, 2000 – 2018

 In 2001, as shown in Figure 1.2, Indonesia experienced more successful terrorist attacks than any other country in the Southeast Asia region. This is the only time in the 19 years that a Muslim country in Southeast Asia experienced the highest total_success. Malaysia and Brunei, the two other Muslim countries in the region, have yet to record a successful attack, along with Timor-Leste and Singapore as shown in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.3: Number of Successful Attacks in Muslim and non-Muslim Countries in SEA, 2000 – 2018 

Figure 1.3 further demonstrates the difference in total_success between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Non-Muslim countries in Southeast Asia experience 17 times more successful attacks compared to Muslim countries in the region. 

Global Trends

Next, it is useful to examine global trends and see how they compare within the period between 2000 and 2018. Upon evaluating the global trends, they are then compared with the trends discussed in the previous section to see if the Southeast Asia region is experiencing the same correlation as the world in regards to the total_success and the Perc_Muslim. As seen in Figure 2.1 below, as a State’s Perc_Muslim increases the total_success increases as well. While this is not a perfect linear fit, one can see that States with a higher percentage of Muslims are experiencing more terrorist attacks.

Figure 2.1: Total Number of Successful Attacks in the World, 2000 – 2018

However, as Figure 2.2 shows, between 2000 and 2003 there does not appear to be any relation between Perc_Muslim and the total_success. It was not until 2004, as demonstrated in Figure 2.3, that the total_success shifted to countries with a higher Perc_Muslim. 2004 marked the first year a Muslim country experienced more terrorist attacks than a non-Muslim country and the trend has continued since with most of these attacks occurring in countries in the Middle East, like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.

Figure 2.2: Total Number of Successful Attacks in the World, 2000 – 2003

Figure 2.3: Total Number of Successful Attacks in the World, 2004

In the 19 years of 2000 to 2018, Muslim countries have experienced 59,596 successful terrorist attacks, almost two times as many successful attacks as non-Muslim countries, which have experienced a total of 30,862 as shown in Figure 2.4 below. This is significant considering there are three times as many non-Muslim countries compared to Muslim countries in the world today.

Figure 2.4: Number of Successful Attacks in Muslim and non-Muslim Countries in the World, 2000 – 2018

Eight non-Muslim countries have experienced over 900 successful terrorist attacks. Combined they have experienced 23,397 attacks, accounting for 75% of the total attacks in non-Muslim countries. Figure 2.5 below compares the results of the eight countries which include: Israel, India, Russia, the Philippines, Thailand, Nepal, Ukraine, and Colombia.

The trends in the data prove the author’s hypothesis that Muslim countries in Southeast Asia are not more likely to experience successful terrorist attacks compared to non-Muslim countries in the same region. This runs counter to global trends, which suggest that Muslim countries are more likely to experience successful terrorist attacks compared to non-Muslim countries. 

Figure 2.5: Non-Muslim Countries with the Highest Total Number of Successful Attacks in the World, 2000 – 2018

Explanation

The trends in Southeast Asia are opposite of the global trends found in the data. While the global trend shows an obvious positive correlation between Perc_Muslim and the total_success, in the Southeast Asia region non-Muslim countries are experiencing more attacks. This section attempts to explain why these trends differ from each other using historical and theoretical analysis.

Historical Explanation

In the Southeast Asia region, Thailand, and the Philippines account for the majority of successful terrorist attacks. Both Thailand and the Philippines are experiencing insurgencies. Southern Thailand has experienced an ethnic separatist insurgency since 2001. These insurgents use drug trafficking as finance for their efforts and often use terrorism to attack the government.[3] Abu Sayyaf has been waging a separatist insurgency in the Philippines since the early 2000s. Abu Sayyaf is often described as a terrorist group because they rely so heavily on terrorist tactics such as kidnappings and bombings, however, they have also been involved in conventional warfare like the battle of Marawi in 2017.[4] The new uptick in Myanmar is explained by the rise of new terrorist groups in the area.[5] Like Myanmar, Indonesia is not experiencing an insurgency but local terrorist group Jemaah Islamiah explains its large number of attacks. Active in the early 2000s many fighters then left to go join AQ and ISIS operations in the Middle East. Many fighters began returning to Indonesia in 2014 which explains why Indonesia is experiencing more terrorist attacks again as shown in Figure 1.1.[6]Malaysia and Brunei have no known terrorist organizations and are currently not experiencing any insurgencies. Both countries also have strong counterterrorism measures in place helping them to avoid any successful attacks.[7]

After the 9/11 attack, the United States began a massive military campaign in the Middle East. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States has been a massive presence in Middle Eastern politics.[8] United States involvement caused many insurgent movements and uprisings in the Middle East, resulting in increased terrorist activity which explains the change between Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. When the United States left Iraq in 2011, the Arab Spring began, with massive uprisings and civil wars breaking out throughout the Arab nations. This gave rise to terrorist groups such as ISIS and Hezbollah who could now gain more control because of the distress already placed on the governments in the region.[9] The continued turmoil in the Middle East, especially with the Syrian Civil War explains the trend displayed in Figure 2.1 as most of the Middle Eastern countries have high Perc_Muslim. Many of the non-Muslim countries in Figure 2.5 are experiencing insurgencies or the return of ISIS foreign fighters as explained in the previous section. Russia, however, is a great power like the United States and the United Kingdom, which represents the influence of a culture contrary to the traditionalist views of extreme Muslims in the Middle East. This makes Russia a close target that serves as a symbol when attacked, of Islamic ideals pushing against the west, which is the ideology of many extremist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS.[10]

The Southeast Asia region is not experiencing the global trend of increasing total_success when the Perc_Muslim increases because the Muslim countries in the region are not experiencing a larger conflict and have strong counterterrorism policies. When analyzed more closely countries with larger total_success are those experiencing war or an insurgency which involves the use of terrorist attacks as a tactic by many small organizations who are not strong enough to engage in conventional warfare.

Theoretical Explanation

In her article, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Crenshaw describes two sets of factors that set the stage for terrorism, permissive and direct factors. Permissive factors are events that create an opportunity for terrorism to occur. The four permissive factors are modernization, urbanization, social facilitation of violence, and the government’s overall inability to prevent terrorism. Direct factors include concrete grievances, lack of opportunity in political participation, elite dissatisfaction, and other precipitating events such as government force.[11] Most countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia are developing countries experiencing modernization and urbanization.[12] Due to the consistent fighting in the Middle East, the Philippines, and Thailand, violence has become a social norm. Since Malaysia and Brunei do not have the social facilitation of violence and have established strong counterterrorism measures they lack all of the permissive factors described by Crenshaw.[13] This proves that Muslim countries in the Middle East, the Philippines, and Thailand are recording large numbers of terrorist attacks because they have the permissive setting for terrorism to occur. This combined with specific direct factors in each State has made terrorism rampant. These factors better explain the trend of terrorist attacks as opposed to Perc_Muslim.

These permissive factors create a setting conducive to the goals of terrorism. Contrary to popular belief, terrorist attacks are not a form of irrational violence. Instead, terrorists are driven by a variety of goals. Kydd and Walter list five ultimate goals of terrorists in their article “The Strategies of Terrorism,” they include regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance.[14] As explained earlier the Philippines and Thailand are currently going through separatist insurgencies. The desire for territorial change and the creation of their own State drives the terrorists there. Most of the countries in the world with large numbers of successful attacks are experiencing a political struggle often in the form of regime change. If there is no desire for political change then terrorism is highly unlikely as explained in Hoffman’s definition of terrorism.[15] These goals are the central driving factors that cause terrorists to attack, not their religion.

Islam like most religions plays a key role in shaping a follower’s identity and moral code. Often the moral code of religion unintentionally turns terrorists to the extreme and makes them extra dangerous since they can so easily overcome the psychological boundaries of violence. Terrorists with religious values tend to personalize the conflict and use their religious beliefs to justify their actions.[16] Since 2001, a sense of islamophobia has encircled America putting the focus on religious terrorism specifically related to Islamism. There are three main variants of Sunni Islamism: political, missionary, and jihadi. Political Islamism involves the desire to obtain more political power by reforming the government. Missionary Islamism is the effort to convert others to the identity and moral code of the Muslim faith. The final variant Jihadi is the Islamic armed struggle to purify the faith mainly in a war against western culture.[17] Many terrorist groups such as ISIS and Abu Sayyaf use a mixture of these variants to push their message and draw recruits. Religion serves more as a rallying call than a purpose behind the movement, as many terrorists are not even active in their traditional faith.[18] Religion, like ethnicity, provides a strong tie to make a terrorist group larger in both size and influence, however, religion is rarely the reason terrorist groups commit violence. Often some form of a political goal, as mentioned by Kydd and Walter, motivates religious terrorists.[19] However, people tend to group and characterize each other by external rather than internal identifiers. Therefore, to fully understand the trends related to Perc_Muslim, the goals of the groups in their specific States must also be evaluated. 

Limitations

As previously mentioned, this database compares the total_success between 2000 and 2018, with the Perc_Muslim of each State. Like any database, there is possible inaccuracy with the reported number of attacks as well as population sizes. With no universally accepted definition of terrorism, the number of successful attacks could be lower or higher than reported.[20] It is also difficult to get accurate population counts especially in developing countries. 

This dataset also fails to include a variety of extraneous variables that could better explain the noticed trends. Recording the number of conflicts in each country within each year could account for the wars in the Middle East and insurgencies in Southeast Asia.[21] Including permissive and direct factors within each country such as economic standing would allow for situations like the economic discrimination against the Muslim population in the Philippines to explain the data.[22] Also accounting for the number of unsuccessful attacks would allow for a gauge at exactly how many attacks are occurring in each country and the extent to which a country has productive counterterrorism measures. 

Extension

Future research will overcome these limitations by accounting for the listed extraneous variables. Oftentimes terrorism is part of a larger war effort. By comparing the level of violence within countries, the level of terrorism based on the number of successful attacks can be determined. Evaluating the factors within each State that create a setting for terrorism will show how much each factor plays into the number of successful attacks. Perc_Muslim will then be compared with these factors to determine which is a stronger predictor of terrorism. Using these factors to better understand the causes of terrorism will also allow for a better analysis of counterterrorism measures. Evaluating the number of successful attacks with the number of unsuccessful attacks will determine the rate of terrorism in each country. Muslim countries that are experiencing low numbers of successful attacks and high counterterrorism levels will then be analyzed to determine what successful measures they are using to combat terrorism. Understanding the policies of these successful nations like Malaysia and Brunei can serve as a blueprint for future counterterrorism policies throughout the Middle East and other Muslim States.[23] The difference in Southeast Asia and global trends emphasize the difficulty in generalizing terrorism across the globe. Instead of focusing on religious and ethnic factors that are specific to certain regions of the world, counterterrorism policy needs to focus on evaluating permissive factors within States. 

Implications

Islam, the second-largest religion in the world, remains largely misunderstood, particularly in the West.[24] Though a handful of Muslim countries have experienced disproportionately high rates of terrorist attacks it is oversimplistic to infer a correlation between Islam and terrorism. Between 1980 and 2005, non-Muslims carried out 94% of terrorist attacks in the United States and 98% of terrorist attacks in Europe.[25] While religion can serve as a factor in causing someone to become a terrorist, religion, especially Islam, is not an accurate label for a category of terrorism.  

Many governments around the world have incorrectly taken extreme action to counterterrorism through religious measures. In the United States, after 9/11 immigration policies changed dramatically, hurting Muslims hoping to enter the country.[26] France currently is undergoing similar changes. In October 2020, President Marcon announced a law against Islamist separatism. Due to recent violence by Muslim terrorists, the controversial bill proposes numerous initiatives targeted towards the rights of Muslims in France. Many criticize the bill for not specifically addressing the issue of terrorism.[27] These policies and the media portrayal of terrorism have created rampant islamophobia. Islamophobia inherently causes the radicalization of the population. In the United States in 2001 assaults against Muslims increased by almost eight times and the numbers continue to remain high.[28] Muslim terrorist attacks cover most of the news media, to the point that if asked to imagine a terrorist people often picture a Muslim.[29]

Governments should be wary of overgeneralizing causes of terrorism, particularly when religion is involved. This preliminary analysis challenges the notion that religion, specifically Islam, is an appropriate factor for identifying and categorizing terrorism. Muslim countries in Southeast Asia successfully deterred terrorist activity as shown in the data from 2000 to 2018, while non-Muslim countries in the region have experienced many successful attacks. While this does differ from global trends, data from the Middle East where internal conflict has ravaged the region for decades skews the global trends. Consequently, policymakers need to identify the direct factors fueling terrorism in different contexts and seek to address those issues rather than focus on religious affiliation. Failure to do so will negatively affect national security and citizens.

Conclusion

Researching the question, are Muslim countries in Southeast Asia more likely to experience successful terrorist attacks compared to non-Muslim countries, the author hypothesized Muslim countries are not more likely compared to non-Muslim countries. The findings from the analyzed data proved that while the global trends show Muslim countries experience more successful terrorist attacks, Muslim countries in Southeast Asia are not as likely. This is because the Muslim population percentage does not appear to be involved in the setting of where terrorism takes place while countries experiencing permissive factors of terrorism are a better indicator. Future research will compare these factors along with unsuccessful terrorist attacks to determine what factor is a better predictor of a country experiencing terrorism. Doing this will also allow for a better understanding of Muslim countries experiencing success in combatting terrorism, such as Malaysia. Counterterrorism measures and policy will then account for permissive factors of terrorism that will better predict areas of future attacks, enabling the effort to lower the number of successful attacks in the future and avoid social problems such as islamophobia.

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[1] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2018 (Washington D.C., 2018) 

https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2018/.

[2] Global Terrorism Database (October 2019), distributed by the University of Maryland.

[3] “History of Thailand’s Southern Insurgency,” The Thaiger, February 26, 2019, 

https://thethaiger.com/news/south/insurgency/history-of-thailands-southern-insurgency.

[4] “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” Counter Extremism Project, 2020, 

https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/abu-sayyaf-group-asg.

[5] “Myanmar (Burma),” Counter Extremism Project, 2020, 

https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/myanmar.

[6] “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),” Counter Extremism Project, 2020, 

https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jemaah-islamiyah-ji.

[7] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Malaysia (Washington D.C., 

2018) https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/malaysia/.

[8] VOX, “The rise of ISIS, explained in 6 minutes,” YouTube video, 6:18, December 16, 2015, 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzmO6RWy1v8.

[9] Ibid.

[10] “Understanding Islamism,” International Crisis Group, March 2, 2005, 14-17.

[11] Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 381.

[12] “Updated List of Third World Countries 2019/2020,” Public Health of Nigeria, 

https://www.publichealth.com.ng/list-of-third-world-countries/.

[13] Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 381.

[14] Andrew H. Kydd, and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 

(2006): 52.

[15] Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 43.

[16] Juergensmeyer, Is Religion the Problem?, 7-8.

[17] “Understanding Islamism,” International Crisis Group, March 2, 2005, i.

[18] Ibid., 15.

[19] Kydd, and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 52.

[20] Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 13-15.

[21] VOX, “The rise of ISIS, explained in 6 minutes.”

[22] “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” Counter Extremism Project.

[23] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Malaysia.

            [24] BBC, s.v. “Jihad,” last modified August 3, 2009, https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions /islam/beliefs/jihad_1.shtml.

            [25] Omar Alnatour, “Muslims are not Terrorists: A Factual Look at Terrorism and Islam,” The Huffington Post, December 9, 2016, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/muslims-are-not-terrorist_b_8718000.

            [26] Muzaffar Chishti, & Claire Bergeron, “Post-9/11 Policies Dramatically Alter the U.S. Immigration Landscape,” Migration Policy Institute, September 8, 2011. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/post-911-policies-dramatically-alter-us-immigration-landscape/.

            [27] Peter Yeung, “‘French Muslims will suffer’ under separatism rules, critics say,” Al Jazeera, February 11, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/11/french-muslims-will-suffer-under-separatism-bill-critics-say.

              [28] Kishi Katayoun, “Assaults against Muslims in U.S. surpass 2001 level,” Pew Research Center, November 15, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level/.   

            [29] Caroline Mala Corbin, “Terrorists Are Always Muslim but Never White: At the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda,” Fordham Law Review 86, no. 2 (2017): 455-460.

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Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

“Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).” Counter Extremism Project. 2020. https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/jemaah-islamiyah-ji

Juergensmeyer, Mark. Is Religion the Problem? UC Santa Barbara: Global and International      Studies, 2004.

Katayoun, Kishi. “Assaults against Muslims in U.S. surpass 2001 level.” Pew Research Center.   November 15, 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-           muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level/.

Kydd, Andrew H., & Barbara F. Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism." International Security     31, no. 1 (2006): 49-80.

“Myanmar (Burma).” Counter Extremism Project. 2020.     https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/myanmar

Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon & Soa    Axelsson. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version January 2020.          University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.            http://www.qog.pol.gu.sedoi:10.18157/qogstdjan20

“Understanding Islamism.” International Crisis Group. March 2, 2005.

“Updated List of Third World Countries 2019/2020.” Public Health of Nigeria.     https://www.publichealth.com.ng/list-of-third-world-countries/

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2018. Washington D.C.,          2018. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2018/

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Malaysia. Washington  D.C., 2018. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/malaysia/

VOX. “The rise of ISIS, explained in 6 minutes.” YouTube video, 6:18. December 16, 2015.        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzmO6RWy1v8

Yeung, Peter. “‘French Muslims will suffer’ under separatism rules, critics say.” Al Jazeera.        February 11, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/11/french-muslims-will-   suffer-under-separatism-bill-critics-say.

Impediments to Ukraine’s Accession to NATO

By: Anastasiya Miazhevich

In view of Russian military buildup near the Ukrainian border in the spring of 2021, the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, appealed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for membership saying it is “the only way to end the war in Donbas” [1]. The breakaway region of Donbas controlled by pro-Russian separatists has been in a state of civil war with the rest of Ukraine since 2014. The conflict was provoked by the increasing anti-Russian sentiments in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia. Historically, the Donbas region located in southeastern Ukraine has had the highest concentration of ethnic Russians and the largest number of Russian speakers in Ukraine outside of the Crimean peninsula [2]. The separatists did not support the installation of the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and self-proclaimed independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk that together comprise the Donbas region. The Russian government has provided the breakaway republics with financial and military support [3]. Since 2014 the confrontation between the Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces has occasionally flared. Despite the ceasefire agreement signed last summer, the clashes in Donbas renewed in recent months [4].

The escalation of the unresolved conflict in Donbas was accompanied by the surge of Russian military activity along the southeastern border of Ukraine. The Kremlin’s motives behind the show of force remain unclear but the sudden military buildup prompted the Ukrainian government to sound the alarm and seek support from the Western partners. Without a formal membership in NATO, Ukraine cannot count on Western military assistance in case of a Russian attack. President Zelensky’s attempt to push for Ukraine’s admission into the Alliance was a rational request that ensued from a perceived threat to the country’s national security. Despite the United States and the EU’s outspoken support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Western allies have reservations about immediately bringing Ukraine into NATO. The reasons for Western hesitance include Ukraine’s formal ineligibility for NATO membership as well as inevitable deterioration of the West-Russia relations in the event of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

Ukraine’s Ineligibility for NATO Membership

NATO views security as a broad concept that is not limited to military cooperation but also entails all-member commitment to the principles of democracy and free-market economy, and offers an open-door policy to countries that aspire to join the organization and contribute to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture [5]. With the provisions of article 10 of the founding Washington treaty, European states that meet the normative prerequisites may join NATO with the unanimous agreement of the existing members of the Alliance [6].

Since 1949, the founding year of the Alliance, 18 new member states have joined NATO. Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Alliance adopted a strategy of eastward enlargement that would bring NATO membership to the former countries of the Warsaw Pact. To facilitate onboarding of aspiring members, NATO introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) that provides “advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance” [7]. Adoption of an individual MAP is a key step towards NATO membership and requires an aspiring country to regularly report on the annual national programs targeted at implementation of political, economic, defense, resource, security, and legal reforms [8]. After the 2014 Ukrainian political crisis, Ukraine has deepened its relationship with NATO and initiated comprehensive reforms in the security and defense sector hoping to bring the country closer to receiving a MAP offer [9]. Due to the increasing tensions in the Ukraine-Russia relations, president Zelensky called for acceleration of the accession process by stressing that “Ukraine's MAP will be a real signal for Russia” [10].

Although NATO shares Ukraine’s security concerns and has continuously supported the country in its aspiration to join the Alliance, Ukraine is unlikely to be accepted into NATO until it meets the organization’s accession standards. Most notably, the Alliance cannot move forward with a state that has unresolved territorial disputes. To be considered for membership, NATO requires that a country must settle an existing dispute “by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles” [11]. Thus, the very idea of accepting a country that solicits membership in NATO to resolve an ongoing military conflict is contradictory to the organization’s underlying recommendations. Until Ukraine finds a peaceful resolution to the war in Donbas, the county’s chances to join NATO will remain slim. Moreover, Ukraine’s corruption levels remain prohibitive and stay far from reaching NATO’s normative standards [12]. Extensive economic and political reforms must be put in place to ensure transparency and proper functioning of Ukrainian democratic institutions. Although Ukraine has started modernization of its defense sector, peaceful resolution of the war in Donbas and deep economic and political reforms are required for Ukraine’s further rapprochement with NATO in the framework of a MAP.

NATO Enlargement and Growing Animosity in the West-Russia Relations

NATO’s reservations about bringing Ukraine onboard are also influenced by fear of escalating the relations between the West and Russia that are already far from perfect. The Kremlin’s hostility towards NATO is the result of the Alliance’s expansion into the states that Russia has perceived to be located in its sphere of influence. Russia’s distrust of NATO stems from the broken promises of non-expansion of the Alliance to the east after German reunification. Shortly before the dissolution of the USSR, Western leaders recognized the Soviet security concerns associated with NATO enlargement and assured Moscow that “there will be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction of military presence one inch to the east” [13]. Nevertheless, once the Soviet Union ceased to exist, NATO membership was extended to the former members of the Warsaw Pact who used to be strategically allied with the USSR. Russia continues to perceive NATO eastward enlargement as a pressing threat to its national security and claims that NATO’s expansionist policy is responsible for instability in Europe and the Ukraine crisis in particular. [14].

In objection to Russia’s concerns about the enlargement policy, NATO asserts that bringing new members to the organization aims to reinforce security and stability in Europe and poses no threat to Russian interests [15]. However, the underlying problem with the collective defense alliances is that their sole existence relies on the presence of an external threat [16]. NATO has repeatedly framed the prospect of Russian aggression as a reason for new states to join the Alliance. From this perspective, the anticipation of the Russian threat may have become NATO’s self-fulfilling prophecy and sowed a conflict in place of an inclusive peace.

As to Russia’s accusations of broken promises to not expand to the east, NATO argues that such a pledge was never codified in a treaty. Denying membership to aspiring countries would be considered a violation of a country’s right to choose its own alliances protected by 1975 Helsinki Charter [17]. Moreover, Russia’s discontent with NATO enlargement is based on the idea of entitlement to a sphere of influence. The West may deny its geopolitical aspirations by discarding the very concept of having a sphere of influence as outdated and incompatible with modern realities of international relations [18]. It is, however, difficult to view NATO enlargement as anything but an expansion of the Western zone of influence. Russia is sure to view it that way. The Kremlin’s determination to prevent Ukraine from entering NATO is representative of the defensive realism theory and may be interpreted as Moscow’s resistance to further loss of influence in the region vital to Russia’s strategic interests.

Technically, Ukraine’s accession to NATO may still be possible despite the formal ineligibility under the organization’s standards. According to the Study on NATO enlargement published by the Alliance itself, the decision to accept a new member is taken on a case-by-case basis, and “there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance” [19]. The Ukrainian administration must be aware of this caveat when appealing to NATO for acceleration of the admission process. Meanwhile, NATO leadership anticipates that prematurely granting membership to Ukraine would instigate a negative reaction from Moscow. The risk of sparking a more serious conflict with Russia outweighs the benefits of securing Ukraine’s commitment to the westward vector of cooperation in strategic, political, and economic areas. At the end of the day, NATO’s priority consists of ensuring that the invited country will contribute to enhanced security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region [20]. At the moment, Ukraine cannot guarantee that its membership in NATO will result in a more peaceful Europe. On the contrary, NATO expansion to Ukraine may provoke an aggressive response from Russia and condemn Europe to greater instability.

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Footnotes

[1] Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “On Ukraine’s doorstep, Russia boosts military and sends message of regional clout to Biden,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-military-biden-donbas/2021/04/09/99859490-96d3-11eb-8f0a-3384cf4fb399_story.html.

[2] “A divided Ukraine,” CNN, last modified March 3, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/02/world/ukraine-divided/.

[3] Anton Zverev, “Moscow is bankrolling Ukraine rebels: ex-separatist official,” Reuters, October 5, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-separatists/moscow-is-bankrolling-ukraine-rebels-ex-separatist-official-idUSKCN1251UQ.

[4] Andrew E. Kramer, “Fighting Escalates in Eastern Ukraine, Signaling the End to Another Cease-Fire,” New York Times, March 30, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-russia-fighting.html.

[5] “Study on NATO enlargement,” Official texts, NATO, last modified November 5, 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm.

[6] “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Official texts, NATO, last modified April 10, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

[7] “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” Topics, NATO, last modified March 23, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm.

[8] NATO, “Membership Action Plan (MAP).”

[9] “Relations with Ukraine,” Topics, NATO, last modified April 27, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm.

[10] “President of Ukraine had a phone conversation with the Secretary General of NATO,” News, Official website of the President of Ukraine, last modified April 6, 2021, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-generalnim-sek-67813.

[11] NATO, “Study on NATO enlargement.”

[12] “Ukraine in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2020,” Transparency International Ukraine, accessed May 19, 2021, https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/ukraine-in-the-corruption-perceptions-index-2020/.

[13] Tom Sauer, “The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West,” Global Policy 8, no. 1 (February 2017): 86.

[14] Andrew T. Wolff, “The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis,” International Affairs 91: 5 (2015) 1103.

[15] NATO, “Study on NATO enlargement.”

[16] Sauer, “The Origins,” 83.

[17] Wolff, “The future,” 1105-1106.

[18] Sauer, “The Origins,” 87.

[19] NATO, “Study on NATO enlargement.”

[20] NATO, “Study on NATO enlargement.”

Scenario Planning: Ukraine, A Nation In-Between

By: Mateja Nikolic 

Abstract: This research paper is an excerpt of a larger body of work completed as a graduate thesis by the same author, regarding the War in Ukraine and the future status of Donbass. This section specifically focuses on the possible scenarios relating to the status of Donbass, examining how the conflict may evolve. The paper outlines four main scenarios: the situation in Donbass remaining the same for the foreseeable future, reintegration with Ukraine, military take over of the sepetarist held areas by Ukraine, or a Russian invasion of the region. The key findings of the thesis identified that the status of Donbass may remain the same for the foreseeable future; the study found that due to the political gridlock regarding the integration of the Minsk Agreements, the conflict will remain frozen, with few changes and skirmishes of varying intensity. A survey of academics, OSCE employees who worked in Ukraine, UN employees, and a German foreign ministry worker pointed to the same outcome. 

Introduction

The conflict in Ukraine has been ongoing for seven years, leaving millions displaced and thousands of dead. The ouster of President Yanukovych in February of 2014, the annexation of Crimea by Russia during February and March of the same year, and the flareup of violence in Donbass on April 6th (2014) culminated in a civil war that is still seeing daily skirmishes. The Minsk Agreements are preventing the conflict from escalating further and may provide a pathway for a peaceful resolution. The election of President Zelensky of Ukraine in 2019 and a change of government may provide an opportunity in conflict resolution. This research will focus on the events from 2014 through 2021. The objective is to ascertain the future status of Donbass, with the key question being what is the likely outcome of the war and what strategies is Ukraine pursuing regarding the conflict? 

 When trying to predict the outcome of such a crisis, one is dealing with uncertainty. The future of Donbass is unpredictable, meaning that it is difficult to attach statistical probabilities relating to the different outcomes, which may occur inside or outside the region that are wholly unforeseeable and may change the status of Donbass forever. There is no cyclical theory of history which predicts the timing, scale, and the nature of the next war or conflict. This may be one of the reasons as to why societies go from one crisis to the next, preparing for the last war until a new one arrives.[1]Donbass is no different. As such, this study is an examination of the possible scenarios for the region, attempting to understand them and their possible consequences. It does not attempt to predict a single scenario over the others.

The causes of the war are complex; there are historical, socio-economic, and geopolitical reasons that can explain the sources of fighting. Therefore, to examine the War in Donbass specifically, this study assesses the conflict holistically, looking into the general causes of the war and exploring the different actors involved, both nations and individuals. From this research, one can better understand the different dynamics of the conflict, both domestic and international. 

The paper utilizes scenario planning as part of its methodology, looking into each scenario and examining the process behind its possible occurrence. The work does this by dividing the outcome of the war into four potential scenarios: the conflict will remain frozen for perhaps decades (as it is today), with ceasefire violations of varying intensity, but no large offensives taking place; Donetsk and Luhansk will reunite with Ukraine (peacefully), with some autonomy, as stipulated by the Minsk II Agreement; Ukraine will take over the separatist held areas through force; and Russia will launch a new offensive, completely taking over the Donbass region. 

Scenario I: Frozen Conflict 

There are aspects pointing to a long-term impasse in Donbass (perhaps decades). Since 2015, there have been very few changes after the signing of the Minsk II Agreement; the agreement, itself, has not been followed, despite many years of opportunities in implementing its provisions. Based on the reports from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine,[2] as of March 4th, 2021, there were 105 ceasefire violations in the Donetsk region. Such violations, occurring daily between the two combatants, not only break the agreement but make it void if they become a norm on the frontlines. Importantly, the Mission observed heavy weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in the Donetsk area, located in a non-government controlled section, effectively breaking the second and third provision of the agreement,[3] which states that there needs to be a withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front lines by both sides. As this violation occurred in a non-government-controlled area, it points to the possibility that the separatists (local militias from the unrecognized Luhansk and Donetsk People’s republics) are responsible for it, representing a lack of will from their side in implementing the agreement. 

These ceasefire violations delegitimize Minsk II and show that there is a lack of will in respecting the agreement and the likelihood that it will not be further implemented. Furthermore, an exchange of fire also has the potential of spiraling out of control, possibly drawing retaliation by the receiving side. 

“The loser gets Donbass” is an expression predicated on the fact that whoever acquires the region would have to spend billions of dollars in its reconstruction efforts – another factor highlighting that the conflict will remain unresolved. This also relates to the repatriation of millions of refugees whose homes have been destroyed. Other factors doing the same would be the difficulty to achieve reconciliation efforts if separatist held areas integrate back into Ukraine. After seven years of violence, how would trust be achieved, how would vigilante justice be prevented in instances where revenge is wanted? As previously mentioned, relating to this scenario and to these questions, what should Ukraine do about the thousands of armed separatists, who through years of propaganda, have a strong hatred towards Kiev. The same can be said of Ukrainians who see the separatists and populations under their control as traitors – how to reconcile such different views? These factors lead to the gridlock of Minsk II and showcase the complexity of the situation. Perhaps, it is far simpler for the opposing sides to keep the conflict frozen than to truly seek peace and reconciliation as they carry with them massive complexities. On the other hand, escalation and full-blown war are also costly, whereas low level skirmishes are not. 

As Lugansk and Donetsk lack international recognition – not even by Russia – these self-proclaimed entities do not have the authority to act as sovereign states. They are represented by Russia in the Normandy Format and the Minsk negotiations, a country in which they are not a constituent part of. This is significant as the population of the region is not represented by its own leadership. Its interests are not represented, instead Moscow’s interests for the region are the region’s own. Further, unlike Crimea, Russia has so far not annexed the Donbass region, perhaps due to the reasons above. This is despite the want of the separatists to be annexed by Russia. The lack of recognition for the two republics points to the conflict remaining unresolved; the lack of legitimate authority and disputed territorial integrity makes the War in Donbass difficult to resolve. 

Ultimately, these factors indicate that the War in Donbass could become a decades long frozen conflict, an internationally unrecognized region in a continuous struggle reminiscent of other parts of the former Soviet bloc: Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, and North Ossetia. All these areas have one thing in common -- Russia intervention. Russia considers the areas of the former Soviet Union as part of its zone of influence, something discussed in the fourth scenario.

Scenario II: Reintegration into Ukraine 

The negotiations on the reunification of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Ukraine have largely stalled, and there have been few attempts in implementing or renegotiating the provisions. 

The Minsk II Agreement provides a framework for the gradual turnover of those territories to Ukraine; point eight refers to reinstating taxation and other payments within the legal structure of Ukraine.[4] That so far has not occurred. The irredentist governments have their own methods of taxation, the institutions necessary to implement their tax policies, and financial and humanitarian aid from Russia. Having separate institutions and financial systems makes it more difficult for reunification. 

A major area of disagreement is point nine, relating to reinstating the full control of Ukraine’s borders after reaching an agreement on local elections and a comprehensive political settlement. As a comprehensive political settlement was not reached, Ukraine’s borders were never restored.

Another crucial paragraph in the agreement, one that has had domestic political consequences, is point 11 regarding constitutional reform in Ukraine. This section adopts a special status to the Donetsk and Luhansk (D/LPR) oblasts, meaning giving those entities more autonomy. Giving D/LPR more autonomy as part of reunification is a sensitive topic in Ukraine, with many seeing such policies as being pro-Russian and acquiescing to Russian demands. On October 2nd, 2019, hundreds of Ukrainians protested President Zelensky's statement that he would back the Steinmeier formula, bringing elections to areas controlled by the separatists.[5] The formula is a package directly tied to Minsk II, named after the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The formula refers to a political and legal settlement in the Donbass region by holding local elections in D/LPR. Such elections are to be held in line with Ukrainian legislation and according to the standards set by the OSCE. The Minsk Trilateral Contact Group -- representatives from Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE -- were meant to develop a bill on local elections in D/LPR, while the Verkhovna Rada, the parliament of Ukraine, was to adopt the bill within four weeks,[6] with the elections being held within 90 days. On the election day, a law was supposed to be enacted on giving autonomy to the two regions in Donbass.[7]

However, the law was never passed by the Verkhovna Rada in the previous years because according to Ukraine, the conditions for the elections were never met as the region is occupied by what it sees as Russian forces. From Kiev’s perspective, a disarmament and withdrawal is necessary for the elections to be valid. After President Zelensky agreed to follow the formula in the fall of 2019, nationalists rallied in Kiev with banners saying, “no capitulation.”[8] As a result, the president redefined his support and stated that the elections would only be held when Russian forces leave the area. As the Steinmeier formula allows for local elections in the presence of such foreign forces, making Ukraine’s actions contradictory towards the formula and the Minsk II overall. According to the agreement, there is no need for the separatists to disarm or for any foreign troops to leave. Such actions, although carrying domestic support for the president, make Ukraine lose its credibility in the Normandy Format, a diplomatic effort involving Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine to end the war. 

Despite President Zelensky’s attempt to simultaneously engage in negotiations and shore up support for himself and his party, Servant of the People (SVP), he has managed to do neither. One of the president’s election promises which made him win the election in a landslide against Poroshenko (his predecessor and former incumbent) was that he would end the war in Donbass. So far, President Zelensky has not made a great step towards achieving this goal. This can be a contributing factor along with other reasons as to why his party had mixed results during the 2020 local elections. Servant of the People did not win any mayoral races in oblast centers, its popularity has declined to 34 percent, and Zelensky’s popularity declined from 73.2 percent to 31.8 percent.[9] His loss of support may lead to further instability and delay in reintegration if the separatists themselves, or Russia for that matter, do not see Zelensky as being politically capable of implementing Minsk II.

After years of propaganda, the way the two sides perceive each other, along with the institutional, structural issues, will be crucial in reincorporating separatists’ areas back to Ukraine. After years of war where thousands have died on both sides and extensive misinformation and the attribution of blame is central to conflict resolution, shaping the possible outcome of the war.[10] In D/LPR, around 43 percent of people believe that the Ukrainian government is to blame for the war, while only around 13 percent in government-controlled territories in Donbass place the blame on Kiev. 32 percent of the gov-controlled Donbass believed that both Russian and Ukrainian governments are to be blamed equally, while only 14 percent believed the same in separatist controlled areas.[11] There is a discrepancy in the perception of who is the perpetrator of the war between the two sides; this is a major obstacle to reintegration.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s leadership seems to be stuck, being unable to make compromises with the opposing side without losing political support. At the same time, as long as the conflict remains frozen and unresolved, Ukraine will continue to suffer economically and politically as it would be viewed as an unstable country, fraught with civil strife. It is also highly unlikely that the separatists would lay down their weapons after years of fighting and reunify with Ukraine without having reached some political settlement first, one which allows for elections. An important question to answer would be how Ukraine would reconcile the populations of Donetsk and Luhansk, bringing the rest of the region back into Ukrainian society. After seven years of war, division, and propaganda, unity would be difficult to achieve without change, such as military takeover.

Scenario III: Ukrainian Takeover of Donbass

As mentioned, this solution was attempted in 2014 and Ukraine was almost successful, having captured most of the territory belonging to the separatists. However, after the pro-Russian forces with Russian help counterattacked, they managed to recapture much of the lost territory. Currently, Ukraine controls the smaller cities and towns in the western parts of Donbass, while the separatists control the eastern areas bordering Russia. The situation in terms of who controls what territory has remained the same since the signing of the Minsk II. Although Ukraine has invested in its military and has received support from the West, specifically training and weapons from the US, it is unlikely that the Ukrainian military would be able to retake separatists-controlled areas.

A short analogy between the Nagorno Karabakh War (2020) and the War in Donbass further elucidates the situation Ukraine finds itself in. During the last months of 2020, in the Nagorno Karabakh War, Azerbaijan managed to retake parts of the enclave using military force after more than 20 years of failed negotiations. Azerbaijan’s actions leave a precedent for other countries to act in a similar manner. There are similarities between the case of Karabakh and Donbass; both regions declared unilateral independence, were a part of the Soviet Union (shared history), entail ethnic strife, and have engaged in conflicts involving Russian military and diplomatic participation.

International recognition are other important similarities. The Republic of Artsakh, a quasi, breakaway state from Azerbaijan encompassing the Nagorno-Karabakh region, is internationally recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan. Baku’s military seizure over the parts of the region has some credibility as the territory is considered as its constituent part. This is the case with the D/LPR; they are regarded as belonging to Ukraine by the international community, including Russia. Not one UN member state recognizes these entities as a country. Therefore, Kiev’s potential use of armed force in recapturing separatist areas may be seen as a justifiable act.

The main difference between the case of Karabakh and Donbass is that Russia would not allow Ukraine to simply take over with the use of force. Russia is much more intricately involved in Donbass, where many people identify as Russians, to let Ukraine have its way. As the frontline is near the Russian border, it is easier for Russia to react and prop up the separatists. Russia has shown that it can intervene on behalf of the separatists, and not doing so would damage the image that Moscow has constructed as being the protector of Russians living in foreign countries. Furthermore, a military offensive led by Ukraine would likely not find international support, something that Kiev desperately needs in terms of financing and arming its troops. It’s unlikely that the EU or the US would openly support Ukraine’s actions if this occurred, especially since EU members -- Germany and France -- are involved in the Normandy Format. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, used its oil and gas wealth to modernize its military, while at the same time had diplomatic and weapons support from Turkey, meaning that it was not alone in recapturing territories of Karabakh. Without international support, the country would have to act alone against Russia, which has one of the largest militaries in the world and nuclear deterrence. Thus, it is unlikely that Kiev would choose the military option. 

Scenario IV: Russian Occupation or Annexation of Donbass 

Moscow has a dual role in Ukraine – a diplomat and a potential aggressor. This gives Russia flexibility in its policy making towards Ukraine. It has influence on the diplomatic process, crafting the Minsk Agreement, and shapes the domestic situation in Ukraine, either through escalation or de-escalation. This makes Russia the most important actor in determining the future status of Donbass.

Ukraine is partially surrounded by the Russian military, from the south (Crimea), east, and north east. At the beginning of April and December 2021, it was reported that Russia was building up forces on Ukraine’s western border, numbering at around 100,000 troops.[12] This current military buildup may be a sign of a Russian intervention. As stated previously, Russia helped the beleaguered separatists in 2014 when they were near defeat, propping up their forces. Now, in what is the largest movement of troops since the annexation of Crimea, the question is what Moscow’s intentions are.

One can infer that the current predicament relating to the status of the Minsk II is not in Russia’s interests, and that the escalating military situation is an attempt to change the status-quo. Why escalate if the situation is in one’s favor? The answer could be to gain an even more favorable position or to change adverse circumstances. On July 22nd, 2020, the Trilateral Contact Group reached an agreement to strengthen the ceasefire. The agreement banned offensive operations, firing, and the deployment of heavy weapons. These provisions were never fully implemented as violations continued throughout 2020 and continue to this day. To get a scale of the violence taking place, there were 663 ceasefire violations and 104 recorded explosions during one day.[13] This high number of violations, relative to the preceding months when there were in tens and not hundreds, showcases the dire, escalatory situation on the ground. If the old adage “violence begets violence” holds true, then the situation will continue to worsen. Further, the current deployment of Russian troops may signal Moscow’s disapproval of the current position of the non-existent ceasefire and a show of support for the separatists.

There is variation with regards to how the occupation of Donbass could look like. Moscow may take parts of Donbass or the rest of it, pushing the frontline further west, and strengthening the position of the separatists. This would likely draw further concessions from Kiev, possibly leading to another Minsk agreement favoring Russia’s interests. As a reminder, the current gridlock relates to giving D/LPR special status (autonomy within Ukraine), the legitimacy of the elections in Donbass, and the disarmament of the separatists. With the Russian intervention and redrawing of the current map, Ukraine’s hesitation in implementing the agreement may be annulled. However, the nationalistic reaction in Ukraine could have the opposite effect, further radicalizing the domestic politics within the nation, and strengthening the anti-Russian sentiment. 

There is a difference, however, between Russia launching an offensive, occupying Donbass, and annexation of Ukraine’s territories; annexing it would mean the region would become the constituent part of Russia, while a taking over the region militarily would not necessarily mean annexation. D/LPR, although becoming larger in this situation, would remain as quasi states supported by Russia. The separatists have long wanted to be a part of Russia, but Moscow has so far refused to annex D/LPR. While Crimea offers a strategic advantage due to the peninsula’s position on the Black sea, Donbass does not. Annexation of the region is also unpopular among the Russian citizenry: only 29 percent of Russians want Donetsk and Luhansk to become a part of Russia. This is a big difference compared to Crimea, where 62 percent continue to support Russia’s annexation.[14] Furthermore, annexing Donbass would mean losing even more influence in Ukrainian politics by removing the ethnic Russian voice and weakening the pro-Russia parties in Ukraine. Thus, annexing D/LPR could be a costly move for Putin, not only in terms of rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure but also in political capital.

The dire economic situation needs mentioning. If Russia annexed Donbass, it would have to rebuild it, making budgetary considerations problematic. As D/LPR are not recognized by any country, doing business with these entities is illegal. Thus, the entities rely on the black market as a function of their economy. Furthermore, the seven years of war have produced billions of dollars of damage. The dire economic situation creates the impression that the “losing state” would have to shoulder Donbass’ reconstruction efforts and expenses.[15] Russia is currently spending around two billion dollars a year on the de-facto republics, covering 50 percent of the DPR’s budget and 80 percent of the LPR’s.[16] With continuing US and EU sanctions against Russia, Moscow’s budget is very tight. This may be one of the reasons as to why Russia is threatening to invade Ukraine: in order to speed up the Minsk II reconciliation process and avoid the financial burden of rebuilding the D/LPR.

The region is seemingly set to become, or already is, like Transnistria, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia. This would mean that D/LPR would remain unrecognized entities, which are for the most part controlled by Moscow. Russia would also use these territories to destabilize Ukraine, so that it cannot join organizations that hinder Russia’s interests. 

There are some similarities between what occurred in Georgia in 2008 (the breaking away of South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and what happened in Ukraine – in order to destabilize the country and prevent the expansion of NATO eastward, Russia intervened and supported the irredentist movements there. This precedent indicates the possible future and current status for D/LPR as unrecognized states. As Russia stationed over 100,000 troops near Ukraine’s border, Zelensky requested to speed up Ukraine’s request for NATO membership, stating “NATO is the only way to end the war in Donbass.” [17] This likely agitated Russia as the nation has shown before that it will not allow Ukraine to join NATO, that it will sacrifice thousands of lives for that effort. Ukraine joining NATO is for Russia an existential threat. 

Moscow also views itself as the protector of Russians abroad, and has given Donbass residents hundreds of thousands of Russian passports since 2019. [18] This gives Russia the pretext to intervene in Ukraine as Ukrainian citizens are also Russian citizens. Any NATO expansion could be framed as a threat to their citizens abroad, thus legitimizing intervention.

Ultimately, the Russian annexation of Donbass remains unlikely; however, another military intervention is not unlikely for several reasons: Russia’s desire to stop the expansion of NATO, speed up the Mink II implementation, and keep Ukraine unstable. Ukraine banning pro-Russia television stations may also have contributed to the current escalation. On February 2nd, Zelensky shut down three Kremlin linked channels in order to prevent what he sees as Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine. Kiev also sanctioned Viktor Medvedchuk, a key Kremlin ally in Ukraine who is the owner of those programs and financier of pro-Russian political parties. [19] This aspect points to the information war between the Kremlin and Kiev, where an attempt to control the dissemination of information by one side causes a military escalation by the other. 

Conclusion

The War in Donbass is nowhere near ending. There is still a heavy Russian military presence on Ukraine’s borders, there are daily ceasefire violations, and tensions are at an all-time high since 2014. The Minsk II Agreement and other diplomatic initiatives, such as the Normandy Format and the Steinmeier Formula, have so far failed to bring peace to Ukraine. The agreement has been gridlocked for years due to disagreements over the disarmament of separatists, the autonomy of Donbass, and the legitimacy of the elections being held there. Furthermore, as this study has shown through its scenarios, Zelensky’s government does not have the domestic support to enact such provisions in the agreement, with protests occurring when the government tried to implement them. Ultimately, the issue can be described as being one over sovereignty and self-determination: Sovereignty for Ukraine and self-determination for the people of Donbass. The question remains how to balance or find a solution between such competing views. 

For Kiev, the issue of sovereignty has several connotations; it does not only mean bringing separatist held areas back into its fold, but how to do so and integrate them within the Ukrainian system. There are fears that if such areas were to be reintegrated into Ukraine, Russia would undermine Ukrainian sovereignty by having control over the domestic political scene in the country, controlling the pro-Russian politicians in the east who could veto Ukraine’s acceptance into Western institutions. Thus, the problem of sovereignty for Ukraine does not end with the rebellion but continues in other circumstances. 

The status quo has continued for seven years now, and despite the buildup of Russian troops, the status quo has not been broken; as of January 17th, 2022, Russia has not launched a new offensive. It is difficult to know what exactly Moscow’s intentions are, but why escalate if all is well. Why change the situation if the conditions are favorable? Gridlock must not be in Moscow’s interests. The increasing ceasefire violations and the high death tolls on both sides does point towards renewed violence, and perhaps another Russian offensive. The offensive would change the situation on the ground, likely in the favor of the separatist position, instigating another round of Minsk negotiations and forcing Kiev’s hand in accepting the provisions. 

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Mateja Nikolic graduated from the University of Texas at San Antonio with a degree in Global Affairs.

Footnotes

[1] Ferguson, Niall. “Is Paranoia the Key to Pandemic Preparedness?” Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-05-18/paranoia-key-pandemic-preparedness.

[2] OSCE. “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 52/2021 Issued on 5 March 2021 - Ukraine.” ReliefWeb. OSCE, March 5, 2021. 

[3] OSCE. “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 106/2021 Issued on 10 May 2021.” OSCE. OSCE, May 10, 2021. https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/486047.

[4] UN. “Minsk II Agreement .” Peacemaker. UN, February 15, 2015. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf.

[5] Fisher, Jonah. “Ukraine Conflict: Anger as Zelensky Agrees Vote Deal in East.” BBC News. BBC, October 2, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49903996.

[6] Peters, Tim B., and Anastasiia Shapkina. “The Grand Stalemate of the Minsk Agreements - Kas.de.” KAS. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung , February 1, 2019. https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/4520172/The+Grand+Stalemate+of+the+Minsk+Agreements.

[7] Ibid. 

[8] Fisher, Ukraine, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49903996

[9] Kiev International Institute of Sociology. “Electoral Sentiments of the Population Regarding the Election of the President of Ukraine.” KIIS . Kiev International Institute of Sociology , September 21, 2020. https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=969&page=1&fbclid=IwAR1px_dZAM9WmdtvQMhuZsQwSc-bZ1XI9uW27y5tatvXZl5w1wwVAv3iuIE.

[10] Loughlin, John, Gwendolyn Sasse, Gerard Toal, and Kristin M. Bakke. “Analysis | A New Survey of the Ukraine-Russia Conflict Finds Deeply Divided Views in the Contested Donbas Region.” The Washington Post. WP Company, February 12, 2021.

[11] Ibid. 

[12] Reuters. “Official Russian Military Build-up near Ukraine Numbers More than 100,000 Troops, Eu Says.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, April 19, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-military-build-up-near-ukraine-numbers-more-than-150000-troops-eus-2021-04-19/.

[13] Stastoli , Andris. “Press Statement of Special Representative Grau after the Regular Meeting of Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020.” OSCE. OSCE Chairmanship , July 23, 2020. https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/457885.

[14] Stepan Goncharov, Denis Volkov. “Russians Want Crimea; Prefer Luhansk and Donetsk Independent.” Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, April 3, 2019. https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/russians-want-crimea-prefer-luhansk-and-donetsk-independent.

[15] Motyl, Alexander J. “It's Time for Ukraine to Let the Donbass Go.” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy , December 6, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/ukraine-better-without-donbass-costly-reconstruction-pro-russia-west/.

[16] International Crisis Group. “Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas.” Crisis Group. International Crisis Group , July 28, 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/261-peace-ukraine-iii-costs-war-donbas.

[17] Deutsche Welle. “Ukraine Urges NATO to Set up Membership Path: DW: 06.04.2021.” DW.COM. Deutsche Welle , April 6, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-urges-nato-to-set-up-membership-path/a-57110384.

[18] Dickinson , Peter. “Russian Passports: Putin's Secret Weapon in the War against Ukraine.” Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council , April 13, 2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russian-passports-putins-secret-weapon-in-the-war-against-ukraine/.

[19] Yermak , Andriy. “Why Ukraine Sanctioned Putin's Ally Medvedchuk.” Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council , February 26, 2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-ukraine-sanctioned-putins-ally-medvedchuk/.