



*Journal of*  
**INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS**

**PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA** | *Renewing the Mandela Legacy and Promoting Active Citizenship in a Changing World*  
44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

**EMMA D. O'ROURKE** | *Environmental Stressors on Migration within Guatemala*

**MARIA JOSE LOZANO SANABRIA** | *IDP Returns in Transitional Societies: Colombia*

**MAI PHAN** | *Decoding the Trade War's Impact on ASEAN*

**LIONEL WH OH** | *On the Islamization of Malaysia: Emergence of Jihadi-Salafism and Future Prospects*

**DEVEN PATEL** | *The ECB's Monetary Reponse to the Euro Crisis Through the Lens of the Taylor Rule: Comparing Germany and Greece to the Eurozone*

**JARED SAWYER** | *Misrepresentations in Conservation: The Blackwashing of Palm Oil Production in Malaysia*

**SHAYNA VAYSER** | *Women in Red: Femininity and Womanhood in the Soviet Union*

**MADELINE SMITH** | *Migrant Pregnancies: Maternal Health and International Aid Along the Refugee Trail from Syria to Europe*

**PAUL WITRY** | *The Cyberspace Race: A Contest to Win Global Digital Dominance*

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
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Dear Reader,

It is my greatest honor and pleasure to present you with the 21st Edition of the Sigma Iota Rho *Journal of International Relations*. The *Journal* represents over twenty years of undergraduate excellence in the field of international relations, and its distinguished reputation is certainly well-earned. This year's articles continue the tradition of academic rigor, and are drawn from a pool of highly competitive submissions from around the world. The *Journal* occupies a unique space in scholarly discourse by offering voices to the most exceptional undergraduate individuals, whose research on topics ranging from migrant pregnancies in Syrian refugees to the impact of trade wars on ASEAN tackle the most difficult questions of our world today. I also invite you to peruse our online journal at SIRjournal.org for weekly opinion, blog and research pieces that contribute to SIR's mission to encourage open forum discourse on international affairs. Our online Editor-in-Chief, Tiger Huang, has made a truly phenomenal contribution to the online journal this year by introducing a record number of writers and correspondents, in addition to publishing articles at a faster rate than the journal has ever seen before.

This year, we are honored to publish another esteemed United States President, President Barack Obama. In the last few years, race and class relations around the world have become increasingly fraught with the rise of xenophobia and extremism, a problem that President Obama addresses in his lecture at the Sixteenth Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture of the Nelson Mandela Foundation. Celebrating the incredible life and contributions of Nelson Mandela, President Obama reflects on that which has been achieved in addition to that which still has yet to be accomplished. I encourage you to read his rousing call for collective action to enact the visions championed by many great individuals – Mandela, King and Lincoln to name a few – of equality, justice and freedom.

Following the transcript of President Obama's lecture, the *Journal* features nine stellar undergraduate articles that contribute their research to the field of international relations. This year's edition highlights a wide array of topics, including the impact of environmental blackwashing of the Malaysian palm oil industry, the ECB's monetary response to the Euro crisis, and the cyberspace race. Furthermore, this year's journal sees a range of research methods, from multivariate regression analyses of the environmental stressors impacting Guatemalan migration, to the use of a feminist theoretical approach to codifying femininity in Soviet animation.

Finally, I would like to recognize the contributions of numerous individuals whose hard work was instrumental to the publishing of this year's journal. I wish to thank Dr. Frank Plantan, National President of SIR, Dr. Tomoharu Nishino, Journal Faculty Advisor, and Mark Castillo, SIR Senior Liaison Officer, for their invaluable guidance and support. Above all, I would like to thank Deputy Editor Justin Melnick, and the rest of the staff for the countless hours they have committed to the *Journal*.

Sincerely,



Sophie Pu  
Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations

Each year in this space I ring the steeple bell for international studies, urging colleagues and new Sigma Iota Rho (SIR) inductees to continue to champion our mission of not only recognizing our best student's academic achievements, but to promote the study of international affairs on campuses and their wider communities. This may merely be preaching to the choir, making it difficult to convey the real urgency we face as educators and practitioners to find new ways of understanding; new theories to account for the ever-changing dynamics of the world; and new operational procedures for the delivery of solutions to the timeless challenge: "how do we make the world a better place?" Likewise, students today are extremely motivated by the idea of bettering the world by affecting change. They are driven by ideals of social impact, social entrepreneurship, corporate social responsibility, the environmental Commons, and demands for recognition of the power of social and ethnic diversity, tied as it is to human rights and the growing socio-political and economic inequalities they see in the world.

The fuller context of these concerns today is we find a liberal arts education, particularly within the humanities and social sciences, are under assault for an alleged lack of relevance; a failure of their core propositions to deliver empirical solutions. The attack is fueled by an emergent sentiment of discontent with the institutional manifestations that grew out of these traditions in our current world order, that these institutions have helped create or exacerbated the discontent and inequities we observe in the world today. Has an intellectual sclerosis settled in to academe and among our policy-makers? Within American higher education, the past year has witnessed an alarming number of closures of humanities and liberal arts programs and departments. We are told in the most categorical of terms that a student's employment and the future of society now lies in the STEM fields. And our social and political world, which we are reminded on a daily basis is "polarized," has produced little else beyond hand-wringing, wailing, and a paralysis of thought and action.

So what are we as educators to do? First, trust the unforeseen benefits of institutional and organizational inertia. While these forces usually stand in the way of change, today they are preserving the liberal international order that has afforded us prolonged periods of peace, an exponential decline in battlefield deaths, a global trade system that provides us often overlooked comforts and conveniences while lifting two billion people out of poverty. It is true that the post-WWII liberal world order is under assault by a new type of globalized authoritarian regimes, but its core still stands today like Notre Dame's hallowed bell towers and buttresses. Present attacks on the system center on over-extension and over-reach—as we saw with NATO's weakening grip in preserving international security; the broadening and deepening of the European Community; and the mad rush to profit from a globalization dynamic that was little understood in the 1990s that gave us a premature creation of the WTO and multinational corporations that are increasingly borderless in their loyalties; and the resulting dislocation of jobs and industries that have contributed to distrust of the liberal order. But we must not abandon a system that mostly works. Instead, we have to restructure and recalibrate. If ever there was a need for serious policy-oriented research and an interdisciplinary approach to teaching and learning, grounded in the disciplines but not held hostage by a single perspective—it is today. The intellectual spirit that stresses foreign language learning, understanding of peoples and cultures, the study of history, replete with context for contemporary disputes and conflicts, and the ability to write and speak persuasively about the issues of the day is needed now more than ever.


We are not competing against the STEM fields, themselves totally globalized. But we need to continue to adapt and demand rigor of our students. Students need to incorporate the ability to manipulate data—

## LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

whether in a database or spreadsheet, with statistics or data visualization software. Our students also must acquire coding abilities (whether basic HTML, or programming in Java) to maintain the competitive advantage they had in the marketplace in the 1990s and early Ought years of the new millennium. But we cannot overlook the value of a strong broad liberal arts education, the acquisition of some reasonable level of proficiency in a foreign language, applied research and internship experiences, and the demonstrable ability to do research and to write with compelling argumentation. With intellectualism intact, our students will thrive in their careers. Indeed, I have every confidence that the future leaders that will emerge from among our membership will find the fixes to what ails the world today.

Best regards,

Frank Plantan



President, Sigma Iota Rho



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# Table of Contents

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<b>PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA</b> RENEWING THE MANDELA LEGACY AND PROMOTING ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD	1	<b>DEVEN PATEL</b>   THE ECB'S MONETARY REPOSE TO THE EURO CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF THE TAYLOR RULE: COMPARING GERMANY AND GREECE TO THE EUROZONE	89
<b>EMMA D. O'ROURKE</b>   ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSORS ON MIGRATION WITHIN GUATEMALA	17	<b>JARED SAWYER</b>   MISREPRESENTATIONS IN CONSERVATION: THE BLACKWASHING OF PALM OIL PRODUCTION IN MALAYSIA	115
<b>MARIA JOSE LOZANO SANABRIA</b>   IDP RETURNS IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: COLOMBIA	33	<b>SHAYNA VAYSER</b>   WOMEN IN RED: FEMININITY AND WOMANHOOD IN THE SOVIET UNION	129
<b>MAI PHAN</b>   DECODING THE TRADE WAR'S IMPACT ON ASEAN	55	<b>MADLINE SMITH</b>   MIGRANT PREGNANCIES: MATERNAL HEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL AID ALONG THE REFUGEE TRAIL FROM SYRIA TO EUROPE	149
<b>LIONEL WH OH</b>   ON THE ISLAMIZATION OF MALAYSIA: EMERGENCE OF JIHADI-SALAFISM AND FUTURE PROSPECTS	67	<b>PAUL WITRY</b>   THE CYBERSPACE RACE: A CONTEST TO WIN GLOBAL DIGITAL DOMINANCE	163

# Renewing the Mandela Legacy and Promoting Active Citizenship in a Changing World<sup>1</sup>

BARACK OBAMA

44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Thank you. To Mama Graça Machel, members of the Mandela family, the Machel family, to President Ramaphosa who you can see is inspiring new hope in this great country, professor, doctor, distinguished guests, to Mama Sisulu and the Sisulu family, to the people of South Africa, it is a singular honor for me to be here with all of you as we gather to celebrate the birth and life of one of history's true giants.

One hundred years ago, Madiba was born in the village of Mvezo. So in his autobiography he describes a happy childhood; he's looking after cattle, he's playing with the other boys, eventually attends a school where his teacher gave him the English name Nelson. And as many of you know, he's quoted saying, "Why she bestowed this particular name upon me, I have no idea."

There was no reason to believe that a young black boy at this time, in this place, could in any way alter history. After all, South Africa was then less than a decade removed from full British control. Already, laws were being codified to implement racial segregation and subjugation, the network of laws that would be known as apartheid. Most of Africa, including my father's homeland, was under colonial rule. The dominant European powers, having ended a horrific world war just a few months after Madiba's birth, viewed this continent and its people primarily as spoils in a contest for territory and abundant natural resources and cheap labor. And the inferiority of the black race, an indifference towards black culture and interests and

1 Delivered on July 17, 2018 at The Sixteenth Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture of the Nelson Mandela Foundation. Reprinted with permission. The lecture is reprinted in its entirety with the exception of a few short opening acknowledgements.

aspirations, was a given.

And such a view of the world – that certain races, certain nations, certain groups were inherently superior, and that violence and coercion is the primary basis for governance, that the strong necessarily exploit the weak, that wealth is determined primarily by conquest – that view of the world was hardly confined to relations between Europe and Africa, or relations between whites and blacks. Whites were happy to exploit other whites when they could. And by the way, blacks were often willing to exploit other blacks. And around the globe, the majority of people lived at subsistence levels, without a say in the politics or economic forces that determined their lives. Often they were subject to the whims and cruelties of distant leaders. The average person saw no possibility of advancing from the circumstances of their birth. Women were almost uniformly subordinate to men. Privilege and status was rigidly bound by caste and color and ethnicity and religion. And even in my own country, even in democracies like the United States, founded on a declaration that all men are created equal, racial segregation and systemic discrimination was the law in almost half the country and the norm throughout the rest of the country.

That was the world just 100 years ago. There are people alive today who were alive in that world. It is hard, then, to overstate the remarkable transformations that have taken place since that time. A second World War, even more terrible than the first, along with a cascade of liberation movements from Africa to Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, would finally bring an end to colonial rule. More and more peoples, having witnessed the horrors of totalitarianism, the repeated mass slaughters of the 20th century, began to embrace a new vision for humanity, a new idea, one based not only on the principle of national self-determination, but also on the principles of democracy and rule of law and civil rights and the inherent dignity of every single individual.

In those nations with market-based economies, suddenly union movements developed; and health and safety and commercial regulations were instituted; and access to public education was expanded; and social welfare systems emerged, all with the aim of constraining the excesses of capitalism and enhancing its ability to provide opportunity not just to some but to all people. And the result was unmatched economic growth and a growth of the middle class. And in my own country, the moral force of the civil rights movement not only overthrew Jim Crow laws but it opened up the floodgates for women and historically marginalized groups to reimagine themselves, to find their own voices, to make their own claims to full citizenship.

It was in service of this long walk towards freedom and justice and equal opportunity that Nelson Mandela devoted his life. At the outset, his struggle was particular to this place, to his homeland – a fight to end apartheid, a fight to ensure lasting political and social and economic equality for its disenfranchised non-white citizens. But through his sacrifice and unwavering leadership and, perhaps most of all, through his moral example, Mandela and the movement he led would come to signify something larger. He came to embody the universal aspirations of



dispossessed people all around the world, their hopes for a better life, the possibility of a moral transformation in the conduct of human affairs.

Madiba's light shone so brightly, even from that narrow Robben Island cell, that in the late '70s he could inspire a young college student on the other side of the world to re-examine his own priorities, could make me consider the small role I might play in bending the arc of the world towards justice. And when later, as a law student, I witnessed Madiba emerge from prison, just a few months, you'll recall, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, I felt the same wave of hope that washed through hearts all around the world.

Do you remember that feeling? It seemed as if the forces of progress were on the march, that they were inexorable. Each step he took, you felt this is the moment when the old structures of violence and repression and ancient hatreds that had so long stunted people's lives and confined the human spirit – that all that was crumbling before our eyes. And then as Madiba guided this nation through negotiation painstakingly, reconciliation, its first fair and free elections; as we all witnessed the grace and the generosity with which he embraced former enemies, the wisdom for him to step away from power once he felt his job was complete, we understood that. We understood it was not just the subjugated, the oppressed who were being freed from the shackles of the past. The subjugator was being offered a gift, being given a chance to see in a new way, being given a chance to participate in the work of building a better world.

And during the last decades of the 20th century, the progressive, democratic vision that Nelson Mandela represented in many ways set the terms of international political debate. It doesn't mean that vision was always victorious, but it set the terms, the parameters; it guided how we thought about the meaning of progress, and it continued to propel the world forward. Yes, there were still tragedies – bloody civil wars from the Balkans to the Congo. Despite the fact that ethnic and sectarian strife still flared up with heartbreaking regularity, despite all that as a consequence of the continuation of nuclear détente, and a peaceful and prosperous Japan, and a unified Europe anchored in NATO, and the entry of China into the world's system of trade – all that greatly reduced the prospect of war between the world's great powers. And from Europe to Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, dictatorships began to give way to democracies. The march was on. A respect for human rights and the rule of law, enumerated in a declaration by the United Nations, became the guiding norm for the majority of nations, even in places where the reality fell far short of the ideal. Even when those human rights were violated, those who violated human rights were on the defensive.

And with these geopolitical changes came sweeping economic changes. The introduction of market-based principles, in which previously closed economies along with the forces of global integration powered by new technologies, suddenly unleashed entrepreneurial talents to those that once had been relegated to the periphery of the world economy, who hadn't counted. Suddenly they counted. They had some power; they had the possibilities of doing business. And then came scientific breakthroughs and new infrastructure and the reduction of armed

conflicts. And suddenly a billion people were lifted out of poverty, and once-starving nations were able to feed themselves, and infant mortality rates plummeted. And meanwhile, the spread of the internet made it possible for people to connect across oceans, and cultures and continents instantly were brought together, and potentially, all the world's knowledge could be in the hands of a small child in even the most remote village.

That's what happened just over the course of a few decades. And all that progress is real. It has been broad, and it has been deep, and it all happened in what – by the standards of human history – was nothing more than a blink of an eye. And now an entire generation has grown up in a world that by most measures has gotten steadily freer and healthier and wealthier and less violent and more tolerant during the course of their lifetimes.

It should make us hopeful. But if we cannot deny the very real strides that our world has made since that moment when Madiba took those steps out of confinement, we also have to recognize all the ways that the international order has fallen short of its promise. In fact, it is in part because of the failures of governments and powerful elites to squarely address the shortcomings and contradictions of this international order that we now see much of the world threatening to return to an older, a more dangerous, a more brutal way of doing business.

So we have to start by admitting that whatever laws may have existed on the books, whatever wonderful pronouncements existed in constitutions, whatever nice words were spoken during these last several decades at international conferences or in the halls of the United Nations, the previous structures of privilege and power and injustice and exploitation never completely went away. They were never fully dislodged. Caste differences still impact the life chances of people on the Indian subcontinent. Ethnic and religious differences still determine who gets opportunity from the Central Europe to the Gulf. It is a plain fact that racial discrimination still exists in both the United States and South Africa. And it is also a fact that the accumulated disadvantages of years of institutionalized oppression have created yawning disparities in income, and in wealth, and in education, and in health, in personal safety, in access to credit. Women and girls around the world continue to be blocked from positions of power and authority. They continue to be prevented from getting a basic education. They are disproportionately victimized by violence and abuse. They're still paid less than men for doing the same work. That's still happening. Economic opportunity, for all the magnificence of the global economy, all the shining skyscrapers that have transformed the landscape around the world, entire neighborhoods, entire cities, entire regions, entire nations have been bypassed.

In other words, for far too many people, the more things have changed, the more things stayed the same.

And while globalization and technology have opened up new opportunities, have driven remarkable economic growth in previously struggling parts of the world, globalization has also upended the agricultural and manufacturing sectors in many countries. It's also greatly reduced

the demand for certain workers, has helped weaken unions and labor's bargaining power. It's made it easier for capital to avoid tax laws and the regulations of nation-states – can just move billions, trillions of dollars with a tap of a computer key.

And the result of all these trends has been an explosion in economic inequality. It's meant that a few dozen individuals control the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of humanity. That's not an exaggeration, that's a statistic. Think about that. In many middle-income and developing countries, new wealth has just tracked the old bad deal that people got because it reinforced or even compounded existing patterns of inequality, the only difference is it created even greater opportunities for corruption on an epic scale. And for once solidly middle-class families in advanced economies like the United States, these trends have meant greater economic insecurity, especially for those who don't have specialized skills, people who were in manufacturing, people working in factories, people working on farms.

In every country just about, the disproportionate economic clout of those at the top has provided these individuals with wildly disproportionate influence on their countries' political life and on its media; on what policies are pursued and whose interests end up being ignored. Now, it should be noted that this new international elite, the professional class that supports them, differs in important respects from the ruling aristocracies of old. It includes many who are self-made. It includes champions of meritocracy. And although still mostly white and male, as a group they reflect a diversity of nationalities and ethnicities that would have not existed a hundred years ago. A decent percentage consider themselves liberal in their politics, modern and cosmopolitan in their outlook. Unburdened by parochialism, or nationalism, or overt racial prejudice or strong religious sentiment, they are equally comfortable in New York or London or Shanghai or Nairobi or Buenos Aires, or Johannesburg. Many are sincere and effective in their philanthropy. Some of them count Nelson Mandela among their heroes. Some even supported Barack Obama for the presidency of the United States, and by virtue of my status as a former head of state, some of them consider me as an honorary member of the club. And I get invited to these fancy things, you know? They'll fly me out.

But what's nevertheless true is that in their business dealings, many titans of industry and finance are increasingly detached from any single locale or nation-state, and they live lives more and more insulated from the struggles of ordinary people in their countries of origin. And their decisions – their decisions to shut down a manufacturing plant, or to try to minimize their tax bill by shifting profits to a tax haven with the help of high-priced accountants or lawyers, or their decision to take advantage of lower-cost immigrant labor, or their decision to pay a bribe – are often done without malice; it's just a rational response, they consider, to the demands of their balance sheets and their shareholders and competitive pressures.

But too often, these decisions are also made without reference to notions of human solidarity – or a ground-level understanding of the consequences that will be felt by particular people in particular communities by the decisions that are made. And from their boardrooms or

retreats, global decision-makers don't get a chance to see sometimes the pain in the faces of laid-off workers. Their kids don't suffer when cuts in public education and health care result as a consequence of a reduced tax base because of tax avoidance. They can't hear the resentment of an older tradesman when he complains that a newcomer doesn't speak his language on a job site where he once worked. They're less subject to the discomfort and the displacement that some of their countrymen may feel as globalization scrambles not only existing economic arrangements, but traditional social and religious mores.

Which is why, at the end of the 20th century, while some Western commentators were declaring the end of history and the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy and the virtues of the global supply chain, so many missed signs of a brewing backlash – a backlash that arrived in so many forms. It announced itself most violently with 9/11 and the emergence of transnational terrorist networks, fueled by an ideology that perverted one of the world's great religions and asserted a struggle not just between Islam and the West but between Islam and modernity, and an ill-advised US invasion of Iraq didn't help, accelerating a sectarian conflict. Russia, already humiliated by its reduced influence since the collapse of the Soviet Union, feeling threatened by democratic movements along its borders, suddenly started reasserting authoritarian control and in some cases meddling with its neighbors. China, emboldened by its economic success, started bristling against criticism of its human rights record; it framed the promotion of universal values as nothing more than foreign meddling, imperialism under a new name. Within the United States, within the European Union, challenges to globalization first came from the left but then came more forcefully from the right, as you started seeing populist movements – which, by the way, are often cynically funded by right-wing billionaires intent on reducing government constraints on their business interests – these movements tapped the unease that was felt by many people who lived outside of the urban cores; fears that economic security was slipping away, that their social status and privileges were eroding, that their cultural identities were being threatened by outsiders, somebody that didn't look like them or sound like them or pray as they did.

And perhaps more than anything else, the devastating impact of the 2008 financial crisis, in which the reckless behavior of financial elites resulted in years of hardship for ordinary people all around the world, made all the previous assurances of experts ring hollow – all those assurances that somehow financial regulators knew what they were doing, that somebody was minding the store, that global economic integration was an unadulterated good. Because of the actions taken by governments during and after that crisis, including, I should add, by aggressive steps by my administration, the global economy has now returned to healthy growth. But the credibility of the international system, the faith in experts in places like Washington or Brussels, all that had taken a blow.

And a politics of fear and resentment and retrenchment began to appear, and that kind of politics is now on the move. It's on the move at a pace that would have seemed unimaginable just a few years ago. I am not being alarmist, I am simply stating the facts. Look around.

Strongman politics are ascendant suddenly, whereby elections and some pretense of democracy are maintained – the form of it – but those in power seek to undermine every institution or norm that gives democracy meaning. In the West, you've got far-right parties that oftentimes are based not just on platforms of protectionism and closed borders, but also on barely hidden racial nationalism. Many developing countries now are looking at China's model of authoritarian control combined with mercantilist capitalism as preferable to the messiness of democracy. Who needs free speech as long as the economy is going good? The free press is under attack. Censorship and state control of media is on the rise. Social media – once seen as a mechanism to promote knowledge and understanding and solidarity – has proved to be just as effective promoting hatred and paranoia and propaganda and conspiracy theories.

So on Madiba's 100th birthday, we now stand at a crossroad – a moment in time at which two very different visions of humanity's future compete for the hearts and the minds of citizens around the world. Two different stories, two different narratives about who we are and who we should be. How should we respond?

Should we see that wave of hope that we felt with Madiba's release from prison, from the Berlin Wall coming down – should we see that hope that we had as naïve and misguided? Should we understand the last 25 years of global integration as nothing more than a detour from the previous inevitable cycle of history – where might makes right, and politics is a hostile competition between tribes and races and religions, and nations compete in a zero-sum game, constantly teetering on the edge of conflict until full-blown war breaks out? Is that what we think?

Let me tell you what I believe. I believe in Nelson Mandela's vision. I believe in a vision shared by Gandhi and King and Abraham Lincoln. I believe in a vision of equality and justice and freedom and multi-racial democracy, built on the premise that all people are created equal, and they're endowed by our creator with certain inalienable rights. And I believe that a world governed by such principles is possible and that it can achieve more peace and more cooperation in pursuit of a common good. That's what I believe.

And I believe we have no choice but to move forward; that those of us who believe in democracy and civil rights and a common humanity have a better story to tell. And I believe this not just based on sentiment, I believe it based on hard evidence.

The fact that the world's most prosperous and successful societies, the ones with the highest living standards and the highest levels of satisfaction among their people, happen to be those which have most closely approximated the liberal, progressive ideal that we talk about and have nurtured the talents and contributions of all their citizens.

The fact that authoritarian governments have been shown time and time again to breed corruption, because they're not accountable; to repress their people; to lose touch eventually

with reality; to engage in bigger and bigger lies that ultimately result in economic and political and cultural and scientific stagnation. Look at history. Look at the facts.

The fact that countries which rely on rabid nationalism and xenophobia and doctrines of tribal, racial or religious superiority as their main organizing principle, the thing that holds people together – eventually those countries find themselves consumed by civil war or external war. Check the history books.

The fact that technology cannot be put back in a bottle, so we're stuck with the fact that we now live close together and populations are going to be moving, and environmental challenges are not going to go away on their own, so that the only way to effectively address problems like climate change or mass migration or pandemic disease will be to develop systems for more international cooperation, not less.

We have a better story to tell. But to say that our vision for the future is better is not to say that it will inevitably win. Because history also shows the power of fear. History shows the lasting hold of greed and the desire to dominate others in the minds of men. Especially men. History shows how easily people can be convinced to turn on those who look different, or worship God in a different way. So if we're truly to continue Madiba's long walk towards freedom, we're going to have to work harder and we're going to have to be smarter. We're going to have to learn from the mistakes of the recent past. And so in the brief time remaining, let me just suggest a few guideposts for the road ahead, guideposts that draw from Madiba's work, his words, the lessons of his life.

First, Madiba shows those of us who believe in freedom and democracy we are going to have to fight harder to reduce inequality and promote lasting economic opportunity for all people.

Now, I don't believe in economic determinism. Human beings don't live on bread alone. But they need bread. And history shows that societies which tolerate vast differences in wealth feed resentments and reduce solidarity and actually grow more slowly; and that once people achieve more than mere subsistence, then they're measuring their well-being by how they compare to their neighbors, and whether their children can expect to live a better life. And when economic power is concentrated in the hands of the few, history also shows that political power is sure to follow – and that dynamic eats away at democracy. Sometimes it may be straight-out corruption, but sometimes it may not involve the exchange of money; it's just folks who are that wealthy get what they want, and it undermines human freedom.

And Madiba understood this. This is not new. He warned us about this. He said: "Where globalization means, as it so often does, that the rich and the powerful now have new means to further enrich and empower themselves at the cost of the poorer and the weaker, [then] we have a responsibility to protest in the name of universal freedom." That's what he said. So if we are serious about universal freedom today, if we care about social justice today, then we have a

responsibility to do something about it. And I would respectfully amend what Madiba said. I don't do it often, but I'd say it's not enough for us to protest; we're going to have to build, we're going to have to innovate, we're going to have to figure out how do we close this widening chasm of wealth and opportunity both within countries and between them.

And how we achieve this is going to vary country to country, and I know your new president is committed to rolling up his sleeves and trying to do so. But we can learn from the last 70 years that it will not involve unregulated, unbridled, unethical capitalism. It also won't involve old-style command-and-control socialism from the top. That was tried; it didn't work very well. For almost all countries, progress is going to depend on an inclusive market-based system – one that offers education for every child; that protects collective bargaining and secures the rights of every worker; that breaks up monopolies to encourage competition in small and medium-sized businesses; and has laws that root out corruption and ensures fair dealing in business; that maintains some form of progressive taxation so that rich people are still rich but they're giving a little bit back to make sure that everybody else has something to pay for universal health care and retirement security; and invests in infrastructure and scientific research that builds platforms for innovation.

I should add, by the way, right now I'm actually surprised by how much money I got, and let me tell you something: I don't have half as much as most of these folks or a tenth or a hundredth. There's only so much you can eat. There's only so big a house you can have. There's only so many nice trips you can take. I mean, it's enough. You don't have to take a vow of poverty just to say, "Well, let me help out and let a few of the other folks – let me look at that child out there who doesn't have enough to eat or needs some school fees, let me help him out. I'll pay a little more in taxes. It's okay. I can afford it." I mean, it shows a poverty of ambition to just want to take more and more and more, instead of saying, "Wow, I've got so much. Who can I help? How can I give more and more and more?" That's ambition. That's impact. That's influence. What an amazing gift to be able to help people, not just yourself. Where was I? I ad-libbed. You get the point.

It involves promoting an inclusive capitalism both within nations and between nations. And as we pursue, for example, the Sustainable Development Goals, we have to get past the charity mindset. We've got to bring more resources to the forgotten pockets of the world through investment and entrepreneurship, because there is talent everywhere in the world if given an opportunity.

When it comes to the international system of commerce and trade, it's legitimate for poorer countries to continue to seek access to wealthier markets. And by the way, wealthier markets, that's not the big problem that you're having – that a small African country is sending you tea and flowers. That's not your biggest economic challenge. It's also proper for advanced economies like the United States to insist on reciprocity from nations like China that are no longer solely poor countries, to make sure that they're providing access to their markets and

that they stop taking intellectual property and hacking our servers.

But even as there are discussions to be had around trade and commerce, it's important to recognize this reality: while the outsourcing of jobs from north to south, from east to west, while a lot of that was a dominant trend in the late 20th century, the biggest challenge to workers in countries like mine today is technology. And the biggest challenge for your new president when we think about how we're going to employ more people here is going to be also technology, because artificial intelligence is here and it is accelerating, and you're going to have driverless cars, and you're going to have more and more automated services, and that's going to make the job of giving everybody work that is meaningful tougher, and we're going to have to be more imaginative, and the pace of change is going to require us to do more fundamental reimagining of our social and political arrangements, to protect the economic security and the dignity that comes with a job. It's not just money that a job provides; it provides dignity and structure and a sense of place and a sense of purpose. And so we're going to have to consider new ways of thinking about these problems, like a universal income, review of our workweek, how we retrain our young people, how we make everybody an entrepreneur at some level. But we're going to have to worry about economics if we want to get democracy back on track.

Second, Madiba teaches us that some principles really are universal – and the most important one is the principle that we are bound together by a common humanity and that each individual has inherent dignity and worth.

Now, it's surprising that we have to affirm this truth today. More than a quarter century after Madiba walked out of prison, I still have to stand here at a lecture and devote some time to saying that black people and white people and Asian people and Latin American people and women and men and gays and straights, that we are all human, that our differences are superficial, and that we should treat each other with care and respect. I would have thought we would have figured that out by now. I thought that basic notion was well established. But it turns out, as we're seeing in this recent drift into reactionary politics, that the struggle for basic justice is never truly finished. So we've got to constantly be on the lookout and fight for people who seek to elevate themselves by putting somebody else down. And by the way, we also have to actively resist – this is important, particularly in some countries in Africa like my own father's homeland; I've made this point before – we have to resist the notion that basic human rights like freedom to dissent, or the right of women to fully participate in the society, or the right of minorities to equal treatment, or the rights of people not to be beat up and jailed because of their sexual orientation – we have to be careful not to say that somehow, well, that doesn't apply to us, that those are Western ideas rather than universal imperatives.

Again, Madiba, he anticipated things. He knew what he was talking about. In 1964, before he received the sentence that condemned him to die in prison, he explained from the dock that, "The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world." In other words, he didn't say well, those books

weren't written by South Africans so I just – I can't claim them. No, he said that's part of my inheritance. That's part of the human inheritance. That applies here in this country, to me, and to you. And that's part of what gave him the moral authority that the apartheid regime could never claim, because he was more familiar with their best values than they were. He had read their documents more carefully than they had. And he went on to say, "Political division based on color is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one color group by another." That's Nelson Mandela speaking in 1964, when I was three years old.

What was true then remains true today. Basic truths do not change. It is a truth that can be embraced by the English, and by the Indian, and by the Mexican and by the Bantu and by the Luo and by the American. It is a truth that lies at the heart of every world religion – that we should do unto others as we would have them do unto us. That we see ourselves in other people. That we can recognize common hopes and common dreams. And it is a truth that is incompatible with any form of discrimination based on race or religion or gender or sexual orientation. And it is a truth that, by the way, when embraced, actually delivers practical benefits, since it ensures that a society can draw upon the talents and energy and skill of all its people. And if you doubt that, just ask the French football team that just won the World Cup. Because not all of those folks – not all of those folks look like Gauls to me. But they're French. They're French.

Embracing our common humanity does not mean that we have to abandon our unique ethnic and national and religious identities. Madiba never stopped being proud of his tribal heritage. He didn't stop being proud of being a black man and being a South African. But he believed, as I believe, that you can be proud of your heritage without denigrating those of a different heritage. In fact, you dishonor your heritage. It would make me think that you're a little insecure about your heritage if you've got to put somebody else's heritage down. Yeah, that's right. Don't you get a sense sometimes – again, I'm ad-libbing here – that these people who are so intent on putting people down and puffing themselves up that they're small-hearted, that there's something they're just afraid of. Madiba knew that we cannot claim justice for ourselves when it's only reserved for some. Madiba understood that we can't say we've got a just society simply because we replaced the color of the person on top of an unjust system, so the person looks like us even though they're doing the same stuff, and somehow now we've got justice. That doesn't work. It's not justice if now you're on top, so I'm going to do the same thing that those folks were doing to me and now I'm going to do it to you. That's not justice. "I detest racialism," he said, "whether it comes from a black man or a white man."

Now, we have to acknowledge that there is disorientation that comes from rapid change and modernization, and the fact that the world has shrunk, and we're going to have to find ways to lessen the fears of those who feel threatened. In the West's current debate around immigration, for example, it's not wrong to insist that national borders matter; whether you're a citizen or not is going to matter to a government, that laws need to be followed; that in the public realm newcomers should make an effort to adapt to the language and customs of their new home.

Those are legitimate things and we have to be able to engage people who do feel as if things are not orderly. But that can't be an excuse for immigration policies based on race, or ethnicity, or religion. There's got to be some consistency. And we can enforce the law while respecting the essential humanity of those who are striving for a better life. For a mother with a child in her arms, we can recognize that could be somebody in our family, that could be my child.

Third, Madiba reminds us that democracy is about more than just elections.

When he was freed from prison, Madiba's popularity – well, you couldn't even measure it. He could have been president for life. Am I wrong? Who was going to run against him? I mean, Ramaphosa was popular, but come on. Plus he was a young – he was too young. Had he chose, Madiba could have governed by executive fiat, unconstrained by check and balances. But instead he helped guide South Africa through the drafting of a new Constitution, drawing from all the institutional practices and democratic ideals that had proven to be most sturdy, mindful of the fact that no single individual possesses a monopoly on wisdom. No individual – not Mandela, not Obama – are entirely immune to the corrupting influences of absolute power, if you can do whatever you want and everyone's too afraid to tell you when you're making a mistake. No one is immune from the dangers of that.

Mandela understood this. He said, "Democracy is based on the majority principle. This is especially true in a country such as ours where the vast majority have been systematically denied their rights. At the same time, democracy also requires the rights of political and other minorities be safeguarded." He understood it's not just about who has the most votes. It's also about the civic culture that we build that makes democracy work.

So we have to stop pretending that countries that just hold an election where sometimes the winner somehow magically gets 90 percent of the vote because all the opposition is locked up, or can't get on TV, is a democracy. Democracy depends on strong institutions and it's about minority rights and checks and balances, and freedom of speech and freedom of expression and a free press, and the right to protest and petition the government, and an independent judiciary, and everybody having to follow the law.

And yes, democracy can be messy, and it can be slow, and it can be frustrating. I know, I promise. But the efficiency that's offered by an autocrat, that's a false promise. Don't take that one, because it leads invariably to more consolidation of wealth at the top and power at the top, and it makes it easier to conceal corruption and abuse. For all its imperfections, real democracy best upholds the idea that government exists to serve the individual and not the other way around. And it is the only form of government that has the possibility of making that idea real.

So for those of us who are interested in strengthening democracy, let's also stop – it's time for us to stop paying all of our attention to the world's capitals and the centers of power and to start

focusing more on the grassroots, because that's where democratic legitimacy comes from. Not from the top down, not from abstract theories, not just from experts, but from the bottom up. Knowing the lives of those who are struggling.

As a community organizer, I learned as much from a laid-off steel worker in Chicago or a single mom in a poor neighborhood that I visited as I learned from the finest economists in the Oval Office. Democracy means being in touch and in tune with life as it's lived in our communities, and that's what we should expect from our leaders, and it depends upon cultivating leaders at the grassroots who can help bring about change and implement it on the ground and can tell leaders in fancy buildings, this isn't working down here.

And to make democracy work, Madiba shows us that we also have to keep teaching our children, and ourselves – and this is really hard – to engage with people not only who look different but who hold different views. This is hard.

Most of us prefer to surround ourselves with opinions that validate what we already believe. You notice the people who you think are smart are the people who agree with you. Funny how that works. But democracy demands that we're able also to get inside the reality of people who are different than us so we can understand their point of view. Maybe we can change their minds, but maybe they'll change ours. And you can't do this if you just out of hand disregard what your opponents have to say from the start. And you can't do it if you insist that those who aren't like you – because they're white, or because they're male – that somehow there's no way they can understand what I'm feeling, that somehow they lack standing to speak on certain matters.

Madiba, he lived this complexity. In prison, he studied Afrikaans so that he could better understand the people who were jailing him. And when he got out of prison, he extended a hand to those who had jailed him, because he knew that they had to be a part of the democratic South Africa that he wanted to build. "To make peace with an enemy," he wrote, "one must work with that enemy, and that enemy becomes one's partner."

So those who traffic in absolutes when it comes to policy, whether it's on the left or the right, they make democracy unworkable. You can't expect to get 100 percent of what you want all the time; sometimes, you have to compromise. That doesn't mean abandoning your principles, but instead it means holding on to those principles and then having the confidence that they're going to stand up to a serious democratic debate. That's how America's Founders intended our system to work – that through the testing of ideas and the application of reason and proof it would be possible to arrive at a basis for common ground.

And I should add for this to work, we have to actually believe in an objective reality. This is another one of these things that I didn't have to lecture about. You have to believe in facts. Without facts, there is no basis for cooperation. If I say this is a podium and you say this is an

elephant, it's going to be hard for us to cooperate. I can find common ground for those who oppose the Paris Accords because, for example, they might say, well, it's not going to work, you can't get everybody to cooperate, or they might say it's more important for us to provide cheap energy for the poor, even if it means in the short term that there's more pollution. At least I can have a debate with them about that and I can show them why I think clean energy is the better path, especially for poor countries, that you can leapfrog old technologies. I can't find common ground if somebody says climate change is just not happening, when almost all of the world's scientists tell us it is. I don't know where to start talking to you about this. If you start saying it's an elaborate hoax, I don't know what to, where do we start?

Unfortunately, too much of politics today seems to reject the very concept of objective truth. People just make stuff up. They just make stuff up. We see it in state-sponsored propaganda; we see it in internet driven fabrications, we see it in the blurring of lines between news and entertainment, we see the utter loss of shame among political leaders where they're caught in a lie and they just double down and they lie some more. Politicians have always lied, but it used to be if you caught them lying they'd be like, "Oh man." Now they just keep on lying.

By the way, this is what I think Mama Graça was talking about in terms of maybe some sense of humility that Madiba felt, like sometimes just basic stuff, me not completely lying to people seems pretty basic, I don't think of myself as a great leader just because I don't completely make stuff up. You'd think that was a base line. Anyway, we see it in the promotion of anti-intellectualism and the rejection of science from leaders who find critical thinking and data somehow politically inconvenient. And, as with the denial of rights, the denial of facts runs counter to democracy, it could be its undoing, which is why we must zealously protect independent media; and we have to guard against the tendency for social media to become purely a platform for spectacle, outrage, or disinformation; and we have to insist that our schools teach critical thinking to our young people, not just blind obedience.

Which, I'm sure you are thankful for, leads to my final point: we have to follow Madiba's example of persistence and of hope.

It is tempting to give in to cynicism: to believe that recent shifts in global politics are too powerful to push back; that the pendulum has swung permanently. Just as people spoke about the triumph of democracy in the 90s, now you are hearing people talk about end of democracy and the triumph of tribalism and the strong man. We have to resist that cynicism.

Because, we've been through darker times, we've been in lower valleys and deeper valleys. Yes, by the end of his life, Madiba embodied the successful struggle for human rights, but the journey was not easy, it wasn't pre-ordained. The man went to prison for almost three decades. He split limestone in the heat, he slept in a small cell, and was repeatedly put in solitary confinement. And I remember talking to some of his former colleagues saying how they hadn't realized when they were released, just the sight of a child, the idea of holding a child, they had

missed – it wasn't something available to them, for decades.

And yet his power actually grew during those years – and the power of his jailers diminished, because he knew that if you stick to what's true, if you know what's in your heart, and you're willing to sacrifice for it, even in the face of overwhelming odds, that it might not happen tomorrow, it might not happen in the next week, it might not even happen in your lifetime. Things may go backwards for a while, but ultimately, right makes might, not the other way around, ultimately, the better story can win out and as strong as Madiba's spirit may have been, he would not have sustained that hope had he been alone in the struggle, part of buoyed him up was that he knew that each year, the ranks of freedom fighters were replenishing, young men and women, here in South African, in the ANC and beyond; black and Indian and white, from across the countryside, across the continent, around the world, who in those most difficult days would keep working on behalf of his vision.

And that's what we need right now, we don't just need one leader, we don't just need one inspiration, what we badly need right now is that collective spirit. And, I know that those young people, those hope carriers are gathering around the world. Because history shows that whenever progress is threatened, and the things we care about most are in question, we should heed the words of Robert Kennedy – spoken here in South Africa, he said, "Our answer is the world's hope: it is to rely on youth. It's to rely on the spirit of the young."

So, young people, who are in the audience, who are listening, my message to you is simple, keep believing, keep marching, keep building, keep raising your voice. Every generation has the opportunity to remake the world. Mandela said, "Young people are capable, when aroused, of bringing down the towers of oppression and raising the banners of freedom." Now is a good time to be aroused. Now is a good time to be fired up.

And, for those of us who care about the legacy that we honor here today – about equality and dignity and democracy and solidarity and kindness, those of us who remain young at heart, if not in body – we have an obligation to help our youth succeed. Some of you know, here in South Africa, my Foundation is convening over the last few days, two hundred young people from across this continent who are doing the hard work of making change in their communities; who reflect Madiba's values, who are poised to lead the way.

People like Abaas Mpindi, a journalist from Uganda, who founded the Media Challenge Initiative, to help other young people get the training they need to tell the stories that the world needs to know.

People like Caren Wakoli, an entrepreneur from Kenya, who founded the Emerging Leaders Foundation to get young people involved in the work of fighting poverty and promoting human dignity.

People like Enock Nkulanga, who directs the African Children's mission, which helps children in Uganda and Kenya get the education that they need and then in his spare time, Enock advocates for the rights of children around the globe, and founded an organization called LeadMinds Africa, which does exactly what it says.

You meet these people, you talk to them, they will give you hope. They are taking the baton, they know they can't just rest on the accomplishments of the past, even the accomplishments of those as momentous as Nelson Mandela's. They stand on the shoulders of those who came before, including that young black boy born 100 years ago, but they know that it is now their turn to do the work.

Madiba reminds us that: "No one is born hating another person because of the color of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart." Love comes more naturally to the human heart, let's remember that truth. Let's see it as our North Star, let's be joyful in our struggle to make that truth manifest here on earth so that in 100 years from now, future generations will look back and say, "they kept the march going, that's why we live under new banners of freedom." Thank you very much, South Africa, thank you.

# Environmental Stressors on Migration within Guatemala

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## ABSTRACT

*The paper examines the intersection of environmental stress factors on net migration within Guatemala. This paper begins by discussing the institutions within Guatemala (both formal and informal) and a brief historical account of Guatemala and its property rights to provide context to the study. Environmental variables available to test the hypothesis were Guatemalan average temperature, average precipitation, and deforestation rates over a fifteen-year period from 2000-2015. Control variables that historically explain migration were included in the study such as GDP per capita, unemployment rates, and homicide rates in order to effectively analyze these control variables against the theoretical variables to test which may have a relationship with migration within Guatemala. The study found that average temperature, average precipitation, and deforestation displayed a relationship with net migration out of Guatemala. This study will inform future policymakers on essential variables not conventionally accounted for when studying migration.*

## Introduction

Conflict and violence within Guatemala are as old as the country itself. Since the arrival of the Spanish in 1524, Guatemala has endured tumultuous internal strife. Guatemalan conflict is rooted in *land* — essentially who is in control of it. Land control has shifted throughout Guatemala's history, whether it be a result of newly arriving Spanish conquistadors who enslaved Mayan communities and seized their land in the sixteenth century, or commercial coffee plantations, banana exporters, and international mining companies that drove off their small plots in the twenty-first century. Today, one major consequence of internal strife within Guatemala is northern migration, posing policy challenges around border enforcement and immigration politics inside Mexico and the United States. This paper contributes to discussions of regional migration by examining the intersection of Guatemalan political institutions, domestic societal conflict, and migration north with a review of consensus or mainstream approaches to migration as well as an analysis of new causal factors linked to

environmental stress factors. Conventional wisdom tends to tie Guatemalan migration to *pull factors* in the form of an insatiable demand for cheap labor in the United States as well as the dynamics of chain migration. This study, however, emphasizes *push factors*, specifically issues associated with climate change. No doubt pull and push factors weigh on Guatemalan migration but it is our sense that relevant policymakers and stakeholders underestimate the impact of environmental pressures and degradation on Guatemalan society, and that soon the term *climate refugee* will become commonplace.

In analyzing migration patterns of individuals out of their native lands, the effects of environmental stress factors are often overlooked. Human induced environmental stressors — polluted waterways, deforestation, soil erosion, extensive population growth — are essential to understanding the underlying causes of conflict.

In 1994, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), identified the state of the world's refugees as a result of four major causes. These causes included: political instability, economic tensions, ethnic conflict, and environmental degradation.<sup>1</sup> The UNHCR included environmental degradation as one of the four major causes after a growing number of studies discussed the link between environmental degradation population movement. “Jacobson (1988) notes that, “environmental refugees have become the single largest class of displaced persons in the world.”<sup>2</sup>

Institutions and policies within a nation are affected by environmental stressors, thus making the topic crucial to analyze. Contextual factors such as institutions are important to analyze in determining whether nations will respond effectively to the impacts of scarcity.<sup>3</sup> The goal is to gauge the human-induced environmental stressors on conflict within Guatemala in relation to the traditional theories surrounding migration. This paper will discuss a new variable that is likely to affect Guatemala's institutional structures: environmental change. The prediction is that environmental change over time will impact Guatemala's institutions by causing pressures that are expected to create an uptick in migration over time. As time progresses, migration will swell with increasing environmental stressors.

## INSTITUTIONS

Why do institutions matter? The neo-classical theory that rational decision making alone can govern favorable outcomes in a market system is not entirely true according to Douglas

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1 Steve Lonergan, *The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement*, (University of Victoria, 1995), 5.

2 *Ibid.*, 5

3 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 85.



North, a Nobel Prize winner for his work on economic history and development. The human experience varies among individuals in different societies. Institutions are in place to generate constraints on human decision making based on the notion that humans use mental models to formulate choices. Without institutions, there would be no regulator on human decision making. Thus, institutions help determine efficiency within societies.<sup>4</sup>

Institutions are constraints that structure societal interactions. They consist of both informal constraints (norms, taboos, customs, traditions) and formal constraints (rule of law, property rights) that dictate political, economic, and social interplay within a society.<sup>5</sup> North's institutions are "contractual arrangements between principals and agents, made to maximize wealth."<sup>6</sup> The interplay between organizations and the institutions that constrain them are essential to the understanding of how societies function. North says, "together formal rules, informal constraints, and the ways by which they are enforced, define the whole character of human interaction and therefore make up the institutional matrix which defines the set of choices available to individuals as far as the humanly devised constraints upon which humans beings go."<sup>7</sup> These constraints allow individuals to set forth what decisions they can make in the "institutional matrix."<sup>8</sup>

When observing any particular society, one must first look towards the formal and informal constraints within it to better understand the way in which the society functions. In Guatemala, the formal constraints, such as property rights, are essential to understanding the way in which Guatemala functions.

#### GUATEMALA'S FORMAL RULES

The persistence of inequality within Guatemalan land ownership continues to threaten the country's stability. Guatemala's largest 2.5% of farms occupy two thirds of agricultural land while 90% of the farms take up only one sixth of the agricultural land. Moreover, indigenous Guatemalans make up 43% of the population and land tenure insecurity within Guatemala is considered one of the fundamental causes of poverty among this group. The rural population makes up 52% of Guatemala's total population (80% are indigenous Mayans). Today, three quarters of the rural population live in poverty, largely resulting from the country's history of ethnic marginalization and geographic isolation. The Guatemalan government's inability

4 Douglas C. North, *Institutions*, (The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991).

5 Douglas C. North, "Final Remarks-Institutional Change and Economic History," (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1989), 240.

6 Douglas C. North, "Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History," (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1984).

7 Douglas C. North, "Final Remarks-Institutional Change and Economic History," 240.

8 Ibid., 240.

to resolve land disputes and create effectual ways to allocate land has led to increasingly diminished investment. The lack of effective regulatory mechanisms also reduces the potential contribution of agriculture in creating improvements in rural living standards and economic growth.<sup>9</sup>

Today, Guatemala continues to lack basic land laws that describe land tenure types and that address indigenous rights to land. The lack of law and regulation make land conflict a challenge to resolve and thus leaves indigenous people with a lack of any mechanism in which to obtain legal rights regarding land interests.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, women are prevented from legal rights to land due to a patriarchal system still strongly present today.<sup>11</sup>

Distorted land distribution patterns, rural poverty, and income inequality have historically been present in Guatemala. The 36-year Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996) was rooted in land related issues. Yet, even after the 1996 Peace Agreement, which tempted to address land related issues, change has been insignificant. Guatemala continues to house the most inequitable and concentrated land distribution of ownership in all of Central America.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, a long-standing landed oligarchy continues to control massive tracts of the most fertile land in addition to maintaining political influence over land and labor issues within Guatemala.<sup>13</sup> As a result, sustenance farmers, the majority of Guatemala's farmers, cultivate only small parcels of land in increasingly eroded hillsides (as Guatemala's population continues to grow). The most impoverished regions of farmland, the northwestern and western departments, show the highest density of indigenous populations and the highest poverty and social marginalization rates. Regions with the most food insecurity are those comprised nearly entirely of indigenous populations. Likewise, Guatemala's Mayan majority have the lowest per capita income in the region. Guatemala, a nation enormously dependent on agriculture production, is the third highest in the world in malnutrition levels.<sup>14</sup>

#### GUATEMALA'S INFORMAL RULES

Informal constraints are observable and practiced by individuals within a society. They are

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9 Global Faculty for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, "Vulnerability, Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change: Guatemala," (The World Bank Group, Washington DC, 2011), 14.

10 Ibid., 14.

11 Ibid., 15.

12 Ibid., 16.

13 Ibid., 16.

14 Global Faculty for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, "Vulnerability, Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change: Guatemala," (The World Bank Group, Washington DC, 2011), 16.

essential to analyze when considering the social, economic, and political interplay within a nation. For example, a formal rule that forces individuals pay taxes is written into law but whether or not individuals actually adhere to this law is even more crucial to study. Each society differs in their norms and practices regardless of transcribed rules. Using a scenario of street lights and intersections can be used to demonstrate the varying of informal rules within nations. At a four-way intersection in the United States, each car will stop when the street light turns red ahead of them just as the cars whose light is green will proceed on. Douglas North would ask, why is it that cars stop when the light turns red even though there may be no oncoming cars perpendicular to them? In a society like the United States, the norm is that each individual expects the others to follow the rules of the road, which is to stop at red and go at green. Douglas North would say that this is because most individuals in the US care about their community and believe that others will follow as they do. As such, that individual will follow the transcribed rules of the road to fit in with other individuals who think the same. Individuals in the US will even stop at red when no cars are coming and when there is no third party examining their behavior (i.e. a law enforcer) because the norm is that the transcribed rules are followed by all others.

#### BRIEF HISTORY OF GUATEMALA

Before delving into the environmental pressures and their effects on Guatemala's institutions, it is essential to first understand Guatemala's political, economic, and social history. Prior to the Spanish invasion in 1523, the Mayan civilization which inhabits modern day Guatemala spanned from Chiapas in the Yucatan to El Salvador and Honduras. Pedro de Alvarado's arrival in 1524 with 250 men led to the reform of the political, economic, religious, social, and territorial structure, turning it into the Spanish Kingdom of Guatemala. The Spanish invasion of Guatemala supplied the Spanish crown with textiles, cocoa, and dyes.

Guatemala's history from 1839 to 1945 surrounded primarily around military dictatorships, the pronounced influence of the Catholic Church, and an oligarchy of European descendants. These powerful groups established themselves within Guatemala's capital. The elites focused mainly on securing property of natural resources.<sup>15</sup> During the Cold War era, the anti-communist movement headed by the United States culminated in a coup in Guatemala. This plunged Guatemala into its 36-year long Civil War. The conflict ended with a Peace Agreement signed in 1996.<sup>16</sup> During this conflict estimates calculated that 130,000 to 200,000 people died, 50,00 disappeared, 100,000 became refugees, and about one million were displaced.

Despite the promises and commitments brought on by the 1996 Peace Agreements, few have

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15 Ana Maria Mendez, "A Brief Introduction to the History of Guatemala," (Operation Dagsverke, 2016).

16 Ibid.

come to fruition. The most vulnerable and marginalized groups continue to suffer. Access to land, opportunity, and recognition of equal rights continue to plague the country for indigenous and poor populations.<sup>17</sup> The indigenous Guatemalans have historically and continue to face the most hardship of any ethnic group in Guatemala.

#### Theory

##### TRADITIONAL VIEWS ON MIGRATION & CONFLICT

When examining a country's pattern of migration, experts often look to factors of economics, inequality, and security as tools to explain such phenomenon. According to Lonergan, it is problematic "to remove environmental processes from the social, economic, and political institutional structures of which they are a part."<sup>18</sup>

Security is a key factor to consider as well as migration out of a country. Guatemala, in the last several decades, has become a major thoroughway for drug trafficking as it bridges South America to Mexico and finally to the United States. The U.S. Department of State found that an estimated 60% of cocaine passing through Central America en route to the U.S. is transited through Guatemala. As a result, drug networks in association with Colombian and Mexican drug organizations have been established in Guatemala since the 1990s. Drug trafficking is linked to other illicit activity that creates security concerns within Guatemala including gang violence, kidnapping, money laundering, smuggling of arms, and murder. According to Duilia Mora Turner, before the 1990s and the establishment of drug networks within Guatemala, gang violence was more frequently seen on a local level, whereas today gang violence is seen increasingly widespread as a national threat.<sup>19</sup>

Morrison and May assert that economics have been a major factor in Guatemalan migration. Economic factors, such as high levels of unemployment rates or GDP per capita, are often cited as major push factors in migration out of nations. In Guatemala's economic history, the greatest violence has occurred in three different periods of economic innovation and modernization: the conquest, the liberal era, and the military dictatorships of the post-revolutionary period. The tie between economic modernization and social violence are studied thoroughly within Guatemala. Such strife can be seen as a push factor in migration out of the country.<sup>20</sup>

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17 Ana Maria Mendez., "A Brief Introduction to the History of Guatemala," (Operation Dagsverke, 2016).

18 Steve Lonergan, *The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement*, (University of Victoria, 1995), 6.

19 Duilia Mora Turner, "Root Causes of Violence in Post-Civil War Guatemala: A literature Review," (E-International Relations, 2015).

20 Andrew R. Morrison, Rachel A. May, "Escape from Terror: Violence and Migration in Post-Revolutionary Guatemala," (Latin American Research Review, 1994).

According to Davin, economic migration is triggered by the belief that a better economic opportunity exists in another location. This notion is coupled with the belief that regional and local economies that exist in the current location are insufficient. As a result, migration is seen as the favorable option. Davin explains that poverty, lack of economic opportunity, land shortage, and low living standards serve as possible push factors while property, opportunity, and employment act as pull factors. This economic migration model is typically used to explain migration patterns.<sup>21</sup>

Morrison and May provide a historical explanation for violence within Guatemala in regards to racial and ethnic tensions that have persisted over time. Violence within Guatemala has been relatively constant since colonial times where violence has been motivated largely by racial and ethnic pressures brought on by Hispanic and European colonizers who subjugated the indigenous Mayan majority. This oppressive relationship has fostered a long history of resistance and uprising from the indigenous populations and exacerbated paranoia by elites who seek to preserve their power in Guatemalan society.<sup>22</sup>

#### ENVIRONMENTAL FOCUS

Before discussing the environment and its effects on Guatemala migration, first the nuances of the issue must be clarified. Clark Gray and Richard Bilborrow provide two pathways for environmental influences on population migration, the *fast* pathway and the *slow* pathway. The *fast* pathway occurs after a rapid environmental change. For example, a natural disaster like a massive hurricane would cause immediate harm to populations. These events cause rapid migration due to unpredictable exposure to risk, leading to a loss of assets or income. The *slow* pathway is not only less studied in literature studies but also more difficult to define and to measure. The *slow* pathway is characterized by factors such as land quality degradation and long-term climate changes that adversely affect assets and the production of resources. Gray and Bilborrow attest that the *slow* pathway affects more people over a longer period of time and has received less attention in literature given that its effects although more disastrous, are less extreme.<sup>23</sup> This paper will examine the ways in which the *slow* pathway may cause Guatemalans to migrate outside of their native land.

Next, what kind of environmental resources will this paper be looking at? Natural resources can be divided into two categories: renewable and nonrenewable resources. Nonrenewable

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21 D. Davin, *Why People Migrate. In: Internal Migration in Contemporary China*, (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).

22 Andrew R. Morrison, Rachel A. May, "Escape from Terror," (Latin American Research Review, 1994)

23 Clark Gray and Richard Bilborrow, "Environmental Influences on Human Migration in Rural Ecuador," (US National Library of Medicine National Institute of Health, 2013).

resources include substances such as oil or mineral whereas renewables are resources such as freshwater, fertile soil, and forests. According to Homer-Dixon, nonrenewable are characterized by stock, the total amount available for consumption. A renewable resource has stock and flow or, "the incremental addition to, or restoration of, the stock per unit of time."<sup>24</sup>

This paper will focus on resource scarcity regarding renewable resources. Homer-Dixon defines scarcity in three ways: the increase in demand for resources, the decrease in supply of resources, and the change in the relative access of different groups to certain resources.<sup>25</sup> Understanding the concept of "environmental scarcity" is essential in better understating its importance as it interacts with political, economic, and social factors within societies. Homer-Dixon defines environmental scarcity as the scarcity of renewable resources that arise from depletion or degradation and from unequal distributions.<sup>26</sup> Renewable resources are those that can be used recurrently and are replaced naturally. Problems arise when renewable resources are depleted or degraded faster than they can be naturally renewed. Examples of this include deforestation and forest resources, polluted waterways and the access clean water, in addition to climate change and rainfall patterns on farmers' yields.<sup>27</sup>

The depletion and unequal distribution of renewable resources customarily harm developing nations more than developed nations. This is because developing nations tend to rely more on natural resources. Moreover, developing nations are usually less able to buffer themselves from the effects of environmental stressors.<sup>28</sup>

#### THE ENVIRONMENT IN GUATEMALA

Guatemala's forest system is experiencing a rapid annual rate of deforestation and is thus losing its economic value, suffering from forest fires, agricultural expansion, wildlife poaching, and large scale development projects.<sup>29</sup> Guatemala is home to one of the most biologically diverse forests systems in all of Central America, where 2.8 million hectares of forest are protected by the government (Guatemalan Protected Areas System). Rapid deforestation has occurred in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, the largest protected area in Mesoamerica, as a result of forest fires, poaching, poorly planned development, and unsustainable agricultural expansion.

Deforestation is seen as an environmental stressor as it threatens biodiversity, increases the

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24 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, 47.

25 Ibid., 48.

26 Ibid., 8.

27 Ibid., 9.

28 Ibid., 12.

29 Global Faculty for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, "Vulnerability, Risk Reduction and Adaptation," 13.

occurrence of flooding and sedimentation, and reduces water quality. Guatemalan deforestation rates ranged from 54,000 ha to 90,000 ha in the last decade — three times the average for Latin American and the Caribbean and more than that of Mexico and Brazil.<sup>30</sup> Observing the increased deforestation rates on factors that directly affect the population is critical to analyze as it relates to population mobility.

In developing nations, agricultural productivity is considered the most potentially worrisome effect of environmental stressors. Food security continues to be a key problem facing developing nations. Two factors in which agricultural productivity is dependent upon is average temperatures and average precipitation. Many poor populations are heavily dependent on the price of food and are thus vulnerable to the increases in food prices that occur during a shortfall in production. For example, the change in global weather patterns in turn effects the soil and yield, which can create less food and in turn, increase the price of food.

According to Thomas Homer-Dixon, the effects of global warming is likely to impact agricultural productivity worldwide.<sup>31</sup> The change in weather patterns, rising sea levels and intensified storm may influence croplands particularly vulnerable to environmental changes. For example, the greenhouse effect may manipulate precipitation patterns and soil moisture. Even deforestation may contribute to changing agricultural productivity since logging and land clearing practices have been linked to soil erosion, a change in precipitation patterns, and a decrease in land's ability to retain water during rainy periods.<sup>32</sup> Agricultural productivity is directly related to the survival of populations, especially low income, and may contribute to population mobilization.

## ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS ON CONFLICT AND MIGRATION

Homer-Dixon exemplifies the idea that environmental stress factors often do not create direct links to conflict using the 1994 Rwandan genocide. He cites that the Rwandan genocide has, on some accounts, been linked directly to the rapid population growth, severe land scarcity, and food shortages experienced within Rwanda that ultimately caused the genocide. This association does not hold up. Though the struggle for land in Rwanda's peasant society and growing birth rates caused major pressure within the country, analysis shows that the genocide arose mainly from a conventional struggle among elites for control of the Rwandan state. Land scarcity played at most a peripheral role by reducing regime legitimacy in the countryside and restricting alternatives for elite enrichment outside the government.<sup>33</sup> Here, the environment aided in exacerbating the existing political, economic, and social challenges already present

30 Ibid., 13.

31 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, 81.

32 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, 81.

33 Ibid., 17.

within Rwanda. The growing population and infertile soil linked with land rights and racial tensions came to fruition with the 1994 genocide and mass refugee crises within Rwanda. The importance of context cannot be stressed enough. Merely linking environmental stressors to violence is not an accurate portrayal of the whole story. Overlooking contextual factors can incorrectly turn simple correlations into causation.

This paper will discuss links of environmental scarcity to migration, specifically environmental stressors on net migration out of Guatemala over a fifteen-year period. Yet, it is often noted by researchers in the study of the environment and migration that finding direct links to environmental stress factors on migration is not usually clear. Often, environmental stresses play a peripheral role in the tangled convoluted road to conflict and migration. Yet, this paper will focus on how environmental stressors contribute to migration rates. Research asserts that environmental scarcity often reacts with other factors – economic, political, and social – to cause conflict. There is rarely solely one factor that contributes to the migration of populations.

## Research Design

This analysis will include two OLS multivariate regression tests to explain variances in migration on environmental stress factors to determine how much of an effect environmental stress factors have on Guatemalan migration rates over 15 years (2000-2015). These years serve as the unit of analysis for this study. The dependent variables used in this analysis will be Guatemalan migration rates, obtained from the CIA World Factbook under the title “Net Migration rate (migrant(s) 1,000 population)”<sup>34</sup> To ensure accurate measurement of migration rates this model will utilize multiple variables as a measure of migration for better understanding of the effects of the independent variables on population mobilization.

There will also be seven independent variables overall, three of which will be of theoretical interest while the other four control variables. The variables of theoretical interest include: average temperature, average precipitation, population rate, and deforestation rate. The variables being controlled will be: Guatemala's annual GDP per capita, annual Unemployment, Guatemalan string of disasters, and annual homicide rates. Before further synopsis on methodology, a breakdown of each variable will be given to provide for further information of the variables used in these tests.

First of all, the variables used for theoretical argument, both average precipitation and average temperature for Guatemala, were obtained by the World Bank Group<sup>35</sup> which provided information data on historically annual temperature (in degrees Celsius) and rainfall (measured

34 “Central Intelligence Agency.” CIA - The World Factbook -- Field Listing: Government Type.

35 The World Bank, *Guatemala*. (Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2018).

in millimeters) during the period of 2000 to 2015. Looking at temperature and precipitation alterations over time can help explain possible changes in soil conditions associated with agricultural production as well as water availability. Deforestation rates annually were gathered from The World Bank's data under "Forest area (% of land area)" which was measured as forest area land under natural or planted strands of trees of at least five meters in situ, measured as weighted annual average.<sup>36</sup> Deforestation threatens biodiversity, increases the occurrence of flooding and sedimentation, and reduces water quality. A lack in the accurate collection and recording of environmental factors such as soil quality, water quality, drought rates, and productivity rates may affect the outcome of this study.

Next, there are the independent control variables that are also included in this analysis. The first of which is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. The data was retrieved from the World Bank. The second control variable is historical annual unemployment rates. This information was retrieved from the Food Security Portal<sup>37</sup>, the inclusion of this control variable is important because economic factors such as GDP<sup>38</sup> and unemployment rate are historically noted as primary push factors of outward migration. The third control variable is the "string of disasters" in 2010 in which Guatemala experienced major environmental disasters such as a volcanic eruption, tropical Storm Agatha, and the opening of a sizable sinkhole.<sup>39</sup> Controlling for this year is necessarily given that this analysis is not on major environmental shocks but rather of environmental degradation over time (all years will be labeled "0" except for 2010 the year of the disasters which will be labeled "1"). The last control variable will be homicide rates within Guatemala that the World Bank defines as "intentional homicides per 100,000 people."<sup>40</sup> This control variable is important because increased crime can influence migration if individuals believe there is a lack of security.

The methodology strategy will be varying multivariate regression models using migration as the dependent variables coupled with both the theoretical and control independent variables. The dependent variable is the net migration rate in Guatemala using the years from 2000-2015). Each of the two tests will account for the four theoretical variables (Average Temperature, Average Precipitation, and Deforestation measured as Forest Area) and the four control variables (GDP per capita, Unemployment, String of Disasters Event, and Homicide rates).

By utilizing a multivariate regression, one can formulate a hypothesis for the analysis:

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Michel Martin, "Guatemala Suffers String of Natural Disasters," (National Public Radio, June 2010).

40 The World Bank. *Guatemala*. (Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2018).

H0: *There is no relationship between migration rate with temperature, precipitation, and population within Guatemala.*

H1: *There will be an increase in migration out of Guatemala as temperatures increase, precipitation increases, and forest deforestation increases.*

#### FINDINGS

	Model 1	Model 2
Average Temperature	.715** (.690)	.630** (.609)
Average Precipitation	.003+ (.375)	.003+ (.362)
Forest Area	.110** (1.026)	
Unemployment	.069 (.251)	.054 (.196)
String of Disasters	-1.17 (-.139)	-.148 (-.176)
Intentional Homicides	-0.10+ (-.324)	-.015* (-.475)
GDP per capita		.000256*** (-.939)
Constant	-23.582**	-16.717
N	16	16
R2	.777	.802

\*\*\* = p < .001    \*\* = p < .01    \* = p < .05    + = p < .1

The results of the above multivariate linear regression analysis aim to model a response in the dependent variable as a function of the independent, or predictor values.

The R-Square value in Table 1 is 77.7%. This means that the model accounts for 77% of the variance. Model 1 accounted for all independent variables except for GDP (Average Temperature, Average Precipitation, Forest Area, Unemployment, String of Disasters, and

Intentional Homicides). This model showed no multicollinearity, meaning that none of the independent variables correlate. Thus, this model showed significance between several of the independent variables. Average Temperature held significance at the .05 level, demonstrating that with every one unit increase in average temperature within Guatemala in consecutive years, there is a .715 increase in Guatemala's net migration rate. This finding supports the hypothesis because it assumes that since net migration within Guatemala is negative (more people leaving than entering), as temperatures increase every year, there is an increase in net negative migration rates. It is possible that average temperature increases are related to an increase in migration out of Guatemala. Average Precipitation was significant at the .1 level and indicated that for every one unit increase in average precipitation within Guatemala for each consecutive year, there is a .003 increase in net migration. This supports the hypothesis that as average precipitation increases so does net migration out of Guatemala. Increases in precipitation rates every year effect agricultural productivity which is what most lower income populations (especially in developing nations) depend upon for survival. As average precipitation changes over time, crop yields are affected and food shortages can follow, ultimately leading to increased migration out of Guatemala.

The independent variable that held the greatest effect on the dependent variables was Forest Area which is measured at Guatemala's deforestation rate (Forest Area showed significance at the .05 level). For every unit increase in the percent of forest area (at a decreasing rate every year) within Guatemala there is a .110 increase in Guatemala's net migration. This finding supports the hypothesis given that as the percent of forest area decreases (deforestation increases), there is an increase in net migration out of Guatemala.

Model 1 suggested significance between intentional homicide rates and net migration within Guatemala (at the .1 level of significance). For every one unit increase in intentional homicides there showed a decrease in net migration by -0.10. Thus, despite previous literature, as intentional homicide rates increased in consecutive years, net migration within Guatemala decreased. This rejects the assumption supported by previous literature that as homicide rates increase net migration out of the country increases.

Model 2 included all independent variables (Average Temperature, Average Precipitation, Unemployment, String of Disasters, Intentional Homicide, and GDP per capita) but excluding Forest Area. Model 2 held an R-Square of 80.2 percent of the variance. Accounting for multicollinearity, this model suggested significance of four of the independent variables. The independent variable that had the most effect on net migration was GDP per capita. For every one unit increase in GDP per capita, net migration out of Guatemala decreased by -0.000256. This finding aligns with historical studies on migration that as a nation's DP rises, less migration out of the nation will occur.

In Model 2, Average Temperature held significance the (at .05 level). For every one unit increase in average temperature for consecutive years, there held a .630 increase in net

migration. Average precipitation was significant (at .1 level) where every one unit increase in average precipitation over consecutive years, there was a .003 increase in net migration. Lastly, there was once again significance (at the .1 level) relating to intentional homicide and net migration. Where every unit increase in intentional homicides per 100,000 people, net migration decreased by -.015 percent.

## Conclusion

This study rejects the null hypothesis. Measuring Guatemala environmental factors over time with average temperature increases, average precipitation increases, and increased deforestation rates caused a significant relationship with the nation's net migration rate. Thus, within Guatemala, varying environmental stressors suggest an effect on net migration out of Guatemala over the last fifteen years (2000-2015).

Guatemala may serve as a case study on the effects of environmental stressors on migration patterns as certain factors such as temperature, precipitation, and deforestation are significant with Guatemala's net migration. For more accurate and telling outcomes, there must be improved data collection of environmental aspects such as soil erosion and health rates, water quality, and agricultural productivity. More factors are needed to paint a more accurate picture of the impact of environmental factors on populations. Today, there are gaps in the available data of environment rates within Guatemala. An investment in resources to better collect such data would provide a clearer picture as to the impact environmental factors have on populations. Reliable and consistent data is crucial to effective prevention and understanding of environmental and disaster effects and its effect on populations. Data collection, analysis, and research are needed to increase resources and bolster political will. Today, the picture is not complete due to a deficiency in resources for proper analysis.

It is difficult to isolate environmental degradation as the single cause for population displacement. Scholars have found considerable confusion among the definitions, measurements, and exact causes of "environmental refugees". This area of study has become increasingly popular to research yet, has experienced challenges due to "complex set of variables affecting population movement." Lonergan is skeptical that environmental degradation can be separated from social, economic, or political causes of population displacement. For most effective policy, environmental factors must be incorporated as a factor worth considering when analyzing migration. Bodies like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and international civil society organizations host the annual Regional Conference on Migration where policy ideas for effective implementation of mechanisms in which to handle migration are discussed. In order to provide for a more holistic approach to improving policy surrounding migration, environmental factors must be considered.

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# IDP Returns in Transitional Societies: Colombia

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## ABSTRACT

*The return of IDPs remains one of the biggest challenges for durable peacebuilding. The successful return and relocation of IDPs constitutes a building block for durable peace, nonetheless, national and international actors often forget IDPs during the process of transitional justice. The lack of monitoring regarding the process of return and post-settlement presents an obstacle for research and reporting in the subject matter. This article analyzes the role of national governments, international organizations and grassroots movements in facilitating the return of internally displaced people within transitional societies. By focusing on the case of Colombia, the country with the highest number of internally displaced people, this study examines the advantages and limitations of each actor. It stresses the importance of sustainable return and justice for IDPs. Similarly, it emphasizes the crucial role of grassroots movements composed of internally displaced populations. In the case of Colombia, the findings suggest that the active participation and recognition of grassroots movements is imperative to facilitate sustainable return. Studies regarding IDP returns must value the agency and the experiences of IDPs as peacemakers and political actors. The inclusion of IDPs in politics of return and relocation is essential to guarantee durable solutions and prevent further displacement.*

## Introduction

Colombia suffered the longest civil war in the Western hemisphere. The civil conflict between the government and the Marxist guerrilla armed forces called FARC-EP (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) lasted over 60 years increasing, violence and poverty across the country.<sup>1</sup> The consequence of the armed conflict is the displacement of 7.7 million of people

1 Kiran Asher. 2007. "Ser Y Tener: Black Women's Activism, Development, and Ethnicity in the Pacific Lowlands of Colombia". *Feminist studies*, 33 (Spring): 11-37.

in the country. As of today, Colombia is the nation with the highest number of internally displaced people (IDP) in the world.<sup>2</sup> Although the government signed a peace agreement in 2016 with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to end the conflict, violence persists. Land restitution and social inequality present some of the biggest challenges to victims' compensation. The acceleration of displacement across the country presents an obstacle to the successful return and reintegration of IDPs, who constitute 7 out of the 8 million of victims from the armed conflict.<sup>3</sup>

This study will analyze what actors help facilitate the return of Internally Displaced People in a transitional society. It will focus on the role of the national government, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and grassroots movements in facilitating the safe return of internally displaced people.

The analysis of these three actors is crucial since all three of them are actively involved in the process of returning displaced people through policy making, law, reporting, activism and other mechanisms. Analyzing the role these actors play is essential to understand what elements work and what elements fail when addressing IDP returns. It also serves as a mechanism to understand power dynamics between these different actors in addressing the return and compensation of IDPs. The successful return of IDPs is essential for reconciliation and long-term peace in a transitional society.<sup>4</sup>

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- 2 Nick Miroff. "Colombia's war has displaced 7 million. With peace, will they go home." *The Washington Post*. September 5, 2016. Accessed October 30, 2018. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the\\_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.a488619dafac](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_story.html?utm_term=.a488619dafac); "Colombia-Fact Sheet". *UNHCR*. September 2018. Accessed November 27, 2018. [https://www.acnur.org/op/op\\_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html](https://www.acnur.org/op/op_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html); Alsema, Adriaan. "Colombia has the highest number of internally displaced people." *Colombia Reports*. June 19, 2018. Accessed October 31, 2018. <https://colombiareports.com/colombia-has-highest-number-of-internally-displaced-people/>
- 3 En Colombia, 4.2 millones de víctimas del conflicto armado son mujeres: Alan Jara." *Unidad Para Las Víctimas*. Accessed November 7, 2018. <https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/enfoques-diferenciales/en-colombia-42-millones-de-victimas-del-conflicto-armado-son-mujeres-alan>; "Country Profiles: Colombia." *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDCM)*. Accessed October 28, 2018. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia>; "Forced displacement growing in Colombia despite peace agreement." *UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency*. March 10, 2017. Accessed October 27, 2018. <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2017/3/58c26e114/forced-displacement-growing-colombia-despite-peace-agreement.html>
- 4 Richard Black and Saskia Gent. "Sustainable Return in Post-conflict Contexts." *International Migration* 44, no. 3 (2006): 15-38.



This paper argues that despite the engagement and the institutional power of national governments and the UNHCR, grassroots organizations constitute the most important actor in facilitating the sustainable return of IDPs. Their knowledge regarding local needs and circumstances as well as their long-term stability addresses IDP claims regarding recognition and redistribution before, during and after the process of return. Claims of recognition refer to the acknowledgement of historically oppressed populations, while claims of redistribution relate to socioeconomic equality.<sup>5</sup> Addressing both of these claims is critical to provide IDPs with justice and durable solutions. IDPs will be considered as a specific category and population since they are not entitled to the same protections of refugees under international law. Their lack of international legal status means they face different challenges and a different reality.<sup>6</sup>

Most of the research regarding IDPs focuses on the context of armed conflict and civil war. This focus directly leads to the question of voluntary and involuntary return of IDPs in post-conflict societies. The return of IDPs is a complex subject as a result of conflicts of interest, abuse of power, marginalization, and diverse forms of oppression. Additionally, it is important to consider the autonomy and agency of IDPs by considering the ways in which IDPs create different forms of capital for themselves.<sup>7</sup> Some scholars focus on the importance of property and land restitution.<sup>8</sup> Other scholars emphasize the importance of sustainable return, meaning “the successful reintegration of returnees to their home societies and the wider impact of return on macroeconomic and political indicators.”<sup>9</sup> In conflict-affected societies, the active participation of IDPs in the process of transitional justice is necessary.<sup>10</sup> Social justice should be prioritized in order to ensure the successful return, compensation and reintegration of victims. This entails addressing claims of recognition and redistribution for groups that have

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5 Fraser, Nancy. “Culture, Political Economy and Difference, On Iris Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference.” *Justice Interruptus*. 1997

6 Christine Smith Ellison. “Introduction: A Global Overview of Education and IDPS’s.” *Education and Internally Displaced Persons*. Vol. 3775; UTB Soziale Arbeit. 2013;

7 Umut Erel. “Migrating Cultural Capital: Bourdieu in Migration Studies.” *Sociology* 44, no. 4 (2010): 642-60.

8 Rachel Anneke Smit. “Housing and Property Restitution and IDPS Return in Kosovo.” *International Migration* 44, no. 3 (2006): 63-88.

9 Richard Black and Saskia Gent. “Sustainable Return in Post-conflict Contexts.” *International Migration* 44, no. 3 (2006): 15-38.

10 Susan Harris Rimmer. “RECONCEIVING REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPSS) AS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ACTORS.” *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* 2, no. 2 (2010): 163-180.; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Eric. *Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and Democracy*. Security and Governance Series. London ; New York: Routledge, 2010. 19-25.

been oppressed.<sup>11</sup> This paper will explore the role of the national government, UNHCR and grassroots movements by analyzing the experience of Colombian IDPs. Colombia presents a valuable case study for this paper since it is currently transitioning from war to peace, and it hosts the largest number of IDPs in the world.<sup>12</sup>

The internal displacement of people continues to increase in Colombia despite the passing of the 2016 peace agreement.<sup>13</sup> The ongoing displacement demonstrates the need to address the root causes of the displacement of people, which are directly attached to structural violence.<sup>14</sup>

The data for this study will come from analyzing qualitative studies, Participatory Active Research (PAR) studies, ethnographic studies, government reports, UNHCR reports and official documents from grassroots organizations in Colombia. The paper seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the experiences of IDPs by emphasizing the importance of collective identity. Therefore, the methodology will favor the contribution of sociological and anthropological approaches to migration studies.<sup>15</sup> First, I will provide a literature review regarding debates and ideas pertaining to IDPs in conflict-affected settings. Then, I will provide a background section regarding my case study, Colombia. Subsequently, I will examine the case of IDPs in Colombia by analyzing the role of the three actors mentioned above. Lastly, I will make some concluding remarks regarding the outcomes of the analysis.

## Literature Review

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11 Nancy Fraser. “Culture, Political Economy and Difference, On Iris Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference.” *Justice Interruptus*. 1997

12 Nick Miroff. “Colombia’s war has displaced 7 million. With peace, will they go home.” *The Washington Post*. September 5, 2016. Accessed October 30, 2018.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the\\_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.a488619dafac](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_story.html?utm_term=.a488619dafac)

13 Erika Rosas Guevara. “Colombia: Government must implement immediate action plans in the face of mass forced displacement.” *Amnesty International*. July 13, 2018. Accessed October 31, 2018. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/07/colombia-gobierno-debe-implementar-planes-de-accion-de-forma-inmediata-ante-desplazamientos-forzados-masivos/>

14 “Forced displacement growing in Colombia despite peace agreement.” *UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency*. March 10, 2017. Accessed October 27, 2018. <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2017/3/58c26e114/forced-displacement-growing-colombia-despite-peace-agreement.html>

15 Steven Gold and Stephanie J. Nawyn. *The Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies*. (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2016), 494-505, 564-575.

## THE CONCEPT OF IDP

According to the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced people are defined as individuals or groups forced to abandon their residence as a consequence of violence, human rights violations, natural disasters or armed conflict. Although they are displaced, they remain within their nation-state. The fact that they do not cross national borders is usually what distinguishes them from refugees. However, there are other crucial differences. First, in terms of international law, there is no binding legal framework that protects the rights of IDPs. There are guiding principles, but these do not exist in the form of a convention and they are not enforced. Second, there is a difference pertaining to the source of displacement. The factors that lead to internal displacement are broader and there is no consensus regarding which factors make an individual or a population an IDP. Third, the fact that IDPs remain within their sovereign territory directly affects the protections and aid they are able to receive. The assistance of international mechanisms is limited because international law sustains the notion of national sovereignty.<sup>16</sup>

The conditions that IDPs face often differ from the vulnerabilities and needs of other victims during an armed conflict. Mooney argues for the necessity to view IDPs as a “distinct category of concern.” This conceptualization certifies that their specific needs and vulnerabilities are taken into account to protect their rights. IDPs are often historically oppressed groups, minority groups and are specifically targeted during armed conflicts.<sup>17</sup>

The lack of consensus regarding the concept of IDP goes beyond the meaning of the term. There is no agreement regarding the culmination of internal displacement. Initially, internal displacement ends once an individual or a group is able to safely return to its original residence. This scenario assumes that safe return is always possible, which is not always the case. Internal displacement may last decades and persist through generations. It may also end quickly, depending on each case. The time frame is arbitrary because the definition of IDP is not considered as a legal status. Once the displacement is over, there is a responsibility to provide IDPs with conditions that allow for long-term stability. Mooney argues that there is a growing consensus regarding the need to develop a more concrete principle that clarifies the culmination of internal displacement. This principle must prioritize a needs-based approach that considers the vulnerabilities and risks of IDPs beyond the physical fact of displacement and return.<sup>18</sup>

16 Christine Smith Ellison. “Introduction: A Global Overview of Education and IDPS’s.” *Education and Internally Displaced Persons*. Vol. 3775; UTB Soziale Arbeit. 2013.

17 Erin Mooney. “The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern.” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2005): 9-26.

18 Ibid.

## IDP RETURNS

The return of IDPs in post-conflict societies is often conceptualized as the return to normality. Governments have a responsibility in providing the conditions for the return of IDPs, however, they often use the return of IDPs to favor a particular national interest.<sup>19</sup> Among migration scholars, there is a general consensus for voluntary IDP returns.<sup>20</sup> However, there are different ideas about the degree of voluntariness and the conditions needed for successful return in the case of transitional societies.<sup>21</sup>

## SUSTAINABLE RETURNS

The restitution of land and property is often considered to be the most important reparation for IDPs to ensure safe return.<sup>22</sup> However, land restitution is not an integral solution to the return of IDPs. Ballard argues that there are common misconceptions regarding the role of land restitution in post conflict societies. First, restitution does not guarantee reconciliation since it does not guarantee the political participation of displaced people, it may lead to resentment and political revenge. Second, restitution will not necessarily advance economic and social stability. IDPs need physical security and socioeconomic opportunities. Land restitution alone is, therefore, inefficient.<sup>23</sup>

Sustainable return focuses on the greater implications of the return process. It analyzes the degree of reintegration in home societies and the influence of return on political and macroeconomic factors. Black and Gent favor the sustainable return approach since it provides a broad definition of return that takes into account the implications of mobility for individuals and communities. It prioritizes “successful” return, which is an essential factor for long lasting

19 Christine Smith Ellison. “Introduction: A Global Overview of Education and IDPS’s.” *Education and Internally Displaced Persons*. Vol. 3775; UTB Soziale Arbeit. 2013; Vanessa Iaria. “Attempting Return: Iraqis’ Remigration from Iraq.” *Refuge* 28, no. 1 (2011): 109.

20 Christine Smith Ellison. “Introduction: A Global Overview of Education and IDPS’s.” *Education and Internally Displaced Persons*. Vol. 3775; UTB Soziale Arbeit. 2013; Vanessa Iaria. “Attempting Return: Iraqis’ Remigration from Iraq.” *Refuge* 28, no. 1 (2011): 109; Richard Black, Saskia Gent, Rhodri Williams, Anneke Smit, Joanna Harvey, Anders Stefansson, and Marita Eastmond. “Sustainable Return in the Balkans: Beyond Property Restitution and Policy.” *International Migration* 44, no. 3(Sup.) (2006): 15-160.

21 Richard Black and Saskia Gent. “Sustainable Return in Post-conflict Contexts.” *International Migration* 44, no. 3 (2006): 15-38.

22 Megan J Ballard. “Post-conflict Property Restitution: Flawed Legal and Theoretical Foundations.” *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 28, no. 2 (2010): 462-496.

23 Ibid.

peace and reconciliation.<sup>24</sup>

Return is considered sustainable if “livelihoods can be maintained without external inputs and are sufficiently robust to withstand external shocks.”<sup>25</sup> Successful return ideally comes from the decision of an internally displaced person or group to return. However, the degree of voluntariness is contested since external actors may influence this decision. For example, governments may provide IDPs with economic incentives to influence their decisions on returning. Calculating and monitoring the degree of voluntariness for returns remains a challenge.<sup>26</sup>

The factors that affect the sustainability of return include but are not limited to: characteristics of returnees, experiences before exile, and circumstances of exile and return. The circumstances of return entail the protection and realization of socioeconomic rights. National and international programs assisting the return of IDPs must monitor the process of return to ensure that policies are meeting the needs of IDPs for successful reintegration.<sup>27</sup>

The return of IDPs is often organized and monitored by national governments and organizations such as the IOM and the UNHCR.<sup>28</sup> However, IDPs actively engage in decision-making processes to organize their return. Iaria studied the experience of displaced Iraqis who decided to return. Their decision was not influenced by peace or stability in Iraq, it was inspired from their wish to regain their original life and overcome socio-economic difficulties. For some, return was the best choice since there was no alternative. In order to make an informed decision regarding return, they gathered specific sources of information and resources that prioritized their personal concerns.<sup>29</sup>

Iaria’s study demonstrates the ways in which IDPs create different forms of capital for themselves. Through the creation of networks, resources and other mechanisms they create social, economic and cultural capital in their new territories and during the process of return.<sup>30</sup>

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24 Ibid

25 Ibid

26 Ibid

27 Ibid

28 “Colombia.” *International Organization for Migration (IOM)*. Accessed November 1, 2018. <http://www.iom.org.co/oim-en-colombia>; “Colombia”. *UNHCR Global Focus Operations Worldwide*. Accessed October 31, 2018. <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2542>

29 Vanessa Iaria. “Attempting Return: Iraqis’ Remigration from Iraq.” *Refugee* 28, no. 1 (2011): 109.

30 Umut Erel. “Migrating Cultural Capital: Bourdieu in Migration Studies.” *Sociology* 44, no. 4 (2010): 642-60

## JUSTICE FOR IDPS

Mechanisms of justice play a crucial role in facilitating the return of IDPs. At the international level, humanitarian agencies like the UNHCR seek protection for IDPs and refugees. The UNHCR is meant to act as an impartial mechanism that seeks justice for IDPs through protection and assistance. However, the UNHCR is not able to get deeply involved in promoting justice for IDPs since it upholds the concept of national sovereignty.<sup>31</sup>

The UNHCR may be able to influence state behavior towards IDPs through soft law, meaning through norm entrepreneurship. Orchard argues that non-state actors at the international and national level have been able to influence domestic legislation regarding the protections of IDPs. This is seen in the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. They have been adopted nationally and internationally, which indicates norm internalization and could eventually lead to the formulation of hard law.<sup>32</sup>

The role of the rule of law is increasingly important in discussions regarding the status and return of IDPs. This circumstance is due to the fact that there is no legal status for IDPs. The African Union is one of the exceptions since its convention on IDPs, during which it declared IDPs to be subjects of rights instead of simply “victims of circumstances.”<sup>33</sup> This means state and non-state actors have a set of obligations towards IDPs.<sup>34</sup>

Though the advancement of legal measures for the protection of IDPs is important, however, some scholars contend that is not sufficient as a form of justice. Grace and Mooney argue for the electoral participation of displaced populations. They contend that this measure is essential for peace building. Elections serve as a peaceful and inclusive mechanism to address differences in polarized societies.<sup>35</sup>

Participation in electoral process is a first step to inclusion; however, it is not sufficient to provide IDPs with justice. Rimmer calls for the reconceptualization of IDPs as actors of transitional justice. She criticizes the ways in which transitional justice overly emphasizes institutions and

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31 Michael Barnett. “Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow.” *The International Migration Review* 35, no. 1 (2001): 244-77.

32 Phil Orchard. “Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Soft Law as a Norm-generating Mechanism.” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 281-303.

33 Won Kidane, Won. “Managing Forced Displacement by Law in Africa: The Role of the New African Union IDPs Convention. (internally Displaced Persons).” *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 44, no. 1 (2011): 1-85.

34 Ibid.

35 Jeremy Grace and Erin Mooney. “Peacebuilding through the Electoral Participation of Displaced Populations.” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2009): 95-121.

is not accessible to displaced populations. IDPs should be included in the decision making process of transitional justice including trials, truth commissions, legislative agendas, security policies, budgets, governance and state building. Transitional justice in post conflict contexts with high percentages of displaced populations must emphasize the needs of IDPs.<sup>36</sup>

Internally displaced populations have different needs. For example, Lemaitre and Sandvik argue that the experience of women regarding forced internal displacement is different compared to the experience of men who are displaced. This means reparations must not be the same for men and women. Reparations must take into consideration socio-economic and legal status as well as the influence of patriarchal structures that disproportionately affect women.<sup>37</sup> Transformative justice takes into account these differences since it provides an intersectional understanding of justice for IDPs. It addresses claims of recognition and redistribution by taking into account socioeconomic inequality and historical oppression.<sup>38</sup>

## Case Study

### BACKGROUND

Colombia has suffered the longest civil war in the Western hemisphere for over 50 years. Although the conflict has been national, urban regions have mostly remained protected from the atrocities of war. Rural regions have suffered the biggest impact from the war. Armed groups have controlled rural areas in multiple regions for decades.<sup>39</sup>

The structural root causes of the armed conflict go back to Colombia's history of poverty and social inequality.<sup>40</sup> The civil war is often framed as a conflict between the government and leftist Marxist guerillas (FARC). However, there are multiple actors involved including the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), paramilitary groups, drug traffickers, landowners and different state actors. The length of the conflict between diverse actors has led to the targeting of specific geographical, historical, cultural and ethnic locations.<sup>41</sup> State and non-state actors

36 Susan Harris Rimmer. "RECONCEIVING REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPSS) AS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ACTORS." *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* 2, no. 2 (2010): 163-180.

37 Julieta Lemaitre and Kristin Sandvik. "Beyond Sexual Violence in Transitional Justice: Political Insecurity as a Gendered Harm." *Feminist Legal Studies* 22, no. 3 (2014): 243-61.

38 Nancy Fraser. "Culture, Political Economy and Difference, On Iris Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference." *Justice Interruptus*. 1997

39 "Colombia." The Center for Justice and Accountability. Accessed November 2, 2018. <https://cja.org/where-we-work/colombia/>

40 Ibid

41 Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor. *Transitional justice from below: Grassroots activism and the struggle for change*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008

have committed crimes against humanity during the conflict.<sup>42</sup>

The armed conflict has led to a severe displacement crisis of 7.7 million people. 92% of municipalities in Colombia have had IDPs flee from their habitual residence. Reasons for internal displacements include but are not limited to violence, forced recruitment from armed groups, anti-personal mines, sexual and gender violence, and forced disappearance. Displacement has specifically affected regions along the Pacific coast. There are no camps in Colombia for displaced people and although over 400,000 IDPs have been returned through governmental initiative, there is no information about the success of returns. There are many challenges to sustainable return and there is a lack of data and monitoring regarding post-settlement.<sup>43</sup>

In 2016 the Colombian government reached a peace agreement with the FARC to end the conflict. The agreement led to the disarmament of 10,000 combatants who are now reintegrating into civil life. However, national peace building remains a challenge.<sup>44</sup> The ELN and the government have not reached a peace agreement. Additionally, other armed groups including FARC dissidents, el clan del golfo (drug cartel), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) remain active.<sup>45</sup>

Colombia is also facing challenges throughout the process of transitional justice. These include truth, justice, reconciliation, reparations for victims, agricultural and land reform.<sup>46</sup> The negotiations for the peace agreement sought to include the participation of victims, community leaders, individuals and groups historically oppressed and affected by the armed conflict. There was international and national pressure on making the peace agreement inclusive since exclusivity was one of the main root causes of the war.<sup>47</sup>

42 Country Profiles: Colombia. *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDCM)*. Accessed October 28, 2018. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia>

43 Ibid

44 "The Current Situation in Colombia." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 28, 2018. Accessed November 2, 2018. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/03/current-situation-colombia>

45 "Las zonas más afectadas por el conflicto." *El Mundo*. April 18, 2018. Accessed November 2, 2018. <https://www.elmundo.com/noticia/Las-zonas-mas-afectadas-por-el-conflicto/369880>

46 Country Profiles: Colombia. *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDCM)*. Accessed October 28, 2018. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia> ; Alsema, Adriaan. "Colombia's obstacles for peace: returning the 15% of national territory that was stolen in the war." *Colombia reports*. October 17, 2016. <https://colombiareports.com/returning-colombias-15-stolen-territory-one-real-obstacles-peace/>

Women were excluded from peace talks at the beginning. However, due to pressure from grassroots movements, NGOs and the UN, there was an effort to ensure that 40-50% of the regional working groups were women. Nonetheless, one of the sub-commissions that focused on the conflict and its victims had no participation from Indigenous or Afro-Colombian representatives, which excluded the perspective of the two most marginalized communities of the armed conflict.<sup>48</sup>

The implementation of the peace process is ongoing in Colombia. Peace remains fragile in the nation as violence continues. This fragile peace presents a challenge for the successful return and reintegration of IDPs. Statistics from the UNHCR show that displacement continues to increase in Colombia despite the passing of the peace agreement.<sup>49</sup>

#### COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

The Colombian constitution of 1991 created a constitutional system to specifically target inequality and discrimination. This established the framework for a progressive constitutional system focused on the importance of rights.<sup>50</sup> This progressive legal framework may be interpreted as an advantage for vulnerable populations such as internally displaced people. The high rates of displacement have led the Colombian government to develop legislations that protect IDPs through a specific set of rights. The government recognizes ten rights for IDPs, presented as follows:

First, in order to be recognized as an IDP, IDPs are not required to be registered with the (RUPD), which is the governmental registry for IDPs. Even if they are not registered, they still have access to all the benefits of IDPs.<sup>51</sup>

47 "The Current Situation in Colombia." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 28, 2018. Accessed November 2, 2018. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/03/current-situation-colombia>; Virginia Bouvier. 2016. "Gender and the role of women in Colombia's peace process". *New York: UN Women*. 2016. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Gender-and-the-Role-of-Women-in-Colombia-s-Peace-Process-English.pdf>. (Accessed March 3, 2017).

48 Ibid

49 "Colombia". *UNHCR Global Focus Operations Worldwide*. Accessed October 31, 2018. <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2542>; "Forced displacement growing in Colombia despite peace agreement." *UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency*. March 10, 2017. Accessed October 27, 2018. <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2017/3/58c26e114/forced-displacement-growing-colombia-despite-peace-agreement.html>

50 Patrick Delaney. "Legislating for Equality in Colombia: Constitutional Jurisprudence, Tutelas and Social Reform." *Equal Rights Review* 1 (2008): 50-59.

51 "Estos son los 10 derechos de las personas desplazadas en Colombia" *Fundación Derecho Justo*. April 14, 2017. Accessed October 31, 2018. <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicial/servicios/10-derechos-de-las-personas-desplazadas-en-colombia-81040>

Second, IDPs have the right to the restitution of land and belongings. All IDPs have the right to land restitution under law 1448 from 2011 as long as they are listed as the landowners. The devolution of personal belongings is not direct restitution and it is repaid through other mechanisms. This devolution requires being registered with the RUPD.<sup>52</sup>

Third, IDPs have the right to receive healthcare in different cities. Healthcare must be provided wherever and whenever it is requested.

Fourth, IDPs have the right to subsidized housing.<sup>53</sup>

Fifth, IDPs have the right to receive humanitarian aid. This form of aid is temporary since its purpose is to provide IDPs with basic socioeconomic stability. Recipients of humanitarian aid are monitored through sporadic visits.<sup>54</sup>

Sixth, IDPs have the right to extend temporary humanitarian aid for people with special conditions of protection. The extension is granted automatically for groups such as single mothers, seniors and people with disabilities.<sup>55</sup>

Seventh, IDPs have the right to minimum conditions for survival. Humanitarian aid must persist if it is providing an IDP with the basic needs for survival.

Eighth, IDPs have the right to be accredited the status of IDP. The government must be flexible in analyzing the evidence that grants a person the status of IDP.<sup>56</sup>

Ninth, female IDPs have the right of differential treatment due to their conditions. Women have been particularly vulnerable throughout the conflict and generally provide evidence that grants them the status of IDP.<sup>57</sup>

Tenth, IDPs have the right to a favorable interpretation of the rule of law. The interpretation must be less severe since IDPs represent a population protected by the constitution.<sup>58</sup>

These rights approach the needs of IDPs comprehensively, however, these rights have not been able to protect IDPs from violence to ensure their safe return. The legal measures introduced by the Colombian government are part of the solution but they do not guarantee a permanent solution. Since the root causes of discrimination and inequality are structural, law alone is not

52 Ibid

53 Ibid

54 Ibid

55 Ibid

56 Ibid

57 Ibid

58 Ibid

sufficient to ensure a sustainable social reform.<sup>59</sup>

The Colombian government follows the principles of dignity, security and voluntariness in the process of returning IDPs. The governmental agency Unidad Para Las Victorimas is in charge of this process, which includes reporting and assistance regarding IDP protections, rights and reparations.<sup>60</sup> The Colombian government has led the efforts for the return and relocation of IDPs with the assistance of UNHCR, USAID and the IOM. Currently 452,000 IDPs have been returned or relocated with assistance from the government.<sup>61</sup> Data and reporting regarding the process of return and relocation remains scarce, which presents a challenge for the monitoring of returns.<sup>62</sup>

## UNHCR

The UNHCR has been the most important international actor in facilitating the return and relocation of IDPs. The agency has been actively working in Colombia since 1997. The objectives of UNHCR focus on the protection of IDPs, the implementation of preventative strategies to decrease displacement, and most importantly, the creation of durable solutions for IDPs. UNHCR operations seek to monitor the displacement situation in the country and focus on the populations that have been historically oppressed and affected due to the violence. These populations include children, Indigenous populations and Afro Colombians. UNHCR constitutes an important actor in the return of IDPs since it actively works with them and with the receiving communities before, during and after the process of return.<sup>63</sup>

UNHCR has established a strong relationship with the Colombian government for the most part. The agency has supported the initiatives of the Constitutional Court related to policies that enable higher protections for IDPs. At the local and regional level, the agency has also

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59 Patrick Delaney. "Legislating for Equality in Colombia: Constitutional Jurisprudence, Tutelas and Social Reform." *Equal Rights Review* 1 (2008): 50-59

60 "Ruta de Retornos y Reubicaciones Individual." *Unidad Para las Victorimas*. Accessed November 6, 2018. <https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/ruta-de-retornos-y-reubicaciones-individual/282>

61 Ibid

62 Country Profiles: Colombia. *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDCM)*. Accessed October 28, 2018. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia>; "MI DERECHO AL RETORNO Y A LA REUBICACION como victima del desplazamiento forzado." *Unidad para la Atencion y Reparacion Integral a las Victorimas*. January 8, 2015. Accessed November 27, 2018. [http://escuela.unidadvictimas.gov.co/cartillas/VICTIMAS\\_R&R.pdf](http://escuela.unidadvictimas.gov.co/cartillas/VICTIMAS_R&R.pdf)

63 "Colombia-Fact Sheet". *UNHCR*. September 2018. Accessed November 27, 2018. [https://www.acnur.org/op/op\\_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html](https://www.acnur.org/op/op_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html); Martin Gottwald. "Peace in Colombia and Solutions for Its Displaced People." *Forced Migration Review*, no. 52 (2016): 14-16.

worked and supported the work of different social movements by facilitating legal counseling and return.<sup>64</sup> For example, it created a project called the Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) along with the UNDP that sought to create a bridge between the national government and displaced populations. Seventeen communities participated in the project to negotiate with diverse politicians, discussing issues such as economic development, land, housing and basic human rights.<sup>65</sup>

Despite the active engagement of UNHCR regarding IDP returns, one of the biggest barriers confronting the organization is lack of sufficient funds. The operational budget for 2018 was \$8.3 million although the country requested \$31.8 million. The budget allocated is considerably low given the massive displacement crisis that continues to take place.<sup>66</sup>

Another challenge facing the work of UNHCR is the nature of the agency's relationship with the Colombian state. International humanitarian agencies like UNHCR have been designed to work with failed states. However, the Colombian state is not weak. It represents a strong government with well-established political institutions. Legal policy in Colombia has been particularly stable in Colombia despite the conflict. This has created confusion regarding the role UNHCR can play to facilitate the return of IDPs. The main focus of the agency has been oriented towards developing projects not towards building state capacity since UNHCR was not created for that purpose. This factor is challenging because the power of the state and the government, which is often linked to human rights abuses and corruption that override the mission of UNHCR.<sup>67</sup> In the case of Colombia, the connections between illegal armed groups and public officials make it even more complicated for an external actor to intervene at the regional and national level.

## GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS

*Unidad para Las Victorimas*, a governmental agency created for the reparation of victims and national peace building, estimates that there are over 8 million victims from the armed conflict. UNHCR's statistics state that there are over 7 million IDPs in Colombia.<sup>68</sup> These statistics show that IDPs make up the majority of victims during the armed conflict.

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64 Ibid; Elizabeth Ferris. "CHANGING TIMES: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA." *Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement*. December 2014. Accessed November 27, 2018

65 Martin Gottwald. "Peace in Colombia and Solutions for Its Displaced People." *Forced Migration Review*, no. 52 (2016): 14-16.

66 "Colombia-Fact Sheet". *UNHCR*. September 2018. Accessed November 27, 2018. [https://www.acnur.org/op/op\\_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html](https://www.acnur.org/op/op_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html)

67 Elizabeth Ferris. "CHANGING TIMES: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT I IN COLOMBIA." *Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement*. December 2014. Accessed November 27, 2018

The social and political mobilization of IDPs is often confronted with violence, insecurity and threats from armed groups and corrupt politicians. Political insecurity remains a reality for IDP social leaders and defenders. As of July 2018, 123 social leaders and human rights advocates were killed in 2018 alone. 80% of the victims assassinated belonged to ethnic and grassroots organizations.<sup>69</sup>

Despite being affected by the structural causes of inequality and violence, IDPs have been crucial agents in creating mechanisms for their own protection, return and relocation. Grassroots organizations from IDPs have mobilized for decades through the creation of networks with civil society, national and international organizations. They have created mechanisms of resistance against the armed conflict.

Women's grassroots organizations have been particularly active in the return, relocation and protection of IDPs. This is due to the fact that women and children constitute almost 80% of all Colombian IDPs. Moreover, women are the heads of family for nearly 50% of all displaced households.<sup>70</sup> In an effort to create better living conditions for themselves and for their households, women have become leaders in their communities. For example, The *Liga de Mujeres Desplazadas* in Bolivar is one of the biggest grassroots organizations of internally displaced women. It has been active in Colombia since 1999. The members of this organization have developed projects to empower displaced women and children despite social inequality and constant threats. They created *ciudad de mujeres* (women's city) in the city of Turbaco. Thousands of IDPs lived in Turbaco after fleeing from their residencies. The work of *Liga de*

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68 "Colombia-Fact Sheet". *UNHCR*. September 2018. Accessed November 27, 2018. [https://www.acnur.org/op/op\\_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html](https://www.acnur.org/op/op_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html) ; "En Colombia, 4.2 millones de víctimas del conflicto armado son mujeres: Alan Jara." *Unidad Para Las Víctimas*. Accessed November 7, 2018. <https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/enfoques-diferenciales/en-colombia-42-millones-de-victimas-del-conflicto-armado-son-mujeres-alan>

69 "Separata de actualización INFORME ESPECIAL. Todos los nombres, todos los rostros: Informe de Derechos Humanos sobre la situación de lideresas y líderes sociales, de defensoras y defensores de Derechos Humanos y de ex combatientes de las FARC – EP y sus familiares en los territorios." *La Coordinación Social y Política Marcha Patriótica, La Cumbre Agraria, Campesina, Étnica y Popular - CACEP, y el Instituto de Estudios sobre Paz y Desarrollo – INDEPAZ*. May 18, 2018. Accessed November 7, 2018. <http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Separata-de-actualizaci%C3%B3n-de-INFORME-ESPECIAL-Todos-los-nombres-todos-los-rostros.-5-de-julio-2018.pdf>

70 Elizabeth Ferris. "CHANGING TIMES: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT I IN COLOMBIA." *Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement*. December 2014. Accessed November 27, 2018

*Mujeres Desplazadas* facilitated the relocation of IDPs by creating safe spaces for education and community building. Women's city included the creation of a school and other community-based institutions to meet the needs of IDPs.<sup>71</sup>

The organization has also engaged with national and international actors to call attention to the importance of durable solutions for IDPs. For example, it presented cases at the inter-American court of human rights.<sup>72</sup> Currently, it forms part of the (PIRC), which is the integral plan for collective reparations. The activism of *Liga de Mujeres* has been crucial to break with dominant structures of power that have historically oppressed IDPs. The organization recognizes itself as a social movement isolated from political parties. Its main objective is to focus on sustainable development and durable solutions for IDPs.<sup>73</sup> The organization's expansive knowledge regarding the conditions of IDPs in diverse regions and its lack of affinity for any political party has prevented the movement from being co-opted. More importantly the organization has created a safe space for IDPs where their claims of recognition and redistribution are taken into account.

## Analysis and Conclusion

The Colombian case presents specific challenges to the return of IDPs due to the presence of multiple armed actors and criminal groups. At the national level, the Colombian state has created specific laws that seek to protect IDPs, nonetheless factors such as corruption, lack of governmental presence in certain areas of the country and lack of reporting hinder efforts to return and relocate IDPs. For example, the lack of accessible and up-to-date data regarding IDP returns depicts the government's failure in dealing with the crisis. Less than 10 percent of IDPs have been returned and displacement continues to increase across the country.<sup>74</sup> The government must consider IDP returns and relocations as a priority.

UNHCR has been an important international actor for IDPs during the protracted conflict. However, the complex relationship between regional governments and UNHCR has presented an obstacle for increased UNHCR involvement and intervention. Furthermore, UNHCR has not been able to obtain a budget that allows it to expand its operations. Facilitating the return

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71 Julieta Lemaitre and Kristin Sandvik. "Beyond Sexual Violence in Transitional Justice: Political Insecurity as a Gendered Harm." *Feminist Legal Studies* 22, no. 3 (2014): 243-61; "Proyectos realizados." *Liga de Mujeres Desplazadas*. Accessed November 7, 2018. <http://ligademujeres.org/proyectos-realizados/>

72 Ibid

73 Julieta Lemaitre and Kristin Sandvik. "Beyond Sexual Violence in Transitional Justice: Political Insecurity as a Gendered Harm." *Feminist Legal Studies* 22, no. 3 (2014): 243-61

74 Country Profiles: Colombia. *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDCM)*. Accessed October 28, 2018. <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia>

of over 7 million people remains a nearly impossible task for the humanitarian agency. Lastly, the current Venezuelan refugee crisis has become UNHCR's main area of focus in Colombia.<sup>75</sup> Although it is crucial for the agency to assist Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, the focus on Venezuelan refugees may detract the agency's projects regarding IDP return and relocation.

Finally, grassroots organizations have been actively engaged in the facilitation of IDP return and relocation for decades even before the passing of the peace agreement. Grassroots organizations in Colombia are well established and expansive. They are not limited by sovereignty and although they face financial issues, they have been very creative by building other mechanisms that allow them to resist and progress. These organizations have worked at the local level for decades and are made up of IDPs, meaning they have a unique and thorough understanding of what return entails.

Despite the engagement and the institutional power of the national governments and the UNHCR, grassroots organizations constitute the most important actor in facilitating the sustainable return of IDPs. Their knowledge regarding local needs and circumstances as well as their long-term stability addresses IDP claims regarding recognition and redistribution before, during and after the process of return. Moreover, the inclusion of IDPs in politics of return and relocation is essential to guarantee durable solutions and prevent further displacement. The Colombian conflict, like most protracted conflicts, has its roots on exclusivity, discrimination and social inequality. Therefore, the exclusion of IDPs is only likely to reproduce patterns of marginalization and displacement.

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<sup>75</sup> "Colombia-Fact Sheet". *UNHCR*. September 2018. Accessed November 27, 2018. [https://www.acnur.org/op/op\\_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html](https://www.acnur.org/op/op_fs/5b9926924/hoja-informativa-colombia.html)

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## Decoding the Trade War's Impact on ASEAN

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### ABSTRACT

*Since the Cold War, multilateral cooperation and international organizations have rapidly emerged and globalization began to take the place of nationalism. The contemporary world order is based on a unipolar system where the United States is the safeguard of the world's stabilization. However, this system is being challenged as China is rising as the new global power. The transitional period not only involves changes in the United States and China but also across the globe.*

*The trade war between two major powers, the United States and China, has a substantial impact on the global economy. China is the leading export nation worldwide, and the U.S. has long served as the largest economy in the world. Since the United States implemented the first tariff on Chinese products in June 2018, several economic experts tried to examine the consequences of the trade war on other nations' economies. However, there is insufficient research dedicated to examining how the Southeast Asian economy is doing in the context of the current power transition. Therefore, this research paper will focus on analyzing the outcomes of the trade war on member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN). The central purpose of the research paper is to determine whether the U.S. – China trade war will economically benefit ASEAN nations.*

### Hypothesis

As the U.S. and China continue to implement tariffs on each other's goods, ASEAN's export and import monetary values will likely to increase.

The independent variable is the trade war's duration. This research paper will test the impact of tariffs on ASEAN member states' export and import values controlled for quarters of the year. Import and export values are the indicators of the trade market. The control variable is a quarter of the year because there are times of the year that a country experiences a downturn in trading. If the trading value of ASEAN member states grows faster than it did before the trade war, the hypothesis will be confirmed. If not, the hypothesis will be rejected. If the trading value decrease, the result can be explained either way: the trade war hurts the ASEAN economy or the linkage between the U.S.- China trade war and the ASEAN economy is not apparent. The null hypothesis is confirmed when there is no relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable.

### Why it is important?

Foremost, ASEAN is becoming an attractive place for transnational corporations to pour money into building factories. The organization combines ten nation states in which GDP growth rates are among the fastest growth in the world. The rapid and fast speed of development attracts an increasing amount of foreign direct investment (FDI). Report from the ASEAN's official website indicates that the organization received US\$120 billion in 2015, accounting for almost 16% of world's FDI among developing countries ("Investing in ASEAN," 2017). Though the trade war is posing more challenges to products labeled "made in China," firms are becoming more interested in investing in ASEAN nations. According to Nargonchai Arkrasanee, the former Thai Minister of Energy, ASEAN has economic potential that no region in the world can compare with, due in large part to the prosperity of natural resources (such as natural gas, metals, gems, and fishes), the availability and improvement of labor force, the potential domestic market, and promotional governmental policies (Arkrasanee, 1983). With more than half of the population below the age of thirty, ASEAN offers significant human resources to the manufacturing industry (ASEAN, 2016). Finally, the U.S.-China trade war is not only economically but also politically motivated. Due to its strategic location, studies about ASEAN deserves special attention from the international community.

### Literature Review

Debates continue surrounding about the role realism will play in the globalization era. Following the end of the Cold War, some scholars rejected the realist explanation of the world order. According to Walker and Morton, author of *Re-assessing the "Power of Power Politics" Thesis: Is Realism Still Dominant?*, realism is no longer adequate to explain the expansion of democracy, the importance of global trade, and international organizations (Walker & Morton, 2005). Both authors believe that the doctrine of liberalism has been embraced strongly and that liberalism surpasses realism to become the single most prevalent theoretical explanation to the world politics. Furthermore, Walker and Morton add that the threat of terrorism and the national political economy may influence the current study. At the same time, they predict that there will be a chance for realism to reemerge as the dominant theoretical framework. In

this case, realism sums up current Washington-Beijing relations.

In an article *Realism* published by Foreign Policy 2009, Paul Wolfowitz reaffirms that “foreign policy is about the national interest” (Wolfowitz, 2009). He claims that realists see national interest different than other theorists. From a realist perspective, the U.S. should not get involved in the global issue; instead, it should focus on its own national policy, domestic politics, and economy. That is, realists interpret the U.S.-China trade war as a proactive move to preserve the American domestic economy instead of stabilizing the global economy. In support of the realist explanation, Galia Press-Barnathan finds that national interests are placed above cooperation in *The Neglected Dimension of Commercial Liberalism: Economic Cooperation and Transition to Peace* (Press-Barnathan, 2006). Press-Barnathan argues that economic cooperation is more likely to be successful if all domestic factors are benefited. Both Wolfowitz and Press-Barnathan utilize realism to prioritize nationalism above multilateral collaboration.

On the other hand, the work of Duncan Bell relates to Walker and Morton’s central argument that liberalism is the dominant theoretical explanation of world politics. In the article *What is Libertarianism*, Bell claims that the contemporary world inherits and inhabits the liberalism doctrine as a response to ideological war against totalitarianism (Bell, 2014). In this case, liberalism explains the fundamental ideology behind ASEAN which is reliant on cooperation to gain mutual dependence and complex economic interdependence. Timo Kivimäki, professor of International Relations at the University of Bath, states that common interest and common commitment contribute to a long peace among Southeast Asia nations (Kivimäki, 2001). In his article *The Long Peace of ASEAN*, Kivimäki points out that even though ASEAN are illiberal non-democracies nations, the region remains peaceful and achieves economic success because of general collaboration.

According to previous studies, some ASEAN countries will benefit economically from the U.S.-China trade war while others will suffer. In the recent study *Creative Disruption: Asia’s Winners in the US-China Trade War*, the Economist Intelligent Unit finds that ASEAN countries that are highly dependent on shipment to China, such as Singapore and the Philippines, will be worse off as the result of the trade war. The research indicates that China is the hub for information and communication technology (ICT) goods for major Asian nations including Singapore, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan. Research also finds that ASEAN countries like Vietnam and Malaysia will emerge in a better position because of the trade war, specifically in low-end manufacturing products. Additionally, U.S. tariffs on Chinese automobile industry will benefit regional manufacturers such as Thailand and Malaysia (the Economist, 2018). The *South China Morning Post* also recognizes that Thailand and Malaysia will become more competitive in electronics and that Vietnam and Indonesia will benefit from supply chain diversification in the light manufacturing and textile industries (Wang, 2018). *The Business Standard* adds that ASEAN nations will also benefit from other sectors such as seafood, rubber, and tourism. According to the article, ASEAN is becoming a promising land for foreign investors due to low production costs, regional integration, and especially ideal geography (Business Standard,

2018). However, the *Nikkei Asian Review* reports that not all ASEAN nations are taking advantage of the trade war, according to October PMI data. PMI (Purchasing Managers’ Index) is an indicator of economic health for manufacturing and service factors. While Vietnam and the Philippines have enjoyed an increase in PMI, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia have suffered from a decrease in PMI (Iwamoto, 2018). In brief, these four studies show that some ASEAN nations stand to benefit from the trade war, but they fail to agree on exactly which countries will be the winners.

## Methodology

This research paper will focus on examining ASEAN’s five-member states: Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. In the literature review, the research paper acknowledges that the U.S. – China trade war impacts Southeast Asia nations differently. Variety in the level of economic development is mainly considered for choosing the five countries. Thailand’s nominal GDP is \$455,220 billion, is followed by Singapore – \$323,907 billion, Malaysia – \$314,500 billion, the Philippines – \$313,595 billion, and Vietnam – \$223,863 billion (World Bank, 2017). Sufficient overview of the trade war’s impact on ASEAN requires the analysis of representative samples of the organization.

All of the data used are official statistics collected from the following government websites: General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Philippines Statistics Authority, the Official Portal of Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation, Thailand Minister of Commerce, and Department of Statistics Singapore. Additionally, some of the data are gathered from the existing sources. In these cases, researchers calculated import and export values of Vietnam in Quarter 2 from 2016 to 2018 by subtracting Quarter 3’s values by Quarter 1’s values. Similarly, Thailand’s Q2 export and import value are calculated by subtracting Jan-Jun value by Jan-Mar value; Thailand’s Q3 values are found by subtracting Jan-Sep value by Jan-June value. To collect Singapore’s statistics, researchers used the table-builder tool provide by the website. Moreover, researchers determined changes in export and import values by following the formula:

$$(Value-Preceding\ value)/(Preceding\ value)\times 100\%=Percentage\ changes$$

It is necessary to note that no data set is perfect. The calculation may result small number errors.

Most importantly, the paper utilizes cross-table tabulation analysis as a methodological tool for analyzing the relationship between independent variable and dependent variable.

The level of analysis in this paper is the national level. To start, this paper will compare value changes within 2018 on a quarterly basis. This study will analyze the direct impact of the trade war on ASEAN’s economy. It is crucial to compare values in a quarter from 2016 to 2018. The

second section determines whether or not to reject the null hypothesis.

#### Data

##### Merchandise Export Monetary Values (billion US dollars)

	Quarter 1			Quarter 2			Quarter 3		
	2016	2017	2018	2016	2017	2018	2016	2017	2018
Vietnam	37.9	43.7	54.31	44.3	54.1	59.62	46	56.2	64.73
Thailand	53.84	56.42	62.83	51.45	56.96	62.98	55.2	62.06	63.91
Malaysia	44.21	53.78	56.75	44.85	54.04	58.5	46.79	56.99	59.95
Singapore	31.51	33.65	32.54	31.94	35.37	34.37	33.72	37.82	52.2
Philippines	13.4	14.2	13.4	11.7	11.4	11.1	13.3	13.4	13

##### Merchandise Import Monetary Values (billion US dollars)

	Quarter 1			Quarter 2			Quarter 3		
	2016	2017	2018	2016	2017	2018	2016	2017	2018
Vietnam	37.1	45.6	53.01	43.6	54.9	58.21	44.7	54	62.70
Thailand	45.65	52.08	60.87	47.03	53.75	61.48	49.53	56.37	64.53
Malaysia	38.5	49.13	48.78	40.59	47.96	52.02	42.38	50.71	53.93
Singapore	24.61	26.24	37.33	24.43	27.47	41.66	25.56	29.17	44.22
Philippines	21	21.1	22.3	20.6	20.9	21.9	20.7	20.3	21.3

#### Part 1: Quarter statistics

##### Export

##### Changes in Merchandise Export Values (percentage)

	Quarter 1		Quarter 2		Quarter 3	
	2016-2017	2017-2018	2016-2017	2017-2018	2016-2017	2017-2018
Vietnam	15.3	24.27	22.1	6	22.17	15.17
Thailand	4.79	11.36	10.7	10.56	12.4	2.98
Malaysia	21.64	5.5	20.4	8.25	21.79	5.19
Singapore	6.79	-3.2	10.73	-1	12.15	38
Philippines	5.9	-5.6	-2.5	-2.6	0.75	-0.29

At first glance, the data chart above shows that the export annual growth rate in Quarter 2 has been decreasing from 2016-2017 to 2017-2018 period. Specifically, Vietnam's annually export values grew 6% in Q2 2017-2018 period, less than 15% in the same quarter 2016-2017 period. Malaysia's annual Q2 growth rate fell from 20.4% to 8.25%. In particular, Singapore and Philippines experienced negative annual growth in Q2. Singapore's percentage growth in Q2 decreased substantially from 10.73% to -1% in 2018. However, the Philippines' annual growth in 2018 did not change dramatically from 2017, with a slight drop from -2.5% to -2.6%. Similarly, Thailand's annual Q2 growth rate decreased slightly from 10.7% to 10.56%. The annual Q2 export growth statistics show that:

1. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore suffered from diminished annual export monetary value in Q2 2018.
2. The annual quarterly growth rates of Thailand and the Philippines were not affected in Q2 2018.

##### Import


##### Changes in Merchandise Import Values (percentage)

	Quarter 1		Quarter 2		Quarter 3	
	2016-2017	2017-2018	2016-2017	2017-2018	2016-2017	2017-2018
Vietnam	22.91	16.25	25.91	6	20.8	16.11
Thailand	14.08	16.87	14.28	14.38	13.8	14.4
Malaysia	29.9	-0.7	18.15	8.46	19.65	6.3
Singapore	6.62	42.26	12.44	51.65	14.12	51.59
Philippines	21.4	9.9	20.8	21.1	18.2	20.5

The annual growth rate of import monetary values in Quarter 2 varied substantially among ASEAN nations. Vietnam and Malaysia's annual quarterly growth rate decreased. In particular, Vietnam's annual growth rate in Q2 fell dramatically from 25.91% to 6%. Similarly, Malaysia's growth rate declined by 10%. In contrast, Singapore experienced significant growth from 12.44% to 51.65%. The annual quarterly growth rates of Thailand and the Philippines were not affected. The findings are:

1. The annual quarterly growth rates of Thailand and the Philippines did not change substantially in Q2 2018.
2. Vietnam and Malaysia lost the most annual import monetary value in Q2 2018.
3. Singapore enjoyed a remarkable annual quarterly growth rate increase in Q2 2018.

From the data above, the two tables show that the controlled variable is the quarter. By analyzing annual quarterly growth rates, this paper has found that the import values of Thailand and the Philippines did not change dramatically in Quarter 2. On the other hand, countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore experienced considerable changes since 2Q18. Therefore, this research paper comes to the conclusion that the U.S.-China trade war does not have a significant influence on the trading monetary values of Thailand and the Philippines. At the same time, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore are significantly affected by the trade war. The null hypothesis is rejected in the case of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore; the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in the case of Thailand and the Philippines.



**Part two: 2018 statistics**

The data above shows that three ASEAN nations — Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore — have increased the number of goods transferred in 2018. The data shows that the consistency of growth varies among the three countries. In particular, Vietnam’s export growth rate reached 9.2% from Q1 to Q2, but dropped to 8.57% from Q2 to Q3. Similarly, Malaysia’s Q1-Q2 export growth was 3%, but the Q2-Q3 export growth rate was 2.47%. Singapore is experiencing fast growth in export monetary values. On the other hand, all three nations suffer a downward trend in import values. After considering both import and export values of the five ASEAN nations, the most important finding is:

Even though Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore have consistently maintained an increase in foreign trade, those countries experienced a slight decrease after Q2.

	Export			Import		
	Q1-Q2	Q2-Q3	Trend	Q1-Q2	Q2-Q3	Trend
<b>Vietnam</b>	9.7%	8.57%	↓	9.7%	7.7%	↓
<b>Malaysia</b>	3%	2.47%	↓	6.6%	3.6%	↓
<b>Singapore</b>	5.62%	51.81%	↑	11.59%	6.14%	↓

The following discussion will integrate the U.S.-China trade war timeline with ASEAN’s trade market growth and discuss the reasons for the findings above.

**Discussion**

**THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES**

The U.S.-China trade war has majorly influenced some ASEAN countries, but not all. Specifically, Thailand and the Philippines are excluded from countries that are influenced by the trade war. The findings are surprising since both Thailand and the Philippines are export-dependent economies. Additionally, both the U.S. and China are top trade partners with Thailand and the Philippines. According to *World’s Top Export*, the Philippines’s top trade market is Japan — with 16.2% of total Filipino exports — followed by the United States’ 14.6% and China’s 11.1%. Similarly, the U.S. is Thailand’s second largest trading partner, followed by China. Therefore, more research is needed to explain why Thailand and the

Philippines did not experience any major changes since the beginning of the trade war.

**VIETNAM, MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE**

On July 6th, 2018, the U.S. initiated the trade war by implementing the first China-specific tariff at the end of Q2. According to *China Briefing*, the first tariff package was worth \$34 billion and targeted products from industrial sectors, such as aircraft ties, nuclear reactors, industrial heating equipment, and more. China reacted by imposing an equally substantial 25% tariff on significant U.S. exported goods. The data above shows that the trade war has created an immediate disruption to Vietnam and Malaysia’s trading market.

The second round of tariff escalations started in Q3, 2018. This time, the U.S. implemented a 25% tariff on Chinese products such as semiconductors, chemicals, plastics, motorbikes, and electric scooters (worth \$16 billion). In response, China implemented retaliatory 25% tariff on American goods, also worth \$16 billion. This tariff targeted major US exports to China such as coal, copper scrap, fuel, and medical equipment. The U.S. and China then implemented a third round of tariffs at the end of Q3. This time, the U.S. placed tariffs totaling to \$200 million on China, and China responded by implementing an additional \$60 billion tariff on US goods. Eight months since the implementation of the first tariff, the trade war does not show any sign of cooling down soon. Both Vietnam and Malaysia are experiencing lower annual and quarterly trading values as the trade war continues.

Singapore is a compelling case to compare with the case of Vietnam and Malaysia. In comparison to the other two countries, Singapore’s trade market has experienced both downturns and expansions. Additionally, Singapore’s annual import growth rate has maintained moderate expansion between Q2 and Q3. This could be the sign of the economy postponed. Notably, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expressed concern regarding the future of ASEAN in a recent speech. According to Loong, U.S.-China trade war could disrupt supply chain integration throughout Asia (Bloomberg, 2018). That is, ASEAN economy may not benefit from the trade war despite previous predictions. The ASEAN trade market is already disrupted in the short-term, as ASEAN nations have historically had a close trading relationship with both great powers. In fact, the U.S. and China are leading trade partners in the region. Therefore, the trade war has a negative impact on the two powers and their trading partners. Washington-Beijing relations is not just bilateral; it is multilateral relationship that has a large impact on other nations as well. As Loong mentioned, ASEAN should expect abrupt changes in sets of foreign trade rules for operating with either powerhouse. Therefore, the research hypothesis is rejected because Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore trade markets have been disrupted since the trade war started.

**SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

This research presents two dominant drawbacks. First, this study requires a longer period of

analysis after the beginning of the trade war. The findings in this study only touch upon the short-term consequences experienced by the ASEAN trade market without predicting long-term impact. Therefore, additional research is necessary to achieve a holistic approach to the topic in the future. Second, this study should also expand its sample to all ASEAN nations in order to understand the general picture. ASEAN currently consists ten-member states, yet this paper only focuses on five countries. This paper shows that the trade war generates very different outcomes on individual ASEAN nations. Even though the five countries selected in this study are representative of ASEAN, a more wholistic study would include all ten.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, the hypothesis presented at the beginning of this paper is rejected. This paper acknowledges that the trade war has had various impacts on ASEAN member states. For example, Thailand and the Philippines are not impacted by the trade war, but Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia are greatly impacted by the trade war. The finding goes against scholars' predictions and the paper's central argument that the trade war benefits smaller countries. U.S.—China relations is not simply a bilateral interaction; it is multilateral relationship that affects many other nations. Both countries are top trading partners to ASEAN and other nations across the globe. Therefore, the trade war does not only have isolated consequence on the two major powers, but also it has a strong influence on Southeast Asia nations. Most of the region negatively suffers from the major changes in international trading rules. Future studies on this topic should include a more expansive sample size and analyze a greater period of time in order to fully understand the bigger picture.

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# On the Islamization of Malaysia: Emergence of Jihadi-Salafism and Future Prospects

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## ABSTRACT

*Malaysia has always been a significant state in the Islamic world, with a domestic Muslim majority and Islam as its official national religion. While Sunni theology is commonly seen as the mainstream form of Islam as practiced in the country, the past few decades have also seen the emergence of Jihadi-Salafists in Malaysia. Encouraged by bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and driven by the politicization of Islam, the increasing appeal of Jihadism among Malaysians has resulted from the conducive ideological space that the political environment has provided. The Malaysian state today thus faces complications in its relationship with Islam, which hamper its response towards more extreme Islamic elements, in spite of the 2018 General Elections.*

## Introduction

Known as the Bastion of Moderate Islam, Malaysia plays an important role in the Islamic world. With a Muslim majority of 60%, Islam is Malaysia's official religion,<sup>1</sup> and the state is by many measures a stronghold of Sunni theology in Southeast Asia. Yet, its religious identity also intersects deeply with the ethnic identity of its Malay population. It is not uncommon to hear the Malay-Muslim label being used frequently to describe its racial majority, illustrating how synonymous the established ethno-religious connections have become. At the same time, the state has managed to achieve significant progress in its economic and social development, as evident by a strong sense of national pride among its populace.

1 Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook: Malaysia." CIA. Accessed December 15, 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html>.

However, while Islam has arguably been a foundational underpinning for Malaysian society, its many forms as practiced do not have an equally harmonious relationship with the state. In particular, with the heightened threat of terrorism in a post-9/11 era, the place of Jihadi-Salafism in Malaysian society has been increasingly scrutinized in domestic discourse. On June 28, 2016, Malaysia suffered its first ever terrorist attack near Kuala Lumpur, the country's capital.<sup>2</sup> Perpetrated by local supporters of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), the bomb blast on a nightclub in Puchong, Selangor, was a solemn reminder of the Jihadi elements in the country still sympathetic to radical causes of extremist groups like ISIS. This phenomenon, however, is not new to Malaysia. The state first observed the threat of Islamic militancy in the 1980s, and again in the 1990s when Soviet-Afghanistan War veterans returned to Malaysia. Today, radical groups founded on Jihadi ideology continue to operate covertly - since 2013, Malaysian police have reportedly arrested over 260 individuals for links to terror-related offenses and foiled over 14 attack plots.<sup>3</sup>

Malaysia provides an interesting case study for analyzing the way in which Islam, particularly the strain of Salafism and Jihadi-Salafism, has evolved in the state and intertwined with concepts of national identity, political frameworks, and policy narratives. In studying the emergence of Islamism and Salafism in Malaysia, scholars have emphasized the need to locate the phenomenon in the context of global trends of post-colonial Islamic fundamentalism. In much of the Islamic world, the failure of secular nationalism to prevent the subservience of Islamic societies to Western culture has led to the movement to re-establish Islam as the core of governance. Malaysia was not immune to this fundamentalist turn, but upon closer examination, its experiences differ from those of the Middle East. Its move towards a more fundamentalist approach, characterized by many as a period of Islamic Revivalism, can arguably be attributed chiefly to the political climate between the 1970s and 1990s. The developments during that time also make a compelling case for the study of Islamic Exceptionalism as theorized by Shadi Hamid, given the lasting and controversial impacts left by Islam on political life.

This paper argues that the Malaysian state today faces complications in its relationship with Islam, which hampers its response towards more extreme Islamic elements. The deployment of Islamic rhetoric in the mainstream political realm has created space for Jihadi-Salafism to grow, which in turn forces politicians to wield Islamism more forcibly in a self-reinforcing cycle. The first part of this paper will study the emergence of Islam and its Jihadi-Salafi strain in Malaysia, analyze the politicization of Islam, and discuss the influence of Saudi Arabia. The second part of the paper will then examine Jihadi trends in Malaysia today, as well as the operational

2 Lourdes, Marc. "Islamic State launches first successful attack in Malaysia." CNN. July 04, 2016. Accessed December 15, 2018. <https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/04/homepage2/islamic-state-attack-malaysia/index.html>.

3 Jani, Muhammad Haziq. "Malaysia," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 9, no. 1 (2017): 18-21.

and ideological response of the Malaysian state. The paper will then conclude by discussing Hamid's conception of Islamic Exceptionalism and future trajectories of Islam in Malaysia in light of the recent 2018 General Elections.

### How Islam Spread to Malaysia

The spread of Islam to Malaysia, or the Malay Peninsula as it was known in the 12th Century, is closely connected to the flourishing of the great maritime Indian Ocean trading routes, made possible by the Strait of Malacca — the artery for commerce that connected China and Japan to India, the Middle East, and eastern Africa. Muslim merchants dominated these sea lanes, and established a vast trading network linking the coastlines along these routes, aided by an impeccable business ethic and universal transaction laws based on the Shariah. Owing to its strategic geographical location straddling the Strait of Malacca, the peninsula was a focal point for trade and commerce. As these Muslim merchants interacted and lived with the indigenous Malay and other populations along its coastline, religion and ideas mixed and propagated.

Islam in particular held much appeal. The new religion offered equal-opportunity social advancement through spiritual devotion, which challenged the power of the traditional Hindu and Buddhist elites prevalent across Southeast Asia. Islam also embodied a complex theology that was attractive to farmers and merchants in the coastal regions.<sup>4</sup> It was against this backdrop that, around the year 1390, a Hindu prince from Java, Parameswara, fled his homeland of Sumatra. Landing along the southwest coast of Malaya with his followers, these Sumatran exiles established the Sultanate of Malacca in 1403. The Arabs had already been maintaining a trading colony in Malacca since the 8th century. However, Islam only really became widespread in the region upon the arrival and conversion of Parameswara.<sup>5</sup> Around the year 1405, Parameswara fell in love with a princess from the Samudera-Pasai Sultanate, a Muslim harbor kingdom on the north coast of Sumatra.<sup>6</sup> He subsequently converted Islam in order to marry her and changed his name to Sultan Iskander Shah.

Even though this was certainly not the first recorded account of Islam in Malaysia, the success of Malacca as an entrepot hub and financial center for the region arguably contributed to the significance this incident had on the spread of Islam in Malaysia. This marked a major milestone for religion in Malaya, and as Malacca went on to become a regional hub for Islamic studies, Islam continued to flourish in peninsula Malaysia throughout the 15th and the 16th century. It remained mostly in the same fashion as the colonial era approached towards

4 Lockard, et al. "The advent of Islam." Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed December 13, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Malaysia/The-advent-of-Islam>.

5 Ahmed, Nazeer. "Introduction of Islam into Malaysia." History of Islam. Accessed December 14, 2018. <https://historyofislam.com/contents/the-post-mongol-period/malaysia-introduction-of-islam-into/>.

6 Esposito, Ed. *The Oxford History of Islam*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

the 18th century, when Malaysia consisted only of British colonies. In 1957, Malaysia won independence and became unified state, embracing the largely secular system adopted from its colonial rulers. The initial vision for the nation was created by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister, and Malaysia became a secular state with Islam as its official religion.<sup>7</sup>

### Emergence of Salafism and Jihadi-Salafism

It is interesting that, with most of the Middle East turning towards Islam in the face of challenges from modernity, military defeat, and nationhood, Malaysia would also ride along with this a wave of Islamism. However, it would do so for mostly political reasons.

Salafism refers to an interpretation of Islam that stems from a puritanical approach that seeks to restore Islamic faith and to practice the way Salafists imagined they existed at the time of Prophet Muhammad. Eschewing religious innovations in the belief that they encourage disunity among the Muslim community, they hold true to the Prophetic model they understand to represent the golden age of Islam, and that now serves as an example for Muslims to follow. Salafists share a common religious creed, that centers around strict adherence to the concept of *tauhid* (the oneness of God) and a staunch condemnation of human reasoning and rationality in religion. By strictly following the rules and guidance in the scriptures (the Koran and the Hadith), they claim to eliminate the biases of human subjectivity, allowing them to identify the truth of God's revelations. From this perspective, Islamic pluralism does not exist, for there is only a singular legitimate religious interpretation.<sup>8</sup>

In this vein, a significant part of Islamic thought in Salafism and its methodology revolves around fundamental questions relating to the relationship between Muslims and political authority. While Salafists agree in creed, they differ on how to apply the prophetic model to the contemporary issues and problems of the present, to implement their beliefs and faith. They also differ in contextualizing and understanding present reality, and thus diverge on how to change this reality in accordance with applying the prophetic model.<sup>9</sup> Hence, these rifts have resulted in the creation of three distinct categories: Quietest Salafists who believe in political abstinence, Haraki Salafists who believe in political activism, and Jihadi Salafists who believe in armed struggle.

Crucially, the Jihadi-Salafism theology is an approach to Jihadism that is coupled with an

7 Ooi, Jeff. "Merdeka...50 years of Islamic State?" Asian Correspondent. July 19, 2007. Accessed December 14, 2018. <https://asiancorrespondent.com/2007/07/merdeka-50-years-of-islamic-state/>.

8 Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207-239.

9 Rabil, Robert, *Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism*. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).

adherence to Salafism. Jihadism is driven by the idea that Jihad (religiously-sanctioned warfare) is an individual obligation incumbent upon all Muslims in the face of illegitimate, non-Islamic regimes. Given their exclusivist view that their approach to Islam is the only true one, Jihadi-Salafists thus often justify violence against others, including Muslims and non-combatants, with *Takfir* (the excommunication of Muslims and accusation of their apostasy because they do not adhere to the Salafist way of practicing Islam).<sup>10</sup> While Islam in Malaysia is still largely Sunni and follows the *Shafi'i* school of thought, Salafism is a significant minority, and its influence is felt even at a political level. Plurality does exist with different Islamic sects existing in the state (with the exception of Shia and other banned forms of Islamic practice), but there is insufficient data to determine the proportion of Salafists in Malaysia.

The first wave of Salafism arrived in the Malay states in the 1920s.<sup>11</sup> Several Malay Pan-Islamism reformists were influenced by the ideas of Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh while studying at the Egyptian al-Azhar University. Upon returning to Malaya, they began propagating these ideas. The most important figure within this group was Sheikh Tahir Jalaluddin, who formed the Kaum Muda – a reformist group that was opposed to many Sufi rituals within the Malay world which they perceived as contrary to Islamic teaching. This earlier version of Salafi thought propagated, among others, the ideal of al-Afghani's Pan-Islamism, as well as other reform doctrines of both al-Afghani and Abduh that emphasized the importance of reviving the Muslim ummah globally and reconciling some elements of modernity with the Islamic culture of the people. However, the ideals propagated by the Kaum Muda never did spread to much of the Malay states (with the exception of the state of Perlis), because they created an atmosphere of hostility towards the establishment, to the disapproval of the country's ruling (i.e. sultans) and religious authorities.<sup>12</sup>

In the 1980s, a second wave of Salafism appeared, which took place during a period of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia, stretching from the 1970s to the 1990s.<sup>13</sup> During this time, there were domestic and external elements interested in the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia and called for the implementation of Shariah law.<sup>14</sup> These demands can be connected

10 Hamid, Shadi and Dar, Rashid. "Islamism, Salafism, and Jihadism: A Primer." Brookings Institute. July 15, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/>.

11 Nawab, Mohamed and Osman, Mohamed. "Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 36, no. 2 (2014): 206-231.

12 Malik, Maszlee. "Theology in Malaysia: Between Mainstream and the Periphery," *Tarjamiyaat Bayt Al Hikma – Journal of Translation Studies*, no. 4 (2013): 51-65.

13 Mutalib, Hussin. "Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political Implications," *Asian Survey* 30, no. 9 (1990): 877-891.

14 Fauzi, Ahmad and Hamid, Abdul. "The Formative Years of The Dakwah Movement: Origins, Causes and Manifestations of Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia," *IKIM Journal* 10, no. 2 (2002): 87-124.

to both developments overseas and the political climate of Malaysia during that period, which will be discussed later. These developments have fundamentally altered Islamic normativity in the country, giving rise to new Islamic vocabularies that shaped contemporary Muslim subjectivities. To that end, the second wave of Salafism in Malaysia, and in particular the emergence of Jihadi-Salafism, can be traced to two key factors – the politicization of Islam, and the influence of Saudi Arabia.

#### A. POLITICIZATION OF ISLAM

Throughout much of Malaysia's recent political history, Islam has always been included in the national conversation, often being employed for political ends. In stark contrast to the secular foundations envisioned by the parties involved in independence talks with the British,<sup>15</sup> Malaysian society has slowly drifted markedly towards an Islamic-centric focus, egged on by domestic incentives to do so. In the Malaysian context, the politicization of Islam and the fracas that ensued between the two main political parties, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), blurred the lines between politics and religion, causing Islam to permeate cultural norms. These conversations often included debates over the legitimacy of *jihad* as a means through which to introduce Islamic law and bring an Islamic state into being in the region – all to achieve political gain. For many individuals seeking to locate themselves and their identity vis-à-vis others in society, such social norms and structures played an important role, and thus contributed to an overall atmosphere of Islamism and growing Salafism.

It is therefore an unfortunate observation that religion in Malaysia is frequently mobilized in service of narrow political interests, amplifying the appeal of Jihadi-Salafism by placing the necessity of the implementation of Islamic strictures at the forefront of national discourse. As Malaysia's dominant ruling party from independence until 2018, UMNO represents Malay-Muslims and predicates itself on the principle of Malay-Muslim supremacy for political appeal and sustainability.<sup>16</sup> Given that Malaysia has a Malay-Muslim majority population, UMNO's main political rivals are naturally also Malay-Muslim parties who brandish religious credentials as a source of legitimacy. Hence, by advancing a narrative since the 1980s that this Malay-Muslim supremacy was under attack from various cultural and religious segments, UMNO has sought to position itself as the defender of all that is Islamic. Malaysian politics has thus become characterized by parties trying to "out-Islam" each other in a sort of Islamization race,

15 Azmi, Dzof. "Malaysia: An Islamic, secular country." *star2*. April 2, 2017. Accessed December 13, 2018. <https://www.star2.com/living/viewpoints/2017/04/02/an-islamic-secular-country-dzof-azmi/>.

16 Schulze, Kirsten and Liow, Joseph Chinyong. "Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad: Transnational and Local Dimensions of the ISIS Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Asian Security*, (2018): 1-18.

and religion has come to be viewed as a zero-sum game, simply because politics is as well.<sup>17</sup>

The foundation that allows this sort of religious mobilization is the intersection between the religious Muslim and the ethnic Malay identity. Islam assumes salience by virtue of being the chief criteria for the definition of “Malay” as articulated in the Malaysian Constitution. That one must be Muslim to be a Malay is telling of the intimate, state-sponsored relationship between ethnicity and religion.<sup>18</sup> The role of Islam at the core of Malay identity has also gained greater centrality because the two other pillars upon which that identity was once based – language and royalty – no longer have the same currency they did decades ago. The centrality of Islam has been very much augmented by the state-orchestrated discourse of Malay primacy encapsulated in the concepts of rights of the bumiputra, or “sons of the land,” as part of UMNO’s employment of exclusive racial and religious discourse.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, though ethnicity has long been the primary identity marker for Malays in Malaysia, post-independence constructs may well have initiated a shift to Malays seeing themselves first as Muslim, rather than Malay.<sup>20</sup> As such, Islam can be seen as having the utility of a political ideology to shore up the legitimacy of the various competing parties, which also has the side-effect of devolving conversations into a particularly exclusive brand of Islamism that has no intention to encourage pluralism or compromise.

The Islamization race between UMNO and PAS can be traced back to the early 1980s, when a group of young *ulama* took over the leadership of PAS and transformed its political approach.<sup>21</sup> The party began distancing itself from the ultra-Malay nationalist agenda of its previous president and condemned Malay nationalism as fanatical, chauvinistic, and running contrary to Islamic teachings. The party also adopted a clear Islamist agenda, advocating strongly for an Islamic state and implementation of Shariah law.<sup>22</sup> In essence, PAS fashioned Islam into an identity and dissenting voice for the Malay-Muslim community in their search for greater political legitimacy. More often than not, PAS attacks against UMNO have targeted what they

17 Ibid.

18 Chee, Tham Seong. “Defining ‘Malay,’” Department of Malay Studies Seminar and Occasional Papers Series, no. 6 (1992): 1-18.

19 Means, Gordon. “The Role of Islam in the Political Development of Malaysia,” *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 2 (1969): 264-284.

20 Liow, Joseph Chinyong and Ahmad-Noor, Farish. “Religion and Identity in Malaysia.” RSIS Commentary. January 14, 2010. Accessed December 16, 2018. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1297-religion-and-identity-in-malay/#.XBWYbid7lQJ>.

21 Liow, Joseph Chinyong. “The 49th PAS Congress: Politics behind the rhetoric.” RSIS Commentary. September 22, 2003. Accessed December 16, 2018. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/588-the-49th-pas-congress-politic/#.XBWY-Cd7lQJ>.

22 Osman, Mohd Nawab Mohd and Arosoaie, Aida. “Jihad in the Bastion of ‘Moderation’: Understanding the Threat of ISIS in Malaysia,” *Asian Security*, (2018): 1-14.

have argued to be questionable religious credentials and a secular approach to politics. This has included the demonization of UMNO leaders as infidels.<sup>23</sup>

Challenged by this new overtly Islamist political agenda, UMNO has sought to strengthen its political position through utilizing Islam and co-opting Muslim religious figures into government service. Paralleled by the change in PAS leadership as mentioned above, UMNO also witnessed the pronouncement of a new strategy focused on ‘the struggle to change the attitude of the Malays in line with the requirements of Islam in this modern age’.<sup>24</sup> As part of that attempt to define the boundaries of Islamic politics in Malaysia, UMNO regularly presents PAS as ‘fanatics’ and ‘radicals’, while portraying itself as representative of a more orthodox Islam. In that vein, it has expanded the religious bureaucracy (for example, institutionalizing accommodation within businesses and the civil service for religious prayer) and advanced policies in support of personal piety.<sup>25</sup>

UMNO has also frequently accused PAS of supporting Islamic militancy. It discredits PAS as fundamentalist Islamists, taking issue with their literal interpretation of *Jihad* that encourages violence and splits the Malay community. While some links between PAS and Jihadi-Salafists do exist, UMNO was particularly strategic in exploiting fears about Islamic militancy for political advantage and, in doing so, ruthlessly suppressing PAS. This was highlighted by the 1985 Memali incident, in which a police raid on Kampung Memali, in the remote Baling district in Kedah state, resulted in the death of PAS leader Ibrahim Mahmood, along with 18 other civilians. Ibrahim had been accused of “deviant teachings” and was to be arrested under Malaysia’s Internal Security Act.<sup>26</sup>

Meanwhile, UMNO has in more recent times incorporated Salafist elements into its political corps in an effort to bolster its religious backing and appeal with a wider Malay-Muslim demographic. The Pertubuhan Ilmuwan Malaysia (ILMU), a group of Salafi *ulama* within UMNO,<sup>27</sup> has been at the forefront in defending the UMNO’s Islamic repute. Especially in light of opposition from PAS, having a group of Salafists to counter their religious views can

23 Abdullah, Kamarulnizam. *The Politics of Islam in Contemporary Malaysia*. (Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2003).

24 Liow, Joseph Chinyong. “Political Islam in Malaysia: Problematising discourse and practice in the UMNO–PAS ‘Islamisation race’,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 42, no. 2 (2004): 184-205.

25 Kepel, Gilles. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

26 “1985 Kedah killings come back to haunt Mahathir.” *The Straits Times*. August 17, 2017. Accessed December 15, 2018. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/1985-kedah-killings-come-back-to-haunt-mahathir>.

27 Malik, Maszlee. “Salafism and politics: A Malaysian case,” *International Journal of Islamic Thoughts* 5, no. 1 (2016): 49-59.

be very beneficial to UMNO for enhancing the party's Islamic credentials and improving its credibility with Malaysian Muslim voters.<sup>28</sup> To that end, the Salafi ulama often use religious based arguments to discredit PAS and its leaders.<sup>29</sup> That said, while the ILMU has categorically rejected the ideology of Jihadi groups like ISIS and discouraged Malaysian Muslims from joining them, the similarities in the mindset and religious doctrine between these groups and the Salafi ulama are making some Malaysian Muslims more susceptible to the *Jihadi* theology.<sup>30</sup>

Overall, the increasingly extremist rhetoric in the country promoted through the state's politicization of Islam, UMNO's increasing concessions to conservative Islam for political gains, the political race between UMNO and PAS over the "right" version of Islam, and the Jihadi rhetoric between the parties have helped foster the seeds of Jihadi-Salafism. The role of the Malaysian state in politicizing Islam in narrowly essentialist terms is regrettable, in contrast with Islam's rich and pluralistic intellectual tradition, and sets the stage for the acceptance of Islamist extremist categories into mainstream public discourse on Islam.<sup>31</sup> Malaysia's ethnocentric Islamic discourse, obsessed as it is with the idea of Malay supremacy and now given a new brand of legitimacy for its Islamic supremacy, can also be seen as the prime source of the radicalization that threatens Malaysia's character as a democratic state.<sup>32</sup>

As a corollary, it also explains the precarious situation the Malaysian government finds itself in today – having to contend with the concept of Malaysia as an "Islamic state" while ISIS proclaims the same.<sup>33</sup> Despite its past rhetoric and guarantees as the patron of Islam, the Malaysian state, with its complexity as a multicultural, democratic, Westphalian nation-state, will never be able to change into the puritanical "Islamic state" ideal held by the radical Islamists. Hence, while the Malaysian state sees ISIS as the anti-state, ISIS sees the Malaysian state as the anti-Islam, and to the extent that these views are irreconcilable, it will potentially

28 Nawab, Mohamed and Osman, Mohamed. "Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence or Expediency?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 36, no.2 (2014): 206-231.

29 Bakar, Sheith Khidhir Bin Abu. "IRF chief on why Umno doesn't oppose Salafism." *FMT News*. February 8, 2018. Accessed December 16, 2018. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2018/02/08/irf-chief-on-why-umno-doesnt-oppose-salafism/>.

30 Osman, Mohd Nawab Mohd. "Islam, politics and violence in Malaysia." *New Mandala*. January 9, 2015. Accessed December 16, 2018. <https://www.newmandala.org/islam-politics-and-violence-in-malaysia/>.

31 Liow, Joseph Chinyong. "Malaysia's ISIS Conundrum." *Brookings Institute*. April 21, 2015. Accessed December 17, 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/malysias-isis-conundrum/>.

32 Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul. "ISIS in Southeast Asia: Internalized Wahhabism is a Major Factor." *Middle East Institute*. May 18, 2016. Accessed December 17, 2018. [https://www.mei.edu/publications/isis-southeast-asia-internalized-wahhabism-major-factor#\\_ftn36](https://www.mei.edu/publications/isis-southeast-asia-internalized-wahhabism-major-factor#_ftn36).

33 Chan, Nicholas. "The Malaysian "Islamic" State versus the Islamic State (IS): evolving definitions of "terror" in an "Islamising" nation-state," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 11, no. 3 (2018): 415-437.

have a jarring radicalization effect on Jihadi-Salafists who have bought into the fundamentalist message put forth by UMNO but are disappointed in its lack of ability to fully achieve it.

## B. THE INFLUENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA

The relationship that Saudi Arabia has with Wahhabism is the centerpiece of that which animates its religious strategy and its domestic and foreign policy. Wahhabism was founded in the late 1700s by Muhammad Abdul Wahhab, a scholar who believed Islam needed to be rejuvenated.<sup>34</sup> Many Wahhabis view themselves as a sect of Salafism and share many creedal tenets with other Salafists, specifically that of returning to the austere practices laid out by the Prophetic model and rejecting all innovations and idolatry in Islam.

The exodus of Muslim Brotherhood members to Saudi Arabia during the Nasser regime in Egypt opened new channels of communication and transmission with Wahhabism and informed the modus operandi of the Jihadi movement. Even though he was not in Saudi Arabia, Egyptian intellectual, writer, and Brotherhood member Sayyid Qutb contributed significantly to this academic discourse by publishing a series of books in the 1960s and 1970s, rigorously tackling issues of Islamic identity, loyalty, and the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims. He addressed issues pertaining to the Shariah and the necessity to refer to it as the supreme law. More importantly, he also laid the blueprint for rejecting any other system of legislation, removing oneself from an ignorant and non-Islamic *Jahilliya* society, and subsequently challenging it through Jihad.<sup>35</sup> Sayyid Qutb was thus perhaps the most influential in adapting Wahhabism towards the Jihadi trend through a theoretical framework. Hence, the Jihadi movement was molded into a more settled form according to this view, which in turn shaped its worldview of itself and other societies.<sup>36</sup>

Given the intimate ties between religious and political institutions, Saudi Arabia has taken an interest in disseminating Wahhabi thought to other Muslim nations, in accordance with its own national agenda. While the more extreme tendencies of Wahhabism have been toned down throughout the years by the Saudi ruling dynasty in the interest of modern statehood and international norms, Saudi Arabia's dissemination of Wahhabi thought in the guise of Salafism has proceeded apace since the 1970s. This evangelical fervor was further kept afloat by its geopolitical desire to eclipse post-revolutionary Iran in a rivalry for the claim of an Islamic state.

34 Bakar, Adam Abu. "Wahabism spreading among Malaysia's elite." *FMT News*. January 14, 2017. Accessed December 17, 2018. <https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2017/01/14/wahabism-spreading-among-malysias-elite/>.

35 Jarman, Mohammed Al. "The Intersection of Wahhabism and Jihad." *Global Policy*. July 6, 2017. Accessed December 17, 2018. <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/06/07/2017/intersection-wahhabism-and-jihad>.

36 Ibid.

The Saudi-Malaysian bilateral relationship incorporates that as a core aspect of cooperation. Since the early 1970s, Malaysian leaders have developed a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia. Saudi financial assistance has generally taken two forms: 1) assistance provided to help build religious institutions as well as to further support activities conveying the message of Islam in Malaysia, and 2) assistance aimed at supporting economic development in Malaysia. However, the religious dimension remains arguably the bedrock of bilateral relations.<sup>37</sup> The Wahhabi transmission process in Southeast Asia has been well documented, penetrating structures of politics, charity associations, non-governmental organizations, Islamist movements, and educational networks, often through the use of financial and other resources.

Economically, within the context of the oil boom of the 1970s and the ensuing rise of the political clout of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (better known as OPEC), petrodollars from Saudi Arabia started pouring into many Muslim countries worldwide, including into Malaysia, for the propagation of Islam and the spreading of the Saudi-Salafi indoctrination process.<sup>38</sup> It is also worth noting that this was executed by the Saudis to the warm reception of the Malaysians, the latter becoming a strong partner and a vocal supporter of the former. Malaysia became a major recipient of aid distributed under the aegis of the Saudi-managed Islamic Development Bank. Among the primary financial beneficiaries have been government-sanctioned bodies responsible for the process of propagating Islam, such as the Islamic Welfare Association of Malaysia<sup>39</sup> and the Malaysian-initiated Regional Islamic Dakwah Council for Southeast Asia and Pacific.<sup>40</sup>

Diplomatically, as with many countries where Saudi embassies are located, a cultural attaché and cultural mission was established at the Saudi embassy in Malaysia to assist in the propagation of Islam. The mission became an important channel for cultural tie-ups and served as a touchpoint for Saudi intellectual and religious influence in Malaysia. A few Saudi-based and Saudi government-supported organizations for Islamic propagation were actively engaged in the teaching of Saudi-Salafism doctrine with Islamic organizations in Malaysia as well, either through the mission or through direct communication with them.<sup>41</sup> In addition,

37 Idris, Asmady. "Malaysia-Saudi Arabia Relations: Roots, Dimensions, and Prospects." Middle East Institute. June 18, 2013. Accessed December 17, 2018. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/malaysia-saudi-arabia-relations-roots-dimensions-and-prospects>.

38 Desker, Barry. "Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (2003): 415-428.

39 Oxford Islamic Studies. "PERKIM." The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Accessed December 15, 2018. <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1844>.

40 Nair, Shanti. *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*. (Singapore: ISEAS / Routledge, 2000).

41 Idris, Asmady. "Key determining factors influencing small states' relationships : a case study of Malaysia's relations with Saudi Arabia." PhD thesis, Newcastle University, 2006.

the mission also employed local graduates from Saudi universities to become their official preachers in the teaching of Islam.<sup>42</sup>

Educationally, it would be through these preachers that the mission would subsequently acquire recommendations for new recruits amongst local students to be sent to Saudi Arabian universities on scholarships for their higher education. In the 1980s and 1990s, many Malaysians went to the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, for their higher education on scholarships sponsored by the Saudi government. Pursuing Islamic education, they studied religion in Islamic universities dominated by Salafi scholars. Exposed to the Wahhabi way of thinking, many who returned began propagating their ideas, or became religious teachers and went on to instill the same theology within the younger generation.<sup>43</sup> Hence, since the 1990s, traditional Islamic theology taught in government schools has been gradually shifting to a view of theology derived from the Saudi Arabia. Students who grew up imbibing the Wahhabi-oriented curriculum in schools are now in many sectors of the work force. These include the government and civil service, scholars and academics, lawyers, and others holding positions of power, especially the political establishment.<sup>44</sup>

This is sustained by the political incentive to support and welcome the presence of Wahhabi and Salafi elements in the country to bilateral ends. International cooperation with a major actor like Saudi Arabia brings tangible benefits for the Malaysian government, specifically domestically by reinforcing its legitimacy as a representative of a Malay-Muslims. Hence, despite the existence of a national *fatwa* (legal ruling) pronouncing Wahhabism as "unsuitable for Malaysian society",<sup>45</sup> even the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department has defended Wahhabism in parliament as being part of mainstream Sunni Islam. Taken together, this creates a national environment where a hardline, Wahhabi approach to Islam has currency in the overall religious discussion in Malaysia.

### Jihad in Malaysia Today & Malaysia's Response

Amidst the factors described above, the 1980s were followed by the formation of Jihadi terror

42 Malik, Maszlee. "Salafism in Malaysia: Historical Account on Its Emergence and Motivations," *Sociology of Islam* 5, no. 4 (2017): 303-333.

43 Anwar, Zainah. *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among the Students*. (Selangor: Pelanduk Publications, 1987).

44 Habib, Shahanaaz. "The radicalisation of Islam in Malaysia." The Star Online. August 28, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/08/28/the-radicalisation-of-islam-in-malaysia-academicians-worry-that-an-exclusivist-way-of-interpretating/>.

45 "No place for wahhabism in Malaysia, fatwa council says." MalayMail. March 01, 2015. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://www.malaymail.com/s/850279/no-place-for-wahhabism-in-malaysia-fatwa-council-says>.

groups within Malaysia, and an upswing in support for foreign groups as Malaysia began encountering the rise of transnational Islamist terrorist groups. This took place mainly in the late 1990s, through the network of Mujahedeen Soviet-Afghanistan War veterans who returned to Malaysia. These individuals carried out their activities in Malaysia (and often throughout Southeast Asia) namely under two groups: Kumpulan Mujahid Malaysia and Jemaah Islamiyah. In view of length constraints, this paper will not discuss the origins of these groups.

Malaysia's overall response to Jihadi-Salafism can be viewed through operational and ideological categories. Generally speaking, Malaysia has been fairly successful in its operational response to ensure its own national security, owing to the strong authority held by its central government. However, the state's ideological response is complicated, especially given the way its ruling party UMNO has wielded conservative Islamic rhetoric in its politicization of Islam.

After the 9/11 attacks and 2002 Bali bombings, Malaysia has been able to leverage the legal and operational instruments at its disposal to crackdown on extremist Jihadi elements within the country. The Malaysian Police Special Branch affords the state a degree of intelligence support,<sup>46</sup> and the Internal Security Act grants authorities tremendous legal and investigative powers.<sup>47</sup> Suspected individuals can also be subject to indefinite detention without trial under Malaysia's Prevention of Terrorism Act, a new set of anti-terrorism policies adopted by the government.<sup>48</sup> Malaysia has made significant strides in fostering regional and international cooperation with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies too. This has curbed the operations of many Jihadi groups, and has successfully decreased the specter of terror incidents in the country. Since the first ISIS-related terror attack in 2016 near Kuala Lumpur, there has been no other reported incidents in the country.

However, it is in the ideological responses to Jihadi-Salafism that the Malaysian state falls somewhat short. Ironically, this is understandable in light of the way UMNO has attempted to establish stronger Islamic credentials and to be seen as more Islamic than PAS – even if it

46 Idris, Azim. "How Malaysian, Indonesian anti-terror cops take the fight to Islamic militants, foil plots." *Asian Correspondent*. December 27, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/12/how-malaysian-indonesian-anti-terror-cops-fight-islamic-militants/>.

47 Tikamdas, Ramdas. "National Security and Constitutional Rights - The Internal Security Act 1960." *The Malaysian Bar*. September, 2003. Accessed December 18, 2018. [http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/human\\_rights/national\\_security\\_and\\_constitutional\\_rights\\_the\\_internal\\_security\\_act\\_1960.html](http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/human_rights/national_security_and_constitutional_rights_the_internal_security_act_1960.html).

48 Hudson, John. "Why Does Malaysia Have an Islamic State Problem?" *Foreign Policy*. September 9, 2015. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/09/why-does-malaysia-have-an-islamic-state-problem/>.

49 Riviere, Craig. "The evolution of jihadist-Salafism in Indonesia, Malaysia and The Philippines, and its impact on security in Southeast Asia." Research report, Australian Defense College, 2016.

has accused PAS of being hardline radical Islamists.<sup>49</sup> One could even argue that the efforts of these two main parties to "out-Islam" one another actually encourages Jihadi radicalization. To the extent that such fundamentalist Islamic rhetoric has been entrenched in Malaysian politics, this has given some advantage to the appeal of Jihadi-Salafism. In particular, the phrase "Peaceful Salafism" has been popularized in an attempt to describe non-violent Salafism in contrast to Jihadi-Salafism.<sup>50</sup> Now that UMNO has co-opted the Salafi ulama for religious legitimacy, there is a rekindling of political discourse within the Salafi worldview, and such a term provides legitimizing comfort for Jihadi-Salafists. As Haziq points out, the problem with this sort of discourse is that "it falls neatly into the already highly-racialized politics in Malaysia, encouraging racist rhetoric and allowing UMNO Supreme Council member Annuar Musa to brag that his racism is based on Islam".<sup>51</sup> The lines between violent and non-violent Salafism are easily blurred, and the resultant religious prejudice and exclusivism run the risk of giving Jihadi-Salafists the impression that the Islamic utopia the long for in Malaysia is within reach.

The prevailing environment conducive for Jihadi-Salafism has translated into tangible signals in the trends and composition of the new generation of Malaysian Jihadists. They are distinctly diverse in their occupational backgrounds and seem to lack religious school backgrounds or awareness of Islamic doctrines.<sup>52</sup> Malaysian authorities have detained teachers, restaurant workers, military staff, resort workers, academics, doctors, businessmen etc.<sup>53</sup> In fact, the lack of religious training amongst Malaysians who support Jihadi groups, as well as their selective appropriation of Islamic notions and incapacity to distinguish between institutionalized theological strands, suggests that they familiarized themselves with Islam through alternative sources.<sup>54</sup> As such, it is arguable that the socio-political developments in Malaysia over the past few decades have gone some ways in relating to and explaining the increasing prevalence of

50 Jani, Muhammad Haziq Bin. "Malaysia and the concept of Peaceful Salafism." *The Straits Times*. December 8, 2018. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/malaysia-and-the-concept-of-peaceful-salafism>.

51 Jani, Muhammad Haziq Bin. "'Peaceful Salafism' in Malaysia: Legitimising Comfort for Radicals." *RSIS Commentary*. December 4, 2015. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/co15266-peaceful-salafism-in-malaysia-legitimising-comfort-for-radicals/#.XBWnqSd7lQJ>.

52 Sani, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd. "ISIS Recruitment of Malaysian Youth: Challenge and Response." *Middle East Institute*. May 3, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/isis-recruitment-malaysian-youth-challenge-and-response>.

53 Zolkepli, Farik. "Immigration officer, six others arrested for Islamic State links." *The Star Online*. March 13, 2017. Accessed December 18, 2018. <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/03/13/immigration-officer-seven-nabbed-islamic-state-militants/>.

54 Osman, Mohd Nawab Mohd and Arosoaie, Aida. "Jihad in the Bastion of 'Moderation': Understanding the Threat of ISIS in Malaysia," *Asian Security*, (2018): 1-14.

Salafism and Jihadi-Salafism in the state. This can be seen in one study conducted by Jonathan Kelley and Nan Dirk De Graaf, which found that the national context of a country had a critical impact on an individual's level of religiosity.<sup>55</sup> A nation's religious environment significantly influences the way in which religious beliefs are 'socialized'. If a nation is religious, then the socialization of religious beliefs has an even stronger impact than that of family influence.

### Future Prospects and Conclusion

The emergence of Salafism in Malaysia, particularly the second wave of Salafism, is closely linked to the political context witnessed during the period of the 1970s to the 1990s, fueled mainly by external influence from a Saudi Arabia in pursuit of its international agenda, and domestic pressures resulting from a heated Islamization race between political parties, vestiges of which still remain today. The Islamic Revivalism seen during that period was largely a product of these factors, and the appeal of Jihadi-Salafism was consequently a legacy of that overall atmosphere of Islamist rhetoric, fundamentalist and conservative approaches to Islam, and a confluence of militant actions and accusations. Today's generation of Jihadists bear clear indications of the socializing effects of that charged atmosphere – a diverse range of occupational backgrounds and increasingly secular educational experiences. While Malaysia's operational response to Jihadi groups post-9/11 has been successful, its ideological response has been markedly muted. Given UMNO's historical baggage and current involvement with Salafist elements, this is to be expected.

Recent developments in Malaysia held a glimmer of hope that the country could break out of its toxic cycle of Islamic politicization. In the 2018 General Elections, the opposition's political coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH) pulled off an unexpected victory, replacing UMNO as the ruling party in government for the first time in Malaysia's history.<sup>56</sup> The result was reflective of a multitude of factors in the shifting Malaysian context, including changing demographics, rising costs of living, and decades-long corruption and other crippling scandals surrounding UMNO, such as the ignominy of Malaysia's state-owned investment fund 1MDB.<sup>57</sup>

PH built its platform on these pressure points, and portrayed itself as the multi-racial, multi-faith coalition that the UMNO-led coalition once aspired to be. What is perhaps significant is

<sup>55</sup> Kelley, Jonathan and Graaf, Nan Dirk De. "National Context, Parental Socialization, and Religious Belief: Results from 15 Nations," *American Sociological Review* 62, no. 4 (1997): 639-659.

<sup>56</sup> Aw, Tash. "What Just Happened in Malaysia?" *The New York Times*. May 10, 2018. Accessed January 23, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/opinion/malaysia-election-mahathir-mohamad.html>.

<sup>57</sup> Whiting, Amanda and Balasubramaniam, Renuka. "Malaysia's Remarkable Election Outcome." *Pursuit*. May 17, 2018. Accessed January 23, 2019. <https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/malaysia-s-remarkable-election-outcome>.

how this could be indicative of a how the country could move beyond the racial and religious politics of the past, with political dynamics centering more around issues of governance and policy. That being said, given the performance of PH since last May, even more complex contestations for the allegiance of Muslims in Malaysia in this "new" political landscape may emerge. Spats between the coalition are beginning to appear, and the government has yet to deliver on multiple campaign promises now 8-months into its term.<sup>58</sup> More ominously, a PH deputy president recently proclaimed that the election victory "has neither caused the Malays to lose their power nor affected the status of Islam in the country".<sup>59</sup> Clearly, the tussle for the souls (and votes) of Muslims in Malaysia is far from over.

What is certainly interesting is the way these observations of Jihadi-Salafism in Malaysia relate to academic discourse on Islam's role in politics more generally. In his argument for Islamic Exceptionalism, Shadi Hamid argues that unlike Christianity which acquiesced to secularism, Islam has an inherent propensity to leave a lasting impact on political life.<sup>60</sup> He offers multiple reasons to justify this. Islam is seen as flexible enough to incorporate western, political ideas like democracy and egalitarianism, and retroactively gives them an Islamic overture. This is made possible through "resources" in Islam, referring to the range of scripture such as Koran and Hadith that can lend themselves as political instruments to give credibility and legitimacy to politics and policy making. Furthermore, it is in the historical tradition of Islam that such a precedence for the intermingling between religion and politics has been made. With the Prophet Muhammed being both a political and religious leader, the active utility of Islam for political impact is rooted in Islamic history.

This line of argument invariably disregards the propensity for traditions like Islam to evolve over time, in practice and interpretation. Indeed, all traditions can be said to be traditions in the making. However, it provides a compelling framework to understand the interplay between Islam and politics in Malaysia. It is undeniable that much like Hamid's description, UMNO and PAS have wielded Islam to their own advantages, imposing the religion and its "resources" onto their political visions and conceptions of Malaysia as a state. Taken with this context, there is certainly some validity in Hamid's insight. Yet, it is also important to note that

<sup>58</sup> Tee, Kenneth. "Lembah Pantai MP scores Pakatan 'B+' for performance since GE14." *MalayMail*. January 22, 2019. Accessed January 23, 2019. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/01/22/lembah-pantai-mp-scores-pakatan-harapan-b-for-performance-since-ge14/1715103>.

<sup>59</sup> Bernama. "Malay power, status of Islam intact under Pakatan Harapan — Muhyiddin." *The Edge Markets*. December 29, 2018. Accessed January 23, 2019. <http://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/malay-power-status-islam-intact-under-pakatan-harapan-%E2%80%94-muhyiddin>.

<sup>60</sup> Hamid, Shadi. *Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping the World*. (London: St. Martin's Press, 2017).



regardless of Islam's inherent potential for political impact, the consequences of religiously-fueled rhetoric by political rulers can still very well be detrimental. In the case of the increased appeal for Jihadi-Salafism in Malaysia, this rings especially true. Malaysia's status as a Bastion of Moderate Islam may perhaps not be so accurate.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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# The ECB's Monetary Reponse to the Euro Crisis Through the Lens of the Taylor Rule: Comparing Germany and Greece to the Eurozone

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## ABSTRACT

*In the wake of the Euro Crisis, one major question that has been raised is whether a single monetary policy is appropriate for diverse economies in the Euro area. Is the monetary policy appropriate for Germany also be appropriate for the rest of the union, including Greece? To address this issue, this paper utilizes the Taylor Rule, a monetary policy rule that prescribes a nominal interest rate based on a country's inflation and output, as a proxy for monetary policy sans the existence of the ECB for Greece and Germany. Five different Taylor Rules with different weights for the inflation and output gaps are used to create different suggested interest rates for Greece, Germany and the Euro area. The five Taylor Rules produce interest rates for Greece that are significantly different from those for Germany and the Euro area. The interest rates suggested by the five models are not significantly different for Greece or the Euro area, but there is some divergence when applied to Germany. This shows that the interest rates that are appropriate for Germany and the Euro area may not be appropriate for Greece. Steps must be taken to reduce asymmetries within the Euro area.*

## Table of Figures

Figure 1: Harmonized Index of Consume Price growth for the Euro area, Germany and Greece	96
Figure 2: Industrial Production Index for the Euro area, Germany and Greece	97
Figure 3: ECB Main Refinancing Operations Rate	98
Figure 4: Taylor1 Equation - Original	98
Figure 5: Taylor2 Equation	99
Figure 6: Taylor3 Equation	99
Figure 7: Taylor4 Equation	99
Figure 8: Taylor5 Equation	99
Figure 9: Taylor Rules	100
Figure 10: Tukey Results for the Taylor Rules	103
Figure 11: Euro Area Taylor Rules Over Time	104
Figure 12: German Taylor Rules Over Time	104
Figure 13: Tukey Test for German Taylor Rules	105
Figure 14: Greek Taylor Rules Over Time	106
Figure 15: GDP Growth 2000-2008. Data from the World Bank	107
Figure 16: Balance of Payments - Data from OECD	109

## Tables

Table 1: Taylor1 F-Test	101
Table 2: Taylor2 F-Test	101
Table 3: Taylor3 F-Test	102
Table 4: Taylor4 F-Test	102
Table 5: Taylor5 F-Test	102
Table 6: F-Test of Euro Area Taylor Rules	103
Table 7: F-Test for German Taylor Rules	104
Table 8: F-Test for Greek Taylor Rules	105

## Section 1 - Introduction

The causes and responses of the Euro Crisis have been widely discussed in the years after Prime Minister George Papandreou revealed the extent of Greek debts and deficits. Some have pointed to reckless spending by the Greek government. Others have claimed that the harsh austerity imposed on the Greece by the Troika<sup>1</sup> prolonged the downturn unnecessarily. Regardless, the Euro Crisis has brought to light major gaps in the construction of the European Monetary Union.

One major question that has been raised is whether a single monetary policy is appropriate for such different economies. Is the monetary policy appropriate for Germany also appropriate for the rest of the union, including Greece? To address this issue, this paper utilizes the Taylor Rule, a monetary policy rule that prescribes a nominal interest rate based on a country's inflation and output, as a proxy for monetary policy sans the existence of the ECB for Greece and Germany. The results of these rules will then be compared to each other and to the Euro area as a whole in order to determine if a single monetary policy would be proper for all three.

This is an important question to answer given the current state of Europe and the context in which the European project was created. European integration has become a political punching bag across the continent as populist and nationalist parties make electoral gains. These groups run on anti-European integration platforms and blame Brussels and Frankfurt for their woes. If European leaders wish to restore confidence in European integration and the system they have built since the Second World War, they must address the gaps exposed by the Euro Crisis. Recognizing these issues is an essential step and European monetary policy is a significant issue that impacts the entire world economy.

This paper will begin an explanation of the Taylor Rule in Sections 1.1. Relevant literature is then presented in Section 2, including the strategy and framework of ECB policy in Section 2.1. The Method section (3) will lay out the data (3.1), the Taylor Rules (3.2) and the tests that will be conducted (3.3). Section 4, Results, will explain the findings of those tests and Section 5, Discussion, will lay out what they mean while applying them to a larger context. This paper will conclude with some brief recommendations in Section 6, and additional information, figures and statistics will be presented in the appendices.

### SECTION 1.1 - THE TAYLOR RULE

The Taylor Rule is a monetary policy rule designed by American economist John Taylor in 1993 that recommends an interest rate based on a country's inflation and output gaps.<sup>2</sup> Taylor

1 The European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund.  
2 Taylor, John B. 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice." *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy* (Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.) 195-214.

notes that "rules are responsive, calling for changes in the money supply, the monetary base, or the short-term interest rate in response to changes in the price level or real income."<sup>3</sup> Based on his research of the history of the Federal Reserve's performance, Taylor proposes the following rule:

$$r = p + .5y + .5(p-2) + 2$$

In this equation,  $r$  is the federal funds rate,  $p$  is the inflation rate over the previous four quarters and  $y$  is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target. The federal funds rate is the rate at which banks lend their reserves to each other on an overnight basis. The inflation gap is the difference between the central bank's stated target and actual inflation. Similarly, the output gap is the difference between the growth rate of a country and its potential GDP. Taylor gives equal weight to both the inflation and output gaps given the Federal Reserve's dual mandate of price stability and low unemployment. The Taylor Rule is based on the Federal Reserve's 2% inflation target and presumes that if the inflation and output gap were both zero, then "the federal funds rate would equal 4 percent, or 2 percent in real terms."<sup>4</sup>

Taylor also stresses that monetary policy should be used as a guidepost rather than a strict rule. The Taylor Rule merely offers suggestions for policymakers. There are countless variables which are not accounted for in Taylor's model that policymakers must consider when setting interest rates. However, monetary policy rules can easily become one of the many factors considered by a central bank. Taylor notes that discretionary policy is often inconsistent and short-sighted, while policy rules entail greater commitment. The design of a rule, how policymakers transition to that rule, how they then operate the rule, and how long the rule has been in place are all important considerations when assessing its effectiveness.

## Section 2 - Literature Review

There is a wide body of literature available covering both the Euro and the Taylor Rule. The mid and late 1990s saw a significant amount of work done on the potential applications of the Taylor Rule in the lead up to the introduction of the Euro. Clarida, Gali and Gertler designed a modified Taylor Rule that incorporates forecasted inflation in place of lagged inflation into the Taylor Rule.<sup>5</sup> Their modifications are designed to reflect the information that policymakers have available to them as they try to influence future inflation and output gaps. They then use their new rule to compare the central bank performance of six countries: Germany, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. They found that the Bundesbank was the most effective, and that monetary policy rules may be better at fighting inflation than

3 Ibid., 196.

4 Ibid., 202.

5 Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler. 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice: Some international evidence." *European Economic Review* (Elsevier Science B.V.) (42): 1033-1067.

pegging to a currency whose central bank is targeting inflation.

In 2003, Ullrich used Clarida et al.'s Taylor Rule to compare the behavior of the ECB and Federal Reserve from 1999 through 2002. She notes that "the contemporaneous inclusion of inflation and output gap gives the only reasonable estimation results," meaning that it is appropriate to use the same data that would be available during the period being examined.<sup>6</sup> When analyzing Europe, she finds that the inflation gap receives less weight than expected while the output gap coefficient is significant.<sup>7</sup> This is interesting given the single price stability mandate of the ECB.

Strum and De Haan use a Taylor Rule to discuss the effectiveness of ECB communication. They find that the ECB's communication provides information that can help predict the ECB's next interest rates move based on the Taylor Rule.<sup>8</sup> Sauer and Strum compare ECB decisions with Taylor Rule recommendations from 1992-2002 and find that the ECB raised interest rates by a lower amount than the expected increase in inflation, thus allowing real short-term interest rates to fall as inflation increased.<sup>9</sup> Mosler and Silipo note that there is a link between unemployment and inflation where high unemployment results in lower pressure on wages and thus lower inflation expectations. They also find that during the Euro Crisis, the relationship between interest rates and inflation, investment, output, employment and credit expansion dissolved.<sup>10</sup>

Dominguez in 2006 argued that structural gaps within the framework created for the Euro could lead to macroeconomic problems in member states. She notes that the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is probably overstated and that interest rates were perhaps lower than they should have been when the Euro launched. These low interest rates made it easier for governments to issue debt and appeared then to be fueling asset bubbles in some countries.<sup>11</sup>

6 Ullrich, Katrin. 2003. *A Comparison Between the Fed and the ECB: Taylor Rules*. Discussion Paper, Mannheim, Germany: Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), 10.

7 Ibid., 12.

8 Strum, Jan-Egbert and Jakob De Haan. 2011. "Does central bank communication really lead to better forecasts of policy decisions? New evidence based on a Taylor rule model for the ECB." *Review of World Economics* (Springer) (1): 41-58.

9 Sauer, Stephan and Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2003. *ECB Monetary Policy: How well does the Taylor Rule describe it?* Working Paper, Munich: CESifo, 10.

10 Mosler, Warren and Damiano B. Silipo. April 2016. *Maximizing Price Stability in a Monetary Economy*. Working Paper, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York: Level Economics Institute of Bard College, 14.

11 Dominguez, Kathryn M. E. Fall 2006. "The European Central Bank, the Euro, and Global Financial Markets." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* (American Economic Association) 20 (4): 67-88.

Orphanides uses the Taylor Rule to examine the performance of monetary policy leading up to the Great Depression and after 1951.<sup>12</sup> He finds that the Taylor Rule accurately portrayed the decisions made by the Federal Reserve, especially leading up the Great Depression.

Schnabl finds that differences between the growth models in Northern and Southern Europe were the root cause of the Euro Crisis as Northern countries had high savings and investment while Southern countries relied on consumption and government expenditures. He argues ECB policy resulted in excessive investment in Southern countries and that the ECB purchase of government bonds is weighing down the economy by allowing inefficient Southern companies to survive.<sup>13</sup>

Lieberman and Pisani-Ferry both give accounts of the Euro Crisis. Lieberman focuses on the experiences of individual countries, observing that the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 did significant damage to the Greek economy since it relied on exports and industries that earned foreign currencies.<sup>14</sup> Pisani-Ferry blames the structural imbalances imbedded in the creation of the Euro for the crisis and Greece's hardships. The Euro was too appreciated for Greek exports to be competitive, and low interest rates fueled a massive speculative bubble.<sup>15</sup> De Grauwe and Eichengreen proposes a similar view that the creation of the Euro was a political project and Europe failed to follow policies that would have brought the Eurozone closer to an optimum currency area.<sup>16 17</sup> De Grauwe also argued in 2003 that enlargement of the Eurozone could potentially make it more difficult to maintain monetary and financial stability.<sup>18</sup> These all agree with Mundell's 1961 argument that an optimum currency area must have a high degree of labor and factor mobility.<sup>19</sup>

Shambaugh holds that Europe is suffering from three interconnected economic crises. There is a banking crisis where banks are illiquid, a sovereign debt crisis causing government bonds to

12 Orphanides, Athanasios. 2003. "Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor Rule." *Journal of Monetary Economics* (Elsevier) (50): 983-1022.

13 Schnabl, Gunther. March 2017. *The Failure of ECB Monetary Policy from a Mises-Hayek Perspective*. Working Paper, Munich: CESifo, 1-30.

14 Lieberman, Ira W. 2018. "The Eurozone Crisis: From Banking Crises to Sovereign Debt Crises to Bailouts." In *In Good Times Prepare for Crisis*, by Ira W. Lieberman, 417-420. Brookings Institution Press.

15 Pisani-Ferry, *The Euro Crisis and its Aftermath*.

16 De Grauwe, Paul. 2013. "The Political Economy of the Euro." *The Annual Review of Political Science* (16): 153-170.

17 Eichengreen, Barry. 2013. "The Future of European Capitalism." *Current History* 298-303

18 De Grauwe, Paul. 2003. "The Euro at Stake? The Monetary Union in an Enlarged Europe." *CESifo Economic Studies* (CESifo) 49: 119.

19 Mundell, Robert A. 1961. "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas." *The American Economic Review* (American Economic Association) 51 (4): 657-665.

have higher yields with higher risks, and an economic growth crisis. Banks hold sovereign debt and their balance sheet loses value if government bonds lose value, forcing the government to save it and increasing government debt. Low growth makes it nearly impossible to escape this cycle.<sup>20</sup> O'Rourke and Alan Taylor conclude that to prevent crises like these from occurring in the future, deeper integration will require greater Euro-wide institutions and mechanisms to deal with the imbalances.<sup>21</sup>

## SECTION 2.1 - STRATEGY AND FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

In 2001, Otmar Issing, the Chief Economist of the ECB, and a team of senior economists and directors at the ECB laid out how the ECB would conduct monetary policy for the Euro area. In addressing the single price stability mandate, Issing declares that the Bank would not concern itself with events in a single country unless they could prove significant to the entire Euro area.<sup>22</sup> In pursuing this mandate, they agree that rules are preferred to discretionary policy since rules “eliminate subjectivity and prevent changing policy behavior in response to current economic conditions,” citing the Taylor Rule as an example.<sup>23</sup> The ECB team maintains that had the Taylor Rule been used during the Great Inflation of the 1970s with zero weight being placed on the output gap, then the Great Inflation would have been avoided.<sup>24</sup>

With maintaining price stability being the overall goal of the ECB, the Maastricht Treaty calls for the Bank to generally support the economic policies of Euro.<sup>25</sup> The Bank considers leading indicators, including output gap measures, cost measures, exchange rates and asset prices as ways of predicting future inflation.<sup>26</sup> To achieve price stability and to support the general economic policies of the area, the ECB utilizes open market operations with the main refinancing rate, standing facilities, and minimum reserve requirements.<sup>27</sup>

## Section 3 - Method

20 Shambaugh, Jay C. Spring 2012. “The Euro’s Three Crises.” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (The Brookings Institution) 157-233.

21 O'Rourke, Kevin H. and Alan M. Taylor. 2013. “Cross of Euros.” *American Economic Association* (American Economic Association) (3): 167-191.

22 Issing, Otmar, Vitor Gaspar, Ignazio Angeloni and Oreste Tristani. 2001. *Monetary Policy in the Euro Area: Strategy and Decision-Making at the European Central Bank*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2.

23 Ibid., 33-42.

24 Ibid., 44.

25 Ibid., 67.

26 Ibid., 91.

27 Ibid., 114.

This analysis will compare the interest rates suggested by the Taylor Rule for the Euro area, Germany, and Greece. The procedures being used reflect those used by Taylor, Ullrich, Sauer and Strum, and Clarida et al. Since the ECB uses the same inflation target as the Federal Reserve, the most important adjustments come from the output gap and the type of data being used.

## SECTION 3.1 - DATA

This paper utilizes data published by Eurostat and the ECB from January 2002, when the Euro launched as a paper currency, through December 2017.<sup>28</sup> The ECB uses the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices to measure inflation across the Euro area. The HICP uses a standard basket of goods to produce comparable inflation figures across countries, meaning the price changes of the same goods are used in every country. The Euro-wide HICP assigns weights to each member state that are percentage of all goods and services covered by the HICP attributed to aggregate household expenditures on those goods and services.<sup>29</sup> The ECB then designs their monetary policy around trends and movements in the Euro-wide HICP to maintain price stability Eurostat publishes HICP data for each member state. The moving twelve-month average rate of change for the all-item HICP will be used as it provides an easy comparison to the ECB's 2% inflation target.<sup>30</sup>




Figure 1: Harmonized Index of Consume Price growth for the Euro area, Germany and Greece

28 European Commission. 2018. *Database*. Eurostat. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

29 Issing et al., *Monetary Policy in the Euro Area*, 52.

30 Since Germany and Greece sometimes use very similar acronyms, Germany will be labeled as GER and Greece will be labeled as HEL, given its official name as the Hellenic Republic, when acronyms are used.




Figure 2: Industrial Production Index for the Euro area, Germany and Greece

When applying the Taylor Rule to Europe, Ullrich, Sauer and Strum and Clarida et al. use non-seasonally adjusted industrial production indices when calculating their inflation gaps. The broadest index currently available from Eurostat covers mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply.

The ECB’s main interest rate is the main refinancing operations rate, which is the rate at which the ECB lends to financial institutions for one week. The ECB sets the main refinancing operations rate every six weeks to address changes in expected inflation under the price stability mandate. Financial institutions can also borrow on an overnight basis at the marginal lending facility rate and can deposit money overnight at the deposit facility rate. While the marginal lending facility rate is the most similar to the Federal Reserve’s federal funds rate at which banks in the United States provide overnight lending, the main refinancing operations rate is the most important for the ECB and will be utilized in this analysis to compare to the recommendations of the Taylor Rule.

There are some notable trends in both the inflation and industrial production data. Inflation in Greece consistently ran higher than in Germany and the Euro area until HICP growth peaked at 5% in early 2011 as it became evident Greece would need a second bailout from the Troika. Greek inflation soon turned into deflation, from which it only emerged in 2016. While the all three had similar movements in inflation, Greece’s fluctuations were more extreme. German inflation was very similar to that experienced by the entire Euro area. The Euro area usually had very slightly higher inflation than Germany. During this period, the Euro area had an average annual HICP growth of 1.7%, compared to 1.5% in German and 2.1% in Greece.




Figure 3: Main Refinancing Operations Rate

The industrial production index shows a similar trend to inflation. Until the onset of the crisis, Greece’s measures were higher than those for the Euro area and Germany. Once the crisis began, the index fell below 100 as the Greek economy entered its deep recession. The Euro area measures fall in between Germany and Greece but once again follows Germany very closely. These trends initially suggest that Greece would need a higher interest rate to tame an overheating economy in the lead up to the crisis and a lower interest rate to spur consumption and economic activity after the onset of the crisis compared to the rest of Europe.

SECTION 3.2 - MODELS

To compare the monetary policy needs of Germany, Greece and the Euro area, this paper will take from the procedures of Ullrich, Sauer and Strum and Clarida et al. to use the original Taylor Rule and four modified versions. Each version will place different weights on the inflation and output gaps. All five will use the ECB’s stated two percent inflation limit as the target, which is the same as the Federal Reserve’s and what Taylor used in his original model. They will be used to compare what monetary policies focuses on different priorities could look like, such as focusing solely on output or solely inflation. The results of these five models will then be compared using F-tests to determine if there are statistically significant differences in what is prescribed for each.

The first model will be Taylor’s original, with equal weight on both the inflation and output gaps.<sup>31</sup> This will be referred to as “Taylor 1” and when applied to the three countries will be referred to as “Euro1,” “Ger1” and “Hel1.” The equation is as follows:

$$i = \pi + .5y + .5(\pi - 2) + 2$$

Figure 4: Taylor1 Equation - Original

31 Taylor, *Discretion versus policy rules*, 202.



In place of the federal funds rate,  $i$  will represent the main refinancing operations rate. The inflation rate is represented by  $\pi$ , with the inflation gap being  $(\pi-2)$ , or the inflation rate minus the inflation target. Inflation is measured by growth in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. The output gap is shown by  $y$ , which will be calculated by following the procedures in Sauer and Strum 2003 and Ullrich 2003. The industrial production index will be run through a Hodrick-Prescott Filter, which uses a multiplier,  $\Gamma$  gamma), to a smooth curve out of cyclical time series data. Since the data is monthly,  $\Gamma$  is set to 14,400.<sup>32</sup> These notations and procedures will be used for the four other models as well.

The second model puts more emphasis on the inflation gap than the output gap, with coefficients of .75 and .25 for the inflation and output gaps respectively. The equation is as follows:

$$i = \pi + .25y + .75(\pi - 2) + 2$$

*Figure 5: Taylor2 Equation*

The third model fully prioritizes the inflation gap with no weight given to the output gap. It is worth noting that Issing et al. argue that adherence to this model could have avoided the Great Inflation of the 1970s.<sup>33</sup>

$$i = \pi + 0.0y + 1.0(\pi - 2) + 2$$

*Figure 6: Taylor3 Equation*

The fourth model places more emphasis on the output gap. This means that the ECB would be more focused on fighting unemployment than inflation. While this may not appear consistent with the ECB's price stability mandate, high unemployment can result in lower expected inflation below the target, as can be seen in the deflation experienced by Greece during the Euro Crisis. Strongly negative price movements still qualify as price instability.

$$i = \pi + .75y + .25(\pi - 2) + 2$$

*Figure 7: Taylor4 Equation*

The fifth and final model fully prioritizes the output gap with no weight being placed on inflation. This model is highly unlikely to be pursued by a central bank designed after the Bundesbank, which had price stability at the nucleus of its monetary policy, but it will still be useful for comparisons with the other models and ECB decisions.


$$i = \pi + 1.0y + 0.0(\pi - 2) + 2$$

*Figure 8: Taylor5 Equation*

<sup>32</sup> The Hodrick-Prescott Filter can smooth data on annual, quarterly and monthly basis, with each having a different gamma value.

<sup>33</sup> Issing et al., *Monetary Policy in the Euro Area*, 52.

It is worth noting that inflation is still present in this equation through the first  $\pi$ . This is because the Taylor Rule prescribes a nominal interest rate rather than a real interest rate since central banks announce nominal interest rates. If inflation and output were both on target and the gaps were zero, the nominal interest rate would be the real interest rate of two percent plus the inflation target of two percent for a nominal rate of four percent.<sup>34</sup>



*Figure 9: Taylor Rules*

### SECTION 3.3 - TESTS & HYPOTHESES

This paper features a series of F-tests to determine if there are differences between the mean

<sup>34</sup> Taylor, *Discretion versus policy rules*, 202.

output of the models. The first group of tests will demonstrate whether the countries need different monetary policies from each other. Five tests will be run in this group; one for each of the five Taylor Rules. These will compare the interest rates prescribed for Germany, Greece and the Euro area. The hypotheses for this group are as follows:

*Ho: The Taylor Rule interest rates for Germany, Greece and the Euro are not different.*  
*Ha: The interest rates prescribed by the Taylor Rule are different for at least one country.*

The second will show whether the five different models produce statistically significant differences in mean suggested interest rates for each individual country. There will be three F-tests for this group, one for Germany, Greece and the Euro area. The hypotheses for this group are:

*Ho: The five Taylor Rule interest rates for a country are not different.*  
*Ha: At least one of the five Taylor Rule interest rates for a country is different.*

One limitation of F-tests is that while they indicate that one of the models produces a statistically significant difference in interest rates as the others, it does not show which model(s) produces the different rates. To get around this, a Tukey test will be conducted to determine if a null hypothesis can be rejected, and the Taylor Rules do suggest that at least one is different, to determine which model(s) are producing different results. This applies to both groups of F-tests. An alpha level of .05 will be used. All tests will be conducted in SAS.

**Section 4 - Results**

**SECTION 4.1 - GROUP 1 – COMPARING COUNTRIES BY TAYLOR RULE INTEREST RATES**

These F-tests compared the interest rates recommended for Greece, Germany and the Euro area for each of the five Taylor Rules. The results are shown in the following tables:

**Table 1: Taylor1 F-Test**

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	2	86.800292	43.400146	11.20	<.0001
Error	573	2219.592233	3.873634		
Corrected Total	575	2306.392525			

**Table 2: Taylor2 F-Test**

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	2	60.282695	30.141348	11.18	<.0001
Error	573	1544.303427	2.695119		
Corrected Total	575	1604.586122			

**Table 3: Taylor3 F-Test**

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	2	38.587165	19.293582	11.15	<.0001
Error	573	991.728154	1.730765		
Corrected Total	575	1030.315319			

**Table 4: Taylor4 F-Test**



Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	2	118.126114	59.063057	11.21	<.0001
Error	573	3017.685612	5.266467		
Corrected Total	575	3135.811727			

**Table 5: Taylor5 F-Test**

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	2	154.284306	77.142153	11.22	<.0001
Error	573	3938.495417	6.873465		
Corrected Total	575	4092.779722			

For each of the five Taylor Rules, the p-value is well below the alpha of .05. This means that for each rule, at least one country is recommended an interest rate that has a significant difference from at least one of the others. The null hypothesis that the Taylor Rule interest rates are the same for Germany, Greece and the Euro area can therefore be rejected for all five rules.

However, the F-tests do not show for which countries the Taylor Rules recommend different rates. A Tukey test has been used to determine which countries could be grouped for not being suggested significantly different interest rates. The results show that for all five Taylor Rules, Greece is the odd country out. The Euro area and Germany are not prescribed different interest rates by any of the Taylor Rules. The different colored bars show groups that are statistically distinct.







Figure 10: Turkey Results for Taylor Rules

SECTION 4.2 - GROUP 2 – COMPARING TAYLOR RULES WITHIN EACH COUNTRY

F-tests were also conducted to determine whether each Taylor rule produced different interest rates for each country. Differences between Taylor Rules would indicate that monetary policies with differing prioritizations between the inflation and output gaps would result in significantly different interest rates in that country.

Table 6: F-Test of Euro Area Taylor Rules

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	4	10.302572	2.575643	1.31	0.2628
Error	955	1871.805195	1.960005		
Corrected Total	959	1882.107767			




Figure 11: Euro Area Taylor Rules Over Time

For the Euro area Taylor Rules, the p-value is .2628, which is greater than the alpha of .05. This means that the null hypothesis of the five Taylor Rule interest rates not producing different interest rates cannot be rejected. The five interest rates do not appear to be significantly different. From the beginning of 2002 through the end of 2007, when the Great Recession roughly began, the interest rates prescribed by the five models were nearly identical. Some divergence appears around the peaks and troughs after that, but the deviations do not appear to be large and are not substantial enough to create significantly different interest rates.

Table 7: F-Test for German Taylor Rules

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	4	32.839625	8.209906	6.04	<.0001
Error	955	1297.212902	1.358338		
Corrected Total	959	1330.052527			




Figure 12: German Taylor Rules Over Time

Germany, on the other hand, has a p-value of <.0001, which is less than the alpha of .05. This indicates that at least one of the Taylor Rules produces an interest rate that is statistically different from the others. Unlike the Greek and Euro area Taylor Rules, the five models do not

appear to recommend similar interest rates after the launch of the paper Euro. There appear to be much wider ranges during the troughs than for Greece and the Euro area. The Tukey test shows intriguing results for which of the Taylor Rules are different from each other.




Figure 13: Turkey Test for German Taylor Rules

There appear to be three separate groups of similar interest rates. The first is between Taylor 1, Taylor 2 and Taylor 4. These represent what can be called the middle three rules, where there is a non-zero coefficient for both the inflation and output gaps. The second are the rules that have a coefficient between .5 and 1 for the inflation gap, being Taylor 1, Taylor 2 and Taylor 3. The third are the rules that have coefficients between .5 and 1 for the output gap. These are Taylor 1, Taylor 4 and Taylor 5. The only rules that do not overlap are the extremes that focus solely on inflation or output, Taylor 3 and Taylor 5.

Like the Euro area Taylor Rules, the Greek Taylor Rules do not produce significant interest rates. The p-value is remarkably high at .9976, well above the alpha of .05. This means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This is an intriguing result given that the Greek Taylor Rules.

Table 8: F-Test for Greek Taylor Rules

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	4	1.280234	0.320058	0.04	0.9976
Error	955	8542.780517	8.945320		
Corrected Total	959	8544.060751			




Figure 14: Greek Taylor Rules Over Time

do not appear to line up nearly as well as the German or Euro area Taylor Rules. It is possible that the result is influenced by the fact that from mid-2009 to mid-2010 the recommended interest rates were remarkably similar. Furthermore, all the models, beside Taylor 2, recommended negative interest rates to varying degrees starting in mid-2013 through the fall of 2016. This may have lowered the means for each rule enough so that the results are not significantly different.

### Section 5 - Discussion

The analysis shows that a single monetary policy for countries like Germany and Greece may not always be appropriate. Using the Taylor Rule as a proxy for monetary policy, the F-tests have shown that appropriate monetary policy for the Euro area more closely reflects what is necessary for Germany rather than Greece. This helped fuel the speculative and investment bubbles at the foundations of the Euro Crisis.

The fact that the five Taylor Rules did not suggest significantly different interest rates for Greece and the Euro area while they did for Germany is intriguing. This means that regardless of which rule was used, the rates suggested for Greece and the Euro area were not significantly different from each other. That suggests that it would not matter which Taylor Rule the ECB adhered to for the Euro area or the Bank of Greece if it still had its independent currency. Meanwhile, focusing exclusively on inflation or output would produce significantly different results for Germany. At most three of the models at a time gave similar interest rates. It may be possible to determine the bounds of Taylor Rule coefficients outside which the interest rates would be significantly different. Further research and statistical analysis are needed to determine the cause of this.

Overall, the results of the F-tests demonstrate that when looking at the inflation and output gaps, Greece may have been better served by a monetary policy not tailored to Germany or the Euro area. A significant amount of literature analyzes the causes of the Euro Crises and the shortcomings of the European response. This section seeks not to review all these failings but

rather to highlight four factors relevant to ECB and monetary policy. First, interest rates were plainly too low for Greece. Second, the zero-lower bound resulted in an interest rate too high for Greece after the crisis began. Third, policymakers failed to account for different growth models across member states. Last, the very mechanism that is the target of ECB monetary policy may have hurt Greece once the crisis began.

To start, the main refinancing operations rate was set too low for Greece. The HICP grew at an average of 3.4% in Greece from 2002 to the end of 2007, while the interest rate was on average 2.7% during that same period. Interest rates were lowered as the German economy struggled from 2002-2005. The Greek economy took off after joining the Euro, resulting in additional inflationary pressure. When interest rates are not high enough, they can raise expectations of future inflation and thus lead to higher inflation.

Furthermore, importing Germany's interest rate allowed governments and banks to borrow more easily at lower rates. The Euro masked lending risks in Greece, fueling a bubble of excessive investment and unsustainable growth.<sup>35</sup> The ECB did not have the authority to supervise banks, so it fell to national regulators who often were unwilling or unable to keep an eye on their financial sectors. Interest rates cannot take all the blame as the problems were made significantly worse by the Greek government's book-cooking and reckless spending. High inflation and excessive government spending chipped away at Greek competitiveness while low German inflation and fiscal entrenchment allowed it to regain the competitiveness it lost with reunification.




Figure 15: GDP Growth 2000-2008. Data from the World Bank

The second factor is the problem posed by the zero-lower bound. The zero-lower bound is the point where a central bank can no longer lower interest rates any further to stimulate the economy. A negative interest rate was needed based on the output and inflation gaps according

35 Lieberman, *Banking, Debts and Bailouts*, 417.

to the Taylor Rule. Greece entered a deflationary spiral and unemployment reached over 27% in 2013.<sup>36</sup> Since monetary policy was no longer a viable solution, fiscal policy was the only remaining tool. However, authorities chose austerity, driving the economy into a deeper hole. Given the huge debts of the Greek government, they did not have the capacity to pursue a fiscal expansion, and the economy contracted sharply and stagnated. Without growth, it became very difficult to reduce unemployment or debt levels, further hindering recovery and putting additional stress on the sovereign and the banking sector.<sup>37</sup> Assistance would have to come from the European Union or the ECB, and for a long time they were reluctant to provide it.

Another issue was that policymakers did not address the separate economic growth models present in Northern and Southern countries. Northern countries relied on high savings, investment and exports, along with fiscal discipline and an independent central bank that focused on price stability. Southern countries relied on consumption, government expenditures, central banks that provided public financing and depreciated currencies.<sup>38</sup> Money saved in the North flowed to the South, stimulating overinvestment as many investors treated risks across the Euro area the same as Germany. The ECB's limited mandate and powers made this nearly impossible to address, and national governments never want to take away the punch at a party. German current-account surpluses have been criticized by the European Commission and the IMF as being excessive.<sup>39</sup> Greece was content to borrow money to fund its extensive social programs. A slightly more expansive fiscal policy in Germany and a tighter fiscal policy in Greece would have reduced these imbalances.

When considering macroeconomic models, Issing, then the Chief Economist of the ECB, only considers the Anglo-Saxon and Continental social models. He notes that "Continental European models tend to produce smaller (negative) output effects than models of Anglo-Saxon countries" when rates are increased by one percent for two years.<sup>40</sup> The Mediterranean model is never mentioned when describing the strategies of the ECB. Of the two countries following the Anglo-Saxon model in Europe, only Ireland joined the Euro while the United Kingdom kept the pound. At the same time, the four countries of the Mediterranean model, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, all joined the Euro and had to be saved by the Troika. There was an assumption that all member states would become more like Germany, but this was not the case.<sup>41</sup>

36 World Bank Data Bank

37 Shambaugh, *The Euro's Three Crises*, 170.

38 Schnabl, *Failure of ECB Monetary Policy*, 7.

39 Jones, Claire. 2018. "Germany on course for world's largest current account surplus." *Financial Times*, August 20.

40 Issing et al., *Monetary Policy in the Euro Area*, 30.

41 Pisani-Ferry, *Euro Crisis and its Aftermath*, 54.




Figure 16: Balance of Payments - Data from OECD

Lastly, the ECB uses the HICP to measure inflation across the Euro area and “aims to keep inflation below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.”<sup>42</sup> The HICP was created so that there was a comparable measure of inflation across Europe, rather than having more than twenty national consumer price indices. Since it is an aggregate measure for the entire Euro area, weights are assigned based on the proportion of total expenditures on goods and services included in the HICP attributed to household expenditures.<sup>43</sup> If the only issue the ECB considers when it comes to interest rates is price stability and HICP growth, then in theory a country whose household expenditures has decreased drastically would have less representation in the HICP. With the focus solely on price stability, that country would be subject to monetary policy increasingly less tailored to its situation at the worst possible time.

## Section 6 - Conclusion

This analysis uses the Taylor Rule as a proxy for monetary policy to show that following the launch of the Euro, the monetary policy pursued for Germany and the Euro area was not appropriate for Greece. Loose monetary policy in the Euro area helped fuel bubbles through the region, and post-crash monetary policy was too tight to allow Greece to recover. However, this is not to say that the Euro is a bad idea. One must recognize the major political considerations that went into its creation. Europe has avoided the devastating wars that ravaged the continent for centuries. The Euro is the number two currency in the world, after the dollar, for foreign exchange reserves, and its share is several magnitudes larger than the next largest.<sup>44</sup> A Grexit would also face massive economic, financial, legal and technical obstacles, meaning the cost

42 European Central Bank. 2018. *Monetary policy*.

43 Issing et al., *Monetary Policy in the Euro Area*, 52.

44 Statista. 2018. *Share of currencies in global foreign exchange reserves from 2009-2017*.

of returning to the drachma could be ruinous.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, Europe will have to address the systematic shortcomings that preceded the Euro Crisis.

Essentially, the Euro area must become closer to an optimum currency area. Originally devised by Mundell in 1961 as an area with high labor and factor mobility, an OCA is now considered to have to have a budgetary union or fiscal federalism and should not be subject to asymmetric shocks. Unfortunately, the Euro area and European Union were never designed to fit these criteria.<sup>46</sup> The steps taken towards a banking union in the aftermath of the Crisis were good steps, but the EU still lacks a meaningful budget. As much as Germany may not like it, additional transfers will have to happen to maintain the viability of the system. Labor mobility must be increased to help ease asymmetric shocks across the area. Pisani-Ferry proposes that the Euro area should take advantage of agglomeration areas and make it easier for people to move to these areas through harmonized education policies, language-learning support and transferable pensions and other social benefits.<sup>47</sup>

On Greece’s end, additional reforms to the economy and government will be needed. Greece has not done enough to restore its competitiveness and corruption is still a major problem.<sup>48</sup> In addition to an inefficient government and a high difficulty of doing business, overtaxing can discourage Greek companies from hiring more employees, which hurts economic growth.<sup>49</sup> With the end of austerity and the IMF programs, Greece will have to maintain its commitment to budget surpluses to run down its huge government debts over the next several decades. This will be very important for maintaining access to international credit markets and gradually lowering the interest rates being offered to Greek banks and companies, which will help Greeks invest and facilitate growth over time. Germany can also help reduce current account imbalances within the Euro area by working to reduce its current account surplus through a more active and expansive fiscal policy.<sup>50</sup>

As it stands today, Greece and Germany still should not always have the same monetary policy. Europe has undertaken some reforms to consolidate the differences and asymmetries between

45 Pisani-Ferry, *Euro Crisis and its Aftermath*, 123-125. Also see Iordanoglou, Chrysafis and Manos Matsaganis. 2017. “Why Grexit cannot save Greece (but saying in the Euro area might).” *LSE Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series* (The London School of Economics and Political Science) for an excellent account of what Grexit would likely look like.

46 De Grauwe, *Political Economy of the Euro*, 103-106.

47 Pisani-Ferry, *The Euro Crisis and its Aftermath*, 139-141.

48 Mitsopoulos, Michael and Theodore Pelagidis. 2018. “The inconvenient truths about Greece.” *Up Front*. The Brookings Institution. March 1.

49 Pelagidis, Theodore. 2018. “Greece is in ‘Hotel California’: Checked out but it can never leave.” *Up Front*. The Brookings Institution. August 18.

50 Jones, *Germany on track for the world’s largest current account surplus*.

countries, but greater effort and legislation is needed to reduce the risks to Euro member states. Greece has a significant amount of work to do, and Germany could be doing more to help. This will require significant political capital and patience at a time when little exists and when animosity between Euro states is high. However, the alternative is a highly unequal Euro area where economic prospects remain divergent. Major steps will need to be taken for the European project to move forward.

## AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

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# Misrepresentations in Conservation: The Blackwashing of Palm Oil Production in Malaysia

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## ABSTRACT

*As environmental conservation remains a critical issue for this generation and the next, conservation methods must be tested. One specific method that has gained unique traction has been the misrepresentation, inflation, and exaggeration of information and claims to make environmental harm appear faster and more catastrophic. This method of conservation generation, known as blackwashing, may generate negative impacts of generating higher rates of denial, dismissal, criticism, and defensive responses from threatened actors. This claim will be analyzed through the test case of the Malaysian palm oil industry and related blackwashing.*

## Introduction

Conservation remains a critical issue for this generation and the next, and constant vigilance is required. The International Union for Conservation of Nature has stated that more than 26,000 species are threatened, equating to more than 27% of all currently assessed species.<sup>1</sup>

Compounding this large volume of endangered species are anthropogenic activities. Studies show that the current rate of anthropogenically induced extinctions is 1,000 times the natural rate of species extinction.<sup>2,3</sup> The success of conservation methods remains critical. From the

<sup>1</sup> IUCN. n.d. "The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species," IUCNredlist.org.

<sup>2</sup> Pimm, Stuart, C. N. Jenkins, R. Abell, and T. M. Brooks. 2014. "The Biodiversity of Species and Their Rates of Extinction, Distribution, and Protection." *Science* 344 (6187).

<sup>3</sup> De Vos, Jurriaan, Lucas Joppa, John Gittleman, Patrick Stephens, and Stuart Pimm. 2015. "Estimating the Normal Background Rate of Species Extinction" 29 (2): 452–62.

increase of protected areas over time, estimated in 2009 at 12.9% of total land,<sup>4</sup> to species reintroductions, such as the bald eagle,<sup>5</sup> to spurring local initiatives that protect individual lesser known species, such as the spoon-billed sandpiper,<sup>6</sup> conservation has been successful in many ways.

Despite this progress, it is important that current methods for conservation be examined and re-evaluated. One method that has gained traction, especially in status-quo climate change debates, has been the misrepresentation of information to make environmental decline appear faster and more catastrophic.<sup>7</sup> This form of unsupported misrepresentation of environmental distresses is defined as *blackwashing*, the intentional inflation of claims and/or employment of scare tactics to garner public support.<sup>8</sup> This paper explores blackwashing and its negative impact of generating higher rates of denial, dismissal, criticism, and defensive responses from threatened actors. This paper seeks to test this claim through examining the Malaysian palm oil industry and related conservation issues.

## Theory

Blackwashing is the inflation or exaggeration of claims through the employment of scaremongering and catastrophism to garner public support and action.<sup>9</sup> This method of misrepresentation is dangerous as it provides room for intensifying disagreement over environmental claims that can easily be dismissed and critiqued factually.<sup>10,11</sup> The overstatement of environmental implications also increases pressures, driving accused actors towards hardline

<sup>4</sup> Jenkins, Clinton, and Lucas Joppa. 2009. "Expansion of the Global Terrestrial Protected Area System." *Biological Conservation* 142 (10): 2166–74.

<sup>5</sup> Sorenson, Kelly, Joseph Burnett, and Mike Stake. 2017. "Restoring a Bald Eagle Breeding Population in Central California and Monitoring 25 Years of Regional Population Growth." *Journal of Raptor Research* 51 (2): 145.

<sup>6</sup> Clark, Nigel, Guy Anderson, Li Jing, Syroechkovskiy Evgeny, Pavel Tomkovich, Christoph

<sup>7</sup> Zockler, Rebecca Lee, and Rhys Green. 2016. "First Formal Estimate of the World Population of the Critically Endangered Spoon-Billed Sandpiper *Calidris Pygmaea*." *Oryx* 52 (1): 137–46.

Ladle, Richard, Paul Jepson, and Robert Whittaker. 2013. "Scientists and the Media: The Struggle for Legitimacy in Climate Change and Conservation Science." *Interdisciplinary Science Reviews* 30 (3): 231–40.

<sup>8</sup> Pin Koh, Lian, Jaboury Ghazoul, Rhett Butler, William Laurance, Navjot Sodhi, Javier Mateo-Vega, and Corey Bradshaw. 2010. "Wash and Spin Cycle Threats to Tropical Biodiversity." *Biotropica* 42 (1): 67–71.

<sup>9</sup> Koh, Ghazoul, Butler, Laurance, Sodhi, Mateo-Vega, and Corey Bradshaw. 2010. "Wash and Spin Cycle" 67–71.

<sup>10</sup> Ladle, Jepson, and Whittaker. 2013. "Scientists and the Media." 231–40.

<sup>11</sup> Koh, Ghazoul, Butler, Laurance, Sodhi, Mateo-Vega, and Corey Bradshaw. 2010. "Wash and Spin Cycle." 67–71.

aggressive and defensive stances. These stances may include aggressive measures such as denial, dismissal, and critique of environmental claims or defensive measures.<sup>12</sup>

In a similar vein, catastrophism, the acute exaggeration of environmental issues, is especially dangerous. In the context of imminent species extinctions, exaggerated rhetoric infused with ‘boy who cried wolf’-style claims often undermine the credibility and legitimacy of conservation science and scientists.<sup>13</sup> Hollow and unsupported catastrophic claims, once debunked, bolster the coherence of alternative environmental messages that exploit the unsupported rhetoric.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, messages that provoke fear of irreversible environmental consequences, such as the extinction of a species, have been shown to elicit defensive responses that reduce engagement with the issue, generate denial, and detract attention from meaningful solutions.<sup>15,16</sup>

## Background

Palm oil is an edible oil product that comes from the fruits of the oil palm tree, *Elaeis guineensis*. Palm oil is primarily used in cooking oils, foods, biofuels, and soaps. In 2015 it was estimated that 30% of the world’s production of vegetable oils were generated from palm oil.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, it was estimated that half of the products in supermarkets, from Dove® soap to Nutella®, contain palm oil.<sup>18</sup>

One country that has substantially benefitted from the expansive palm oil industry is Malaysia, which currently accounts for 39% of world palm oil production.<sup>19</sup> While the expansion of palm oil has bolstered the local Malaysian economy, the harvesting and development of oil palm has devastated the local ecosystems. Scientists have argued that palm oil production and oil palm

12 Delmas, Magali, and Vanessa Burbano. 2011. “The Drivers of Greenwashing.” *California Management Review* 54 (1). [https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/14016/cmr5401\\_04\\_printversion\\_delmasburbano.pdf](https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/14016/cmr5401_04_printversion_delmasburbano.pdf).

13 Merchant, Gary, and Karen Bradshaw. 2016. “The Short-Term Temptations and Long-Term Risks of Environmental Catastrophism.”

14 Ladle, Richard, and Paul Jepson. 2010. “Origins, Uses, and Transformation of Extinction Rhetoric.” *Environment and Society: Advances in Research* 1: 96–115.

15 Weinstein, Netta, Michael Rogerson, Joshua Moreton, Andrew Balmford, and Richard Bradbury. 2015. “Conserving Nature out of Fear or Knowledge? Using Threatening versus Connecting Messages to Generate Support for Environmental Causes.” *Journal for Nature Conservation* 26: 49–55.

16 Merchant and Bradshaw. 2016. “The Short-Term Temptations.”

17 Oosterveer, Peter. 2015. “Promoting Sustainable Palm Oil: Viewed from a Global Networks and Flows Perspective.” *Journal of Cleaner Production* 107: 146–53.

18 Oosterveer, “Promoting Sustainable”, 146-53.

19 MPOC. n.d. “Malaysian Palm Oil Council,” <http://www.mpoc.org.my/>.

development have led to pollution, habitat fragmentation, intense tropical deforestation,<sup>20</sup> significantly lower levels of biodiversity,<sup>21,22,23</sup> and the endangerment of orangutans endemic to Malaysia.<sup>24</sup> These scientific claims of environmental harm, however, are not without contest. Not only is there scientific counter-research that claims the opposite — insisting instead that Malaysian oil palm development has not caused deforestation, hurt biodiversity, nor damaged orangutan habitat<sup>25</sup> — the Malaysian government and palm oil industry have bluntly denied accusations of environmental harm.<sup>26</sup>

The Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC), a government agency dedicated to the protection of the Malaysian palm oil industry has stated, “we do not mind fact-based and balanced discussions. However, we often see that the way that the [non-governmental organizations] stir up campaigns is through manipulation of data, and they propagate very extreme measures.”<sup>27</sup> The MPOC posits that claims of environmental destruction are misconstrued propaganda efforts based on false facts created and deployed by an anti-palm oil organizations.<sup>28</sup>

This paper will focus on four specific instances of blackwashing in conservation directed at the palm oil industry in Malaysia and orangutan conservation. The first is a scenario of extinction alarmism that predicted the imminent extinction of the orangutan due to habitat loss induced

20 Fitzherbert, Emily, Matthew Struebig, Alexandra Morel, Finn Danielsen, Carsten Bruhl, Paul Donald, and Ben Phalan. 2008. “How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?” *Trends in Ecology and Evolution* 23 (10): 538–45.

21 Chey, V.K. 2003. “Impacts of Forest Conversion on Biodiversity as Indicated by Moths.” *Malayan Nature Journal* 57 (4): 383–418.

22 Peh, Kelvin, Sodhi Navjot, Johnny De Jong, Cagan Sekercioglu, Charlotte Yap, and Susan Lim. 2006. “Conservation Value of Degraded Habitats for Forest Birds in Southern Peninsular Malaysia.” *Diversity and Distributions* 12 (5): 572–81.

23 Donald, P.F. 2004. “Biodiversity Impacts of Some Agricultural Commodity Production Systems.” *Conservation Biology* 18 (1): 17–37.

24 Nantha, Hemanth, and Clem Tisdell. 2009. “The Orangutan–oil Palm Conflict: Economic Constraints and Opportunities for Conservation.” *Biodiversity and Conservation* 18 (2): 487–502.

25 Tan, K.T., K.T. Lee, A.R. Mohamed, and S Bhatia. 2009. “Palm Oil: Addressing Issues and towards Sustainable Development.” *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 13 (2): 420–27.

26 Koh, Ghazoul, Butler, Laurance, Sodhi, Mateo-Vega, and Corey Bradshaw. 2010. “Wash and Spin Cycle.” 67–71.

27 Wong, Li. 2017. “The Malaysian Palm Oil Council Has Played a Key Role in Promoting the Palm Oil Industry in Malaysia.” *The Star*, <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/05/18/the-malaysian-palm-oil-council-is-one-of-the-driving-forces-behind-the-progress-of-the-countrys-palm/>.

28 MPOC. 2011. “Facts and Fallacies: Countering the Anti-Palm Oil Lobby Means Debunking the Myths of Its Propaganda.”

by oil palm expansion. On January 2005, Friends of the Earth, an environmental non-governmental organization (NGO), published a research report titled *The Oil for Ape Scandal: How Palm Oil is Threatening Orangutan Survival*. Within the report, Friends of the Earth claimed, the “continued survival of the orangutan, as well as countless other species, hangs in the balance ... the orangutan will be lost within 12 years. The countdown to extinction has begun.”<sup>29</sup> Though the report included some specific research, nowhere within the data was the immediate timeframe of 12 years claimed or supported.

Following this, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), a consumer advocacy group, published a full-page ad in the *New York Times* in March of 2006 featuring a baby orangutan sitting among the skulls of adult orangutans with the headline “dying for a cookie.”<sup>30</sup> The ad was met with immediate pushback by the MPOC in April of 2006, along with the publication of a counter-editorial in the *New York Times* condemning the ad for its biased misrepresentation of the truth.<sup>31</sup>

In 2008 and 2010, Greenpeace, an environmental NGO, published two different videos on social media and YouTube that catastrophized oil palm development. The 2008 video, titled “Dove Onslaught(er),”<sup>32</sup> depicts a young girl in front of a forest that over time gets cut down, razed, and burned for the development of oil palm. Throughout the video, images of forest destruction and dead orangutans are presented without text. The video was followed by the release of a Greenpeace research report in October of 2009 addressing species extinction caused by oil palm development, specifically the imminent decline of orangutan populations.<sup>33</sup>

In March of 2010, Greenpeace released a second video that aired on public television, YouTube, and social media. The video titled “Have a Break?”<sup>34</sup> depicted a man bored at work having a break by eating a Kit Kat. However, upon opening the Kit Kat, it is revealed that instead of a candy bar, there is an orangutan finger inside of the packaging. The man then eats the orangutan finger with a crunch as blood spurts out. The video ends with imagery of deforested

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29 Friends of the Earth, The Ape Alliance, The Borneo Orangutan Survival Foundation, The Orangutan Foundation (UK), and The Sumatran Orangutan Society. 2005. “The Oil for Ape Scandal: How Palm Oil Is Threatening Orang-Utan Survival.” [https://friendsoftheearth.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/oil\\_for\\_ape\\_full.pdf](https://friendsoftheearth.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/oil_for_ape_full.pdf).

30 CSPI. 2006. “CSPI Says Orangutans Literally ‘Dying for Cookies.’” Center for Science in the Public Interest. <https://cspinet.org/new/200603211.html>.

31 Barison, Yusof. 2006. “Palm Oil: The Facts.” *New York Times*.

32 Greenpeace. 2008. “Dove Onslaught(er).” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odI7pQFyjs0>.

33 Greenpeace. 2009. “How Unilever Palm Oil Suppliers Are Burning up Borneo.” <https://www.greenpeace.org/archive-international/Global/international/planet-2/report/2009/10/how-unilever-palm-oil-supplier.pdf>.

34 Greenpeace. 2010. “Have a Break?”. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VaJjPRwExO8>.

and destroyed orangutan habitat and a real Kit Kat candy bar next to a bloody orangutan finger.

These blackwashing publications and videos catastrophized the environmental impact of the Malaysian oil palm industry through alarmism and/or gruesome imagery of dead orangutans. This form of misrepresentation intended to garner emotional appeals has been documented as a common strategy utilized by Greenpeace to frighten people into taking action.<sup>35</sup>

## Hypotheses

In this paper, three case-specific hypotheses will be explored.

Hypothesis 1: Blackwashing the environmental harms of palm oil production and oil palm development generates denial, dismissal, and critical responses from the Malaysian government and palm oil industry.

Hypothesis 2: Blackwashing the environmental harms of palm oil production and oil palm development generates the defensive response from the Malaysian government and palm oil producers that the industry is sustainable or is already taking sustainable actions.

Hypothesis 3: Malaysian government and palm oil industry denial, dismissal, critique, and defensive responses intensify after instances of blackwashing.

## Methods

To test these hypotheses, two sources of Malaysian government responses were analyzed. The first source was a government-owned newspaper, *News Straits Times*. The source was accessed on the Nexis Uni™ database. A search term of ““palm” and sustainab\* and orang\* and not asli and publication (*New Straits Times*),” was used. The search was then narrowed to the period between January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2011, as this timeframe included both the Friends of the Earth’s and CSPI’s 2005<sup>36</sup> and 2006<sup>37</sup> publications, as well as Greenpeace’s videos in 2009<sup>38</sup> and 2010.<sup>39</sup>

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35 Diedring, Kelly. 2008. “Framing Environmental Messages: Examining Audience Response to Humor, Shock, and Emotional Treatments.”

36 Friends of the Earth, The Ape Alliance, The Borneo Orangutan Survival Foundation, The Orangutan Foundation (UK), and The Sumatran Orangutan Society. 2005. “The Oil for Ape Scandal.”

37 CSPI. 2006. “CSPI Says Orangutans.”

38 Greenpeace. 2009. “How Unilever Palm Oil.”

39 Greenpeace. 2010. “Have a Break?”

The search term '*palm*' was used to capture both the product 'palm oil' and the crop 'oil palm.' The term 'palm' was predicted to be more specific than 'oil,' which is also in both terms. The search term '*sustainab\**' was used because both sustainable and sustainability yielded results about environmental implications and conservation. The term conservation was not used as it is too specific. The search terms '*orang\**' and '*not asli*' were used because orangutan is written as orangutan, orang-utan, and orang utan in the literature, while 'orang asli' refers to the name given to indigenous Malaysian populations and is commonly referenced with oil palm in news articles not pertaining to environmental issues.

The search using these terms yielded 64 results from *New Straits Times*. Results that did not mention 'palm oil', 'oil palm', or 'orangutans' more than 5 times were discarded leaving 44 results for analysis. All 44 results were evaluated in order to generate a list of common themes. The list of common themes created and used for analysis were:

- the cause of orangutan decline is and/or was the development of oil palm;
- the cause of orangutan decline was not the development of oil palm, but a result of alternative causes, or a refutation of the claim that oil palm was the culprit;
- Malaysia is or will be taking environmentally sustainable action;
- a directed counter or response to perceived misconceptions;
- unfairness felt by the Malaysian industry;
- counter-attacks on the West by the Malaysian industry;
- oil palm development is beneficial for the environment;
- orangutans are facing a fast extinction (within 20 years);
- the solution should be local;
- the solution should be international;
- the solution should be ecotourism;
- more research is needed;
- the result was neutral (both sides of the debate were included).

Once the list of common themes was created, each article that induced a theme was summed to find the total number of articles that met each theme.

The second source analyzed was the Malaysian Palm Oil Council's (MPOC) website's archived database.<sup>40</sup> The search engine for the database was not as sophisticated, and therefore, the search term was limited to only '*orang*'. This search was functional as searching for '*palm*' was not needed on a website dedicated to palm oil. Furthermore, orangutans were mostly mentioned in an environmental context, therefore, the term '*sustainab\**' was not critical. Only results from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2011 were used.

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<sup>40</sup> MPOC. <http://www.mpoc.org.my/>.

The search yielded 33 results, of which 30 were used. The 3 results that were not used were taken out because they only referred to Orangutan as a proper noun in an organization's name rather than discussing the animal. All 33 results were analyzed to generate a list of common themes.

The list of common themes created and used for analysis were from results identified on the MPOC website include:

- the cause of orangutan decline was not oil palm, but was due to alternative causes, or a refutation of the claim that oil palm was the culprit;
- Malaysia has already or is taking environmentally sustainable action;
- a directed counter or response to perceived misconceptions;
- oil palm is beneficial for the environment;
- there is a socioeconomic value of oil palm and/or palm oil.

Once the list of common themes was created, each article that induced a theme was summed to find the total number of articles that met each theme.

## Results

After theme sorting occurred, each dataset was analyzed for trends. The most salient trends emerged between direct counter (a directed counter or response to perceived misconceptions) and denial (the cause of orangutan decline was not oil palm, was due to alternative causes, or a refutation of the claim that palm oil was the culprit); as well as between direct counter and green action (Malaysia has already or is taking environmentally sustainable action). Interactions between the other themes were not directly analyzed as none seemed to show significant trends.

<i>News Straits Times</i>	<b>Denial</b>	<b>No Denial</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Direct Counter</b>	25	3	28
<b>No Direct Counter</b>	7	9	16
<b>Totals</b>	32	12	44

Table 1 (Relationship between direct counter and denial themes seen in *News Straits Times*)

<i>MPOC Archive</i>	<b>Denial</b>	<b>No Denial</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Direct Counter</b>	17	1	18
<b>No Direct Counter</b>	3	9	12
<b>Totals</b>	20	10	30

Table 2 (Relationship between direct counter and denial themes seen in the MPOC archive)

<i>News Straits Times</i>	<b>Green Action</b>	<b>No Green Action</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Direct Counter</b>	22	6	28
<b>No Direct Counter</b>	5	11	16

**Totals** 27 17 44  
Table 3 (Relationship between direct counter and green action themes seen in *News Straits Times*)

MPOC Archive	Green Action	No Green Action	Total
<b>Direct Counter</b>	14	4	18
<b>No Direct Counter</b>	7	5	12
<b>Totals</b>	21	9	30

Table 4 (Relationship between direct counter and green action themes seen in the MPOC archive)

Following this trend analysis, time-based analysis was conducted to determine if the test cases chosen, Friends of the Earth's and CSPI's publications in January 2005<sup>41</sup> and March 2006,<sup>42</sup> or Greenpeace's videos in October 2009<sup>43</sup> and March 2010,<sup>44</sup> had an impact. Two timeframes were analyzed. The first was from January 2005 to the end of September 2006. This timeframe included both Friends of the Earth's and CSPI's publications, plus an additional 6 months in order to account for response. The second was October 2009 to the end of September 2010. This timeframe included both Greenpeace videos, plus an additional 6 months in order to account for response. Both timeframes, 9 months and 1 year respectively, were analyzed prior to the blackwashing instances to allow for comparison. The timespan in between, from October 2006 to the end of September 2008, was also analyzed.

	1/01/03- 12/31/04	1/01/05- 9/30/06	10/01/06- 9/30/08	10/01/08- 9/30/09	10/01/09- 9/30/10
<b>Results</b>	1	8	19	0	45
<b>Direct Counters</b>	0	8	11	0	26
<b>Denials</b>	1	7	14	0	29
<b>Green Steps</b>	0	8	12	0	27

Table 5 (Relationship between timing, number and articles, and number of themes present for both *News Straits Times* and the MPOC archive)

## Discussion

A common theme seen in a majority of the results from both sources (46/74 articles, 62%) was the inclusion of a directed counter or response to perceived misrepresentations. An example

41 Friends of the Earth, The Ape Alliance, The Borneo Orangutan Survival Foundation, The Orangutan Foundation (UK), and The Sumatran Orangutan Society. 2005. "The Oil for Ape Scandal."

42 CSPI. 2006. "CSPI Says Orangutans."

43 Greenpeace. 2009. "How Unilever Palm Oil."

44 Greenpeace. 2010. "Have a Break?"

of this theme is seen in an article titled, *A distortion of facts, by oil palm critics*, labelled anti-palm oil criticisms as "hysteria by NGOs [that] is mainly a distortion of real facts."<sup>45</sup> A similar example is seen in the article titled, *CSPI mislead consumers on Orangutans*. "The advertisement by CSPI appears to be in bad faith using guilt-based rhetoric to scare and gain sympathy from the public. CSPI should cease to make unsubstantiated claims and wrongful accusations that the orangutan[s] are dying as a result of oil palm expansion."<sup>46</sup>

Using this common theme of directed counter or response to perceived misrepresentations, the hypotheses were tested.

Hypothesis 1: articulated an expected connection between the blackwashing of environmental harms and the denial, dismissal, and critique of claims of environmental harm by the Malaysian government and palm oil industry. This hypothesis was supported by the data through a high level of correlation between both themes.

In the *News Straits Times*, 89% (25/28) of directed counters included denials that the cause of orangutan decline was the development of oil palm, and 78% (25/32) of total number of these denials included directed counters (Table 1). A similar trend was seen in the MPOC archive where 95% (17/18) of directed counters included denials, while 85% (17/20) of denials included directed counters (Table 2).

Hypothesis 2: articulated an expected connection between blackwashing and the generation of a defensive response from the Malaysian government and palm oil industry seen through claims that the Malaysian oil palm production and palm oil development is already sustainable or is already taking sustainable action. This hypothesis was supported by high levels of correlation between both themes.

In the *News Straits Times*, 79% (22/28) of direct counters were written together with mentions of green action while 81% (22/27) of mentions of green action were linked with direct counters (Table 3). In the MPOC archive, a similar, but weaker correlation was identified. 78% (14/18) of the directed counters were linked to mentions of green action, while only 67% (14/21) of green action mentions were associated with directed counters (Table 4).

This difference and weaker trend seen in the MPOC archive could be due to higher percentage of green action mentions without directed counter overall, 34% in the MPOC archive compared to 19% in the *News Straits Times*. This higher percentage of articles including green action that are not direct counters in the MPOC archive is most likely due to the desire of the

45 Basiron, Yusof. 2006. "A Distortion of Facts, by Palm Oil Critics." <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/0dc9de0f-ce0d-45a8-9ecc-7db7d4d4e163/?context=1516831>.

46 The Palm Oil Truth Foundation. 2007. "CSPI Mislead Consumers on Orangutans." <http://www.carodiesel.com/publish/image.htm?code=256>.

governmental palm oil organization to portray palm oil developmental progress as inspiring environmentally friendly action for commercial reasons. Examples of articles with green action without a directed counter support this notion as these results were mostly about action that Malaysia has undertaken to make the industry environmentally friendly, such as an article about the creation of a wildlife center next to oil palm development.<sup>47</sup>

Hypothesis 3: articulated an expected increase in levels of Malaysian government and palm oil industry denial, dismissal, critique, and defensive response in relation to specific events of blackwashing. This hypothesis was supported by the data.

While there was only one article published in September of 2003 about orangutan conservation in which alternative causes to orangutan decline are cited, the other earliest article in either source is October of 2005. Tracking results during and six months after the first 2 cases of blackwashing by Friends of the Earth in January of 2005<sup>48</sup> and CSPI in March of 2006,<sup>49</sup> showed a significant increase in the number of results, direct counters, denial, dismissal, and critique of attributions, and mentions of sustainable green steps (Table 5). Of the eight results in this timeframe, only one result did not have a direct counter, a denial of attribution, and a mention of already sustainable palm oil.

Compellingly, some of these results directly referenced perceived blackwashing. A press statement published in November of 2005 found in the MPOC archive refers to the reports by Friends of the Earth.<sup>50</sup> A letter published to the *New York Times* in March of 2006 also found in the MPOC archive directly referred the “untrue accusations” of CSPI.<sup>51</sup>

Greenpeace’s blackwashing through the usage of shocking videos of dead orangutans occurred in October 2009<sup>52</sup> and March 2010.<sup>53</sup> Analyzing the time period of October 2009 to 6 months after March 2010, 45 results appeared. In contrast, analyzing the same time period of roughly a year before October 2009 yielded no results. There was no mention of orangutans and palm oil between September 2008 and the end of October 2009. Of the results during the Greenpeace timeframe, not only was there a sharp increase in the amount of results, but approximately

47 MPOC. 2010. “Boost to Sabah Wildlife Center,” 2010. [http://archive.mpoc.org.my/Boost\\_to\\_Sabah\\_Wildlife\\_Center.aspx](http://archive.mpoc.org.my/Boost_to_Sabah_Wildlife_Center.aspx).

48 Friends of the Earth, The Ape Alliance, The Borneo Orangutan Survival Foundation, The Orangutan Foundation (UK), and The Sumatran Orangutan Society. 2005. “The Oil for Ape Scandal.”

49 CSPI. 2006. “CSPI Says Orangutans.”

50 MPOC. 2009. “Press Statement on Shoppers Threat To Orang-Utan,” 2009. [http://archive.mpoc.org.my/Press\\_Statement\\_On\\_Shoppers\\_Threat\\_To\\_Orang\\_Utan.aspx](http://archive.mpoc.org.my/Press_Statement_On_Shoppers_Threat_To_Orang_Utan.aspx).

51 Barison. 2006. “Palm Oil: The Facts.” *New York Times*.

52 Greenpeace. 2009. “How Unilever Palm Oil.”

53 Greenpeace. 2010. “Have a Break?”

60% of results included direct counters to blackwashing, denial of attribution, or mentioned already-sustainable actions for palm oil in Malaysia (Table 5).

While there were no results in the 1-year timespan before the Greenpeace blackwashing events, there were 19 results between the timeframes for the blackwashing events from October 2006 to end of September 2008. Of these results, there was large percentage of direct counters, denials of attribution, and mentions of green steps as well. While these results may be spillover from the earlier events, it is more likely due to scope of the analysis. While four moments of blackwashing were analyzed, there were more instances that were not analyzed that occurred during this time period. One possible example of an event that generated backlash was when Greenpeace physically blocked a palm oil tanker from leaving a port in 2007.<sup>54</sup>

### Limitations

Due to the limited scope of the case and the research conducted, it is possible that the trends between blackwashing and the higher rates of denial, dismissal, critical, and defensive responses from the Malaysian government and palm oil industry were mere correlation rather than causation. It is also possible that other variables were at play that affected and instigated palm oil stakeholder response outside of the instances of blackwashing, such as consumers demanding greener products or competing food oils. Blackwashing may be a contributor to the higher rates of denial, dismissal, critical, and defensive responses, but not the main or only contributor.

### Conclusion

Blackwashing in environmental conservation activism is a worrying trend. While the extreme hyperbole of claims may reach the target audience of the unconcerned public, they may also incite negative backlash in the agents in which conservation action is required. As seen in Malaysia, the government and palm oil industry responded by denying, dismissing, and critiquing the attribution of environmental harm and by employing defensive arguments that the industry was already taking environmentally-friendly actions.

Disinformation has played a critical role in the ongoing debate surrounding palm oil.<sup>55</sup> Misrepresentations and exaggerations of environmental impacts have bolstered disinformation campaigns by providing fodder for the dismissal and critique of needs for conservation. Palm oil, the fourth largest economic sector in Malaysia in 2014, is vital for continued Malaysian

54 *New Straits Times* (Malaysia). 2007. “Terrorism against Palm Oil Industry.”

55 Pin Koh, Lian, and David Wilcove. 2009. “Oil Palm: Disinformation Enables Deforestation.” *Trends in Ecology & Evolution* 24 (2): 67–68.

economic growth and success.<sup>56</sup> As exaggerated, catastrophic claims that condemn palm oil generate denial and defensive responses, cooperation for functional middle-ground sustainability and conservation solutions becomes increasingly difficult.<sup>57</sup>

In contrast, there have been successful multi-actor conservation examples within Malaysia regarding orangutans that did not condemn oil palm development in its entirety. In 2010, The Borneo Conservation Trust worked with MPOC to show the findings of a genetic study that determined the need for reduced habitat fragmentation to avoid inbreeding among orangutans. The proposed action was the creation of forest corridors by individual palm oil companies supported by the Malaysian state government.<sup>58</sup> The corridor campaign did not use exaggerated or inflated claims, nor were scare tactics used, but rather a multi-actor solution was generated through genetic research with simple conclusions. The result of the nuanced corridor campaign led to a positive response and action by the palm oil industry.<sup>59</sup>

Nevertheless, this is not to argue that blackwashing is a negative choice for a conservation campaign in all circumstances. Blackwashing and exaggerations that generate emotional appeals easily make frontpage headlines, immediately raising awareness for the issue.<sup>60</sup> However, blackwashing must be used contextually and with awareness that its usage may bring negative consequences.

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58 Ancrenaz, Marc. 2010. Orangutans vs palm oil in Malaysia: setting the record straight. <https://news.mongabay.com/2010/01/orangutans-vs-palm-oil-in-malaysia-setting-the-record-straight/>.

59 Wong, Jack. 2010. "Oil Palm Planters Urged to Create Corridors for Wildlife," 2010. [http://archive.mpoc.org.my/Oil\\_Palm\\_Planters\\_Urged\\_to\\_Create\\_Corridors\\_for\\_Wildlife.aspx](http://archive.mpoc.org.my/Oil_Palm_Planters_Urged_to_Create_Corridors_for_Wildlife.aspx).

60 Koh, Ghazoul, Butler, Laurance, Sodhi, Mateo-Vega, and Corey Bradshaw. 2010. "Wash and Spin Cycle" 67–71.

# Women in Red: Femininity and Womanhood in the Soviet Union

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## ABSTRACT

*This research analyzes the meanings and ideas evoked by discourses on femininity and womanhood in Soviet animation as a means of elucidating the abrupt decline in the participation rate of women in government following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, situating animation as a signifier of cultural attitudes. Heterophobia, class, and sexuality are schematized as discursive layers within the construction of gender in animated adaptations of folklore produced between 1950 and 2005 in the USSR. This analysis utilizes a methodology rooted in psychosocial media approaches, a framework of Gramscian critical rhetoric, and a feminist theoretical lens of international relations. Representations of gender expression, behavior, physical attributes, and language are mapped and categorized across sources and assigned meaning through linguistic and visual cues. This study advances the claim that Soviet animation valued and prioritized the subservience and passivity of women whilst overtly vilifying contestations to normative gender. It offers further criticism of socialism's model of faux-egalitarianism as political strategy through the assertion that true gender equity did not enter Soviet cultural consciousness per the themes and convictions of its selected popular media. The implications of these representations on the shifting behavior and attitudes of communities succeeding 1989 urge the widespread consideration of these texts as cultural documents integral to research regarding post-Soviet state-building and, more broadly, the construction of normative gendered behavior.*

**Keywords:** Gender, Media, Soviet Union, Critical Rhetoric

## Introduction

The wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 featured a dramatic decline in

the participation rate of women in government.<sup>1</sup> Research attempting to rationalize this demographic shift has often omitted the sociocultural factors that influence social practice and normative values, specifically within discourse on behavioral changes in the absence of a communist, faux-egalitarian society. Scholars are able to assess how meanings and values are constructed and how they may account for a shift in cultural attitudes towards women, potentially yielding behavioral effects among viewers when considering the role of popular media as a cultural signifier, and subsequently mapping representations of femininity during the Soviet and post-Soviet era of animation.

An investigation of the discourse on femininity and womanhood in Soviet animation seeks to advance the claim that representations of gender roles or connotations of femininity shifted following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, contributing to a behavioral norm that discouraged women's participation in governance and upheld patriarchal gender hierarchies in sociopolitical contexts. During this time, the government-owned company that monopolized the production and distribution of all popular animated content was conjunctively dissolved.<sup>2</sup> The hegemonic principle of conformity is a unique layer in the discourse on femininity that largely disappears after 1989, and is in some ways replaced by more prominent caricatures of masculinity and femininity, as if to compensate.<sup>3</sup> The result is a new representation of state-sponsored behavior. This paper seeks to identify how gender and femininity were represented in popular Soviet animation from 1950 to 2005. These findings help conceptualize how subliminal messaging regarding sanctioned behavior—featuring submissiveness, modesty, and conformity—recodes and maintains hierarchies of power during sociopolitical and economic turbulence.

In order to investigate this, this paper examines literature regarding representations of femininity and womanhood in Soviet animated adaptations of European folklore. This encompasses the studies of folkloric specialists who engage with the nuances of symbols and rhetoric within animation. This review provides a suggested methodological approach in conjunction with linguistic expertise in Russian colloquialisms.

## Theoretical Frameworks

The primary schools of thought presented in this paper analyze the use of media as a cultural signifier and apply two distinct lenses of analysis to their data. Dominant patterns regarding economic status, color theory, and compliance are investigated in existing scholarship. There

1 Sloat, Amanda. *The Civic and Political Participation of Women in Central and Eastern Europe*. (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2004). 3.

2 Norris, Stephen M. "Animating the Past." *Blockbuster History in the New Russia: Movies, Memory, and Patriotism*. (Indiana University Press, 2012). 217.

3 Kononenko, Natalie. "The Politics of Innocence: Soviet and Post-Soviet Animation on Folklore Topics." (*The Journal of American Folklore* 124, no. 494, 2011): 142.



are auxiliary models of critical rhetoric application and critical social theory that contribute to framing the findings presented by the noted researchers—each advance this investigation of the meanings and ideas evoked by specific representations of women in animated folklore. Media theory accounts for the relationship between animation and derived representations within texts. Contextualizing the discourse on femininity is contingent upon understanding how the animation serves as an indicator of the values and priorities of a society. Media as a cultural influence is explored via cultivation theory, which dictates that media is pervasive and propagates a “general view of reality over time.”<sup>4</sup> Researchers and theorists classify Gerbner’s cultivation theory as reliant on a model of linearity—if media has an influence on its audience, then those who are exposed to greater durations of media will overwhelmingly express behaviors or ideas that reflect those being portrayed when compared to non-consumers.<sup>5</sup> The acceptance of cultivation theory as a model that examines a population’s relationship to media is rooted in observations about the way in which popular culture creates a cognitive consensus.<sup>6</sup> In this context, cultivation theory indicates that the values and priorities perpetuated in media can matriculate into the fabric of cultural understanding.<sup>7</sup> The application of cultivation theory to this study provides a conceptual framework in which the relationship between representation in media and an audience can be explored, justifying research regarding the use of mass media as a mechanism for influencing societal attitudes. This frames the multiple layers of the discourse on femininity expressed within the texts used in this study, specifically discourse on conformity to social practice and gender dynamics.

The critical socialist perspective posits that representations of women in animated folklore were consistently evolving, even prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Essentially, this school of thought considered the critical reception of media by its audience to be indicative that various perspectives of socialism — and various perspectives on femininity — rendered it difficult for the media to shape the values of the post-Soviet community.<sup>8</sup> Consumers of media are awarded agency within this school of thought, negating the alleged production of a false consciousness imbricated with a socialist agenda.<sup>9</sup> The submission of women was valued, but only as a byproduct of misconceptions of “socialist patriotism.”<sup>10</sup> That is, submission is not

4 Kitzinger, Jenny. “The Debate About Media Influence.” In *Framing Abuse: Media Influence and Public Understanding of Sexual Violence Against Children*. (Pluto Books, 2004). 13.

5 Flanagan, Scott C. “Media Influences and Voting Behavior.” In *The Japanese Voter*. (Yale University Press, 1991). 322.

6 Potter, W James. “The Linearity Assumption in Cultivation Research”. *Human Communication Research*. Vol 47, No 4. (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1991). 562

7 Chomsky, Noam. “Propaganda and Media”. *Western Terrorism*. (Pluto Books, 2013). 32.

8 MacFadyen, David. *Yellow Crocodiles and Blue Oranges: Russian Animated Film since World War II*. (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005). 44.

9 Chomsky, Noam. (2013). 32.

10 Balina, Marina and Birgit Beumers. “To Catch Up and Overtake Disney?: Soviet and Post-Soviet Fairy-Tale Films”. *Fairy-Tale Films Beyond Disney: International Perspectives*. (Routledge, 2015). 76.

interpreted to exclusively be valued among women, but rather a part of the greater preference of communal submission associated with socialist doctrine. This school of thought emphasizes the versatility with which women were portrayed, delineated by the facets of submissive behavior, and supported in part by assessing the frequency of derogatory colloquialisms as a means of subversive subjugation.<sup>11</sup>

Essentially, the critical socialist perspective argues that the relevant texts that serve as indicators of societal attitudes towards women are not the animated series themselves, but their critical reception. Researchers like MacFadyen found a lack of consistency among the representations of women across multiple animated platforms following the Second World War.<sup>12</sup> MacFadyen explains that the female or feminine characters do not play a significant enough role in the texts to be considered as integral to the messages presented— in a sense, discourses on femininity and womanhood are largely overlooked in the interest of assessing representations of socialist ideology. Methodologically, this school of thought analyzes discourses on women and their behavior as a layer within the discourse on socialism, developing an array of interpretations regarding the valued behaviors of women and place them on a spectrum from submissive to manipulative.<sup>13</sup> The critical socialist perspective advances the claim that this microcosmic discourse on women evolved along with the historical relationship with socialism as a socioeconomic and political prerogative. These findings have compelled this study to reverse the critical socialist methodology to bring the focus to the limited screen time of women, analyzing socialism as a layer within the discourse on femininity. This has informed my understanding of the role of conceptions of conformity and how they perpetuate gender roles via representations of preferential behavior of women in animation. This paper chose to view socialism as a facet of the discourse on femininity, as opposed to the other way around, in order to ensure that the meanings and ideas elicited by the text are not obscured by the general assumption that time period and content would immediately render it socialist propaganda and nothing more. This school of thought falters in comprehensively analyzing caricatures of masculinity and femininity, instead concluding that representations are a manifested byproduct of the intention of the production company, too much is left to assumption of intent.

The feminist theoretical approach indicates that the discourse on femininity was largely monolithic, attributed in part to the government subsidized *Soyuzmultfilm* production company. The representation of protagonist women as sexless and submissive is consistent throughout the evolution of the animated content, characterized by the use of color as an indicator of power and musical melodies and lyrics as a signifier of the bucolic and inferior.<sup>14</sup>

11 Prokhorov, Alexander. “Arresting Development: A brief history of Soviet Cinema for Children and Adolescents.” *Russian Children’s Literature and Culture*. (New York: Routledge, 2008). 122.

12 MacFadyen, David. (2005). 132.

13 MacFadyen, David. (2005). 28.

14 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 127.

From a methodological standpoint, this school of thought utilizes a folkloric model of analysis in classifying visual imagery or rhetoric within a hierarchal structure of power- it establishes representation in media as a cultural signifier and component of national memory and female identity.<sup>15</sup> This approach maps the dynamics of power within the relationships of male and female characters as opposed to placing value in individual symbols, considering the representation of woman as inferior through their portrayed passivity to be universal and thus constant throughout the contextual framework of analysis.<sup>16</sup> This is seen most prominently in Kononenko's work, throughout which she finds that women depicted in animated folklore wear clothing similar in color and shape, are admonished for speaking out of turn, and are revered for their devotion to fathers or husbands.<sup>17</sup> However, Kononenko joins other scholars within this school of thought in failing to delineate different representations of women playing different roles — more specifically, there is little to no exploration of the representations of villainous women in folklore. This omission has prompted this paper's reconfiguration of the traditional folkloric model of analysis such that it includes the multiplicity of representation alongside a previously established codification of rhetoric used by and towards women in order to evaluate the nature of an interaction as either positive or negative employed by critical feminist theorists.<sup>18</sup> In using language as a signifier of power and thus an indicator of hierarchal structure, both in regard to gender and economic status, this model poses as a valuable method of analysis when applied to discourses on femininity that precisely address language and rhetoric.

Within this school of thought, there exists a subset of scholarship that emphasizes rhetorical analysis, namely Gramsci and McKerrow's explorations of cultural hegemony that interpret the role of language in constructing societies.<sup>19</sup> Gramsci's conceptions of telos in political rhetoric provide context for how questions of usurping a dominant discourse — in this case the pivot in women's roles in a newly independent post-Soviet state — have been framed.<sup>20</sup> This study uses this understanding of changes in discourse in conjunction with the findings of cultivation theory in order to support my claim that the representations of femininity in animated folklore have created a tangible impact on societal attitudes towards women and, more broadly, gender roles.

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15 Fadina, Nadezda. "Fairytale Women: Gender Politics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Animated Adaptations of Russian National Fairytales." (University of Bedfordshire, 2008). 302.

16 Britsyna, Oleksandra, and Inna Golovakha-Hicks. 2005. *Folklore of the Orange Revolution*. (*Folklorica*, 2005) 15.

17 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 122.

18 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 72.

19 Zompetti, Joseph. "Toward a Gramscian critical rhetoric". (*Western Journal of Communication*, 1997). 3.

20 McKerrow, R. E. *Critical rhetoric: Theory and praxis*. (*Communication Monographs*, 1989). 4.

## Methodology

This methodology is grounded in the categorical components of the canonical folkloric model of analysis for the purpose of determining the relationality of representations of gender (aforementioned value judgements of positivity or negativity). Based on the codification system employed by scholars within the feminist theoretical approach, this system analyzes relationships between color, language, and systems of power and dominance by synthesizing attitudes towards expression of femininity and meanings educed by visual representations and colloquial language.

This method of analysis has been expanded to further categorize feminine characters by their role in the plot—i.e., whether they are the hero, the villain, or superfluous. This method will be discussed in a later section, as it is first essential to discuss and justify the representations that have been selected for mapping.

## MAPPING REPRESENTATIONS

Scholars have already identified discourses on economic status, socialism, and the subjugation of ethnic minorities within Soviet and post-Soviet animation.<sup>21</sup> This paper has additionally identified discourses on sexuality and masculinity, for which it will map the representations of in a selection of animated films thematically based on adaptations of folklore produced between 1950 and 2005. These five concepts serve as nodal points that contribute to the construction of representations of the female identity in films like *The New Bremen Town Musicians*, in which the dynamic that exists between the female villain, the innocent princess, and the male characters creates a striking image of valued behavior for women.<sup>22</sup> The discourses produced by the official government texts on representations of women have been supplemented by analyses that seek to account for how attitudes towards wealth, conformity, and the habitus of femininity were constructed. The folkloric model of analysis has overwhelmingly found women represented as submissive, overtly feminine, and as "yokels", or unintelligent rural people.<sup>23</sup> This in turn contributes to another layer of discourse on socioeconomic status and mandated social practices.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, the use and proliferation of specific colors serve as indicators of power within the gender hierarchy, as seen in mapping the color red across primary sources.

Representations of the aristocracy and economic status identify the core and the periphery of

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21 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 44.

22 *The New Bremen Musicians*. Aleksander Gorlenko, Vasily Livanov. Produced by Vladimir Dostal. (2000).

23 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 115.

24 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 142.

society in terms of wealth; the middle-class is the core, and the very poor and very wealthy sit on the periphery.<sup>25</sup> Economic status serves as a traditional signifier within power relationships, and a gap in income becomes apparent between royalty and poor rural communities. This intertwines with the discourse on conformity, which explores an allegiance to social practice via repetition and compliance — this has been interpreted as a discourse on socialism.<sup>26</sup> Discourses on conformity and economic status jointly enforce an acceptance of inferiority within society, which this paper has found to be perpetuated further as an acceptance of inferiority by women in regard to their male counterparts. It is imperative to look at how the discourses on economic status, socialism, and the subjugation of ethnic minorities serve as facets of what constructs echelons of power and influence. As Fadina notes, “through the mediated constructions and representation of women the gender politics counteracted a move to equality, thus enabling the dominance of patriarchal hierarchy on and off screen.”<sup>27</sup> The additional identifiable discourses on sexuality and masculinity likewise play a role in the creation of systems of dominance, but play a more direct role in qualifying actions or visible attributes as positive, neutral, or negative femininity.

#### CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

The absence of the faux-egalitarian doctrine of communism after 1989 partially accounts for ideological and subsequent behavior shifts among polity. Expanding upon these representations in the broader historical context of 1950 to 2005 provides a basis for the evaluation of the shift in animated thematic elements that parallel the ideological shift of the time period within post-Soviet states. In order to connect the two, it was essential to analyze how the discourses presented by the government, and later by independent animators, constructed meanings surrounding femininity and womanhood. Primary source selection was contingent upon both the popularity of the film and the time period in which it was produced. *Soyuzmultfilm* produced hundreds of films from the early 1950s until 1989 at the dissolution of the Soviet government, and thus a look at their most popular films focusing on folklore presents an official government discourse on femininity.<sup>28</sup> For the purpose of investigating meanings associated with the content itself, this paper did not select films that are based on Russian or Ukrainian folklore, such as the poetry of Pushkin, for analysis. Instead this paper examines adaptations of stories by the Brothers Grimm or western European rural folklore.<sup>29</sup> This decision was made given that animated adaptations of national folklore tend to adhere closely to their written

25 Prokhorov, Alexander. (2008). 74.

26 MacFadyen, David. (2005). 81.

27 Fadina, Nadezda. (2008) 17.

28 Norris, Stephen M. (2012). 217.

29 Harris, Jonathan. “Leaning to Live with Pushkin: Pedagogical Texts and Practices.” *Greetings, Pushkin! Stalinist Cultural Politics and the Russian National Bard*. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016). 98.

texts, and as such the visual imagery does not necessarily add any new meaning.<sup>30</sup> Tracing representations of the five aforementioned layers of discourse intertextually informs our understanding of what meanings are being constructed, in that repeated tropes and positive indicators become apparent across the board. Following the disbandment of *Soyuzmultfilm*, very few animated pieces based on folklore were produced. As such, this paper examines all pieces produced between 1989 and 2005 for analysis of the following layers of representations.

#### GENERATION OF EVIDENCE

The films were viewed a minimum of three times each. The first round of viewing included the notation of which characters wear red and the duration of their time on screen. As explained by feminist scholar Kononenko, the use of red serves as an indicator of values by those opposed to royalty and, consequentially, in favor of communism. Kononenko’s argument is that the “good characters” who wear red are examples of purity and the ideals of citizenship.<sup>31</sup> During this first viewing, it was also noted what each character wore to pay notice to any changes in costume in future representations in films produced later. This observational data allows for a researcher to determine if a change in visual representation has occurred in multiple reproductions of a story over the course of several decades. In the series of films based off of the folklore of the musicians of Bremen, an originally German story, the clothing of the characters shifts drastically. Initial observations of the highly sexualized version of the female “baddie” leader in *The New Musicians of Bremen*, which was produced nearly four decades after its predecessor in 1971, illustrated that clothing and exposure of skin would serve as an indicator of a shifting attitude.<sup>32</sup>

Within the analytical stages of this investigation, the application of the folkloric model of categorization contextualizes what meanings are evinced by this change in presentation, making it critical to carry out this process across all films. During the second viewing, the characterizations of each character depended upon the basis of their identifiable behavioral attributes, such as aggression, or docility, or rebellion. The means of identification have been provided by the folkloric model of analysis developed by Kononenko.<sup>33</sup> After this viewing, the identities were cross-referenced with the initial list of individuals who wore the most red. This was done in order to establish a relationship between behavior and the color of the clothing, including the presence of red, yellow, and green. Based on review of feminist scholarship, there are different meanings associated with these three colors, depending on whether the wearer is male or female. Furthermore, color demarcation also correlated with socioeconomic status and power. This second viewing served as a time to note what characteristics within the folkloric

30 Fadina, Nadezda. (2008) 262.

31 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 143.

32 *The New Bremen Musicians*. Aleksander Gorlenko, Vasily Livanov. Produced by Vladimir Dostal. 2000.

33 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 113.

model of analysis were present within each film. At this stage, characters were categorized according to this model as having a specific quality such as passivity. The third round entailed notification of specific words used by male characters towards female characters and vice versa such as to establish a relationship between them. Doing so utilizes the work conducted by linguists such as Prokhorov, who previously identified which colloquialisms are signifiers of inferiority.<sup>34</sup> This viewing laid the foundation for which analysis could be conducted after all data was collected, in which physical representation and language were integrated into creating a comprehensive representation of women.<sup>35</sup> A network of representations across the films presented itself as informing one another's meanings in visual representation and rhetoric.

This paper models its classification system off of the feminist folkloric model of analysis developed by Kononenko as opposed to the Aarne-Thompson-Uther model of folkloric analysis due to the latter's lack of systems of classification for aspects specific to femininity and the construction of gender.<sup>36</sup> Data analysis was conducted via *NVivo*, which classified data cases based on period of production and thus the producing agent. Again, films produced following the disintegration of *Soyuzmultfilm* in 1989 were compiled by independent animators with no affiliation to the government.<sup>37</sup> This research created specific cases for each character that appeared in the film, categorizing them as follows:

Figure 1: Character Specification

Bride (Female)	Hero (Male)	Hero (Female)	Villain (Male)	Villain (Female)	Witch (Female)
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Next, this research established specific cases for characters that appeared in both Soviet and post-Soviet films. Each character was sorted into a case before being coded with the appropriate nodal points, as determined based on their representation in part of the film. The nodal classification included both their dialogue and visual presentation.

Figure 2: Nodal Classification

Attitude	Femininity	Masculinity	Otherring	Red	Sexuality
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The rationale for each node is as follows:

*Attitude* was classified as *positive*, *negative*, or *neutral*. This is in reference to the audience's

34 Prokhorov, Alexander. (2008). 122.

35 Charland, M. "Finding a horizon and telos" (*Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 1991). 3.

36 Aarne, A. and Thompson, S. *Types of Folktale: A Classification and Bibliography* (Helsinki: Academia Scientarum Fennica, 1961).

37 Norris, Stephen M. (2012). 217.

attitude toward a character and was determined by interpretation of the character's role in any given scene. This could shift within a film—for example, attitudes towards a witch might be negative in the beginning, but through a plot of redemption, that shifts to neutral or positive. This interpretation is justified by Prokhorov's rhetorical analysis, which identifies key words and phrases as positive, negative, or neutral, in conjunction with the application of Fadina's classification of action as moral or amoral.<sup>38</sup> *Femininity* is classified by Schipper's construction of feminine representation, which accounts for length of hair, style of clothing, mannerisms, and pitch of voice.<sup>39</sup> This classification was only applied to characters that overtly exhibited prototypical representations of femininity. This is not to be conflated with sexuality, which is later explained. *Masculinity* is also classified by Schipper's construction of the masculine as it relates to the feminine within folklore and encompasses lack of emotional expression, physical show of strength, and exemplified bravery.<sup>40</sup> Like femininity, this classification does not encompass all male characters, but rather only those who align with the aforementioned traits. *Sexuality* is the codification of sexual expression or promiscuity as determined by the clothing, animated physique, and seductive actions of female characters. Sexuality is additionally used as an identifier for female characters who sought out their male romantic interest instead of vice versa. *Otherring*, or the subjugation of ethnic minorities, is a classification of behavior or appearance that distinguishes a character as inferior on account of their ethnicity. This classification was established on the basis of rhetoric and action towards and by the character.<sup>41</sup> Factors that determine the "othering" of a character included the presentation of low intellect, impoverishment, and a rural setting. *Red* is further deconstructed featuring three subsets: *Red*, *Red + Green*, and *Red + Yellow*. Characters were submitted to a category simply based on the color of their clothing and accessories. This was done in order to identify patterns and subsequently analyze the implications of the use of color. Representations mapped on the basis of these classifications create a system of patterns from which meaning has been derived.

### Analysis

Within the discourse on femininity and womanhood presented in Soviet animation between 1950 and 2005, this research discovered two patterns of representation regarding the use of the color red and the operationalization of sexuality. This advances Kononenko's original claim regarding color theory through the incorporation of an adjusted methodology. Moreover, this analysis introduces the notion of female sexual prowess to the broader discourse, for which the academic consensus has previously determined that all folkloric women are portrayed as sexless.<sup>42</sup>

38 Fadina, Nadezda. (2008). 302.

39 Schippers, Mimi. "Recovering the Feminine Other: Masculinity, Femininity, and Gender Hegemony." (*Theory and Society*, vol. 36, no. 1., 2007). 86.

40 Schippers, Mimi. (2007). 88.


41 Prokhorov, Alexander. 2008). 134.

42 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 127.

## THE USE OF RED

This paper's first claim is that the use of the color red evokes themes of subjugation and submission through Soviet and post-Soviet animation due to its prolific use among marginalized characters. Red is thus an indicator of the submissive, depending on the degree to which it is being used to characterize appearance. In *The Bremen Town Musicians*, the princess serves exclusively as a love interest for the male protagonist, the Troubadour, and has no speaking lines.<sup>43</sup> She wears all red, silently complies with plot devices, and represents the ideal object of desire for both the protagonist and the audience.<sup>44</sup> This plot arch exists throughout the majority of animated folklore, and a dichotomy between female brides and witches is consistent throughout. Analysis of representations of both groups prior to 1989 yields a distinction between the colors that red was invariably paired with, as seen in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Witches and Brides



Red and yellow associate with brides, while red and green are present in representations of witches. This finding reveals that yellow and green, when paired with red, illicit meanings that contribute to the discourse on femininity. However, a pattern regarding the qualities associated with brides and witches, in particular what they share, forges an understanding of what attributes are valued. It is clear that attitudes towards witches and brides can be equally positive or neutral depending on the context of the text. For example, the witch in *The Flying Ship* helps the male hero impress the princess that he hopes to marry by vanquishing villains together.<sup>45</sup> However, the predominant pattern that emerges correlates negative attitudes with masculinity and femininity with conformity in reference to brides. The masculinization of witches' features is perpetuated in all of the *Soyuzmultfilm* produced pieces (which is noted in the figure by the

43 *The Bremen Town Musicians*. Inessa Kovalevskaya, Yuri Entin, Vasily Livanov. Soyuzmultfilm. 1969.

44 *The Bremen Town Musicians*. Inessa Kovalevskaya, Yuri Entin, Vasily Livanov. Soyuzmultfilm. 1969.

45 *The Flying Ship*, Directed by Garri Bardin. Soviet Union: Soyuzmultfilm, 1979.

shared governmental, or official actor, producing the discourse) and implies that, in breaking from the bridal character arch, they relinquish their femininity and womanhood. This concept will be addressed within this paper's second claim, which elaborates upon how these nodal points construct gender.

Revisiting the primary claim with an awareness of the complementary attitudes and gendered attributes that the use of green and yellow perpetuate facilitates a greater understanding of their implementation. The economic stratification that exists within folklore yields three levels: aristocracy, peasant class, and subjugated ethnic minority.<sup>46</sup> The bride exists either on the aristocratic or peasant plane, while witches are presented similarly to persons who appear with darker skin tones and variants in textured hair.<sup>47</sup> Thus, yellow becomes associated with wealth and generally positive representations of female behavior. This paper interprets the correlation between the use of yellow/red and themes of conformity when explicitly applied to female characters to refer to the reinforcement of the value of submissive behavior. When women are portrayed positively in folklore they are following the rules outlined by their father, typically a king.<sup>48</sup> MacFadyen's omission of a specific focus on female characters accounts for his generalization.

Although yellow is indicative of higher social and economic status, green serves as its antithesis. The presentation of green/red with characters who are isolated, made a spectacle of, or evocative of negative attitudes reinforces the understanding that the behaviors of and values held by characters in green are not favorable. Ultimately, these layers generate a comprehensive account for how women in red are linked to inferiority to their male counterparts.

Red indicates an object of desire, with the desirable quality being subservience. This paper acknowledges that the meanings associated with the use of red evolve throughout the historical contextual framework of analysis. Red is also seen as a mechanism of representations of conformity and socialist ideology.<sup>49</sup> However, these themes can be simplified as the operationalization of subjugation under the pretense of faux-egalitarianism.<sup>50</sup> Thus when viewed through the theoretical feminist lens, this desired adherence to socialism in turn represents the hegemonic value of submission.<sup>51</sup> This study is therefore able to support the claim that red is a signifier of valued passivity.

## DISRUPTION VIA SEXUALITY

46 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 127.

47 Britsyna, Oleksandra, and Inna Golovakha-Hicks. (2005). 33.

48 *The Little Scarlet Flower*. Directed by Lev Atamanov. Soviet Union: Soyuzmultfilm, 1952.

49 MacFadyen, David. (2005). 56.

50 Britsyna, Oleksandra, and Inna Golovakha-Hicks. (2005). 24.

51 Fadina, Nadezda (2008). 290.

This paper's second claim is that sexuality is weaponized because of the representation of sexuality as negative when, in the context of the scene, it disrupts the gender hierarchy. This disruption occurs due to the association of sexuality with masculinity in female characters.<sup>52</sup> This claim extends from the observation that, contextually, sexuality is only overtly expressed by female characters that serve as an antagonist. Within *The New Bremen Town Musicians*, released in 2000, the leader of the "baddies", or Ataman, is visually represented differently than in the first two films in which she appears, despite her possessing the same goal of overthrowing the king and taking his money for herself.<sup>53</sup> In this film, the third and final installment in the Bremen trilogy, she no longer wears red and is shown wearing clothing that exposes her skin and contextually resembles the paraphernalia of a prostitute.<sup>54</sup> She is now portrayed with more masculine facial features and on account of the alterations to her physical representation in addition to the negative rhetoric used towards her by other characters, this paper can thus categorize her as a villain.<sup>55</sup> This new presentation of a sexualized version of Ataman has usurped the hierarchy and thus her lack of submission withdraws her from consideration as a "real woman."<sup>56</sup>

This is a repetitive theme explored by scholars who implement the folkloric model of analysis for characterizing the valued behavior of women in animated folklore.<sup>57</sup> It is seen here that women in Soviet and post-Soviet animation are not meant to be seen as sexual beings but must rather fit within a specific set of expected behaviors, and violating this is systematically discouraged. In *Sister Alena and Brother Vanya*, Alena pursues a romantic interest and is in turn drowned along with her brother Vanya by a witch, only to be saved by said heroic male.<sup>58</sup> Alena is forcibly reduced to her status of inferiority by the necessity of the rescue. Despite possessing some power over elements of the supernatural, witches reside at the bottom of the power hierarchy. This is conflated with conceptions of witches as a subjugated minority featuring a masculine or unattractive physique. Witches become subhuman due to their inability to be categorized among other female figures in folklore. The analysis conducted thus far has utilized films produced prior to 1989 due to the lack of folkloric adaptations produced following the collapse of *Soyuzmultfilm*, in part the result of the shift in thematic content of post-Soviet

52 Fadina, Nadezda. (2008). 270.

53 *The New Bremen Musicians*. Aleksander Gorlenko, Vasily Livanov. Produced by Vladimir Dostal. 2000.

54 Fadina, Nadezda. (2008). 271.

55 *The New Bremen Musicians*. Aleksander Gorlenko, Vasily Livanov. Produced by Vladimir Dostal. 2000.

56 Fadina, Nadezda. (2008). 271.


57 Kononenko, Natalie. (2011): 127.

58 *Sister Alena and Brother Vanya*, Directed by Olga Chadatajewa. Soviet Union: Soyuzmultfilm, 1953.

films.<sup>59</sup> Animated production of the post-Soviet era more closely resembled a commentary on the economic disarray of Russia in the 1990s, as well as a desire to stray from the minimalist style of animation renowned in the late 1960s in favor of cartoons in the vein of Disney.<sup>60</sup> Contextually, a general thematic shift is a nod to the region's desire to move away from Soviet ideology deemed regressive. This paper posits that the pause on producing folklore was in an effort to separate media culture from tradition and the past. Only three folkloric adaptations were produced after 1989.

In *Grey Wolf and Little Red Riding Hood*, released in 1990, animators parody the demise of the USSR.<sup>61</sup> Little Red Riding Hood and her grandmother fall victim to the wolf and are rescued by the huntsman, as per the original plot. Unlike traditional representations of the ailing grandmother and vivacious young girl, Babushka Theresa is voiced by a man, wears strikingly low-cut clothing, repeatedly hits Little Red over the head with a ladle and smashes Red's head into a table.<sup>62</sup> This disruption of accepted feminine behavior in turn produces negative attitudes towards her, remaining consistent with the other films in this time period case classification.<sup>63</sup> Analyzing all of the women with speaking roles in each post-1989 film produces a similar result; the women are coded abrasive and unpleasant, sometimes referred to as such by other featured characters. Figure 2 on the previous page visually demonstrates the clustered characteristic shared by all female characters in Soviet and post-Soviet animation.

Figure 4: Themes Over Time



59 Norris, Stephen M. (2012). 217.

60 Zipes, Jack. *The Enchanted Screen: The Unknown History of Fairy-Tale Films*. (Routledge, 2011).

61 Zipes, Jack. (2011).

62 *Grey Wolf and Little Red Riding Hood*, Directed by Garri Bardin. Russia, 1990.

63 *Little Longnose*, Directed by Ilya Maksimov. Russia, 2003.

Adaptations produced prior to 1989 share a unique relationship between a positive discourse produced by the official actor. This does not indicate an overarching positive representation of female characters, but rather the glorification of compliant women who do not deviate from an expected pattern of behavior. Attitudes towards female characters fluctuate between positive and negative classifications depending on their role within a plot. Thus, a female character who does not exemplify the valued qualities of subservience and passivity will not be viewed positively by her fellow characters or an audience. Conversely, male characters maintain a level of liberty in their ability to deviate from traditional story arcs and still fluctuate between positive and neutral attitude classifications.

The introduction of independent animators after 1989 consequentially brings sexual expression to the forefront of the admonition of nontraditional females. The immediate implication of this pattern is that women who display aggression, through physical violence as with Babushka Theresa, or through ambition as with Princess Greta in the Wilhelm Hauff fairytale *Little Longnose*, are punished. This perpetuates the value associated with keeping women in their place, and reinforces aforementioned appraisal of quiet, one-dimensional women. This paper acknowledges that while this claim seems straightforward, it is more difficult to distinguish a clear pattern throughout all Soviet animation due to the overwhelming lack of female representation in conjunction with the rare use of overtly expressed sexuality in these texts. *The New Musicians of Bremen* is unique in its portrayal of women, first in that it portrays a woman as anything other than a mother or a love interest, in addition to its visual cues.

An argument against the validity of my claim could be made by pointing to this rarity as an invalid indicator of prevalent cultural models. This study refutes this due to the contextual framework in which this work exists. The visibility of *The New Musicians of Bremen* is on average equivalent to that of the animated films being produced at the time. This film's critical and commercial success must be seen as without relation to its two predecessors and instead compared to other primary sources that emerge following 1989. Given this, the content of the film can be viewed as an indicator of value systems with similar trustworthiness to other primary sources, thus making representations of Ataman a valid indicator of perceptions of sexuality. In considering each representation as valid, it is possible to postulate as to the effects of exposure to these meanings and ideas bolstered and preserved in animated media.

### Conclusion

The discourse on femininity and womanhood in Soviet and post-Soviet animation exemplifies the value placed on submissive behavior by state and non-state producers and how specific rhetoric and visual cues perpetuate this idea as illustrated by the vilification and masculinization of femme characters who disrupted gender hierarchies in their respective narratives. This paper has advanced the claims of scholars who have reached similar findings in their research by broadening the scope of classification to create a more comprehensive understanding of how

these themes were constructed. Understanding the mediums in which systems of values are ingrained within a culture and, furthermore, using animation as a signifier of cultural attitudes at any given time in history forges conceptions of how societies code and re-code sanctioned behavior and build institutions. These representations contextualize how state and polity interact, in that the state can operationalize its ideological agenda via material investments which then influence the societal consciousness. The *social* authority of any state can be found in the minutiae of animated interaction, compelling viewers and scholars to be critical of the agency of media consumers in conjunction with critiques of manifestations of state ideology on screen.

This study's decision to pursue an interpretive research design in the interest of providing an analysis of how symbols can influence cognitive change and behavioral action may make it more difficult for other researchers to replicate this study, given the variances in interpretations for certain symbols. Thus, the trustworthiness could potentially be challenged. However, a thorough sense of Soviet cultural competence has been fostered by the author's upbringing by defectors of the USSR.<sup>64</sup> The author's fluency in conversational Russian, over a decade of exposure to Soviet animation, and the completion of multiple academic courses centered on Russian history have provided this study with a broad understanding of both the region and the manner in which audiences interacted with the media that they consumed. In expansions upon this project, it would be beneficial to break down discourses on femininity in animated folklore based on content specific to a country so as to reduce the generalization of post-Soviet states as a single entity. The inclusion of an analysis of Soviet animated folklore without the parameters of the origin of the folklore would construct a more explicit representation of the culture of each post-Soviet state. This research is a fundamental exercise in turning to different vessels of communication as a means for explaining social phenomenon. Animated folklore that perpetuates the preference of passive women and the increase in the vilification of women who sought to upset the gender hierarchy in post-Soviet animation does not account for the stark decrease in the participation rate of women in government following 1989. There are grounds for the consideration of animated folklore as cultural documents that, when contextually framed by *telos* and cultivation theory, may serve as a facet of accounting for why the culture surrounding women in a position of legislative power changed.

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<sup>64</sup> Neuman, Iver "Discourse Analysis." *Qualitative Methods in International Relations*. (St. Martin's Press, LLC., 2008). 68.

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- The Flying Ship*, Directed by Garri Bardin. Soviet Union: Soyuzmultfilm, 1979.
- The Frog Princess*, Directed by Mikhail Tsekhanovsky. Soviet Union: Soyuzmultfilm, 1954.
- The Little Scarlet Flower*. Directed by Lev Atamanov. Soviet Union: Soyuzmultfilm, 1952.



The New Bremen Musicians. Directed by Aleksander Gorlenko, Vasily Livanov. Produced by Vladimir Dostal. 2000.

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# Migrant Pregnancies: Maternal Health and International Aid Along the Refugee Trail from Syria to Europe

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## Introduction

One of the greatest challenges surrounding the influx of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers into Europe has been the demand for public health services—both within countries of refuge, and along the migrant trail. Since the onset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, over 1 million Syrian migrants have arrived in Europe, and of them, 48% are women. One study assessed that over 9% of female refugees of reproductive age arriving in Germany were pregnant,<sup>1</sup> while a similar Italian study places this rate at 11%.<sup>2</sup> Pregnant migrants possess a particular vulnerability and unique need for maternal healthcare along their journey from Syria to Europe, as approximately 60 percent of preventable maternal deaths worldwide occur in settings of conflict, displacement and natural disaster.<sup>3</sup>

The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that pregnant women receive at least

- 1 Dopfer, Christian; Vakilzadeh, Annabelle; Happle, Christine; Kleinert, Evelyn; Müller, Frank; Ernst, Diana; Schmidt, Reinhold E.; Behrens, Georg M.N.; Merkesdal, Sonja; Wetzke, Martin; Jablonka, Alexandra. 2018. "Pregnancy Related Health Care Needs in Refugees—A Current Three Center Experience in Europe." *Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health* 15, no. 9: 1934.
- 2 Trovato, Alessia et al. "Dangerous crossing: demographic and clinical features of rescued sea migrants seen in 2014 at an outpatient clinic at Augusta Harbor, Italy" *Conflict and Health* vol. 10 14. 15 Jun. 2016,
- 3 "On the Move: A New Mobile Clinic Reaches Refugee Women in the Balkans." United Nations Population Fund. March 01, 2016. Accessed November 19, 2018. <https://www.unfpa.org/news/move-new-mobile-clinic-reaches-refugee-women-balkans>.

four antenatal visits in order to monitor fetal development and check for signs of complication,<sup>4</sup> and access to emergency obstetric care and postnatal services are crucial in preventing maternal and fetal mortality. Pregnant women face increased risks as they travel through areas of conflict, which may have sparsely scattered medical facilities, and even fewer areas of accessible maternal healthcare amidst the instability. These risks are layered upon overarching conditions that pose a threat for all female migrants: in areas of conflict along the migrant trail, women and adolescent girls are at greater risk of sexual and gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence, rape, and early marriage and trafficking.<sup>5</sup> Thus, women may be in urgent need of treatment and counseling that extend beyond the definitions of traditional maternal healthcare. The disruption and shifting nature of access to maternal healthcare throughout the gestational period poses a threat to the health and wellbeing of both mother and child by creating insecurity and vulnerability. Hence, the maternal healthcare needs of Syrian refugees relate not only to their pregnancy, but also to their mental health amidst traumas, including rape and abuse, not just war.

Depending on when a migrant woman's pregnancy begins, she is likely to experience neonatal healthcare at different stages in her journey after leaving Syria: in countries immediately bordering Syria, along the route she follows into Europe, and within her initial country of refuge.<sup>6</sup> I will draw from the emerging literature on refugee health in Europe, primarily from the public health and healthcare policy sectors, and general literature on migrant women's health issues. In addition, I will utilize UN and WHO health reports and summaries, which present statistical information on birth rates and accessibility of health care services.

I will begin by addressing how the circumstances of a woman's pregnancy may produce different forms of social stigma and affect her overall vulnerability. For example, many women arriving in Europe identify as having experienced abuse, including rape by multiple perpetrators—at times resulting in pregnancy.<sup>7</sup> In conjunction with this discussion, I will examine the degree of familial support that a woman carries along her migrant journey, and how the presence of a husband or partner shapes her experience. Separation is reportedly sometimes linked to childbirth, as pregnant women may continue alone for a chance to give birth in the intended

- 4 World Health Organization (WHO). WHO Recommendations on Antenatal Care for a Positive Pregnancy Experience: Summary. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO; 2018.
- 5 *Shelter from the Storm: A Transformative Agenda for Women and Girls in a Crisis Prone World. Report*. New York City: United Nations Population Fund, 2015.
- 6 I recognize that not all migrants follow the same pathway or journey, so these three points are provided in order to give the most holistic view possible.
- 7 Danish Refugee Council (2017), "Human Smuggling – No victimless crime: Voices from those on the move," RMMS Briefing Papers, Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat East Africa and Yemen.

country of destination or to facilitate later applications for family reunification.<sup>8</sup>

My analysis of the shifting nature of maternal healthcare along the migrant trail, and upon entry of Europe will include a discussion that incorporates the difficulties of navigating new healthcare systems and the frequency with which migrant women are taking advantage of available services. Throughout, this paper will present a summaries of initiatives, such as mobile health clinics, proposed by NGOs, particularly in conjunction with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), that will seek to further address the risks that pregnant migrants face by providing healthcare and support. However, the array of situations and models I present are not exhaustive, and are intended to give an overview of maternal health resources, while identifying common themes. In discussing these programs, I will identify the greatest areas of need, and how these programs can operate in order to best serve migrant women.

### Qualifiers of Maternal Health

In my analysis, I will use the term “migrant pregnancies” to refer to pregnancies on the part of women who have fled from the Syrian war— in this case— those who are in a state of transit as refugees without permanent situations. The term also encompasses the varied health concerns, including mental health, that impinge on the migrants’ experiences in the aftermath of the traumas of displacement, war, and in many cases gender-based violence. Though I utilize this term within the context of Syrian female refugees, it may be appropriate for use in other contexts, as migrant pregnancies could share characteristics that transverse situational differences.

Health care is crucial to a woman’s physical, emotional, and mental wellbeing, and lack of women’s health care services in a certain area can cause the disempowerment of women. Maternal healthcare, in particular, encompasses the care necessary throughout the various stages of a woman’s pregnancy, including antenatal, labor and childbirth, and postnatal periods. In order to situate the analysis of women’s health care systems along a woman’s migrant journey, it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of guidelines and qualifiers for maternal health. The World Health Organization recommends that women receive at least four antenatal visits, which should include maternal and fetal assessment, counseling on proper diet and physical activity, and preventive measures to combat disease.

In addition, WHO proposes several health care system interventions to improve the utilization and quality of antenatal care, particularly in areas with low access to healthcare; these including midwifery, group care, and facilitated participatory learning and action (PLA) cycles

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8 *Experiences of Female Refugees & Migrants in Origin, Transit and Destination Countries: A Comparative Study of Women on the Move from Afghanistan, East and West Africa*. Report. Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2018, 26.

with women’s groups.<sup>9</sup> Participatory groups offer the opportunity for women to share their pregnancy experiences while creating a support network. Successful labor and childbirth are contingent upon skilled birth attendance and the availability of emergency obstetric care, while postnatal period is a critical phase in the lives of mothers and newborn babies, as maternal and infant deaths occur during this time. However, this is often the most neglected period for the provision of quality care. Psychosocial support by a trained person is recommended for the prevention of postpartum depression among women at high risk of developing this condition—a woman who has lost her baby or experienced birthing trauma will need additional care.<sup>10</sup> It can also be helpful for women to be given the opportunity to discuss their birthing experience, with a health professional, counselor, or with other women sharing similar experiences.

### The Construction of Unique Vulnerabilities Among Syrian Refugee Women

WHO’s emphasis on mental health reflects not only the need for comprehensive care extending beyond a purely biomedical approach, but asserts that pregnant women, particularly in the postpartum phase, have an increased risk of experiencing depression. In discussing the various forces that contribute to a pregnant migrant’s vulnerability, it is important to recognize that individual experiences and circumstances will vary greatly depending on personal and situational differences. Rather than to create a generic portrait of a pregnant Syrian refugee, this section serves to highlight common themes among pregnant women, female Syrian refugees, and those escaping conflict, and examine how these factors may work together in determining a woman’s vulnerability.

Considering the general characteristics of postpartum depression and maternal mental health,<sup>11</sup> it is important to reflect upon how the migratory status of a pregnant Syrian refugee could exacerbate her mental health struggles. Forced migration due to war and conflict often produces trauma, both physical and emotional, and dislocation can cause abrupt changes and a disruption to family and community structures. Prolonged effects that can follow these experiences include depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder.<sup>12</sup> Refugee and displaced women are also vulnerable to gender and sexual based violence, ranging from abuse, to rape, to trafficking and early marriage.<sup>13</sup> Disruptions in contraceptive use, reluctance to

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9 World Health Organization (WHO). WHO Recommendations on Antenatal Care for a Positive Pregnancy Experience: Summary. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO; 2018, 3-9.

10 WHO. WHO Recommendations on Postnatal Care of the Mother and Newborn. October 2013. Geneva: WHO, 13.

11 Brockington, I. F. *Motherhood and Mental Health*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

12 Martin, Susan Forbes., and John Tirman. *Women, Migration, and Conflict: Breaking a Deadly Cycle*. New York: Springer Verlag, 2009, 12.

13 “UNICEF: Food Aid Halt Pushing More Syrian Refugee Girls to Early Marriage.” *The Arab American News*, Dec, 2014. <https://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1640566560?accountid=14707>.

report aggressors due to fear of shame or lack of trust in helpers,<sup>14</sup> and inability to terminate unwanted pregnancies will further affect how a woman experiences forms of sexual based violence.

During their migrant journey, women may become separated from male family members, rendering them more susceptible to violence; in camps, unrelated families are often placed in overcrowded communal living spaces whose poor design, lighting, and protective measures increase the potential for attacks on women.<sup>15</sup> Familial separation not only poses a threat to the safety of women and children, but contributes to the pre-existing feelings of uncertainty that many refugee women experience throughout their migrant pregnancies. However, the presence of a spouse does not immediately guarantee safety or security, as some Syrian refugees have to marrying their daughters off early to save money or to protect the girls from the sexual advances that single girls suffer. In July of 2014, UNICEF said that nearly one in three marriages among Syrian refugees in Jordan involved a child under 18, and pregnancies resulting in early-marriage cause further instability due to the risk of carrying a child to term in a body that has not yet finished developing.<sup>16</sup>

### Shifts in Practice: Maternal Healthcare Along the Migrant Trail

Throughout the following sections, I use the term “migrant trail” to connect the various places a refugee may pass through before entering Europe. Depending on her route, a woman may pass through refugee camps or urban areas in Lebanon, Jordan, or Turkey, and even stretches of land and sea. The migrant trail is characterized by transience and movement— both of which create gaps in health security— and the nature and presence of centers providing maternal health services will vary greatly from place to place. Maternal healthcare services in refugee camps are typically supported by the collaboration of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and NGO’s. Due to their proximity and elaborate networks of refugee camps, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey are often the first destinations of Syrian refugees, of whom there are currently more than 655,000 registered in Jordan and 3.3 million in Turkey.<sup>17</sup> In Lebanon, there are no formal refugee camps and refugees are scattered throughout rural and urban areas, while in Jordan, approximately 20% of refugees live in established camps.<sup>18</sup> UNFPA supports

14 MacTavish, Emma. “Barriers of Reporting Sexual Violence in Syrian Refugee Camps.” Order No. 10239637, Royal Roads University (Canada), 2016. <https://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1848960778?accountid=14707>.

15 Martin. Women, Migration, and Conflict: Breaking a Deadly Cycle 13.

16 “UNICEF: Food Aid Halt Pushing More Syrian Refugee Girls to Early Marriage.” The Arab American News, Dec, 2014. <https://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1640566560?accountid=14707>.

17 “Syria Emergency.” UNHCR. Accessed December 12, 2018. <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>.

18 Ibid.

21 health clinics throughout Jordan, including four clinics in the Za’atari camp, three in the Azraq camp, and one clinic at Rukban, a remote region in the northeast of Jordan near the Syrian border.<sup>19</sup> These maternal health clinics provide services for safe deliveries, antenatal and postnatal care, family planning and gender-based violence. The health team located at Rukban operates in a mobile clinic equipped to provide comprehensive emergency obstetric and newborn care services, and in January 2018, UNFPA conducted a training program for community health workers in the Rukban camp on the use of clean delivery kits during high-risk pregnancies. Mobile clinics serving refugee populations also operate outside of Jordan; in 2016, UNFPA donated two mobile gynecological clinics donated to the ministry of health in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.<sup>20</sup> These clinics operate in the Tabanovce and Vinojug refugee transit centers, which, prior to the closing of the Macedonia-Greece border, represented major areas of transit along the Balkan migrant route to Europe.<sup>21</sup>

Overall, UNFPA’s strategy focuses on enabling health professionals by supplying free or cost-effective materials, including emergency reproductive health kits that address a variety of needs, ranging from family planning, to clinical delivery assistance, and management of sexually transmitted infections.<sup>22</sup> These kits combat interruptions to the supply chain characteristic of such crises, and prove to be highly effective in humanitarian situations— particularly the Za’atari camp, where there have been zero preventable maternal deaths among 10,000 births since 2012. While this statistic is incredibly impressive, UNHCR publications offer little discussion of the provision of supportive services extending beyond medical materials, such as training, availability of psychosocial support for new mothers, or educational programming, all of which would be beneficial in constructing a comprehensive support system to address migrant pregnancies.

Though refugee camps provide valuable maternal health resources, the majority of Syrian refugees live outside the boundaries of care and face further obstacles in seeking and obtaining care. A comparative study of maternal care among refugee populations in Jordan and Lebanon

19 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 2018. *Delivering Supplies When Crisis Strikes, Country Experiences: Jordan*. [https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA\\_PUB\\_2018\\_EN\\_Delivering\\_Supplies\\_When\\_Crisis\\_Strikes.pdf](https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA_PUB_2018_EN_Delivering_Supplies_When_Crisis_Strikes.pdf). 2-5.

20 “Successful Roll-out of the Mobile Gynecological Clinics.” UNFPA: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. February 23, 2016. Accessed December 13, 2018. <https://mk.unfpa.org/en/news/successful-roll-out-mobile-gynecological-clinics>.

21 *Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Europe: January to December 2017*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016. Accessed December 10, 2018. <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2017%20Regional%20Refugee%20%26%20Migrant%20Response%20Plan%20for%20Europe%20-%20Jan-Dec%202017%20%28December%202016%29.pdf?v=2>

22 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 2018. *Delivering Supplies When Crisis Strikes*, 5.

reports that women are seeking antenatal care at similar rates, 82% and 89%, respectively, while 33% of Syrian women in Jordan and 94% of Syrian women in Lebanon reported paying out of pocket for their deliveries.<sup>23</sup> These statistics identify cost as a major factor in seeking care, and could reflect the difference in the presence of humanitarian aid between the two countries. They further reflect that those who live outside of refugee camps live under considerable financial stress. While maternal health services may be widely available in the public and private sectors of both countries, cost remains a significant burden amongst Syrian refugee women.

Though Turkey's public health sector continues to face considerable strain due to the rapid influx of refugees, all Syrian refugees, whether residing in the camps or outside the camps, are covered under Turkey's general health insurance and are granted the right to access public health care services free of charge.<sup>24</sup> In Turkey, female refugees give birth in public and private hospitals in urban areas, and likely at home as well;<sup>25</sup> the Ministry of Health reports that between 2011-2015, there were over 48,000 births from Syrian women seeking refuge in the country. If refugees require more comprehensive treatment, they can be transferred to public hospitals and looked after free of charge.<sup>27</sup> Pregnant and postpartum refugee women are provided free iron and Vitamin D supplement during their pregnancy, and reproductive health counseling and contraceptive materials are supplied in community health centers free of charge; leaflets on safe motherhood, pre and post-partum care, healthy nutrition during pregnancy and safe sex attitudes are prepared in Arabic with UNFPA and distributed to pregnant refugees. Beyond the scope of rudimentary health care assistance, WHO provides continuing medical education to Turkish and Syrian health staff in diagnosing and treating mental health conditions such as depression, anxiety and post-traumatic disorders.<sup>28</sup> One of the greatest barriers to providing

23 Tappis, Hannah & Lyles, Emily & Burton, Ann & Doocy, Shannon. 2017. "Maternal Health Care Utilization Among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan". *Maternal and Child Health Journal*. 21. 10.1007/s10995-017-2315-y, 1798

24 "Health Care: Turkey." Asylum Information Database. 2018. Accessed December 13, 2018. [https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/health-care-0#footnoteref1\\_qfhoulc](https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/health-care-0#footnoteref1_qfhoulc).

25 Demirci, Hakan, Yildirim Topak, Nevruz, Ocakoglu, Gokhan, Karakulak Gomleksiz, Mehtap, Uzunyurt, Emin, and Ulku Turker, Ayse. "Birth Characteristics of Syrian Refugees and Turkish Citizens in Turkey in 2015." *International journal of gynaecology and obstetrics*. 137, no. 1 (April 2017): 63.

26 Perihan, Elif Ekmekci. "Syrian Refugees, Health and Migration Legislation in Turkey." *Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health* 19, no. 6 (2017): 1438.

27 Perihan, Elif Ekmekci, 1434-1441.

28 "Health Services for Syrian Refugees in Turkey." World Health Organization. December 13, 2018. Accessed December 13, 2018. <http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/emergencies/syria-crisis-health-response-from-turkey/health-services-for-syrian-refugees-in-turkey>.

health care services is the language barrier, and while Arabic-Turkish language interpreters are available to serve as patient guides in some maternal health settings, the number of translators is still not enough. In an absence of translators, Syrian women have reported feeling hesitant, or even afraid, to communicate their problems with health personnel.<sup>29</sup> The second primary issue community health centers face in delivering continuous maternal healthcare is that Syrian refugees are often moving from one province to another, and unless they are officially registered, it can be very difficult to monitor their movement.<sup>30</sup>

While many pregnant Syrian refugees will pass through camps or urban areas in proximal countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, many will traverse large stretches of land and sea where there is little to no healthcare access along their migrant trail to Europe. The journey to Europe remains highly dangerous, and poses dangers associated with the terrain, such as crossing the desert and sea, or the journeys across rivers and mountains, dangers due to smugglers, some of whom force refugees and migrants into situations of trafficking; and risks due to mistreatment by state authorities, including in Europe, particularly in interactions with border control procedures along the route. These periods of movement are dangerous, as lapses in access to care, shelter, and clean facilities and water can increase a woman's chance of infection, which is particularly harmful during pregnancy. Furthermore, should a woman require emergency obstetric care or birth delivery, she would be unlikely to find the support necessary, posing an immediate threat to both herself and her child. The migrant trail into Europe can be characterized by three different Mediterranean routes: the Western route, landing in Spain, the Central route, landing in Italy, and the Eastern route, landing in Greece. The Eastern, followed by the Western, routes see the largest proportion of Syrian refugees in relation to refugees of other origins; arrivals to Spain increased 130%, and to Greece, 88%, over the first seven months of 2018 in comparison with the same period the previous year.<sup>31</sup> For the purposes of remaining specific to Syrian migrant pregnancies, the following section will focus on arrivals to Spain and Greece.

### European Systems of Care: Greece and Spain

Migrant maternity care in European borderlands is characterized not only by typical obstacles in serving large refugee populations, but by cross-cultural and gendered interactions between women and healthcare personnel. Upon reaching Europe, pregnant refugees' vulnerabilities continue to shift in nature and origin— not only are vulnerabilities produced by the

29 Korukcu, Ozgur, Aydın, Ruveyde, Conway, Jane, and Kukulu, Kamile. "Motherhood in the Shade of Migration: A Qualitative Study of the Experience of Syrian Refugee Mothers Living in Turkey." *Nursing & health sciences*. 20, no. 1 (March 2018): 49.

30 The United Nations Refugee Agency. Workshop on development of protection strategies for persons in need of international protection in the urban context. 2016.

31 UN Refugee Agency, 2018. Desperate Journeys: Refugees and Migrants Arriving in Europe and at Europe's Borders, 6.

circumstances of women's bodies and journeys, but vulnerabilities are ascribed to them by medical professionals. Thus, vulnerability becomes a socially produced structure through social order, power, and hierarchies.<sup>32</sup>

In both Greece and Spain, maternal healthcare is classified as 'urgent care', which means a pregnant woman may access services regardless of her legal status. An ethnographic study<sup>33</sup> observing maternal healthcare system experiences in Greece and Spain identified the major obstacles that pregnant migrants face when accessing service. Upon arriving at a Greek island, refugees often face a sense of incredible relief, however, this point marks the beginning of a long administrative process that must be completed in order to journey to the mainland, where care is provided. This period of time is marked by harsh living conditions, power imposed by camp officials, and general unrest—all three of which endanger the health of pregnant migrants. Upon entry, women encountered healthcare providers in both public sectors and NGOs that diminished them to products of war and relocation, due to pre-existing stereotypes that were only exacerbated by brief patient-physician interactions. These stereotypes assert that Syrian women act within culturally-conditioned gender roles, and lack reproductive autonomy. In Athens, maternal healthcare for refugee populations is provided primarily by NGOs, the public sector, though there is the option of a center focused on midwifery, rather than biomedicine.

By the time pregnant refugees from Syria reach Spain along the western route, they have been in transit for 4 to 5 years, generally having passed through several North African countries. Prior to reaching the mainland, refugees are typically held within the Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes (CETI) in Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on the north coast of Africa. Here, they are provided three meals, medical treatment, and psychological support until their situation may be clarified.<sup>34</sup> Within CETI an international NGO manages the primary care of the Centre's residents, and primary caregivers channelled migrants to public health structures and their medical specialists, midwives and gynaecologists. One Syrian refugee, who had spent most of her time since leaving Syria in a UN-managed camp in Lebanon, had travelled with her husband through seven countries over the 8 months of her pregnancy, including Turkey, Mauritania, Mali, Algeria, and Morocco, eventually ending in Ceuta with the goal of reaching the EU; her journey illustrates the incredibly transient and uncertain nature of refugee travel. Other women interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with interpretation during their medical encounters, and those who were undocumented were not given the same care, as health professionals did not seem to be monitoring their pregnancies. Because transfer to Spain is

32 Quesada, J., Hart, L. K., & Bourgois, P. Structural vulnerability and health: Latino migrant laborers in the United States. *Medical Anthropology*. 30, no.4 (2011), 339–362.

33 "Shifting Vulnerabilities: Gender and Reproductive Care on the Migrant Trail to Europe." *Comparative Migration Studies*. 6, no. 1 (2018).

34 "C.E.T.I." The Land In Between. Accessed December 12, 2018. <http://landinbetween.com/en/ceti/>.

prohibited after the eighth month of pregnancy, many women began to see maternal healthcare as an obstacle to their migratory journey, and expressed feelings of suspicion and anxiety. Both situations are marked by a lack of communication between patient and physician, in result of language barriers and stereotypes about Muslim or Syrian pervasive throughout European medical practice and society.

## Conclusion

The transition to motherhood is a significant event in a woman's life, and should be treated as such. Access to quality, respectful maternal care throughout pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum periods is a right for all women, and should continue to be developed in order to mitigate global inconsistencies. Though the countries that are often places of immediate relocation, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, have varying maternal healthcare structures in place for refugees, there is room for a collective increase in focus on psychosocial support, which, in tandem with the preexisting biomedical support, would work to create a more comprehensive system of care that addresses the unique needs of a migrant pregnancy. In Jordan and Lebanon, financial burdens, on both the part of the patient and the healthcare facility, prove the most challenging in maintaining a functional maternal health system. In Turkey, the primary concerns are related to the language barrier and tendency of women to move frequently within the country. The most barren of areas that a pregnant refugee may pass through along her journey, such as stretches of desert, sea, or war zones, prove the most difficult to develop maternal healthcare infrastructures, however, many of these areas could realistically benefit from mobile clinics such as those situated in Macedonia and Rukban.

In understanding how factors of pregnancy, migration, and gender based violence shape a woman's vulnerability, it is crucial that physicians and other caretakers recognize aspects of culturally sensitive care, such as avoiding cultural generalization that preemptively assumes individual characteristics of a refugee woman, and instead, working to understand of factors in the broader socio-ecological environment that may or may not impact the level and type of care needed, such as migration circumstances, cultural backgrounds, language needs, and past trauma. Considering the current structure of maternal healthcare in borderlands, such as Greece and Spain, that serve as a pregnant migrant's first exposure to the European healthcare system, the primary goal for European physicians moving forward, should be working to acknowledge individual vulnerabilities without stripping refugees of their autonomy.

While the care that women receive upon entering Europe is generally effective, there is still room for standardization and improvement. Naturally, the immediate concern of physicians operating in any area of conflict will be the physical health and safety of a pregnant refugee, particularly when she requires emergency obstetric care. However, her mental and emotional wellbeing should come in close second, and should be addressed in a manner that fosters relationships of trust, not power, in relation to her care provider.

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# The Cyberspace Race: A Contest to Win Global Digital Dominance

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## ABSTRACT

*The term “hacker” often conjures up an image of an individual in a dark room, surrounded by computer monitors and cans of Mountain Dew, typing away and writing lines of code. This popularization is not always the case, and over the past decades has become an increased distance from the truth. This paper will focus primarily on the increasing threat of cyber warfare and the international response. It will take into account the political, economic, and diplomatic ramifications of the ever-diversifying cyber security landscape at a national and international level. It will discuss the increasing likelihood of large-scale attacks, as well as pose new questions of the long-term impact of this growing threat. Recent years have seen an expanded presence of cyber safety concerns in the public mind, particularly due to confrontations between the United States and Russia. The author will aim to unpack the changes which have been triggered by these incidents, and speculate on where the future of cyber security is headed in the years to come particularly regarding international relations and the world’s response.*

## Introduction

The global threats of cyber combat and warfare are an issue that is largely twenty-first century in nature. Prior to the advent of the internet, combat was carried out by soldiers with conventional weapons and governments implementing airstrikes. As technological advancements have increased tenfold over the past two decades, this has triggered a shift in how combat is defined, and by what rules this new style of warfare will be fought. The realm of cyberspace is one largely uncharted by many nations, with a select few working to develop strong programs to implement defensive as well as offensive capabilities in order to remain

ahead of their counterparts.

However, one of the unique aspects of technological development that places it apart from previous weaponry is its ability for any individual with a computer and knowledge to create new tools and exploit vulnerabilities. These individuals may have other objectives beyond simply cyber defense, creating a community of like-minded people across what is commonly referred to as the Deep Web. Likewise, the equipment required to carry out a destructive attack is far from unique. With the right individual behind the keys, a laptop can become as deadly as a bomb, triggering a nuclear reactor to overheat or force an emergency electrical grid shutdown. Ultimately, these inherent factors place governments and private companies at somewhat of a disadvantage, forcing them to often become reactionary in times of crisis. This following discussion will divide the topic into multiple sections, first of which is focused on the development of this threat and its employment in various contexts, followed by a discussion of how the landscape stands today. Finally, it will include an interpretation of how this new battlefield will develop and impact international diplomacy as a whole through the proposition of three possible scenarios of digital conflict.

## Definitions:

For the research and writing provided in this article, the author will employ the following definitions of terms in order to provide clarity and a standardized discussion of the topic at hand.

Cybersecurity: The United Nations International Telecommunications Union defines cyber security as “the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets.”<sup>1</sup>

Terrorism: The United States Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

## Abbreviations:

NORAD - North American Aerospace Defense Command

NSA - National Security Agency

SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

DNC – Democratic National Convention

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<sup>1</sup> “GlobalCybersecurity Index (GCI) 2017,” *United Nations International Telecommunications Union (ITU)*, 2017. [https://www.itu.int/dms\\_pub/itu-d/opb/str/d-str-gci.01-2017-pdf-e.pdf](https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/d-str-gci.01-2017-pdf-e.pdf)

IGF – Internet Governance Forum  
 GCI – Global Cybersecurity Index  
 DHS – Department of Homeland Security  
 GGE – Group of Government Experts  
 OEWG – Open Ended Working Group  
 ITU – International Telecommunications Union  
 ICT – Information and Communication Technologies  
 OPEC – Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries  
 P5 – Permanent 5 Members of the United Nations Security Council  
 IGO – Inter-Governmental Organization

### 1: **exe.HelloWorld - The Birth of Cybersecurity**

The 1983 Hollywood film *WarGames* painted a picture that seemed far too fantastic to ever become a reality. A young high schooler, played by Matthew Broderick, stumbles upon access to the United States' most powerful supercomputer and simply starts playing games with it. By the end of the film, Broderick's antics have caused panic among the staff at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) military base, triggering a faux nuclear war to be played out across the monitor screens.<sup>2</sup> This storyline, however, may not have been as fantastical as originally thought. By today's standards, this film and the technology portrayed is antiquated, but the idea remains the same. Just how susceptible are nations to this threat, and what information can be trusted from these machines?

It was not long after this film, in 1984, that President Ronald Reagan would sign the National Security Decision Directive 145 entitled "National Policy and Telecommunications and Automated Information System Security".<sup>3</sup> This policy marked one of the White House's first forays into the realm of cyber security. It granted the National Security Agency (NSA) the ability to regulate all networks and servers in the U.S., a policy that today would draw uproar from the general public.<sup>4</sup> In 1984, however, computers were barely beginning to hit the market and the web was lightyears away from the staple of society that it is today. Focus on these issues would wax and wane over the next decades, with some questions being raised under the Clinton administration. Until President Obama took office, cyber security and the militarization of computer systems largely took place behind closed doors in the U.S. as well as in other countries, both friend and foe, who were developing their digital defense capabilities.

When the Obama administration entered the White House, the war games of cyberspace

2 *WarGames* Directed by John Badham, Performed by Matthew Broderick, Ally Sheedy, John Wood. MGM Films, 1983, Film.

3 National Policy and Telecommunications and Automated Information System Security, National Security Decision Directive 145. President Ronald Reagan, (1984).

4 Ibid.

began to take on a new rhythm, with an increased focus on the importance of defending the United States. Secretary of State Robert Gates created the Cybersecurity Command division in the U.S.<sup>5</sup> With more than twenty other nations following suit and installing a cyber division within their military, the rate of attack from other nation states was beginning to increase. One attack in particular served as a rude awakening to the true powers that cyber weapons could have, and the possible threats that presented themselves in an ever-interconnected world. This attack was known as Stuxnet.<sup>6</sup>

#### 1.1 DOWN A WORMHOLE

The Stuxnet attack is regarded as the "first cyber warfare weapon ever".<sup>7</sup> This program, known as a worm, has widely been attributed to the United States and Israel. This attack marks the first major instance of cyberwarfare. The worm was installed in an Iranian nuclear facility with the sole purpose of destroying that facility, delaying the Iranian nuclear program from developing further.<sup>8</sup> This attack focused on the Iranina Natanz nuclear facility, aiming to destroy the military target. The Stuxnet attack was extremely sophisticated and entirely self-determined, meaning it required no immediate internet or communication access in order to function properly.<sup>9</sup> The program focused on the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system as its main point of entry.<sup>10</sup> It was assigned to attack a specific brand of valve that was present in the Iranian facility after it had been infected. If the worm discovered no valve of the type it was programed to search for, it would ultimately lie dormant and delete itself on a specified date.<sup>11</sup> This was the first attack of this style to be seen in the security community, and was an illustration of what many experts had feared, a program with entirely offensive priorities. This opened the gateway to the endless possibilities presented by cyber weapon development, but simultaneously indicated the level of espionage and offense that was employed between nations behind closed doors.

Stuxnet grew to become an international threat when it was inadvertently removed from the

5 Fred Kaplan, *Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber Warfare*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 3.

6 Ibid.

7 Ralph Langer, "Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon," *IEEE Security and Privacy*, May/June 2011.

8 David E. Sanger, "Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran," *The New York Times*, June 1, 2012. [https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=1&\\_r=2](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2)

9 Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, and Eric Chien, "W32.Stuxent Dossier," *Symantec Security Response*. February 2011. <https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2010-071400-3123-99>

10 Langer, "Stuxnet."

11 Ibid

Iranian nuclear plant and distributed throughout the web. It was allowed to move beyond the air gap. The program's install was built around the concept that information must be manually introduced to a system due to lack of internet connectivity, thus its self-determined feature and self-replicating code.<sup>12</sup> This escape allowed for the code to infect hundreds of computers around the world by exploiting the original Windows security flaw. Figure 1 indicates the number of systems infected hosts according to initial detection systems after the leak from the initial target of the code.




Figure 1. Number of unique hosts infected with the Stuxnet virus by country.

It was not until a New York Times report in 2012 that the breadth of the Stuxnet operation was fully realized.<sup>13</sup> Even after the virus was distributed across the Deep Web, more versions of the program were sent to infiltrate the Iranian plant on orders of President Obama. The mission was continued and considered successful at the time, hindering the Iranian's purification of uranium by disabling up to one fifth of their centrifuges at a time. This program marked a turning point in international cyber conflict, ultimately triggering a lasting change in the perception of cyber warfare as a whole. Not only did it expose U.S. operations, it also indicated that there was much more development in cyberspace than as originally expected.

## 1.2 WHO TURNED OUT THE LIGHTS?

On December 23, 2015, Ukrainian officials responded to what was later identified as a cyberattack on the Kyivoblenergo power grid. This attack affected an estimated 225,000 people, completely cutting their power.<sup>14</sup> Much like the Stuxnet attack, the third-party intruder entered

<sup>12</sup> Falliere, "W.32."


<sup>13</sup> Sanger, "Obama."

<sup>14</sup> "TLP: White Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid" *Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC)*, March 18, 2016. [https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC\\_SANS\\_Ukraine\\_DUC\\_5.pdf](https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf)

through the SCADA system before proceeding to thirty power substations and cutting their power.<sup>15</sup> This forced some to revert to manual power stores while others had no functionality whatsoever. Figure 2 provides a more detailed model of the Ukrainian power facilities that were accessed. In the following days an investigation was initiated, and it has largely been an attack attributed to the Russian government.<sup>16</sup> It is the first reported cyberattack to result in a power outage, leading to larger concerns of power grid vulnerabilities in other countries, mainly the United States.<sup>17</sup> A follow-up attack in 2016 resulted in another blackout on an even larger scale.<sup>18</sup> The attack had chosen to target a primary power station, managing to cause even more widespread power loss than the previous outage. What had originally been regarded as a theoretical threat was beginning to become very real for many nations, identifying a new point of entry for hackers to exploit.

## 1.3 THE DOWNFALL OF DEMOCRACY

The 2016 United States national election was one surrounded by controversy for various reasons. By the end of the election, it was rife with allegations of election interference from



Source: Modification to the DHS Energy Sector-Specific Plan 2010

Figure 2. Electrical System Overview

domestic parties as well as international. The majority of these allegations were aimed at the Russian government and the operations of Vladimir Putin. There is significant evidence to link the Russian president and his cyber division known as APT28 or "Fancy Bear" to election day

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> "Cyber-Attack Against Ukraine Critical Infrastructure" *Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT)*, February 25, 2016. <https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01>

<sup>18</sup> Andy Greenberg, "'Crash Override': The Malware That Took Down A Power Grid," *Wired*, June 12, 2017. <https://www.wired.com/story/crash-override-malware/>

issues in multiple states, as well as compromised email accounts from the Democratic National Convention (DNC).<sup>19</sup> Special counsel Robert Mueller indicted twelve Russian hackers in June of 2018 for their direct involvement in the Russian efforts to meddle in U.S. election operations. His indictment provided detailed accounts of the operations used by the Russian tech wizzes.<sup>20</sup> These direct forms of interference created a cloud of distrust surrounding the electoral system in the U.S. in later elections. In addition, it was later identified by U.S. officials that Russia had employed substantial disinformation campaigns through the creation of bots and fake accounts. This tactic was employed to influence media and public opinion regarding the election. In essence, the Russians chose to hide in plain sight, using a platform that was already well

established to manipulate information and deliberately deceive and misrepresent issues. The United States is not the lone country to experience Russian interference in their national elections. Intelligence indicates that the nation's team of hackers have compromised elections in Germany and France, among others.

Some nations have already worked to combat this particular form of cyberattack. France in particular has chosen to implement laws with the goal of removing so called "fake news" and establishing regulations on social media platforms. President Emmanuel Macron spoke at the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF), calling for this regulation to begin and the creation of a "free, open and safe Internet."<sup>21</sup> This follows a historic coalition between French officials and the social network giant Facebook, who has opened its gates to French cybersecurity experts as they investigate how they handle various issues that arise on the social network.<sup>22</sup> This regulation, however, is likely to draw criticism from many regarding the "freedom" of the internet and just how free it may be due to this regulatory tactic.

## 2. Where are We Now?

In 2017, the United Nations in conjunction with the International Telecommunication Union published its second annual Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI).<sup>23</sup> This report indicated that

19 Andy Greenberg, "How Russia Hacks Elections in the U.S. and Around the World," *Wired*, June 9, 2017. <https://www.wired.com/story/russia-election-hacking-playbook/>

20 United States of America v. Netyksho et al, 18-cr-215-ABJ (D.D.C. July 13, 2018)

21 Emmanuel Macron "IGF 2018 Speech by French President Emmanuel Macron," (United Nations Internet Governance Forum 2018, Paris). <https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-2018-speech-by-french-president-emmanuel-macron>

22 Nahema Marchal, "Unpacking France's 'Mission Civilisatrice' To Tame Disinformation of Facebook," *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 20, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/unpacking-frances-mission-civilisatrice-tame-disinformation-facebook>

23 "Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2017," *United Nations International Telecommunications Union (ITU)*, 2017. [https://www.itu.int/dms\\_pub/itu-d/opb/str/d-str-gci.01-2017-pdf-e.pdf](https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/d-str-gci.01-2017-pdf-e.pdf)

half of all member states are lacking any coherent plan to address the threat of cyberattacks on their nation, both on a governmental and corporate level. Figure 3 offers a breakdown of this percentage according to the GCI. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a report in March of 2018 detailing their findings regarding Russian activity against critical entities including the nuclear and energy sectors, among others. It was determined through their investigation that Russian operatives had repeatedly attempted to access both government and private facilities across the country.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, data breaches are becoming increasingly expensive for companies around the globe. According to IBM researchers, an average data breach for a company outside of the United States can cost up to 3.86 million dollars, while a U.S. company will face almost 8 million dollars in financial losses due to a breach.<sup>25</sup> Making matters worse, the timeline for discovering a data breach averages 196 days, reducing response time from authorities, private protection companies and governments to address the fallout from said breaches.<sup>26</sup> While attacks against private companies may have other intentions such as corporate espionage or criminal activity, the tools used and long-term impact of these breaches can prove to be detrimental to national economies and governments for years to come.

2018 saw the highest number of government and private company data breaches, totaling at more than 100 major attacks according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, compared to 2006 featuring less than 15 total major attacks.<sup>27</sup> This increase in attacks against government and public institutions indicates a monumental increase in the prevalence of these cyber threats. There are likely hundreds of other unreported or thwarted attacks present in the international community as well, labelling this issue as one even more time-sensitive. The international community has hardly been able to reach a consensus regarding what the norms of operation should be for states in the growing cyber field. Two of the major players in the debate, the United States and Russia, proposed competing plans to create different working groups on the topic. The United States proposed document created a Group of Government Experts (GGE) group.

24 "Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors," *United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)*, March 15, 2018. <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A>

25 Ponem Institute, "2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study," *The Ponem Institute for IBM Security Service*, June 2018. <https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=55017055USEN>

26 Ibid.

27 "Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006," *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*, 2018. <https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity-and-governance/technology-policy-program/other-projects-cybersecurity>




Figure 3. Cybersecurity strategy and training commitments

This group would, in accordance with UN policy, create a working group of up to twenty-five member states to focus on this issue.<sup>28</sup> Conversely, the Russian proposal would create an open-ended working group (OEWG), positing that the United States proposal was too exclusive and ultimately would achieve no cohesive policy.<sup>29</sup> Much to the surprise of both, each of these separate proposals were passed by the General Assembly, creating both bodies and further dividing the efforts of the United Nations to find some semblance of continuity across the organization's policies.<sup>30</sup> Due to this lack of organization, policies have largely fallen to states to establish which creates a varying level of security, as noted by the ITU's CGI Index and understanding across borders in such a borderless arena as cyberspace.<sup>31</sup>

### 3. Calculating the Trajectory of a Cyber-Weapon Future

The following section will lay out three probable scenarios illustrating what the future of cybersecurity may entail. While these scenarios may include names of specific countries,

28 United Nations General Assembly (GA), A/C.1/73/L.37 "Advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security," October 18, 2018. <http://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1>

29 United Nations General Assembly (GA), A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1 "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security," October 29, 2018. <http://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1>

30 Alex Grigsby, "The United Nations Doubles Its Workload On Cyber Norms, and Not Everyone is Pleased," *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)*, November 15, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/united-nations-doubles-its-workload-cyber-norms-and-not-everyone-pleased>

31 "Global Cybersecurity Index 2017," 2017.

those names will become largely interchangeable as more nations increase their cyber and telecommunication functionality in the coming years. Additionally, these scenarios very well may intertwine and present themselves in conjunction with one another. These scenarios are fully hypothetical, however are conceived based on different attacks that have already taken place and the general progression of ICT and malicious technological activities by both nation-states and non-state actors such as terrorist organizations or cyber criminals.

### SCENARIO A: LARGE-SCALE ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES FROM A FOREIGN POWER:

While there has been clear probing and reconnaissance between many of the major cyber-capable countries, namely the United States, China, and Russia, this is deemed a common practice among the intelligence community.<sup>32</sup> However, in the coming years this scenario looms as more likely with tensions growing between these three nations. As that competition increases, each country will seek to flex their technological muscles and increase their rapport among the community. Based on the data provided in Figure 4, the United States is most likely to be faced with an attack, with almost 40% of global attacks between 2015 and




Figure 4. Top 10 Countries Affected by Targeted Cyber Attacks Between 2015 and 2017

2017 being aimed at the P5 nation. Whether this attack is focused on the financial sector, energy, or government defense remains is up for debate. Considering DHS's definitive report

32 "Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors," *United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)*, March 15, 2018. <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A>

of Russian probing within the energy sector, and past dry runs that took place in Ukraine as previously mentioned, energy systems and the power grid seem like the most likely target for a Russian based attack.<sup>33,34</sup> However, increased election interference and political noise created by President Vladimir Putin and his government may soon resemble a breach of national sovereignty, disrupting the free and fair elections of the United States. This interference could trigger a retaliatory cyber response from the U.S. The answer of how this conflict would impact the international community, however, will largely be shaped by U.N. policies and common practice guidelines. More likely than not a large-scale conflict will ensue before the IGO's policies reflect a cohesive plan to respond to scenarios like this. Member states will be forced to act reactively versus proactively and will still struggle to come to a consensus.

#### SCENARIO B: DEVELOPING NATION IS RAVAGED BY A MID-LEVEL ATTACK

As the 2017 CGI notes, about half of all countries in the world lack any form of a cyber-attack contingency plan in the event of a large data breach or attack against government systems.<sup>35</sup> This attack could originate one from one of two sources; a state-sponsored campaign by a government agency or an independent non-state actor. Either of these sources could be plausible given the increased availability of ICT to organizations, as well as the available knowledge to execute such attacks. As has been show in the case of Ukraine profiled previously, it is not unlikely to attribute something like this to a powerful nation-state, acting with either economic or political interests in mind. The threat to developing economies looms large in a more globalized world with growing dependence on the internet to allow global trade to function. In 2016, the World Trade Organization (WTO) reported that \$27.7 trillion U.S. dollars-worth of digital trade took place, increasing almost \$8 trillion USD since 2012.<sup>36</sup> Figure 5 provides a breakdown of e-commerce sectors. The e-commerce market and importance of ICT in global trade will only increase. Consequently, the impact of a large-scale attack on a developing economy will become that more destructive. If formulated properly, an attack could dismantle an entire economy by crippling stock markets or trade organizations, causing major losses for businesses.

An attack of this sort could be employed by either a rival state in order to reduce economic output, such as a member of the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to cause oil price fluctuation. However, it could also be induced by third-party actors to make statements or for personal gain. The hacktivist group known as Anonymous has gained

33 "Russian Government Cyber Activity," March 2018.

34 "TLP: White," 2016.

35 "Global Cybersecurity Index 2017," 2017.

36 World Trade Statistical Review "World Trade Statistical Review 2018," *United Nations World Trade Organization*. 2018. [https://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/statis\\_e/wts2018\\_e/wts18\\_toc\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2018_e/wts18_toc_e.htm)

international acclaim and infamy for their activities in this realm, taking on governments and companies alike to make political statements. They are far from the only ones, with attacks reaching back to the mid-1990's, though far less sophisticated than today's forms of attack and arguably less destructive. Anonymous remains the most widely-known group, although they have yet to reach the level of cyberterrorism as it is defined in this writing. The third parties triggering these attacks may be both international and domestic, with some operating around the globe. This is an aspect of cyber terrorism that offers a challenge for those wishing to mitigate these threats.

Global e-commerce totalled US\$ 27.7 trillion in 2016, up from US\$ 19.3 trillion in 2012.




Figure 5. Value of E-Commerce Markets 2016

An attack aimed at a technologically-developing country could work as signal of the importance of cyber security for all nations and their governments. It may help to precipitate a more productive discussion of cybersecurity measures. It may also foster better partnerships between developed and developing states, forging new solutions and measures that will lead to an overall safer electronic environment. This will help establish multifaceted solutions for all states as opposed to directing the spotlight specifically toward the top ICT nations in the world.

#### SCENARIO C: A CYBERATTACK CAUSING SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF LIFE

No cyberattack has been directly linked to widespread loss of life, which is one of the core requirements of the definition of terrorism employed in this article. However, that does not entirely rule out the possibility of this as consequence of digital intrusion. U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta painted a dark portrait of what the future of cyberterrorism could hold, saying "They could, for example, derail passenger trains or even more dangerous, derail trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities or shutdown the power grid across large parts of the country."<sup>37</sup> While these fears have not been realized, the technology to carry out these plans has presented itself. The Stuxnet virus

employed by the United States and Israel stands as a major example of that.<sup>38</sup> Control systems could have accessed and manipulated by governments and non-state actors alike, causing a catastrophic incident leading to the death of hundreds and contamination of many more.

Elon Musk and Tesla have worked tirelessly to break ground on self-driving cars, an industry rife with opposition from many different corners. These vehicles will, theoretically, require an internet connection in order to function and acquire updates. This leaves them susceptible to significant breaches in security from those with malicious intent. However, it has already been shown that even cars operated by a human driver are susceptible to attacks across the web. In 2014, a Jeep recall order 1.4 million vehicles to be returned and patched. The reason? These vehicles could be remotely accessed and the person behind the keys could engage the breaks, accelerate the car and even cut the transmission entirely.<sup>39</sup> While Jeep created a patch to address the immediate flaw, the problem is far from solved. The ability for terrorists to carry out their attacks over the web provides them with an anonymity that cannot be achieved with a physical attack. Instead, these attacks and programs can be disguised and carried out from countries away, wreaking havoc in urban environments and causing panic and loss of life.

These attacks could also be perpetrated by a national government or through a state-sponsored terrorist organization, which would likely trigger a violent international cyber conflict for the first time in history. This territory would be so new, placing the international community in uncharted waters as a conflict erupted before the eyes of the world. Likely this would be a period where new forms of digital weaponry were employed, many of which would be new to the world and never actually put into practice. Likewise, cyber defense systems would actively be tested for the first time in real-world scenarios, inevitably resulting in some malfunctions and failures. Widespread power failures would likely ensue, inhibiting the ability of first responders to assess damages in highly populated areas. Telecommunication would lack some functionality or be interrupted completely due to power failure. An attack of this scale, triggering wide-spread loss of life would throw the international community into utter turmoil, likely inducing a U.N. – mandated state of emergency in the effected countries. This would fundamentally alter the face of international conflict and likely change the political landscape of the United Nations. This would likely spark calls for regulation and classification of digital arms, a problem that member states will grapple with after this conflict unfolds. Much like the post-Cold War policy regarding nuclear weapons, they would seek to inhibit the proliferation of these new weapons. This will prove to be a much more daunting task than the concern physical nuclear materials.

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37 Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security, New York City,” October 11, 2012. <http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5136>

38 Sanger, “Obama.”

39 Andy Greenberg, “After Jeep Hack, Chrysler Recalls 1.4M Vehicles for Bug Fix,” *Wired*. July 24, 2015. <https://www.wired.com/2015/07/jeep-hack-chrysler-recalls-1-4m-vehicles-bug-fix/>

#### LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH:

As with many issues concerning government policies and technology, the limitation of classified state secrets presents itself when attempting to understand the full development of weapons and other tools. However, we can glean from the information provided from attacks and operations already committed and understand what nations have made a concerted effort to develop these capabilities. In the years to come this development will continue, increasing exponentially in their complexity and impact on the global community. Likewise, having accurate statistics on all attacks attempted by nations and against what entities is a rather limiting factor when evaluating and predicting risk factors regarding cyber security. This caveat would reasonably indicate that there are in fact many more offensive and defensive and operations than those recorded and presented publically by states across the world.

This research also simplifies the issue of data security and data ownership into the umbrella of data breaches and cyberattacks. These present a host of other issues that organizations are faced with tackling, particularly those of intellectual property and the right to privacy in the expanding digital age. This passes beyond the questions of cybersecurity and enters a new realm of digital ethics and ultimately personal data usage that will also become a continued discussion over the next decade.

#### 4. Conclusion

The popular sci-fi series *Star Trek* labels space as the final frontier that human beings will encounter. While it may stand as the final frontier, humankind must first address cyberspace, the Wild West of technological advancement that has the power to drive national economies and topple regimes with just a few keystrokes. The proposed scenarios are far from the only issues which may come to life in the next decade of international diplomacy. However, the likelihood that the next global conflict will be fought not with nuclear launch codes but with lines of code is becoming far more realistic. It will present a challenge unseen by even the largest of the world’s military powers, and bring with it new threats beyond the battlefield. These threats are likely to stem from both other nations and non-governmental organizations alike, forcing governments to constantly be one step ahead of the competition to ensure safety and security for their own citizens and corporations, as well as that of the international community as a whole.

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