By Madison Sargeant
On July 12th, the Polish people re-elected incumbent President Andrzej Duda for a second five year term. The victory for Duda and his allies in the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) came in a narrow run-off vote (51.03% to 48.97%) against Civic Platform (PO) candidate and Warsaw mayor, Rafał Trzaskowski. The hotly anticipated election has led to divergent opinions on what the results indicate not only for Poland, but for far-right nationalism in Europe as a whole. For some, such as British-Polish economist Jacek Rostowski, Duda’s slim margin of victory indicates the “nationalist-populist tide has peaked”. More pessimistic critics argue the election only solidifies the Polish government’s embrace of illiberalism. What is certain is that Polish society is divided between its rural communities that did not reap the benefits of the post-socialist market reforms, and Poland’s well-to-do, urban communities, as can be seen by voting data broken down by voivodeship. If the Civic Platform party intends to win in the next election cycle, it just might benefit from the same playbook that PiS has used so successfully—economic welfare for the most vulnerable, and as former Prime Minister Donald Tusk calls it, “responsible nationalism”.
Western media regards the success of PiS in Poland over the last decade as a “rise of nationalism”, and in doing so, fails to recognize the support for an ultraconservative political party for what it is: a continuation of the Polish collective consciousness, albeit sprouting a new, ugly head. There is a strong historical precedent for the success of PiS in modern times that does not come from Poland’s illiberal, communist period, but rather from an ethnic-cultural identity, largely centered around Roman Catholicism, that has held the Polish nation together through the partitions of the late eighteenth century, World War II, and the communist era. Poland’s cultural homogeneity is even more apparent when one recognizes that Civic Platform, the current opposition, received much of its support from the Poles now supporting PiS in its heyday from the early 2000s to the mid 2010s. PO is classified as a liberal-conservative party, and while its members do have slightly more progressive social views than its PiS counterpart, decreased support for the party came from its failure to offer voters a compelling counter-offer to PiS’s economic platform as well as allegations of corruption during its ruling tenure. PO might be more liberal, but it does not reject values associated with conservative Polish national identity. As discussed by Mitchell Orenstein, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute based in Philadelphia, the patriotic and conservative identity assumed by both major parties indicates that support for PiS is based largely on its welfare model, not a desire to disengage from the international community. The fact that eighty-nine percent of Poles support Poland’s EU membership as of March 2020 debunks the myth that nationalism is the driving force for PiS’s winning streak. Poles have been able to juggle both strong nationalistic beliefs with support for the EU and other international institutions, despite various clashes between the state and Brussels.
In liberal political rhetoric, nationalism is regarded as a dangerous, backwards idea that puts countries at odds with democratic peace, globalism, and progressive policies. As such, Western and Eurocentric observers and heads of government regard the success of nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe as a step in the wrong direction. Yet nationalism has always been a catalyst for change in this region. Central and Eastern Europe has historically been a target of occupation and power projection by imperial powers, such as Prussia/Germany, Austria, Russia—and most recently the Soviet Union—to suppress the autonomy of many of the nations scattered throughout the region. Even after the end of the communist era, the desire to express nationalistic pride and defense of one’s country from external influence is remarkably pervasive in the region. In 2010, demonstrations in Riga and Vilnius celebrated Latvian and Lithuanian independence with signs stating, “This Land is for Latvians”, and “Lithuania for Lithuanians”. Domestic leaders and the West largely overlooked these acts of nationalism in these two NATO and EU member states. Nationalism is nothing new to Central and Eastern Europe—after all, nationalism played an important role in the resistance to Soviet influence and the eventual collapse of the communist regimes—and the end of the Cold War has done little to suppress nationalist sentiments, especially in regard to matters of state security.
Setting aside nationalism as the determining factor in the outcome of Polish elections, one can see the economic appeal in voting for the Law and Justice party. PiS has offered substantial policy solutions for legitimate economic concerns, through legislation such as the 500+ program, which gives an additional tax-exempt PLN 500 per year for each additional child a family has beyond their first. For the rural communities that did not fare well economically under Civic Platform’s rule, these incentives are a deciding, if not the deciding factor in one’s choice at the ballot box. It is easier for individuals to overlook PiS’s illiberal policies when the party simultaneously pushes for policies that help put food on the table. Protecting the popular welfare policies introduced by PiS, which Trzaskowski said he would do, can make the opposition more competitive with the ruling party. Having lost the presidential election in 2015 and facing decreasing influence in Polish politics, PO must seize the initiative and continue to address rural communities’ economic grievances if they are going to defeat PiS.
Critics argue that PiS’s emphasis on Poland’s rural-urban economic divide is a form of fear mongering and “exaggeration” on the actual state of the economy, but similar economic concerns have won other nationalist parties political influence across the region. In Estonia, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) came third in the March 2019 parliamentary elections. Constituents feeling left behind in the post-communist era, much like in Poland, bolstered EKRE’s success. As liberal Estonian entrepreneur Karoli Hindricks writes, “We can’t say 100,000 people who voted for this party made a wrong choice; it’s about what drove them there, and how we get ourselves back together.” Hindricks organized a concert following the elections as a response to the far-right’s march on February 24, 2019, Estonia’s Independence Day. The concert featured thousands of Estonians proudly waving their national flag, a scene Hindricks hoped would foster unity and tolerance, in stark contrast to the manner in which Estonia’s far-right appropriated the symbol. Individuals such as Hendricks argue that the rise of the far-right is not necessarily indicative of hate and social conservatism, but rather reflects the desire for greater economic inclusion by marginalized sections of society. In fact, how close the presidential election was in Poland hints that the country isn’t as divided socially as it may appear. Rather, Poles are voting with economic interests in mind, not social values. There isn’t necessarily a growth in far-right nationalism in Poland, but far-right nationalists have been given a platform by PiS, which stays in power due to support from moderate voters who are willing to look the other way when it comes to the party’s socially conservative and increasingly illiberal platform.
A smart strategy for PO would be to put forth a candidate that can effectively display the party’s own conservative values, borrow certain principles of economic policy from PiS, and maintain nationalistic rhetoric to garner support from Poles across the political spectrum. In some countries, such as New Zealand and Denmark, liberals have been successfully compromising on certain policies to defeat far-right, ultraconservative ruling parties. Civic Platform would benefit from a similar course of action. By adopting some of PiS’s economic policies with limited reform and acknowledging the asymmetrical benefits of market transition across Poland’s cities and rural communities, PO can encourage a move to the center-right for “on-the-fence voters” who’ve sided with PiS based on its economic policies.
While many might be quick to make definitive statements on what July’s presidential election results mean for Poland, Europe, and the fight between democracy and authoritarianism, nothing is certain, especially in politics. The reelection of Duda does guarantee PiS five more years of power in which it can control state media, politicize the judicial system, and collide with the EU on human rights and legal issues. The PiS government will continue to perpetrate attacks on political dissenters and activists, such as in the August arrests of roughly 50 demonstrators protesting anti-LGBT legislation and violence. However, the next parliamentary and presidential elections are for the taking. The opposition would do well to utilize similar tools that have gained PiS moderate conservative followers, such as implementing new social programs, invoking patriotic rhetoric, and focusing on the interests of rural Poles to break the far-right’s grip on the political system. Addressing the economic concerns of rural communities and emphasizing its socially conservative values could help the Civic Platform close the gap between itself and its rival. Poles are not doomed to illiberalism, but those opposed to PiS’s anti-democratic tendencies must get real about why the far-right party has garnered a broader coalition of voter support.
Madison Sargeant is a senior at Boston University studying International Relations and Statistical Methods. She will graduate and commission as a Naval Officer in 2021 and has previously worked at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., and the Texas State Capitol. Her research focuses on energy security, cyber policy, and nationalism in Eastern Europe.
