Gulf Security in the Face of Iran's Challenges

By Mary Elise Pieters

The Islamic Republic of Iran poses security, military, and intelligence threats to the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Iran is an asymmetric power and its most threating capabilities include its backing of proxy groups in the region, its military capabilities to include its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities and its naval power, and its intelligence threat through the channels of its Quds force. The GCC states have advantages over Iran spending significantly more on their military and having conventional military forces that are armed with much more modern and capable military hardware in comparison to Iran. Despite these advantages, the GCC has been unable to effectively combat Iranian challenges due to political differences between GCC states and some states sharing more friendly relationships with Iran, like Qatar. While Iran poses a credible threat to GCC nations through asymmetric means, Iran’s strategic approach to conflict is one which avoids direct confrontation, which it views as lose-lose, and instead pursues military, security, and intelligence capabilities which allow it to deter regional actors while ensuring its freedom of action to further its interests and guarantee regime survival. 

Overview

To provide a brief background on the GCC, the Gulf Cooperation Council was established in 1981 and is a political and economic alliance of the six GCC States: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The GCC formed in the two years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. In the last decade, Gulf states have shown considerable strength and stability during a period in which the rest of the Arab world has experienced great tumult. Political scientists have coined the phrase “Gulf moment” saying, “the implosion of some, previously strong, regional actors (such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt) has given way to other players—all of which are now located in the Gulf. In terms of regional relations, the Arab world has therefore entered a Gulf moment, and is likely to remain in it for the time being.” GCC states like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar now represent the most influential powers in the Middle East and increasingly see themselves as a model of stability for the rest of the Arab world. Notably, the Charter which establishes the GCC does not have any article similar to NATO’s Article 5, describing the organization’s collective defense. Absent a unified GCC collective defense policy, Iran continues to threaten regional security.

Facing GCC states over a narrow sea, Iran is a large country both in terms of population and geography with 83,024,745 million people and a land area of 636,313 square miles. Iran has the largest Shia majority of any country at nearly 90% of the population. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has been led by a highly conservative clerical elite under Supreme Leaders Ruhollah Khomeini (1979-1989) and the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (1989-present). Descendants from the ancient Persian Empire, Iran is the largest state since the 16th century following the Shia creed, and its denunciation of Sunni beliefs isolates the state from its Arab neighbors. 

No experts believe that Iran poses a conventional threat. Iran is unable to conventionally compete with GCC powers like Saudi Arabia and its allies like the United States. Knowing this, Iran has developed its asymmetric capabilities to deter regional actors through three primary methods: propaganda, supplying money, and supplying arms to its proxy groups. Iran has exploited conflicts throughout the region, often utilizing Shia militant groups in different countries and channeling propaganda, money, and arms, in attempt to foment insurrection like Iran has done countless times in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, Lebanon, etc. 

 Through these methods, Iran acts a credible asymmetric threat and it uses these methods in pursuit of its security, military, and intelligence capabilities.  Iran has created military threats though its ballistic and cruise missiles and its naval capabilities, security threats through its backing of regional terror groups and proxies, and intelligence threats through the channels of its Quds force. The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ report Gulf Security after 2020 argues, “Iran’s military doctrine, way of war and emphasis on asymmetric tactics is likely to persist, with few exceptions. However, Iran will also seek to modernize its military and fill capability gaps through prioritized acquisitions of advanced weaponry. The need to address social and economic shortfalls caused by mismanagement and sanctions will likely constrain Iran’s military modernization efforts.” Iran is a country with few allies and after years of imposed sanctions, Iran has no choice but to pursue asymmetric capabilities by using propaganda, giving money, and supplying arms to proxies, creating security, military, and intelligence threats to deter regional actors, while avoiding direct confrontation which it views as a lose-lose. 

Proxy Warfare

Iran’s use of proxies to develop security threats by moving money and arms was instrumental in Iran’s performance in the Iran-Iraq war, and changed Iranian strategy in the long run. Experts argue that, “It is hard to overstate the importance of the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War in shaping Iran’s approach to warfare. The conflict cemented Iran’s doctrinal focus around three main axes – proxy warfare, asymmetric warfare (especially in naval defense) and ballistic missiles – in addition to internal defense and regime preservation.” The Iran-Iraq war of 1988 showed that Iranian conventional units performed poorly under a much smaller Iraqi force, but Iran surprised Iraq by finding its niche in asymmetric warfare. 

When Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, he assumed that the divided Iran population after the chaos of the Iranian Revolution would quickly falter to Iraq, and not be able to put up much of a fight. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), established during the Iranian Revolution as an internal security force transformed into a second military. Seth Jones, Director of the Transnational Threats project says that, “Iran’s comparative advantage became its ability to work with state and non-state actors—an irregular approach led by the IRGC, including the IRGC-QF, rather than conventional Iranian military forces (Artesh).” Iran switched to a strategy of aiding Shia Iraqi militant groups, the most famous of which was the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Hakim’s Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The Iran-Iraq war showed Iran that its threat was not in conventional warfare, but asymmetrical warfare. By exploiting the fact that Iraq is mostly a Shia majority country, Iran trained and supplied arms to Shia Iraqi groups, posing a security threat to target Iraqi forces, and later on, to target U.S. soldiers.  

 Those lessons learned during the Iran-Iraq war informed Iran’s use of Iraqi Shia militant groups during the Second Gulf War, targeting U.S. soldiers in order to tie down the United States military in Iraq by continuing to fund and arm Iraqi Shia militant groups. President Bush had reports in 2007 of, “evidence of Tehran supplying material support, including mortars and elements of sophisticated roadside bombs, to insurgents in Iraq who in turn target and kill U.S. forces.” The United States has attributed the death of 600 soldiers in Iraq to Iranian backed groups and holds Iran’s IRGC-QF responsible for these deaths. Iran’s strategy in Iraq involved covert action through proxy groups to prevent the U.S. from directly accusing the Iranian government of backing Iraqi Shia militant groups to target U.S. forces. Professor Beehner at the Modern War Institute at West Point reinforces this idea saying, “U.S. officials have said they can trace serial numbers on mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and EFPs to sources across the border but have resisted blaming the Iranian leadership." Iran used Iraq as a buffer zone and a first line of defense against foreign invasion. Iranian actions in Iraq were designed to exploit an existing conflict through proxy groups, and bleed out U.S. forces, so that the U.S. wouldn’t turn to Iran next after they were finished trying to stabilize Iraq. 

An article on the Council of Foreign Relations reinforces this idea saying, “Some have called Iran’s policy one of “managed chaos”—enough instability to eject U.S. forces from Iraq but not enough to engulf Iraq’s neighbors in a wider sectarian war. Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy says of such a policy: “To a degree, this keeps [U.S. forces] tied down and not available for use in Iran.” Iranian strategy throughout its time in Iraq demonstrates Iran’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with powers like the United States, and instead shows its use of asymmetric warfare to deter actors and guarantee regime survival by arming Shia proxy groups with mortars, grenades, and arms. Iran’s approach in Iraq is similar to its approach in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, and revolves around exploiting the conflict by funding and arming proxies, to deter regional actors threating to Iranian regime survival like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. 

Iran’s strategy in Yemen, like Iraq, has involved funding and arming Shia proxies to exploit an existing conflict, to deter regional actors like Saudi and UAE, the GCC states most hawkish toward Iran. The conflict in Yemen has its roots in the Arab Spring uprisings that forced Yemen President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to transfer power in 2011 to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Hadi has dealt with a variety of issues in Yemen including the Houthi movement run by Yemen’s Zaidi Shia Muslim minority. The Houthis took control of the Northern Province heartland of Saada province and later tried to take control of the entire country, forcing President Hadi to flee. Members of the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and other Sunni Arab states have begun a military campaign in Yemen to restore Hadi’s government, receiving intelligence and logistical support from the United States, the UK, and France. Iran’s IRCG and Quds Force have aided the Houthis, with Iranian missile and drones being used by the Houthis to threaten shipping near the Bab el Mandeb Strait and conduct attacks against land-based targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Located at the Southern end of the Red Sea between Yemen and Djibouti, the Bab el Mandeb Strait is strategically important as five million barrels of oil pass through the strait every day. Seth Jones, Director of the Transnational Threats Project, argues that, “Iran’s objectives in Yemen include retaining—and perhaps increasing—Iran’s influence along the Red Sea as well as weakening Saudi Arabia and the UAE.” 

The war in Yemen intensified in 2016 after increasing involvement of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran increased its aid to the Houthis providing, “anti-tank guided missiles, sea mines, aerial drones, 122-millimeter Katyusha rockets, Misagh-2 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), RDX high explosives, ballistic missiles, unmanned explosive boats, radar systems, and mining equipment.” The IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah provided training to the Houthis in Iran and Yemen. Iran’s strategy in Yemen mirrors its strategy in Iraq. While Iran did not start the conflict, it has taken advantage of it by aiding the Houthis, to weaken Saudi Arabia, Iran’s biggest threat within the GCC, and exhaust GCC states resources so Saudi Arabia and the UAE cannot turn to Iran next. Iranian strategy in Yemen involves creating regional security threats by funding proxies to tie down powers threating to Iranian regime survival, while avoiding direct conflict which Iran views as a lose-lose. 

Iran also deters regional actors and guarantees its freedom of action through its funding of the Hezbollah terror group and using Hezbollah to create security threats throughout the Gulf. Lebanon’s Hezbollah is the IRGC-QF’s chief partner. With the help of Iran, “Hezbollah has amassed a range of weapons and systems, such as the Fateh-110/M-600 short-range ballistic missile, Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 short-range ballistic missiles, Toophan anti-tank guided missiles, Kornet man-portable anti-tank guided missiles, M113 armored personnel carriers, T-72 main battle tanks, Karrar unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and Katyusha rocket launchers.” Additionally, because of Iran, Hezbollah’s armed droned capabilities are among the most advanced of any terror group, using such drones in Syria to destroy the Islamic State. Iran views Hezbollah as part of its “Axis of Resistance,” and continually uses Hezbollah to achieve its interest in the region. Even before Iran’s use of Hezbollah in Syria, Iran nurtured Hezbollah from very early on, and the state was instrumental in the 1983 bombings of U.S Marine barracks and embassy in Beirut. Data shows that prior to 9/11, “Hezbollah had killed more Americans than any other international organization.” Along with utilizing Hezbollah to achieve its anti-Israeli interests in the region, “One of Tehran’s objectives in Syria and Iraq has been to create a land bridge linking Iran to Hezbollah’s stronghold in south Lebanon and, by proxy, to the Lebanon-Israel border. Hezbollah and its supporters have been integral to this endeavor.” Iran’s use of Hezbollah is further evidence of Iranian strategy through terror financing to threaten GCC states, the U.S., and Israel to deter these powers while avoiding direct confrontation, which it views as a lose-lose. 

Iran’s Military Capabilities 

Apart from its use of terror and proxy groups, Iran is a threat to the region and GCC states through its asymmetric military capabilities mainly, its naval and missile forces. After years of sanctions, Iran, unlike its Gulf neighbors, has no choice but to dedicate itself to building up its military capabilities through domestic production and clandestine acquisition of key pieces of foreign military hardware.  Iran’s population of 82 million means it has an incredible amount of manpower to rely on. Iran has an estimated 534,000 active personnel in the army, navy, air force and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Apart from the Artesh, Iran’s conventional military power, “the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is Iran's elite military force responsible for protecting the Islamic regime from internal and external threats. A 125,000-man force, it also controls the paramilitary Basij militia, which has about 90,000 active members, and runs the foreign special operations Quds force.” Iran’s sheer size, man-power, and ruthless IRGC forces is a key reason why Iran’s military although not conventionally strong, poses a credible threat to GCC states.  

Iran’s two primary military means to inflict harm in the region are from its missile capabilities and its navy. According to the CSIS Missile Defense Project, “While Iran has not yet tested or deployed a missile capable of striking the United States, it continues to hone longer-range missile technologies under the auspices of its space-launch program. In addition to increasing the quantity of its missile arsenal, Iran is investing in qualitative improvements to its missiles’ accuracy and lethality.” Iran has gravitated towards focusing on new missile capabilities including moving towards solid fuel, precision and accuracy, and anti-ship (ballistic and cruise missiles. Iran has become a center for missile proliferation, aiding its proxies in Syria, Yemen, and supplying it chief terror group, Hezbollah, to weaken Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and its allies. The CSIS missile defense project holds that, “Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, with thousands of short-and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles capable of striking as far as Israel and southeast Europe. Missiles have become a central tool of Iranian power projection and anti-access/ anti-denial capabilities in the face of U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council naval and air power in the region. Ballistic missiles are essential to Iran’s defensive and deterrent strategy and have been ever since Iran used Scud- B missiles to attack Iraq, stunning Saddam Hussein. 

After the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, Iran sought to increase its missile capabilities after seeing how useful they were to its defense in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran turned to North Korea and China for its missile capabilities, purchasing 200-300 Scud-B and -C missiles, with the -C missiles having enough of a range to threaten GCC states and its U.S. allies throughout the region. In the 1990s, Iran turned again to North Korea, allowing it to purchase more missiles with the capability to target Turkey, Israel and the western part of Saudi Arabia. Iran also perfected its Shahab-3 missiles, now called Ghadr, increasing its range by 1,600km, which can be used to threaten any of Iran’s regional adversaries, reaching as far as Israel. Additionally, Iran has spent the last decade moving its missile-development efforts away from focusing on increasing range, to enhancing the precision of its missiles.  In line with Iran’s need to develop precision and accuracy missile capabilities, the state has been working on the development of the Fateh-110, a semi-guided rocket, and has been trying to perfect this for the past twelve years. Despite however an improvement in accuracy, the first generation on Fateh-110 lacks the precision to consistently strike military targets. The Fateh-110’s range is limited to 200-250km. The only countries that are reachable for the Fateh-110 are Kuwait, and portions of Iraq and the UAE. The later development of the Fateh-313, still cannot reach most targets in Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the western portion of the UAE. Despite their current lack of missile precision, this is likely to change as, “…development of the Fateh-110 family of missiles, including the optically guided anti-ship Khalij Fars and the anti-radar Hormuz systems, as well as the Fateh-313, suggests that Iran seeks to produce and field highly accurate missiles capable of shaping the outcome of future military conflicts.” Experts estimate that based on the time it took other countries to develop precision-guided ballistic missiles with a range greater than 300km, Iran will not develop this before 2025. Iran also lacks a targeting and damage assessment missile capability, as evidenced in June 2017 when Iran launched seven Zolfaqar missiles against ISIS in Syria. Only two of the missiles landed in the suspected areas. Despite the missile’s poor performance, Iran proved it was capable of flying surveillance drones over above the suspected target and relaying this information to distant launch crews. 

In recent years Iran has focused on developing missile precision, not long-term range. Senior Fellow for Missile Defense at IISS, Michael Elleman, states that, “The ‘mosaic defense’ strategy, authored by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), establishes three asymmetric operational tactics to impede conventional military advances by an attacker: proxies provide a forward-based fighting force; guerrilla warfare at sea threatens enemies and impedes a navy-supported invasion; and the implicit threat of extraterritorial attacks with ballistic missiles deters adversaries.” Iran’s arsenal of lethal ballistic missiles encompasses all three approaches to Iran’s asymmetric warfare. Heavy artillery rockets and short-range missiles would be capable of denying an enemy access to Iranian territory along its borders. Short and medium range missiles would threaten the security of key ports servicing the navies of GCC states and their allies like the United States. Iranian ballistic missiles could also strike airfields critical to the operations of Gulf States and the United States, if their missiles struck with precision. Also, assuming Iran develops accurate and precise missiles, Iran could use these missiles to strike key military and civilian infrastructure, such as targeting the UAE’s desalination plants, which would cause a majority of the country’s water to vanish. The GCC and its allies should focus on developing a strategy to counteract the effects of Iranian missiles should Iran develop highly accurate ballistic missiles and technologies like real-time targeting and damage-assessment capabilities.

Iran’s naval capabilities are a significant challenge, characterized by distributed firepower through the use of small boats and fast attack capabilities, and anti-access, area denial capabilities. Iran has developed its navy by procuring modern mines and anti-ship missiles, and many small boats, fast attack crafts, and midget submarines. Iran operates several classes of submarines including the Russian produced Kilo craft, the North Korean designed and indigenously produced Ghadir submarines, and Iranian designed and produced Qaaem, Fateh, and Nahang boats.  Iran wants to maintain its ability to influence the maritime environment and to that end they have, “invested significantly in asymmetric capabilities, including hundreds of lethal small craft and a network of coastal-defense cruise missiles, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can potentially support the accurate targeting of adversary naval forces.” Iran’s navy seeks to maintain influence in the Gulf, especially in the Straits of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. The Straits of Hormuz are incredibly important as 30 to 35 percent of the world’s oil passes through them. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the straits upon imposition of U.S. oil sanctions. Despite these credible threats, Iran is not a maritime force capable of operating globally and has only ever roamed as far as China and South Africa.

 Retired Vice Admiral John Miller reinforces this idea arguing, “The IRGCN has been built specifically for its primary purpose: protecting the regime. The force has achieved most regime goals effectively and at relatively low cost by mass producing small, fast craft. These vessels can be used to swarm larger boats, deploy small numbers of troops ashore and to oil platforms, plant mines, patrol the Strait of Hormuz and harass commercial ships.” Iran’s current naval capabilities consist of protecting the state of Iran and its regime and protecting Iranian interests in the Gulf, acting as a maritime presence strong enough to limit or deny access of foreign powers to the Straits of Hormuz, and supplying Iranian proxies in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. If Iran wants to remain a threating naval force however, the navy will have to modernize as most of their ships are 38 years old. Iran has produced two ships since 2006, which are equipped with “SM-1 anti-aircraft missiles; Noor anti-ship missiles; torpedoes and a helicopter for anti-submarine warfare; a 76mm multi-purpose gun; and several smaller caliber guns for point defense. The ships’ ability to operate helicopters suggests that they are also able to operate UAVs for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as over-the-horizon targeting.” Despite the development of these two ships, Iran is unlikely to develop a navy that would allow it to operate global waters as Tehran is unlikely to afford these capabilities.  Moving forward, Iran will seek to maintain freedom of action within the Gulf, and will commit some funds to growing the capabilities of their navy and, “It is possible, if not likely, that Iran will gain access to unmanned, high-speed, explosive-laden surface craft supported by armed UAVs that provide over-the-horizon targeting and ISR. The country may also acquire modern smart mines that can be covertly deployed – and whose deployment only becomes known when a ship strikes one.” Iran’s navy is one of their most threating capabilities, and the GCC states and its allies should make sure to cooperate together to ensure maritime stability in the Middle East. 

In February 2019, Iran posed a new maritime threat to Gulf security after their claims to have successfully launched an anti-ship cruise missile from an indigenously produced submarine. The launch of this missile poses an increased risk to any ships sailing in the Gulf. Iran claims to have launched a Nasr-1 anti-ship missile from a Fateh submarine. This is concerning as, “the Nasr-1 has a range of about 30km and can cripple ships of up to about 1,500 tonnes, such as a corvette or coastal merchant ship.” The claim of Iran to have launched an anti-ship missile from a submarine is threatening to Gulf security, especially as Iran has been subject to years of international sanctions designed to limit its military capabilities, yet it has apparently managed to accomplish this military feat. 

Iran’s navy and ballistic and cruise missle powers characterized by small boats and fast attack capabilities, and anti-access, area denial capabilities pose a credible threat, but unlike the GCC nations, Iran lacks the wealth and access to acquire advanced weaponry from the U.S. and Europe. For that reason, Iran has developed its asymmetric powers by supplying its proxy and terror groups with it ballistic and cruise missiles, and using its naval powers to transport weaponry to its proxies. The civil war in Syria has especially allowed Iran to utilize its military threats by training, arming, and deploying its Shia foreign legion to defend the Assad regime, while trying to have as few Iranian ground troops in Syria as possible, to minimize direct conflict. An article examining Gulf Security after 2020 argues that Iranian action in Syria is because, “many in Tehran saw the uprising against the Assad regime as part of a US–Saudi–Israeli conspiracy to undermine the ‘Axis of Resistance’, whose core members are Iran, Hezbollah and Syria. The war threatened both the survival of the Assad regime and Tehran’s air bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon.” Iran has created a legion of Shia fighters recruited from Hezbollah, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to fight in the Syrian war. Iran has deployed as few ground troops as possible to protect the Syrian regime, with data showing Iran has 1,500 troops in Syria. Iran has tried to give most of the war fighting burden to its “Shia foreign legion,” to minimize risk and direct conflict. Director of the Washington Institute’s Military and Security Studies Program argues that, “Iran knows – based on bitter experience and observation of US campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan – how costly and difficult it can be to end a war. As a consequence, Tehran seeks to avoid conventional wars at almost any cost.” Iran has sought to protect its allies or its Axis of Resistance- the Hezbollah and the Syrian regime but aims to do so with as little risk to the state itself as possible. It has therefore trained and armed a Shia foreign legion to deploy in Syria and carry the brunt of the war, while Iran guarantees its survival by minimizing direct conflict with conventional powers. 

Iran uses its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities to pose a military threat by arming its proxies around the region. Iran has become a center for missile proliferation, aiding its proxies in Syria, Yemen, and supplying it chief terror group, Hezbollah, to weaken Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and its allies. Iran has also used its naval powers to supply Iranian proxies in Yemen. Reports of the IRGC using “waters further up the Gulf between Kuwait and Iran as it looks for new ways to beat up an embargo on arms shipments to fellow Shi’ites in the Houthi movement.” Iran supports security threats around the Gulf by utilizing its military capabilities, to arm and move weaponry around the region to its various proxies, deterring regional actors while avoiding direct confrontation with conventional powers.

Iran’s Intelligence Capabilities 

Lastly, Iran poses a threat to GCC states through its use of its intelligence forces. The IRGC has a large intelligence operation with 5,000 men in the IRGC assigned to unconventional warfare. Additionally, the IRGC has a special Quds force that plays a big role in giving Iran the ability to conduct asymmetrical warfare overseas through its use of proxies. The Quds force have supported Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Shia militias in Iraq, Hamas, Syria, and Yemen. Chairman of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman explains how, “The Quds troops are divided into specific groups or “corps” for each country or area in which they operate. There are Directorates for Iraq; Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula…” Iran’s Al Quds force is one of their strongest capabilities and is the Iranian intelligence unit designed to specialize in unconventional, asymmetric warfare, that exploits existing conflicts overseas though their use of proxy groups. The Quds force has allowed Iran to meddle in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and keep close ties with Lebanon’s Hezbollah. 

Iran’s Quds force poses an intelligence threat by dispersing propaganda throughout the region, which has been especially evident in the case of Saudi Arabia. Iran has utilized the Shia population in Saudi Arabia to foment unrest within Saudi. Although Saudi’s population is only 10% Shia, the Shia are concentrated in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. After the Iranian Revolution and fall of the Shah, Iran’s new ruler, Ayatollah Khomeini, the first Supreme Leader of Iran, criticized Saudi Arabia for having pro-Western ties. Khomeini further provoked Saudi Arabia by criticizing Saudi of being an unfit guardian of the holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina, and questioned Saudi Arabia’s Islamic religious legitimacy. Some of the Shia population in Saudi began to speak on behalf of Khomeini and from 1979-80, Shia and Saudi security forces fought in the Eastern province. Iran has long engaged in a political, propaganda war with Saudi Arabia, creating security crises within the Saudi state, by exploiting the discontentment within Saudi’s Shia population. 

Iran also succeeded in fomenting unrest in Saudi in the Eastern province in the Arab Spring of 2011-2012 with the eastern province witnessing, “continuous, low-level unrest in an unending cycle of detentions, shootings, and demonstrations”. In a Sunni dominated country, the Shia population of Saudi Arabia have faced discrimination, but the unrest in Saudi from 2011-2012 can also be attributed to Iranian covert action. Iran used propaganda to exploit the discontentment of the minority sect in Saudi, to pose create a security threat within the borders of Saudi Arabia and engage in a propaganda war. The Arab Spring uprisings provided the perfect opportunity for Iran’s intelligence forces to covertly stoke unrest across the region, using the same propaganda through its intelligence capabilities to foment unrest in Bahrain’s Shia population. 

GCC Conventional Capabilities  

Despite these threats, the GCC states have numerous conventional advantages over Iran’s military capabilities with their, “modern and effective weapons available from the U.S. and Europe and would be supported by the U.S., Britain, and France in any serious warfighting contingency.” Additionally, the Gulf states far outspend Iran in regard to military expenditures. Data estimates that Arab GCC states spent $95 to $128 billion on military forces in 2017. Iran is estimated to have spent $15 to $16 billion. Iraq, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have spent more than 10 percent of their economies on military forces. Although the UAE and Qatar have provided no official data on their military spending, it is likely they also spent more than 10 percent, driven especially by the UAE’s fighting of the war in Yemen. Overall the Arab Gulf states spent 11.3 times more than Iran has spent, due to the constraining of Iranian military modernization efforts after years of imposed sanctions. 

Apart from the GCC having more major weapons in most areas of conventional arms, the GCC weapon systems are far more modern and efficient than Iran’s with “close examination of Iran’s land, air, and sea-based military modernization efforts reveal that key Iranian force systems are obsolete, obsolescent, or of relatively low quality. Many systems date back to the Shah or were worn during the Iran-Iraq War.

With weapon systems far more modern than Iran’s, the GCC has the advantage of buying high-tech weapon systems for its allies like the United States. In 2013, Abu Dhabi bought Patriot missile batteries as well as two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries. Saudi Arabia is also incredibly well off, possessing the biggest and oldest missile defense capabilities. Today the Saudi’s has numerous capabilities including Hawk surface-to-air missiles (MIM 23B I-Hawk and MIM J/K Hawk) and Patriot batteries, which include Pac-2 and Pac-3. Saudi and the UAE represent the bulk of military capabilities and defensive capabilities, possessing arsenal like missile defense capabilities. 

The GCC states with their spending significantly more on their military and having conventional military forces which are armed with much more modern and capable military hardware, still have been unable to affectively combat Iranian challenges, due to political differences between GCC states, and some states sharing more friendly relationships with Iran like Qatar. Iran has repeatedly tried creating instability in the GCC as evidenced in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and breaking up the unity of GCC states, as evidenced in Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar who have resisted the Saudi led call for greater regional integration. 

Exploiting Instability within the GCC

GCC states have faced a variety of security threats from “encroachment by Iran and Saudi Arabia to sweeping regional civil unrest.” Iran has increasingly exploited instability within GCC states, fomenting unrest whenever possible. Iranian strategy in Bahrain included exploiting the discontentment among Bahrain’s Shia population, using propaganda and arming Shia groups to create instability within the GCC. Bahrain is ruled by an Arab Sunni Royal family, but a majority of Bahrain’s population are Shia and have faced discrimination for their religious differences with Sunnis. Like in Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring came to Bahrain and demonstrations in February 2011 by Shia protestors were viewed by Bahrain’s royals and Sunni as a Shia uprising. Like Saudi, “the Bahraini authorities, plus the Saudis and Emiratis, saw an Iranian hand in these protests.” Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent troops to Bahrain in March of 2011 to help Bahrain squash the protests with force. As the situation escalated, “some radical elements of Bahrain’s Shia community have indeed sought some clandestine assistance from Iran.” Iran used its intelligence capabilities to exploit grievances in Bahrain’s Shia population, and later escalated the situation by arming Shia groups, in effort to ignite GCC instability and break up the unity within the GCC. This has proved an effective tactic for Iran as Bahrain still struggles with Iranian backed Shia groups within its population with reports released on April 16 stating a court in Bahrain had sentenced 139 people to prison and revoked the citizenship of all but one. The people were accused of “setting up a cell linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Bahrain has accused Iran of fomenting unrest among its Shia community since 2011, and Iran has continued this practice if effort to create instability within GCC states. 

When the Arab Spring came to Egypt, like it did to Bahrain and Saudi, the event started the pull away of Qatar from the GCC. Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt showed that its foreign policy revolved around building ties with groups and actors throughout the region including Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Taliban, which Qatar views as allies to increase its influence throughout the region. In 2011 relations between GCC started to fracture when Qatar supported the Arab Spring Uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by supporting Muslim Brotherhood member, Mohammed Morsi, who briefly came into power. In 2014, Qatar continued its support of such groups and gave its support to the Muslim Brotherhood again and Salafi extremists in Syria. These actions stood out as Qatar’s main “foreign policy pivots” in the year 2014. Senior Analyst Aida Arosoaie stated, “While the Saudis and its close allies perceive the Muslim Brotherhood to be a direct threat to their domestic security, Qatar has generously extended it support for conflicts occurring from Libya to Egypt, and from Tunisia to Syria.” 

After the Qatar rift in 2017, Qatar-Iran relations grew increasingly stronger. The rift occurred between Qatar and GCC states when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE formed a blockade around Qatar and submitted thirteen demands to the state, holding that Qatar supported terrorism. Although the GCC demanded that Qatar sever ties with Iran, Iran was quick to offer support offering Qatar use of its airspace and supplied food in order to prevent food shortages occurring as result of the blockade. The GCC remains at odds with Qatar to this day, and Iran’s asymmetrical strategy to break up GCC unity has proven to be effective. After the Qatar rift, “there has been greater cooperation between Qatar, Iran and Turkey. In November 2017, they signed a transportation pact to boost trilateral trade, with Iran connecting the other two countries.” Qatar’s desire to maintain a close relationship with Iran is echoed in Qatar’s Prime Minister Hamad Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani statement that, “Qatar will not allow any country to interfere in its relations with Iran.” 

GCC members Oman and Kuwait have also demonstrated the breaking apart of the GCC over Iranian foreign policy. Smaller GCC states Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait have long resisted the Saudi led call for regional integration, repeatedly disagreeing with Saudi’s desire for an aggressive Iranian stance. In 2017, Iranian President Rouhani visited Kuwait in February 2017, stating that “there are vast potentials for deepening and cementing relations between Iran and Kuwait.” Oman has also maintained a friendly relationship with Iran, and in 2017 was the only GCC country not to downgrade it relations with Iran. The war in Yemen has further created disunity between Oman and its GCC counterparts. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have formed a Saudi led coalition to defeat the Houthis, Oman has faced international criticism for its position regarding the war in Yemen. In September 2016, weapons smuggled through Oman, meant for Houthi rebels, were intercepted in Yemen. Oman has used its various close ties to mediate between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, choosing not to join its GCC counterparts in the Saudi led coalition against Iranian- backed Houthis. 

Hybrid and asymmetrical warfare are especially effective for states who are overmatched by the conventional forces of their foes, as is the case for Iran when facing the modern militaries of the GCC. Iran poses a credible security, military, and intelligence threat through its use of proxy groups, its ballistic and cruise missiles and its distributed naval firepower which utilizes small boats and fast attack capabilities, and its intelligence capabilities through the channels of its Quds force. Iranian strategy combines using propaganda, funding and arming proxy groups throughout the region, while avoiding direct conflict, to deter regional actors and ensure its freedom of action in the region. GCC states have numerous advantages over Iran with their modern and efficient weapon systems to include modern airframes and missile defense systems, their ability to significantly outspend Iran on military hardware, and their allies like the United States and Europe. Despite these advantages, Iran’s strategy of creating GCC instability and breaking up GCC unity has proven to be effective in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and Oman, Kuwait and Qatar. While Iran poses credible asymmetric threats to the GCC and its allies, perhaps its most dangerous capability is the slow burn of the political threat to member states of the GCC. If Iran continues to break up GCC unity, this could very well pose an existential threat, making the future of the GCC, non-existent. 

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The Eastern European Paradox

By Kavya Singh

Often to be European is to be simply a collection of values. Enshrined in the foundation of the European Union, the values of democracy, liberalism, freedom, respect for human rights, and the rule of law are conveyed to transcend national identities. In a portrait of what it is to be European, the rest of the world is knowledgeable to drawing a landscape that is limited to tea, the Eiffel tower, football, and royalty. Yet, to Europeans, their homeland is built by many national heroes and moments, despite its history of creating and being unable to escape the bloodshed. However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the psychological and physical gap between Western and Eastern Europe still rages. Author, Dragomir Draganov, predicted well in his newspaper opinion article for Trud (a Bulgarian newspaper for trade unions) published on 14th November 1989, “From now on, people will talk much more about the division than has been the case until now”, he is right in his sentiments as the eastern side scrambles to rise out of the shadows of its western frenemies, who have launched unto their peaks, marking the invisible division deeper into the ground.

As once, one East German visiting West Berlin in 1988 was quoted saying, "The streets don't look any different than in [East Berlin district] Prenzlauer Berg. Sure, the shops are more colourful, and the selection is much bigger. But at home, on the other side, I have my work, a nice apartment, a kindergarten spot for Nicole.” In the contemporary world, nothing much has changed except fully-fledged capitalism has taken over the entirety of Germany as well as Poland and embody a picture-perfect version of Europe that often the West cites as a success of their involvement. 

Yet the differences between are huge in terms of both, economic and political attributes. This paper focuses on the reasons of failure as to why Eastern Europe (some many more than others) failed to prosper citing three main arguments of intergenerational politics, ethnic mix, and western behavior. It further discusses and heavily focuses on its consequences from a broader perspective as illiberal democracies rise and present the paradox that the East faces.

Though many use the former Soviet bloc as Eastern Europe, since the geographical context, in this case, is abstract, this paper recognizes the United Nations Statistics Division of Europe. Hence, Eastern Europe comprises of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, as well as the republics of Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. 

“Why have we not made it?” Eastern Europe’s Dilemmas

The divergence of Eastern Europe from its counterparts is open to popular interpretations based on religious, historical or economic fronts. Many researchers and experts who have travelled across eastern Europe believe that Poland has ‘made it’ as it becomes one of the strongest regional economies. Many others have successfully lobbied and achieved EU membership yet, the affluence hasn’t reached all. This section refutes the argument that ‘looking west’ would lead to better times for the Eastern European front. It draws three elements from spheres of life to bring to light deeper issues that could be crippling their box-office success story.

1. Politics: Domestic and Intergenerational

Living Better?

In a survey led by Open Media Research Institute in 1995 with voters from 12 countries from Central and Eastern Europe, at least 80% from 10 countries had voted for a free market economy or a mixed one, the only outliers being Ukraine and Russia. Furthermore, in all countries, more people had thought that economic reforms had rolled out too slowly and in the Slavic trio of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, more than 90% of the people said they had become worse off now than a year or so before. In regarding this as the true will of the people, it would be fair to assume that citizens would be inclined to vote for leaders who were not ex-communists and were favourable towards forging better relations with the EU, i.e., leaning west. Yet, in 1996, in Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma was elected president (former head of the Communist Party) who though won based on his pro-market reforms, favoured stronger Russian relations. His Janus-faced reforms in the second term eventually led to the formation of oligarchy and labelled Ukraine as a semi-authoritarian regime. Whereas in Belarus, President Lukashenko, who should have been up for re-election, had been allowed to extend his term for an additional two years based on a referendum. Almost 25 years later, he still serves as the President and retains a Soviet-era symbolism in his decision-making. 

So why did the temptation to restructure the economy overcome the concerns about such ‘dodgy’ leaders?

One of the most convincing explanations to this can be based on the argument by Sachs that elections (if they are even held and fair) are “not referendums on the virtues of capitalism but contests dominated by interest groups” based on the ultimate prize: the social safety net. Reformed Communist leaders have led successful campaigns to increase the provisional welfare state and this has earned them brownie points with the older generation, as a bigger amount moves to live off pension. Since 1989, social expenditure in the cases of early-income support, retirement, and health care programs has seen an increase in Eastern Europe but with rising inflation and a decline in GDP, it has led to a serious deterioration in living and movement below the poverty line. In terms of Sachs again, “Much of social spending has gone to buy off an entire generation - those of 45 or older who have had the toughest time adjusting to capitalism.” 

Living Differently?

 In a survey led by Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2009 with voters from 6 countries from the former Soviet bloc, the results offer a contrasting view. The similar end of communism that was cheered in 19991, is riddled with reservations about democracy and capitalism. This is consistent with the argument that capitalism has given rise to the elitism, making ordinary people worse off. Furthermore, in the case of age gaps, the younger ages were more inclined towards a shift to the western ideals however since, a big amount of the youth from these countries move across borders for a freedom of opportunity, their voices have diminished due to the presence of an older generation which is burdened with memories of the past. 

In simpler words, they tend to vote for leaders who will offer them a life in comfort and these leaders, by the means of populist nationalism, cannot help themselves by pulling strings to stay in power. Hence, presenting the first Eastern European paradox: voting for ex-communists while shopping till they drop.

1. Ethnicity, Minorities and Linguistic Divides

Echoes of torture and lives lost 

As the pathway between Europe and Asia, millions of traders, nomads, migrants, and armies have walked the lands of Eastern Europe since history could be remembered. It is compilation of complex ethnic groups who share various beliefs and strive for the recognition they have struggled for their entire lives. As Huntington put it, “clash of civilisations” was inevitable to occur as ideologies for each minority differed and given Eastern Europe’s track record, is rightly known as an ethnic checkerboard as cultural crossroads clash along the lines of ethnic cleansing and torturous agendas. 

Thanks to Hitler, who manifested the complete destruction of ethnic groups as the goal of a state, and his megalomaniacal effort that wiped away nearly 12 million people from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia post WWII. Over the years, the “Hungarian problem” in Czech which was handled by Stalin’s consent, Yugoslavia’s degeneration into a crimson pool of wars, killings within Russia’s own borders, and as other horrors filled the beautiful tapestry of Eastern Europe, it broke down the sizable minorities in specific countries to almost zero. Though no one may ever accept it due to its ultimate disgrace to humanity, this allowed the countries with huge majorities to soar better in establishing democracies and economic reforms since catering to minorities was off the charts. Poland, Hungary, and to an extent, the Czech Republic had an easier time as compared to Romania or Bulgaria, who saw sizable minorities of Hungarians and Turks respectively still alive within its borders. 

Look the same but ‘sound’ funny!

Similarly, in the case of Ukraine, linguistic divide draws an imaginary line across the country and political spectrum. The Russian speaking vote different, think different, feel different and in sharp contrast, have a different understanding of their heritage and identity as to the Ukrainian speaking population. Hence, every vote cast is on the grounds of the identities they belong to, making it broken and harder to emerge from deadlock as one united state.

1. Western Behaviour

Mirror, mirror on the wall, who’s the evilest of them all?

Often there is misconception that Eastern Europe is one bloc (basically Russia) that opposes the West when in reality, Eastern Europe is in itself a complex maze with fault lines and as many states see EU membership as the ultimate win of their journey, the West’s orientation and support is critical. It would be expected that the West would embrace the idea of creating more democracies and trade as a purposeful way to shove it into China and Russia’s face, yet the enthusiasm is sluggish and inadequate and often times, comes off as an act of superiority that they love to uphold as tradition. In the case of Ukraine, it can be argued that one of the reasons why presidents turn to Russia is because the West is unwilling and unmotivated to give them a seat at the elders’ table. Similarly, it can be seen from the paradoxical stance that Russia’s presents – it is highly unwelcomed, its values interpreted as different, and always bullied so it did exactly what kids sometimes do – it became a bully to others, blackmailing and preventing its former territories to walk into a deal that could make them better off so it isn’t hated alone or all by itself . 

Another aspect of the West that is discouraging is the policy of selective engagement. Though it hails humanitarian intervention, promotes Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ideals and stands on frontlines of most battles, embodying a realist perspective, it only does what is right for itself. As Ash (1997) writes,

“This was particularly true of Western Europe, which fiddled over the Treaty of Maastricht while Sarajevo began to burn. Within its sluggish response, the West certainly favoured some. This favouritism, and particularly the carrots of NATO and European Union membership, have clearly helped the transformation in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic Without those manipulative, post-communist politics, the ethnic divisions would not have turned into open sores or, in the case of Yugoslavia, to rivers of blood. Precisely because the West was, alas, more reacting than acting, what made the crucial difference to these former communist countries was the quality of the domestic politics - and, of course, the way in which those politics were sold in the West.” 

Though the West may not all be a bad guy, in this story, it isn’t a superhero either. At the end of the day, prosperity is the end goal and the myth that accession of post-communist countries could obstruct EU development and result in fragmentation is outdated as well as refutable by any aspect of higher economic returns, creating an ‘ever closer union’, and building a deeper identity. 

Which European are you?

Another aspect that hinders Eastern Europe’s incorporation in the EU is the interpretation of the institution’s history and perception itself. To the West, it is a collective effort that stemmed out of the WWII, a battle against fascism and a war that will always haunt Europe. However, to the East, it is a guarantee of safety against tyrants, protection of democracy, freedom from corruption, and sound institutions. This emotion is what distinguishes East from West. It is the fact that will create an ‘in’ vs ‘out’ group feeling, mark the demise of any agreement, and hence the feeling of any hope.

“Where to next?” Legacy of the Past

Eventually, the relations between, within, and outside of these countries have severe implications relevant to all and the future of Europe. This is being realised as over the past couple of years, global scenario has changed as Zakaria’s prophecy of ‘illiberal democracies’ turns to reality, budding particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Being hailed as the biggest crisis of liberalism, an anti-western ethos is standing on the porches of democracy and its presence is asking a big question: what went wrong?

Fake it till you make it 

The history for these states begins in 1989, after the fall of Berlin Wall and the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the East was independent: broken but free. Contrary to perceived notions of utopia, this period was marked with nervousness. The race to join the West had just begun, and the East, seeing the joyous sophistication that came from embracing liberalism, followed the alleyway, apprehensive but with the optimistic idea that in the next 10 years or so, they will be happy too. Yet, as Hungarian sociologist Elemér Hankiss observed: 

“People realised suddenly that in the coming years, it would be decided who would be rich and who would be poor; who would have power and who would not; who would be marginalised and who would be at the centre. And who would be able to found dynasties and whose children would suffer.”

And that is where it went all downhill. Soon, the ‘imitation’ game wasn’t a win-win basis at all. In order to be normal, Eastern Europe had forgone its originality and the effects on its moral psyche were devastating. It continued to drown in the feelings of inferiority, dependency, debt, identity crisis, and nothingness. Realising that they had willing walked into the colonial project of Westernisation, to justify and shake off the deep-seated humility, rose xenophobia, authoritarian regimes, and chauvinism . Apparently, they learnt our truth: we weren’t all living wealthily or cheerfully either and most importantly, that they had been duped by the shattered ideology that was so cunningly wrapped in pretty pastel illusions.

Hence, 30 years later; as Turkey, Hungary, and Poland backslide on the Western model and reshape the eurozone; the bittersweet reality of 1989 is that the liberal, democratic chants of “we the people” have in a surprising turn of events turned populist, aligned to the far right, and become more conservative. Feffer (2018) writes critically, 

“for the World War II generation in Eastern Europe, communism was the god that failed. For the current generation in the region, liberalism is the god that failed.”

Is old the new black?

The above narrative, in a nutshell, brings the final paradox to this: to be prosperous, Eastern Europe wants to be a part of the EU which is built on the ever-ringing foundations of liberalism and democracy but also rejects those very ideals as it brings less prosperity. 

As the European topography pivots to laments of moving to their older way of life, the consequences are unknown and unventured. For the first time, the truth is out there, an untethered generational voice rises to echo the anger, the rage of simply having had enough with reforms that are further dividing the continent than integrating it under the pretense of making lives better. For the European Union’s liberal project to become attractive again and for Europe to catch its second breath, they must restructure the institution and form a new dialogue with engagement and care for all while fully taking into account the psychology of each country. Whether the EU moves the world into a new world order or shifts the frame back to older times, they have to figure it out together. Eastern Europe plays a critical role in deciding if the heart of Europe is big enough for all of them.

A new phoenix

Bearing in mind the immense intergenerational differences of the European population, interestingly, a timid voice breaks through under the thick canopy that covers Eastern Europe. Optimism is rare in the young cohort, but it is there. It is mobile, driven, and most importantly, asking for a way life that they can pass onto their children. Many are moving away from the perceptions their parents built and each voice is changing the dynamics of the political community: it is no longer about being Western or Eastern, it is now about on whose behalf we talk, about how we describe the society we want to belong in. 

Spectre of Tomorrow

Drawing to a close, this paper agrees with Krastev & Holmes (2019) assessment that 

“The ultimate revenge of the Central and East European populists against Western liberalism is not merely to reject the “imitation imperative,” but to invert it. We are the real Europeans, […] and if the West wants to save itself, it will have to imitate the East.”

The East is no less European to the West, it is equal; nothing less and nothing more. Each state is constantly revamping its own history, nationalistic attachment, and identity. For the Eastern Europeans, they have struggled to live up to the domineering Western ideals and are on a journey to find their own way of living. This is in contrast to most of Europe, who ventured out to other lands to actually find and then impose their gentlemanliness. So, maybe the Eastern ideology of self-discovery is not entirely wrong. If the ideals of liberalism and democracy could withstand the tiring trials of time and humanity, they will soon find their way into the not-yet discovered Eastern model. As Orbán famously said in a speech in July 2017, “Twenty-seven years ago here in Central Europe we believed that Europe was our future; today we feel that we are the future of Europe.” 

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The Unfortunate Truth Behind Where Our Waste Ends Up

By Jordan Bailey

What would modern life be without plastics? According to the World Economic Forum, plastic production has skyrocketed over the last 50 years, growing from 16.5 million tons in 1964 to 343 million tons in 2014. But with this huge rise of plastic manufacturing comes immense negative impacts of improper or insufficient waste management, most of which affects impoverished nations that don’t have the economic stability to fix the problem. 

Mass consumption of plastics in the United States only started a little less than 70 years ago, with the first major commercial plastic spray bottle kicking off disposable consumerism. From there, single-use plastics began to make their mark in the United States, with many corporations such as Coca-Cola switching from glass bottles to plastic ones because of the significant decrease in manufacturing costs. As the demand for mass consumerism increased, so did the demand for disposables, which in turn has created a massive waste management issue within the US. According to a 2018 United States Census Bureau report, 32% of single-use plastics end up in the ocean, with the other 78% of US plastic production being shipped to developing countries with poor waste management. The worst part is, almost all the exported plastic that is being shipped overseas is also being counted as “recycled” by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia accept more than 429 shipping containers of US waste every single day. This creates substantial environmental and economic issues for these countries, but many developing nations will still accept plastic waste because of the short-term economic gains that are associated with it. But even the short-term monetary benefits of accepting over 100,000 shipping containers of US waste annually will never equate to its long-term effects. 

So why does the United States send so much plastic overseas? According to Jenna Jambeck, an associate professor of engineering at the University of Georgia, it is more economical to push plastics out of the country rather than to recycle them. And with most of these developing countries trying to make a profit off of re-manufacturing US waste, no one is analyzing the underlying issues and massive risks in dumping all of this trash into these areas. “Plastic doesn’t just affect the oceans, it also pollutes the air and water on land – and it directly harms humans too,” Christine Cole said, a research associate at Loughborough University. “Poor waste management is linked to diseases or conditions such as diarrhea, cholera, respiratory illness, and eye and skin infections.” According to a WasteAid report, roughly 9 million people die every year from diseases linked to either mismanagement of waste or pollutants. 

Unfortunately, the United States is not the only developed nation sending waste to these countries. Places like the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Japan also send plastics overseas, with Canada and South Korea even going as far as re-exporting American waste. According to Jenna Jambeck’s study, “Plastic Waste Inputs from Land into Ocean,” high waste mismanagement rates are considered 5% and larger. Most of the developing countries that accept trash have mismanagement rates of more than 80%, with both Indonesia and Vietnam having over 85%. In turn, most of these regions are forced to dump trash into local waters, because of how unbearable the waste becomes for its citizens. According to the Ocean Conservancy, 60% of the plastic trash flowing into the seas originate from China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand. Areas like the Con Vanh Beach in Vietnam are completely littered and flooded with waste, damaging the local environment and making it impossible for citizens to enjoy their homes. 

There are several reasons why the United States as well as other developed countries should stop the exportation of waste into these regions, the first being the effects that plastic waste has had on the citizens. Many of these nations receive a huge flow of trash that flood their ports and docks. Citizens like Daniel Tay from Malaysia have pushed for import restrictions to help put an end to the overflow, but most developing countries have still failed to implement regulations on waste. The second reason why the US should stop shipping trash overseas is because many Americans don’t realize how big of a problem this really is. With less than 10% of plastics being recycled in the United States, almost all waste consumption is being pumped into these areas with little to no education about it. If the US is transparent about the volume of plastic waste that is consumed and produced within the country, American citizens will be able to recognize and acknowledge how prevalent an issue single-use plastics truly are. Another huge reason why the US should stop exporting waste is because of the need for legislation to strengthen within America’s recycling system. By sending so much plastic to developing countries, the need to develop a national recycling infrastructure gets neglected. The United States needs to take responsibility for how much trash is consumed within its borders, because if not, the amount of waste that is produced will not decrease, and will only cause more pain and devastation to the nations that are being used as America’s dumping grounds. 

With climate change becoming an increasingly more imperative issue, it is only fundamentally substantial to analyze the effects that waste consumption has on the environment and people. Because the longer we allow mass consumerism to manipulate and define our everyday lives, the longer we will allow our governments and multinational corporations to take advantage of impoverished nations and the natural environment that creates and makes up our world.