By Daniel Loud
It is no secret that over the past few years, Japan, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has taken several steps to become a stronger force in the Asian Pacific. Just in the past few months, there have been two major developments in Japan that seem to indicate a desire for a stronger military presence. First, the Japanese legislature passed a new Security Bill in October, allowing the largely demilitarized island nation to defend its allies even when it is not directly under attack. Second, Japanese Defense Ministry revealed the country’s first stealth fighter jet in January of this year. Both of these developments indicate a more outward military stance for Japan, which many citizens domestically and internationally identify as a necessary response to a more aggressive China. However, Japanese lawmakers and government officials have a long way to go before they can commit to a stronger military presence in the Pacific. Before any major steps can be taken in either direction by Japan, its government must first consider the many advantages and many challenges to building this presence.
Ideally, it would be helpful to understand the root cause by Japan’s desire for a stronger military role in the Pacific. What many believe to be the strongest stimulant for the Japanese military is in reality the threat of a more assertive China. In the past few years, China has made considerable claims in the East China Sea, bringing their presence very close to the southern end of the Japanese archipelago. Many analysts argue that to those in Tokyo who favor stronger armed forces, the immediate intention is to fend off Chinese advances approaching the Japanese islands. As China acts more aggressively in the East China Sea, many in the Japanese government have expressed desires to rely on their own strength, instead of that of the United States. When arguing in favor of October’s controversial security bill, Prime Minister Abe stressed a need to “lend substance” to the Pacific security framework mainly kept intact by the U.S. However, comments such as these indicate a stronger desire for Japan to take its security into its own hands in the face of Chinese advances.
If Japan were to decide on building a stronger presence in the Pacific, it would certainly be achievable. As one of the world’s strongest economies, all Japan needs to rival China is the willpower, as it certainly has the financial strength to do so. However, unavoidable repercussions include a restructuring of the budget and likely domestic backlash. Additionally, the idea of a stronger Japan has received widespread support from other Pacific powers, many of which have their own concerns over Chinese assertiveness or territorial claims that conflict with those of China. Japan has the immediate option of using a Vietnamese naval base, and already has the support from the Indonesian government if it chooses to build up domestic forces.
While Japanese military expansion would surely be possible, the government would face many obstacles in order to accomplish this goal effectively. To those living in a nation that has not experienced war in over 70 years, these difficulties may require unnecessary sacrifices or changes, as mentioned previously. The Japanese Constitution, drafted at the end of the World War II, provides many restrictions regarding military armament and build-up. The most well-known feature of this Constitution is Article 9, in which Japan gave up its right to declare war except in cases of self defense, and that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” As Prime Minister Abe has sought an expanded role for Japan on the international stage, this ideal of self-defense has become harder to maintain, and the security bill was most fiercely debated along these lines.
Beyond the obvious constitutional limits to Japanese militarization, there are a great many domestic obstacles that the Abe government will need to tackle before it can “lend substance” to the current Pacific military landscape. First of all, the new security bill was wildly controversial among the Japanese public, particularly among the elderly and conservative members of the public. This can only foretell future debates in Japan, where any further attempts by Abe to take a stronger military stance can only be expected to meet similar or increased pushback. Furthermore, it is questionable if Japan truly has the tools at its disposal right now to rival China (which, after all, is widely considered to be the goal of this proposed expansion). As it currently stands, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF), Japan’s armed forces, are not manned or equipped well enough to support any meaningful presence beyond the Japanese islands. While Prime Minister Abe has proposed a large increase in self-defense spending for the coming years, it is unlikely that these will fit into Japan’s budget. On top of this, China still can easily outspend Japan when it comes to the military. All of these factors may prove that Japan cannot actually mount a meaningful challenge to the threatening Chinese presence.
Although Shinzo Abe’s fear of a growing China and his desire to counter it are very understandable, it is unclear if Japan could truly rely on its own capabilities for defending itself. To truly challenge China, Japan would need to undergo what would essentially count as a complete military transformation, which at the moment does not have sufficient public or financial support. While many actors in the Pacific may meet a larger military role for Japan positively, this cannot occur yet. As it stands right now, Japan faces major risks of over-extension and constitutional roadblocks that could stop any progress immediately. Before Prime Minister Abe can continue with his mission to defend against China without the U.S., he and the rest of the Japanese government must truly weigh the pros and cons of a military buildup, and must build a solid foundation for any changes that may come.
Daniel Loud is a sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania.
