By Jenna Vigal
Introduction
Ukraine has a lengthy history of partnership with NATO dating back to the 1990’s. NATO leaders agreed at a 2008 summit that Ukraine would one day join the alliance, however the Ukrainian public did not support NATO membership, and Ukraine’s pro-Russian president at the time -- Viktor Yanukovich—never pursued it. Nonetheless, since 2008, Ukraine has taken part in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo[1]. Cooperation has increased since the Russian occupation of Crimea and Donbas, with NATO condemning the action and providing support to Ukraine.
Potential for Ukraine NATO Membership Increases
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on 10 March 2018 welcomed NATO’s mid-March recognition of Ukraine as an aspirant country, and he noted that Kiev’s next goal is to pursue a Membership Action Plan (MAP), according to Interfax-Ukraine[2].
· Poroshenko signed a decree on 24 September 2017 that stated Ukraine’s priority national interest is a strategic partnership with NATO, the EU, and the United States[3].
· Poroshenko stated in July 2017 that Ukraine would work on defense and anti-corruption reforms to meet NATO membership standards by 2020, according to a Reuter’s press report[4].
Poroshenko’s pursuit of NATO membership probably reflects growing public support for the move, particularly as the conflict in eastern Ukraine continues. Many Ukrainians see NATO as a way of protecting themselves from potential Russian aggression. According to a poll by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 69 percent of Ukrainians want to join NATO as compared to 28 percent support in 2012 when Yanukovich was in power[5].
Russian Opposition to Eastward NATO Expansion
Russia continues to oppose the eastward expansion of NATO, including the admission of Ukraine to the alliance. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 19 February 2018 argued that Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas as a result of NATO’s eastward expansion[6]. Additionally, after Ukraine announced its plans to meet NATO membership standards in 2020, Russia on 10 July 2017 quickly declared the prospect of NATO membership for Ukraine would not promote stability and security in Europe, according to a Reuters press report[7].
Reforms Initiated, But More Needs to be Done
Ukraine has promised to implement reforms that will tackle structural problems within its defense system and combat corruption, which NATO requires for membership.
Defense Reform:
Ukraine’s government is working on major structural defense reforms to ensure it meets NATO standards by 2020, including promoting civilian oversight of the armed forces, combat readiness, and equipment modernization.
Ukraine is incrementally incorporating civilians into the defense sector, albeit at a rate slower than what NATO desires. Ukraine largely preserved the Soviet-era tradition of having military professionals fill the higher ranks of the Military of Defense (MOD), but without a civilian cadre, the MOD is more likely to take a military approach rather than a political approach to solving security issues. Evidence for increasing civilian-military ties includes the decision by Ukraine’s Parliament on 19 March 2018 to alter the “On the National Security of Ukraine” to include the appointment of a civilian defense minister as of 1 January 2019[8].
Ukraine also is improving combat readiness and equipment modernization since the Russian occupation in eastern Ukraine, partly as a result of the increased defense spending. Military spending rose from 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product in 2013 to more than 5 percent of GDP in 2018, totaling around $6 billion[9].
· The Ukrainian armed forces grew from 157,000 in 2014 to 250,000 in 2018[10], making Ukraine the second-largest standing army in Europe, behind only Russia.
· In 2013, the armed forces did not train at the brigade or regimental level. In 2016, however, they logged 20 brigade-level exercises and 26 in 2017.
· Between 2014 and 2017, up to sixty fighters and aerial bombers were modernized or repaired.
Ukraine needs to further increase civilian control of the military, which is a provision of the five-year U.S.-Ukraine Partner Concept, and privatize the state-owned conglomerate of 130 defense companies, Ukroboronprom, which enjoys a de facto monopoly over Ukraine’s defense industry[11]. The NGO Transparency International describes current civilian control, including through relevant parliamentary committees, as “weak. [12]. Ukraine has completed only 30% of its planned reforms regarding Ukroboronprom, and will struggle to privatize the conglomerate because of its corrupt high-level officials[13].
Corruption Reform:
Ukraine is taking steps to tackle corruption, which is prevalent in the Ukrainian government and undermines the effectiveness of state institutions, the justice system, and international cooperation. NATO continuously stresses that addressing corruption is critical for Ukraine to join the alliance[14]. For example, 20 percent of all suspicious transactions reported by businesses to the Ukrainian authorities had a link to public officials in 2015, according to Transparency International[15]. Ukraine also ranked 130th among 180 countries in the 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index[16]
Ukraine to date has made minimal progress in advancing transparency. The country improved its score on the Corruption Perception Index in 2017 last year result by one point, with 30 points out of 100 (0 being highly corrupt). The Ukrainian National Anti-Corruption Bureau also forwarded the first corruption-related cases to courts where suspects were high-ranking officials in 2017[17]. And in October 2017, President Poroshenko signed legislation to establish an Anti-Corruption Court, however it it still has not been set up[18].
Ukraine will probably have trouble advancing corruption reform by the 2020 deadline because of the lack of its leadership’s political will to pass corruption legislation and the public’s low level of trust in Ukrainian judges and prosecutors. The most effective reform measure would likely be the formation of an Anti-Corruption Court. The necessity of this court has been recognized both domestically and internationally. On 28 Feb the IMF called the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Court "benchmark" of Ukraine's progress toward Western legal standards and said it would help ease the future release of IMF loans[19]. Additionally, the Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) stated that without the Anti-Corruption Court the activities of NABU will not be effective, because only the court decides whether the person is guilty or not[20].
Implications for the United States
Ukraine will most likely continue to look to the United States to provide military aid regardless of NATO membership status, especially as the conflict with Russia in eastern Ukraine escalates. Ukraine attaining NATO membership status in the midst of its conflict with Russia is likely to cause an Article 5 contingency, in which case the United States would need to provide support.
Providing Military Aid:
The Ukraine probably will continue to look to the US to provide lethal weapons to use in its conflict against Russia regardless of NATO membership status. The US can also expand and upgrades the military training program between American and Ukrainian troops to further Ukraine’s combat readiness and support its territorial integrity.
Continued US and NATO support probably would present a unified front against Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine. However, Russia is likely to view this as an escalation of the eastern Ukraine conflict on the part of Ukraine, and Moscow in response probably will increase its own military presence on the border.
Current NATO Membership Prospects Bleak, Hope for Future:
Ukraine is the only state that has experienced Russian hybrid warfare, and therefore would likely be a valuable resource to the NATO alliance. NATO forces remain concerned about a Russian invasion of the Baltic States. In 2014 Russian forces redeployed and reorganized in a way that would support a rapid mechanized invasion of Ukraine from both the north and east, while remaining well prepared to conduct a hybrid warfare intervention in the Baltics similar to what it did in Ukraine after the Maidan Revolution, according to a report by the Institute of the Study of War[21].
Even if Ukraine manages to implement the desired defense and corruption reforms and the conflict in eastern Ukraine is ongoing, then NATO will likely wait to approve a MAP, because NATO members would face a potential Article 5 contingency against Russia upon Ukraine’s entrance. The US would then need to decide whether to support Article 5 and contribute military troops.
If the United States advocates for Ukraine’s membership in the NATO alliance by supporting Ukraine’s request for a MAP, Russia is most likely to feel threatened by the eastward expansion of NATO and drastically escalate the conflict in eastern Ukraine. If the MAP is unsuccessful and Ukraine cannot deliver on promised anti-corruption and defense reforms, this move would damage our reputation and credibility among NATO allies and other NATO-aspirant countries.
Jenna Vigal is a student studying at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, where she is majoring in Political Science and Global Studies.
Sources
[1] Government Website; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine; Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO; http://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/euroatlantic-cooperation/ukraine-nato; 22 March 2018
[2] Online Newspaper; Interfax-Ukraine; Poroshenko hail’s NATO’s decision to grant Ukraine status of aspirant country; 10 March 2018; https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/poroshenko-hails-natos-decision-grant-ukraine-status-aspirant-country.html 12 March 2018
[3] Government Website; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine; Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO; http://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/euroatlantic-cooperation/ukraine-nato; 22 March 2018
[4] Online Newspaper; Pavel Polityuk and Natalia Zinets; Reuters; 10 July 2017; Pledging reforms by 2020, Ukraine seeks entrance into NATO; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-nato/pledging-reforms-by-2020-ukraine-seeks-route-into-nato-idUSKBN19V12V ; 13 March 2018
[5] Online Newspaper; Pavel Polityuk and Natalia Zinets; Reuters; 10 July 2017; Pledging reforms by 2020, Ukraine seeks entrance into NATO; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-nato/pledging-reforms-by-2020-ukraine-seeks-route-into-nato-idUSKBN19V12V ; 13 March 2018
[6] Onine Newspaper; Ukrainian Independent Information Agency for News (UNIAN); 19 February 2018; https://www.unian.info/politics/10012331-lavrov-blames-nato-for-russian-aggression-in-ukraine.html ; 11 March 2018
[7] Online Newspaper; Pavel Polityuk and Natalia Zinets; Reuters; 10 July 2017; Pledging reforms by 2020, Ukraine seeks entrance into NATO; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-nato/pledging-reforms-by-2020-ukraine-seeks-route-into-nato-idUSKBN19V12V ; 13 March 2018
[8] Online Newspaper; Natsya Stanko, Anna Tokhmakhchi & Ihor Shevchuk; Hromadske International; 3 March 2018; NATO Standards and Civilian Control: What Ukraine’s New Security Strategy is About; https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/nato-standards-and-civilian-control-whats-ukraines-new-security-strategy-about ; 27 March 2018
[9] Online magazine; Mykola Bielieskov; The National Interest; 27 February 2018; Ukraine’s Military is Back; http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ukraines-military-back-24674 ; 3 March 2018
[10] Online Periodical; Valeriy Akimenko; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 22 February 2018; Ukraine’s Toughest Fight: The Challenge for Military Reform; http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/22/ukraine-s-toughest-fight-challenge-of-military-reform-pub-75609 ; 5 March 2018
[11] Online Periodical; Valeriy Akimenko; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 22 February 2018; Ukraine’s Toughest Fight: The Challenge for Military Reform; http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/22/ukraine-s-toughest-fight-challenge-of-military-reform-pub-75609 ; 5 March 2018
[12] Online Periodical; Valeriy Akimenko; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 22 February 2018; Ukraine’s Toughest Fight: The Challenge for Military Reform; http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/22/ukraine-s-toughest-fight-challenge-of-military-reform-pub-75609 ; 5 March 2018
[13] Online Newspaper; Interfacx Ukraine; 26 March 2018; Bukin: Corporatization of Ukroboronprom should be thoroughly prepared, privatization amid military actions in Ukraine poses many risks; https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/interview/494706.html
[14] Online Newspaper; Brian Bonner; KyivPost; 10 July 2017; Stoltenberg to Ukraine’s Leaders: Want to join NATO? Fight corruption; https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/stoltenberg-ukraines-leaders-want-join-nato-fight-corruption.html ; 16 March 2018.
[15] NGO website; Max Heywood; Transparency International; 28 February 2018; Corruption and dirty money: the Ukrainian link; https://voices.transparency.org/corruption-and-dirty-money-the-ukrainian-link-15b4218318ee ; 10 March 2018
[16] Online Newspaper; Ukrainian Independent Information Agency for News; 22 February 2018; Ukraine most corrupt country after Russia; https://www.unian.info/society/10016660-ukraine-most-corrupt-country-in-europe-after-russia-ti.html ; 27 February 2018
[17] Online Newspaper; Ukrainian Independent Information Agency for News; 22 February 2018; Ukraine most corrupt country after Russia; https://www.unian.info/society/10016660-ukraine-most-corrupt-country-in-europe-after-russia-ti.html ; 27 February 2018
[18] Online Annual NGO Report; Freedom House; 2018; https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/ukraine 4 March 2018.
[19] Online Newspaper; RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty; 1 March 2018; Ukraine Moves Closer to Anti-Corruption Court, But Doubts Remain; https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-anticorruption-court-passes-first-reading/29070605.html ; 20 March 2018
[20] Online Newspaper; KyivPost; 8 February 2018; Sytynk: Launch of Anti-Corruption Court in Ukraine to become trial for Ukrainian authorities; https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/sytnyk-launch-anti-corruption-court-ukraine-2018-become-trial-ukrainian-authorities.html ; 23 March 2018
[21] Online Newspaper; Ukrainian Independent Information Agency for News; 8 March 2018; https://www.unian.info/politics/10035065-russia-positioned-for-short-notice-conventional-war-with-ukraine-study.html ; 12 March 2018
Image Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-nato-idUSKBN19V12V
