Distrust, Discourse, and Diplomacy: Pimachiowin Aki and Challenges for the Canadian Delegation in the World Heritage Committee

By: Andrew Vandenbussche

Canada has been consistently overlooked on the global stage and assumed to have nothing but good intentions in its domestic and foreign policy. Simultaneously, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (WHC) has garnered an international reputation as a vital organization dedicated to the important cause of conserving and preserving monuments of global significance. However, the nomination and inscription of Pimachiowin Aki, Canada’s first mixed cultural and natural World Heritage Site, reveals a more complicated reality. This paper evaluates the historical and modern challenges to indigenous and non-indigenous relations in the world heritage sphere, which are built on cultures of distrust and disillusionment. Specifically, it discusses the Canadian government and the WHC’s efforts to collaborate with First Nations groups in the conservation of traditional indigenous lands and how bureaucratic machinery supports narratives of continued colonialism and subservience. The text concludes with a discussion of how structural issues with the nomination process hinder conservation efforts and suggests future avenues for scholarship.


Introduction

The World Heritage Committee (WHC) gathered for a session in the afternoon of July 1, 2018 in Manama, Bahrain.[1] After nearly two decades of fraught discussions between Indigenous groups, provincial and federal governments, and the international community, the committee was reevaluating the nomination of Pimachiowin Aki, a site deep in the boreal forests of the Canadian prairie province of Manitoba far removed from the country’s urban centers. An animated session showed enthusiasm for the proposal as state parties stoutly voiced their support for the site.[2] Spain thanked the state party of Canada for assembling a thorough and worthy nomination document. Hungary applauded the site for its synergistic vision of people and the land. Tunisia congratulated the Canadian government for its dedication to upholding ethical consultation of local communities. The committee then adopted 42 COM 8B.11, adding Pimachiowin Aki as Canada’s first mixed Cultural and Natural Site to UNESCO’s List of World Heritage Sites.[3] The Canadian delegation was then given the floor. Its diplomats first expressed gratitude for the committee’s support after a tumultuous nomination process. Afterwards, Ed Hudson, a member of the Poplar first nation and a director of the Pimachiowin Aki Corporation, while expressing sincere appreciation for the committee’s approval, also noted the difficult path towards World Heritage designation.[4] With good reason, the inscription of Pimachiowin Aki represented a series of calculated logistical maneuvers to coordinate local communities, political agencies, and diplomatic channels. Distrust between Indigenous peoples and higher government agents further compounded the challenges of the state’s nomination.[5] Still, Hudson encouraged other Indigenous groups to make use of the World Heritage Convention despite difficulties in the nomination process. Following the speeches, the tone was understandably celebratory. Diplomats and representatives from the various composite First Nations shook hands as they acknowledged the end of a long journey. They were quickly interrupted by the session’s chair, however, who asked the participants to have the congratulations outside the salle.

The anticlimactic end to this dubious nomination process is representative of a wider challenge for the Canadian delegation. Government officials struggle to adequately represent Indigenous ownership over heritage within a diplomatic channel like UNESCO, which is built from the “top-down” with political higher ups exercising control over local communities. In this paper, I argue that the Canadian government at the WHC, while showing consideration for First Nations cultural heritage in its modern history, struggles to successfully broker trusting relationships between local and international organizations given historic distrust and structural issues with the nomination process. Moreover, given the bureaucratic machinery of the WHC, Canada struggles to adequately secure free, prior, and informed consent. These shortcomings amount to a failure to address the historic oppression of Canada’s First Nations peoples, maintaining a historic division between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations. This paper also faults the WHC and the site inscription process for forcing Indigenous peoples to justify their claims to their land, further exacerbating colonial narratives of oppression and subservience.

With this paper’s focus on Canada, this scholarship is distinct from previous work on the diplomacy of world heritage conservation. Instead of focusing on the strategies of the United States, European states, and emerging BRICS nations, which tend to exercise much larger influence in committee sessions, this paper focuses on the diplomatic policies of the otherwise under-discussed international actor Canada in one of the most salient avenues for modern conservation diplomacy—UNESCO. With immense praise being directed towards the Canadian state party for its considerable efforts to consult with Indigenous peoples, it is worth considering the extent to which the party is succeeding at ethically interacting with local communities. This paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, I establish a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of Canada’s current diplomatic scheme. Specifically, I rely on the WHC’s operational guidelines and contrast them with the calls to action identified by Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), revealing a lack of accountability mechanisms for the Canadian Commission for UNESCO. In the second section, I provide an overview of Canadian diplomatic strategies, both broadly and in the WHC. Within this, I consider the history of Pimachiowin Aki and contextualize its nomination for World Heritage status as part of wider Canadian foreign policy. Third, I discuss the failures of the nomination process to fairly represent the desires of First Nations groups and how these shortcomings have built upon existing cultures of distrust. I argue that the Canadian political agenda and the structure of the WHC worsen relationships between local communities and government representatives. Finally, I conclude with a discourse on other possible areas for research. Note that I will be referring to the local communities of Pimachiowin Aki as Indigenous or First Nations people, as per most national and international organizations’ naming conventions.[6]

Organizational Guidelines for Indigenous Consultation

Historically, the United Nations and its various branches largely neglected Indigenous rights.[7] However, recent efforts have been made to further include First Nations voices in committee sessions. In 2007, the general assembly passed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, serving as “the most comprehensive international instrument on the rights of Indigenous peoples”.[8] Still, the document contains shockingly little guidance for the management of Indigenous heritage, except for Article 31 which states:

“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.”[9]

 UNESCO proudly declares their support of Indigenous peoples. Following the adoption of UNDRIP, the WHC modified their operational guidelines to facilitate the inclusion of Indigenous peoples. Notably, the guidelines advise that “States Parties are encouraged to ensure that Preliminary Assessment requests involve appropriate stakeholders and rights-holders engagement” and that state parties should seek and demonstrate “the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples”.[10] Free, prior, and informed consent refers to the ethical practices associated with conducting anthropological fieldwork which are necessary to mitigate issues of trust and ensure confidentiality.[11] Consent is particularly important in Indigenous communities, where histories of colonial oppression have left lasting scars of local practices.[12] In the case of Pimachiowin Aki’s inscription, the lines between consent and dissent were more blurred, as will be discussed in the next section.

Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), established in 2008, was formed by the Canadian government as part of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.[13] Designed to lay the foundation for lasting reconciliation across Canada, the TRC hosted several national reconciliation events, collected archival materials related to residential schools from the Church and government bodies and gathered statements from survivors. The commission’s activities culminated in the publishing of a series of calls to action, which prominently called for a review of the federal government’s implementation of UNDRIP.[14] Interestingly, there were few recommendations outlined with explicit reference to the management of Indigenous heritage. Articles 70 and 79 suggested that the Association of Canadian Archivists, the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, and other similar Canadian organizations should aim to fully implement UNDRIP with respect to the preservation of heritage and archives, but there is no clear language instructing Canada’s Commission for UNESCO to adopt more reconciliatory approach to heritage management.[15] While the Canadian government has shown obvious interest in the issue of First Nations representation, this goal sometimes falls secondary to other issues, mostly pertaining to Canada’s economic interests as discussed in the following section.[16]

Canadian Diplomatic Strategy and the Nomination of Pimachiowin Aki

Pimachiowin Aki is Canada’s only mixed cultural and natural UNESCO World Heritage Site.[17] Inscribed to the list in 2018, the site represents the largest protected area in the North American Boreal Forest System, covering an area of approximately 2,904,000 hectares. The site includes the boundaries of Manitoba’s Atikaki Provincial Park, Ontario’s Woodland Caribou Provincial Park, and the Eagle-Snowshoe Conservation Reserve. Travel to the site is difficult given its remote location. Visitors can either drive to the Bloodvein River at the Eastern portion of the site, fly to access more rural communities, or voyage through icy roads in winter.[18] Four Anishinabeg First Nations are located within Pimachiowin Aki, all on the Manitoba side of the provincial boundary: Bloodvein River, Little Grand Rapids, Pauingassi, and Poplar River. These groups have historically managed the land, and this history shows in the 285 archeological sites that scatter the area, including pictographs and evidence of traditional land-use which go back almost nine thousand years.[19]

In 2002, four First Nations groups—the Little Grand Rapids, Pauingassi, Poplar River, and Pikangikum—signed an accord among themselves.[20] Their goal was to protect their ancestral lands through a UNESCO World Heritage designation, thus beginning what became a 16-year campaign for the prestigious status. The Bloodvein River First Nation joined them shortly thereafter, also in opposition to possible commercial development. What began as an aspirant goal quickly transformed into an intense effort to nominate the site.

For many nations, global patrimony and the WHC engine serve as pawns of international power dynamics.[21]UNESCO seeks nominations to incorporate nations within its multilateral system and cement its legitimacy as an organization. Meanwhile, many countries recognize the World Heritage brand as a possible source of tourism revenue.[22] The United States, France, and the United Kingdom use committee sessions to assert power through a morphed version of their colonial imperial power status.[23] The consequential BRICS Coalition (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have also used the WHC as a platform for its efforts to increase its influence within the global community. Efforts amongst large players within the organization to project hegemonic power have curtailed many local and Indigenous communities’ influence.[24]

Contrastingly, Canada has stood out as a unique actor, displaying a willingness to seek out Indigenous voices. This display reflects a diplomatic strategy of “multicultural” cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy, as defined by former ambassador Cynthia P. Schneider, is “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding”.[25] A 2019 Canadian Senate Report indicated that Canada’s efforts within the realm of cultural diplomacy, which include its involvement in UNESCO, are designed to maintain Canada’s brand on the international stage, supporting a vision of Canada as being diverse and inclusive.[26] That being said, Canada’s brand image is one facet of the nation’s foreign policy. The government is also deeply invested in its economic interests, with the country historically and presently supporting the construction of oil pipelines through Indigenous lands, particularly for export to other nations.[27]

The nomination of Pimachiowin Aki undeniably fit within Canada’s international brand and allowed the country to present itself to the international community as a nation of model world citizens.[28] With the Canadian government supporting an Indigenous-led grassroots effort to nominate the site, the government could cultivate its image as an ethical, considerate nation to the global community. Moreover, Pimachiowin Aki offered little economic viability; the area has few resources that make it suited for forestry, mining, or fossil fuel extraction.[29] The government therefore could nominate the site without worrying about forgoing any possible business opportunities. In 2004, the Canadian Government added Pimachiowin to the tentative list of World Heritage Sites, being just one of ten potential candidates from a selection of 125.[30] The federal government’s choice was not without controversy. The Manitoba government under the New Democratic Party showed frustration that another nomination for an urban landscape proposal was not accepted.[31] Likewise, Hydro Manitoba, the province’s publicly owned hydroelectric power company, had development plans for parts of the nominated territory to build Bipole III, a transmission line.[32] The NDP government eventually grew warmer to the proposal, recognizing the potential public relations benefits of supporting Indigenous communities. Partnerships with the governments of Manitoba and Ontario led to the creation of the Pimachiowin Aki Corporation in 2006.[33] The institution was established to protect and present Pimachiowin Aki’s “Outstanding Universal Value” if it were designated World Heritage status. However, the group’s formation and the NDP’s support fueled political opposition from the Progressive Conservative (PC) party of Manitoba. The PCs opposed the nomination efforts as part of their 2007 general election platform.[34] First Nations groups expressed sadness with the opposition to the communities’ efforts to claim ownership of their land through the World Heritage Convention.

Over the subsequent five years (2007–2012), management plans were submitted by communities and parks organizations for a nomination document. In 2007 and 2008, Woodland Caribou Provincial Park and Atikaki Provincial Park Management Plan each submitted their management plan proposals respectively.[35] In 2011, each of the five participating First Nations groups completed land management plans for their ancestral lands. Indigenous peoples reported difficulty completing the necessary paperwork given the technical language of UNESCO. For instance, elders in the Poplar River First Nation had difficulty understanding the concept of “Outstanding Universal Value” which did not translate well to their native language.[36] Similarly, Indigenous groups expressed doubt over park management organizations’ proposals. Historically, Canada’s provincial and federal park management organizations like Ontario Parks have lacked clear and concise definitions over collaborative management strategies which have led First Nations groups to be suspicious of their operations.[37] This helped fuel a culture of distrust throughout the nomination process which hindered both Indigenous and government efforts to advance the site.

Following the completion of the management plans, the Government of Canada submitted the World Heritage site nomination bid to UNESCO in 2012. In 2013, a team of International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) evaluators completed a three-day visit of the site.[38]According to Sophia Rabliauskas, a member of the Poplar River First Nation, the evaluators treated the community with respect, kindness, and honesty. Still, tensions emerged between the evaluators and the local community. As Rabliauskas explained, “… one of the evaluators expressed surprise and asked us, where is the evidence of your existence on this land. All he could see was pristine wilderness and no developments. He didn’t understand how the concept that thousands of people have lived and travelled on this land for thousands of years only leaving minimal traces was a positive thing. We couldn’t comprehend his question.”[39] Following the evaluation, ICOMOS released an insulting report, suggesting the nomination be deferred. It elaborated that First Nations groups “did not wish to see their property as ‘exceptional’” since they did not compare their relationship with their land to those of other Indigenous groups.[40] The report also stated that the community needed greater protections to avoid development efforts, which perplexed locals who understood the World Heritage designation as a way to circumvent development efforts from organizations like Hydro Manitoba.[41]

During the 2013 WHC session, UNESCO acknowledged flaws in their nomination process and promised to rethink its method of evaluating proposals for Indigenous mixed nominations.[42] However, they also asked for more information from the State Party, much to the chagrin of all stakeholders. The federal and provincial governments expressed disappointment.[43] Meanwhile, the leader of the Manitoba PCs pessimistically believed that the province would never see a return on the millions of dollars being spent on the bid. This rhetoric furthered distrust between local communities and the government.[44] First Nations groups viewed the rejection as a major loss; they understood the deferral as a refusal, and many wanted to give up on the nomination.[45]

Government officials encouraged the local communities to submit an updated nomination document. In 2014, a new report was submitted which placed greater emphasis on the people’s relationship with the land.[46] It placed the Anishinaabe cultural tradition of ji-ganawendamang Kitakiiminan (“Keeping the Land”) as central to the nomination.[47]ICOMOS and IUCN reevaluated the site in 2016. The visit went much more smoothly, with community members feeling much more at ease with the evaluators, according to representatives from the Poplar community. However, several months after the visit, the Pikangikum First Nation, the only Ontario-based community, abandoned the nomination over concerns with errors in the UNESCO evaluation report.[48] This dealt another blow to the nomination, with the NDP premier of Manitoba being non-committal on continuing to support the nomination, further exacerbating tensions. He even went as far as to entertain the development of the Bipole III transmission line, reversing his previous stance of protecting the site.[49]

For the following two years, remaining groups anxiously continued work on the nomination dossier, with the federal government encouraging all parties to remain on board. With the Pikangikum First Nation exiting, the nomination document was revised once more, decreasing the size of the proposed site.[50] Finally, in 2018, the site was inscribed on the list of World Heritage Sites, following changes to UNESCO’s nomination process. After millions of dollars spent, disagreements over management approaches, and inconsiderate bureaucrats discouraging local community participation, Indigenous peoples finally had realized the goal of their 2002 accord: World Heritage status.

Discussion

The nomination and inscription of Pimachiowin Aki highlight the scores of logistical challenges associated with ethical consultation of local communities in preparation of World Heritage bids. The nomination process required local, regional, national, and international stakeholders to work hand in hand in spite of sour relations. First Nations peoples are rightfully skeptical when working with government agents. Canada’s history of cultural genocide has contributed to significant modern inequities with access to quality health care and education lagging in Indigenous communities.[51]The legacy of Canada’s residential school system remains present, with the discovery of children’s remains on school premises making media headlines internationally in 2021.[52] Despite efforts on the part of the Canadian state party, local groups in Pimachiowin Aki were understandably wary of the government’s involvement in the nomination. Moreover, the politicization of Indigenous heritage management by non-Indigenous actors like the Progressive Conservative party in Manitoba contributed to increased frustration amongst Indigenous groups.[53] A history and modern culture of distrust can partially explain the Pikangikum First Nation group’s decision to pull out. Free, prior, and informed consent is arduous given the sheer degree of dubiety that governments must overcome in order to achieve some degree of confidence from Indigenous peoples.

The structure of the inscription process for World Heritage Sites also inherently violates the premise of free, informed, and prior consent. While Article 31 of UNDRIP states that Indigenous people have the right to manage their cultural heritage, the WHC lacks any real mechanism for Indigenous people to nominate a site without the support of their government, given that local communities must explain to evaluators and state parties the significance of their heritage. This is exacerbated by the organization’s formulaic approach to evaluating heritage sites that leaves local communities like those of Pimachiowin Aki in the unpleasant situation of having to justify their ties to their own land.[54] The WHC’s failure to provide avenues for “bottom-up” participation in sessions (beyond observer status where Indigenous people can occasionally speak on issues pertaining to their land) also worsens colonial narratives by making Indigenous communities justify their culture’s “Outstanding Universal Value” to foreign nations. Thus, free, prior, and informed consent is aspirational at best in an organization which ultimately gives voting power only to nations. Chrissy Grant, chair of the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on World Heritage, has expressed concern over the lack of adherence to the principle of free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples and local communities.[55] As she states, “[the lack of free, prior and informed consent] sends a clear message that their concerns are not required or important.” 

The Canadian government, compared to other state parties in the WHC such as the United States, has acted with far greater concern for First Nations rights. Simultaneously, efforts to consider First Nations culture are often guided by a diplomatic strategy of presenting the nation as diverse and not necessarily out of a genuine interest in reconciliation. While Hydro Manitoba considered constructing a transmission line across the property, Pimachiowin Aki otherwise had little economic viability and therefore served as a relatively non-controversial candidate for nomination.[56] The government has also overlooked calls to nominate sites of First Nations oppression like residential schools, instead favouring sites which present a cheerier image of Canadian cosmopolitanism.[57] While development efforts are an undeniable national priority, attempts to prioritize economic prospects over Indigenous claims to their land reveals a complicated present of continued colonialism. Interestingly, the Canadian Commission for UNESCO does not include any mention of UNDRIP in any of its annual reports, indicating a possible lack of prioritization given to Indigenous representation.[58]

Though efforts to nominate Pimachiowin Aki to the UNESCO World Heritage list led to successful inscription, these efforts occurred in a context of Indigenous distrust of national and international government agents. The outcome was undeniably positive, as Pimachiowin Aki’s First Nations people were able to successfully inscribe their site as they had sought in their 2002 agreement. However, the nomination revealed significant shortcomings of UNDRIP and the failures of the Canadian government to follow through on the calls to action laid out by the TRC. The site’s inscription should therefore not be viewed as a success story of the Canadian government and international community rallying behind the common goal of reconciliation. Rather, it should be viewed as what it was: a tenuous endeavor to coordinate unfriendly stakeholders around the common goal of inscription, despite their differences. This case study does not serve as an example of successful free, prior, and informed consent. Instead, it illustrates how colonial narratives can persist through the continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples to the demands of the national and international communities. While diplomatic agents and channels might view themselves as vessels for reconciliation and peace, their behavior can often contradict these same values.

Conclusion and Further Research

As Vera Mitchell, the former Chief of the Poplar River First Nations group said, “Today we see ourselves as rightful caretakers of our traditional land in Poplar River. We want to run our own lives, our own affairs, and to continue our traditional heritage of living off the land. We have come to a new era where we see ourselves as a people continuing to be stewards of the land, to have a say as to what goes on in that land, our territory.”[59] However, the nomination of Pimachiowin Aki suggests an alternate understanding of ownership over Indigenous heritage: one in which more stakeholders have the ability to determine how traditional ancestral lands are administered, through systems like the WHC which conscribe local communities to lengthy bureaucratic processes when they are already wary of collaborating with government agents. Further research is needed in order for the Canadian government to improve upon its efforts to consult with Indigenous peoples. I outline two suggestions below.

First, scholarship should further scrutinize Canada’s selection of sites for its tentative list. Canada deliberately chose Pimachiowin Aki because it was uncontroversial and could help the government further cultivate its image as a culturally considerate country. Still, the site has very little name recognition across Canada, with the Facebook and Instagram pages maintaining a puny following.[60] The site, given its lack of national recognition, is in many respects a poor reflection of national culture. In light of the discovery of mass graves in residential schools this past year, some scholars have suggested that greater emphasis be placed on nominating sites of oppression.[61] Therefore, the list of tentative sites can be more carefully examined in order to further understand the Canadian government’s strategy of nominating which can represent the nation well on the global stage. From this, we can better understand the lens through which Canadian cultural heritage is examined internationally.

Second, it is unclear whether any of the nomination efforts were worthwhile. Little scholarship has studied the effectiveness of utilizing Pimachiowin Aki’s World Heritage status to protect the land. Given the First Nations groups insistence on leveraging the WHC to protect the local communities’ interests, the broader community impacts of the site’s inscription should be further considered. For instance, few scholars have documented how First Nations members took on new roles as managers of a World Heritage site (i.e. providing tourism services, inspiring newfound relationships with their ancestral lands, etc.). Therefore, scholars should continue to monitor the site to establish whether it is in other First Nations groups’ interest to similarly seek out World Heritage status.

Canada is still a long way from reconciliation as identified by the TRC. While efforts on part of the Canadian government in the WHC to fully implement UNDRIP through consultation with Indigenous communities are steps in the right direction, these efforts simultaneously reveal shortcomings of the World Heritage management system and its consistent inability to sufficiently meet First Nations groups’ needs. The nomination of Pimachiowin Aki is emblematic of this failure, demonstrating an organizational structure that is unable to remedy past grievances because of inability to guarantee free, prior, and informed consent. The nomination process itself also brings unwanted pressure to communities who are frustrated by the bureaucracy of UNESCO and the politicization of their heritage by provincial and federal governments. While the communities of Pimachiowin Aki are grateful for their site’s inscription, much work is still needed in order to achieve further adequate representation in international forums. 


Andrew Vandenbussche is a sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in political science and economics. He is from Montreal, Canada and currently studies in Philadelphia. His research interests include international development, human rights, and international organizations. He can be reached at avandenb@sas.upenn.edu.

Endnotes

[1] UNESCO World Heritage Centre. 2018. “42nd Session of the World Heritage Committee, July 1, 2018.”

[2] Cody Groat. 2019. “Pimachiowin Aki | The Canadian Encyclopedia.”

[3] UNESCO, “42nd Session of the World Heritage Committee”

[4] UNESCO, “42nd Session of the World Heritage Committee”

[5] Lemelin, Raynald Harvey, and Nathan Bennett. 2010. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project: Management and Protection of Indigenous World Heritage Sites in a Canadian Context.”

[6] Lemelin, Raynald Harvey, and Nathan Bennett. 2010. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project: Management and Protection of Indigenous World Heritage Sites in a Canadian Context.”

[7] Jeff Corntassel. 2008. “Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse.”

[8] United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs. 2021. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples | United Nations For Indigenous Peoples.”

[9] United Nations. 2008. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.

[10] UNESCO World Heritage Centre. 2021. “The Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention.”

[11] Jennifer Shannon. 2007. “Informed Consent: Documenting the Intersection of Bureaucratic Regulation and Ethnographic Practice.” 

[12] American Anthropological Association. 2012. “Obtain Informed Consent and Necessary Permissions.” 

[13] Ry Moran. 2020. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission | The Canadian Encyclopedia.”

[14] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. 2015. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Action.”

[15] TRC. “Calls to Action.”

[16] Walker, Ryan, Jojola, Ted, and Natcher, David. 2013. Reclaiming Indigenous Planning : Reclaiming Indigenous Planning. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

[17] Cody Groat. “Pimachiowin Aki.”

[18] Agnieszka Pawlowska-Mainville and Peter Kulchyski. 2015. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers: Hunters, Land Use, and the Poplar River First Nation Proposal for a World Heritage Site.”

[19] Cody Groat. “Pimachiowin Aki.”

[20] Pimachiowin Aki Corporation. 2021. “Timeline - Pimachiowin Aki.” 2021. 

[21] Meskell, L., C. Liuzza, E. Bertacchini, and D. Saccone. 2015. “Multilateralism and UNESCO World Heritage: Decision-Making, States Parties and Political Processes.”

[22] Cassel, Susanna Heldt, and Albina Pashkevich. 2014. “World Heritage and Tourism Innovation: Institutional Frameworks and Local Adaptation.”

[23] Bertacchini, Enrico, Claudia Liuzza, and Lynn Meskell. 2017. “Shifting the Balance of Power in the UNESCO World Heritage Committee: An Empirical Assessment.”

[24] Logan, William. 2013. “Australia, Indigenous Peoples and World Heritage from Kakadu to Cape York: State Party Behaviour under the World Heritage Convention.”

[25] Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 2019. “Cultural Diplomacy at the Front Stage of Canada’s Foreign Policy.”

[26] Senate. “Cultural Diplomacy at the Front Stage of Canada’s Foreign Policy.”

[27] Cecco, Leyland. 2019. “Pipeline Battle Puts Focus on Canada’s Disputed Right to Use Indigenous Land.” 

[28] Senate. “Cultural Diplomacy at the Front Stage of Canada’s Foreign Policy.”

[29] Lemelin and Bennett. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project”

[30] Cody Groat. “Pimachiowin Aki.”

[31] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[32] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[33] Pimachiowin Aki Corporation. “Timeline.”

[34] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[35] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[36] Sophia Rabliauskas. 2020. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki World Mixed Cultural and Natural Heritage, Canada.”.

[37] Lemelin and Bennett. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project”

[38] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[39] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[40] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[41] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[42] Pimachiowin Aki Corporation. “Timeline.”

[43] "Government of Canada Reacts to UNESCO Decision on Pimachiowin Aki." CNW Group, June 22, 2013. 

[44] Winnipeg Free Press. 2013. “Province Not Deterred by UNESCO Bid Rejection.” The Brandon Sun.

[45] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[46] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[47] State Party of Canada. 2018. “Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Project: The Land That Gives Life.”

[48] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[49] C.B.C. News. 2016. “UNESCO Bid for Manitoba-Ontario Boreal Forest Suffers Major Blow | CBC News.”

[50] Pimachiowin Aki Corporation. “Timeline.”

[51] Ray Markham, Megan Hunt, Robert Woollard, Nelly Oelke, David Snadden, Roger Strasser, Georgia Betkus, and Scott Graham. 2021. “Addressing Rural and Indigenous Health Inequities in Canada through Socially Accountable Health Partnerships.”

[52] Anne-Marie Reynaud. 2017. Emotions, Remembering and Feeling Better : Dealing with the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement in Canada.

[53] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[54] Sophia Rabliauskas. “An Indigenous Perspective: The Case of Pimachiowin Aki.”

[55] IUCN. 2021. “The Outlook for World Heritage at 50 – Crisis or Crossroads?” IUCN. September 10, 2021.

[56] Lemelin and Bennett. “The Proposed Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site Project”

[57]  Groat, Cody. 2018. "Commemoration and Reconciliation: The Mohawk Institute as a World Heritage Site."

[58] Canadian Commission for UNESCO. 2021. “Canadian Commission for UNESCO.” Canadian Commission for UNESCO. Accessed December 9, 2021. https://en.ccunesco.ca/.

[59] Agnieszka and Kulchyski. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers.”

[60] Pimachiowin Aki World Heritage Site, Facebook. 2021. “@PimAkiWHS.” 2021. https://www.facebook.com/PimAkiWHS/.

[61]  Groat, Cody. 2018. "Commemoration and Reconciliation: The Mohawk Institute as a World Heritage Site."

References

Agnieszka Pawlowska-Mainville and Peter Kulchyski. 2015. “The Incalculable Weight of Small Numbers: Hunters, Land Use, and the Poplar River First Nation Proposal for a World Heritage Site.” International Journal of Canadian Studies 52: 133–49.

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